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Abstract
This thesis considers the phenomenological experience of e-reading (reading on an 
electronic screen) as a way-in to discussing wider issues of technology and our 
encounter with objects in our environments. By considering the resistance shown 
toward reading on iPads and Kindles in popular and academic discourse as a source of 
valuable “folk phenomenological” report, this thesis hopes to shed light on both the 
particular engagement of portable e-reading and the general experience of embodied 
encounters with artefacts.
The first chapter will consider the shortcomings of contemporary definitions of 
technology and aims to provide its own definition commensurate to the task of 
describing the intimate and very human encounter with equipment, an encounter which 
will be described as “technological.”
In the second chapter an ontology (begun in the background of the first) will be 
developed which primarily considers our encounter with things that are as embodied as 
ourselves. This ontology sees evolution as an epistemological concern, with every 
evolutionary act occurring as a response to environmental pressures and producing a 
knowledge of that environment. This knowledge, it will be argued, in light of 
conclusions drawn from an engagement with Object Oriented Ontology, can be tested 
only via repeatable successful action with that which might be known. Such 
evolutionary concerns, it will be further argued, are equally applicable to our artefacts.
The third chapter will focus on metaphor and critical theory to consider how e-
reading in particular might function as a material metaphor, enabling productive 
thought. It will conclude with readings of three texts which put the language of all three 
chapters to work.
This thesis draws on several fields, including Critical Theory, Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Philosophy, the bringing together of 
which is intended to be of use to the still emerging Digital Humanities and the work's 
home discipline of English Studies as it gets used to the substantial alterations in the 
substrate of its object of study.
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To take embodiment seriously is simply to embrace a more balanced view of our 
cognitive (indeed, our human) nature. We are thinking beings whose nature qua thinking 
beings is not accidentally but profoundly and continuously informed by our existence as 
physically embodied, and as socially and technologically embedded, organisms.
- Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind 217
We are frightened and rejoicing witnesses. We have experienced the transition from the 
pen to the typewriter, then to the electric typewriter, then to the computer, and all this in 
thirty years, in a single generation, the only one to have made the whole crossing. But 
the voyage continues.
- Jacque Derrida, Paper Machines 31
This may be the awakening, but it feels curiously like the fantasies that circulate 
through our sleep. From deep in the heart I hear the voice that says, “Refuse it.”
- Sven Birkerts, The Gutenberg Elegies 229
The Digital Humanities are becoming increasing important to contemporary Humanities 
research. The field can be traced back at least as far as the 1980s and the emergence of 
“Humanities Computing,”1 but despite this perhaps surprisingly long history the 
boundaries of its modern incarnation are still being fought. Mark Sample offered a 
round-up of the Digital Humanities related talks and workshops at the MLA 2012 
conference in Seattle and noted that the “list stands at 58 sessions, up from 44 last year 
(and 27 the year before). If the trend continues, within the decade it will no longer make 
sense to compile this list; it’ll be easier to list the sessions that don’t in some way relate 
in (sic) to the influence and impact of digital materials and tools upon language, literary, 
textual, and media studies.” But even as interest and, significantly, funding has grown, 
panels from the MLA 2012 conference, such as “Debates in the Digital Humanities,”2 
demonstrate the issue: what exactly are the Digital Humanities? The 2011 Digital 
Humanities conference held at University College London was organised under the 
theme “Big Tent Digital Humanities” and, at least in part, sought to address this 
question. The “big tent” approach calls for a wide variety of digital tools and media 
1 Though we might trace the field back further to the cybernetics movement of the 1940s and its earlier 
inception in the 20s, see Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Mind.
2 A panel which would also become a forthcoming book on the same theme edited by one of the panel 
participants, Matthew K. Gold.
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related study to come together under the banner term of DH; the opposition often calls 
for a greater focus on the use of computing in Humanities research and emphasises the 
creation and dissemination of digital tools as a hallmark of the field3. In Melissa Terras’ 
talk at DH2010, “Present, Not Voting: Digital Humanities in the Panopticon,” she raised 
this issue for scholars who described themselves as digital humanists, that they “must 
not only understand [their] discipline [them]selves, but be able to communicate it 
succinctly to others,” and this paper was still frequently being referenced in abstracts 
and sessions for the MLA and DH conferences of 2011 and 2012.
Whilst it is not my task here to answer the question of what should rightfully be 
considered DH, this thesis aims to be a contribution to this simultaneously emerging and 
yet wholly established field, and one which subscribes to the big tent approach by 
pushing at the edges of what should be included under its name, particularly in terms of 
theory. I want to make a phenomenological argument about how we understand and 
interact with technology, but the technologies that I will focus on to draw my 
conclusions, electronic reading devices, raise arguments which are increasingly central 
to the Humanities, and to English Studies in particular: If we want to stand against it, if 
we want to grudgingly accept it, if we want to embrace it then we must start to 
understand what happens when reading moves away from paper and onto a screen. This 
is a huge issue, and as such my particular interest here is not with any or every screen, 
but with the portable digital devices of the last four or five years, devices which, as will 
be argued, are the first real threats to the printed book as the primary carrier of written 
information. I want to argue that we make a significant mistake if we don't learn the 
lessons of Book History, bibliographic and textual scholarship, and also of recent 
theoretical work in the Digital Humanities, by taking into account the impact of the 
substrate on which our reading materials sit, and as such I believe these new artefacts 
deserve our attention.
But understanding is hard won. This thesis will argue that to understand e-
readers, e-books, and readers' reaction to them, we must also better understand how we 
use technologies and artefacts more generally. E-reading is a special case of this wider 
phenomena and I hope to show that to understand either the specific instance or its 
parent group impacts upon our conception of the broader or narrower term. To better 
understand technology as a class of physical equipment4 we must understand how we 
3 For more on these issues refer to Gold (ed.) Debates in the Digital Humanities.
4 We'll also consider, in passing, intangible technologies, ways of extending our abilities which aren't 
dependent on a physical item, man-made or naturally occurring, but the focus of this thesis is very 
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define it, how we interact with it, how it changes us, and how we make changes to it 
over time; I will argue that e-reading is the perfect case study for all of these effects. To 
better understand e-reading in turn we must negotiate the same principles, and we 
should turn to prior studies of technology to better situate them.
As I have already said, this pushes at a basic definition of what the Digital 
Humanities might be, but it nevertheless sits on a continuum from the theoretical work 
undertaken, at least retrospectively, in DH's name in the 1990s, work which formed the 
basis for the contemporary field. In Writing Space (Bolter, 1991), Hypertext (Landow, 
1991), and Hyper/Text/Theory (Landow, ed., 1994) Jay David Bolter and George 
Landow set out theories, and theoretical implications for the new digital literature, 
databases, and environments that were starting to impact upon English study. These 
texts were rightly influential, but they were also very enthusiastic about the new forms 
and sought largely to see how the American academy’s poststructual strategies of the 
time could be mapped onto digital products; there was little interest shown in the 
potential downsides of a shift in media from print to pixels, nor what was going on 
during programming, what effects code and coding might have upon the reader’s 
reception of a text.
Espen Aarseth’s Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (1997) bridges 
the gap between these early works and contemporary theoretical approaches to digital 
studies. Like Bolter and Landow, Aarseth was fascinated by the potential for the new 
hypertextual methods and what a “non-trivial” effort in traversing a text could mean for 
the kinds of work that might be created, but with his language of textons and scriptons5 
he also gave his readers a way into understanding the impact of code and increased the 
requirement to look at the apparatus on which they were accessing their new texts.
Picking up on Aarseth’s language and, as we’ll see in chapter 3, attempting to 
move on from Bolter and Landow’s theoretical position, Katherine Hayles, first with 
Writing Machines (2002) and then with Electronic Literature (2008) sought to bring the 
close reading of classical English Studies to bear on digital resources, and also to see 
what effect those resources had started to have on more conventional printed work. 
Hayles’ increasing sensitivity to the particularities of every aspect of digitisation has 
been hugely influential on the theoretical aspects of contemporary DH study and has 
much on physical interactions; even when considering metaphor and cognition it is bodies to which 
we will continually return.
5 A scripton is a line as it appears to the reader, a texton is a line as it appears in the text. Aarseth notes 
that these need not be the same; the code of an electronic text looks very different to the script that the 
reader encounters for instance.
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made it both accessible to traditional media scholars and pushed it forward for a new 
generation of researchers. The effects of her work can perhaps be most keenly felt in 
that of her former student Mark B.N. Hansen who’s Embodying Technesis (2000), New 
Philosophy for New Media (2004), and Bodies in Code (2006) join Hayles’ rigorous 
digital reading practice with a philosophical concern with the body and 
Spinozan/Bergsonian/Deleuzian conceptions of affect6.
Hayles’ influence can also be felt in Matthew Kirschenbaum’s Mechanisms 
(2008), a work which sits at the heart of recent theoretical discussions in the Digital 
Humanities, where the physical particularities of the computer are meticulously picked 
apart. Roughly, whereas Hansen encourages us to look at the effects of digital 
environments and artworks on the body, to read bodies better, Kirschenbaum asks us to 
look at the body of the machine to read it better; Hayles, in her readings of electronic 
and electronically inspired literature, looks at both bodies (though the human to a lesser 
extent perhaps) so that we might better read the text presented7. In each of these works 
there is a clear move away from Bolter and Landow’s mapping of poststructuralism 
onto hypertexts, but they each retain an enthusiastic fascination with the new and how 
theoretical approaches might offer us a way into understanding.
In the drive for a phenomenological understanding of technology, and in 
particular of e-reading devices, this thesis continues the trajectory of the theoretical 
work outlined above; as Hayles sits roughly between the differently body-centred 
projects of Hansen and Kirschenbaum so too does this work, not in an effort to better 
read particular texts (though this will be addressed in the third chapter), but in an effort 
to better read the bodies of both user and technology and the point at which they meet. 
This meets a gap in the present academic literature: phenomenological readings of e-
reading devices are numerous, but they're not where we might expect them to be. The 
astute observations of the effects of these new devices on the body and haptically-
influenced psychology of their users are, as yet, under-represented in textual and digital 
studies research; Anne Mangen, whose work will be explored in the the second chapter, 
is starting to address these issues from a Cognitive Science perspective, but these effects 
also need to be discussed by Humanities scholars who are invested in these new forms 
of text and where they might sit in media history. Instead, the great abundance of 
6 Hayles own concerns with the body and the text can be seen in How We Became Posthuman (1999) 
and they continue to haunt her later work; in Electronic Literature, for instance, she deals with the 
experience of time in digital texts.
7 This has to be an artificial distinction, each of these writers wish to read texts better, but for the most 
part it holds as a rough division.
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interesting philosophy on this subject is to be found in popular reports, blog posts, 
reviews, comments, editorials, and the like, and its this living archive that will act as a 
provocation to the chapters here (in the second chapter I will describe this work as “folk 
phenomenology,” similar to a folk psychology in its need to influence, support, and also 
be challenged by academic work). Each chapter will begin with an idea commonly 
repeated in discussions of e-reading: “e-reading is unnatural,” “e-reading doesn't feel 
right,” “e-reading makes readers stupid.” Each of these ideas appears frequently in the 
popular press and online, and deploying language which has become telling in itself in 
its historical precedent and more recent codification.
The work here then will draw on this material, interrogating the language and 
ideas being used and co-opted, and attempting to see what it brings to light and what it 
occludes in its prominence. In the second chapter I will also try and bridge some of the 
gap between the popular and the academic in my own report of what it's like to first 
encounter these devices; first person report has a rich history in phenomenological 
practice, originating with Edmund Husserl's descriptions of what it is like to encounter 
an object, what resonances it might produce within us, descriptions which have always 
mixed the seemingly banal, the literary, and the philosophical and attempted to make 
observations which appear both obvious and defamiliarising. From this base of 
attempting to articulate a novel experience I wil move on to developing a more rigorous 
phenomenological approach to interaction with artefacts, using e-readers as the 
principle example.
The phenomenology that I want to deploy has its roots in a Husserlian tradition 
of observation, report, and intention extended by Martin Heidegger's notion of a tool's 
readiness-to-hand and the user's experience of objects during use. I will build on this 
approach, however, by considering Heidegger's influence on contemporary Cognitive 
Neuroscience and seeking further empirical support for his claims, as well as 
rearticulating this scientifically aware phenomenology through Evolutionary 
Epistemology and Graham Harman's manifesto for an Object Oriented Ontology in 
Tool-Being8. The aim is to produce a phenomenology of encountering artefacts which 
can be at least partially supported empirically, and incorporates a variety of approaches 
to bodily experience to show how they might be productively combined in order to 
explore our complex interactions with technologies. An important aspect of the object-
8 Itself a radical re-reading of Heidegger's readiness-to-hand, a point I'll pick up again in the second 
chapter.
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oriented approach is the building-in of the requirement that a full understanding of an 
interaction is dependent on also understanding the body of the artefact being interacted 
with; the phenomenological approach presented here wants to consider the points of 
relationship between user and tool, and, as I'll discuss shortly, whether that relationship 
should be considered special enough to be called “technological.” This investigation 
will provide a language for discussing the artefacts we use to accomplish tasks in the 
world that we couldn't in isolation, to demonstrate that we have always used such 
things, that they are a part of our make-up, and to situate e-reading, if not necessarily 
particular e-readers, as another element along that continuum. It also aims to show that 
“technology” as a term is being deployed at all levels of discourse in a fashion which is 
incommensurate to the task of describing the intimacies of our interaction with objects 
and the cognitive processes they extend, processes which sit at the heart of how we 
understand our abilities. I will therefore offer a definition of the term which is sensitive 
to these issues before demonstrating how the experience of using the body in cognitive 
processes is applicable to the discussion of both technology and e-reading. Continuing 
my concerns with the bodies of both users and artefacts, I will turn to evolutionary 
epistemology in order to argue that artefacts develop via evolutionary pressures 
produced in response to users' phenomenological experience and that this allows us to 
see their forms as knowledge claims about their environment. In response to this I will 
also detail a phenomenological mechanism of “getting used” to technology, with e-
readers as my example, showing the other side of the equation: how we adapt to 
artefacts as they conform to us. The thesis will conclude by demonstrating how, as our 
bodies affect our cognition, so to do the bodies of our tools in their functioning as 
material metaphors. This will be demonstrated with a consideration of several writers 
who use the artefacts of their day as productive sites of meaning in an extended text. In 
short I want to try and approach from all sides the intimate meeting of two physical 
bodies, the user's and the artefact's, and to consider their various effects on one another; 
as we shall see, the main sites of resistance to the change in reading practices marked by 
the digital can be traced back to bodily concerns, again making e-reading an apposite 
arena for this discussion.
The particularities of and distinctions between page and screen are in the process 
of being articulated as users come to understand them. Over the course of this thesis I 
will consider the tablet screen's projection rather than reflection of light (as seen in the 
printed page and Kindle screen); internet connectedness and distraction; changes in 
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haptics, ergonomics, and tactility; nostalgia, history, and mythology; and the perception 
of an artefact as technological (unnatural - e-reading) or naturalised (and somehow 
seemingly unartificial - a printed book). This list isn't complete, but in its being drawn 
from popular discussion I think that it represents the most pressing concerns 
experienced by typical users.
Before detailing a brief chapter breakdown I'd like to look a little closer at the 
objects which will often act as the final examples for the discussions presented here.
On 19 November 2007 Amazon launched a bid to expand its founding interest, 
the selling of books online, by releasing the Kindle electronic reading device. Following 
the frequently repeated promises to take book-length electronic reading (e-reading)9 
away from being a minority pursuit undertaken on a the tethered computer screen and 
into the realm of traditional bound-book like portability, the original Kindle, and its 
subsequent iterations10 remain the totemic examples of this new form, appearing as a 
default in articles on the subject throughout the mainstream press11. Despite SONY 
releasing a similar product the year before12 it's the Kindle which marks the first time 
the U.S. and U.K. public took notice, and in swift and significant numbers13, of the 
adoption of a piece of equipment used exclusively for reading written content in a 
digital form (an e-reader)14. Prior to the announcement of the Kindle’s release, critics of 
the potential for the mass adoption of electronic book (e-book) reading often looked to 
previous media revolutions for corollaries that might enable a prediction of the market 
to come. Their conclusion: what was required for the success of the new form was an 
“iPod for books,” a device which did for electronic reading what the iPod achieved for 
9 The reading of written texts on a screen rather than a printed, or otherwise inscribed, material writing  
space.
10 The Kindle 2 launched in February 2009, and an “international” version emerged in October allowing 
customers from over 100 countries to use the mobile internet connectivity enjoyed by U.S. customers 
from the first iteration. The third Kindle (Kindle 3) shipped simultaneously in the U.K. and U.S. on 27 
August 2010. International postage was available from the U.S. site shortly afterwards.
11 See, for instance, Patrick Béhar et al. “Publishing in the Digital Era: A Bain & Company Study for the 
Forum d’Avignon” or Craig Mod “Post-Artefact Books and Publishing,” both of which use the Kindle 
as their sole example of e-reading devices, and the iPad as their default example of a tablet device.
12 The PRS-500 (PRS standing for “portable reading system”) went on sale in the U.S. in September 
2006, and the PRS-505 begin to sell in the U.K. in September 2008. The PRS-350 and -650 launched 
in September 2010 and marked the first official foray into the Australasian market.
13 The original Kindle sold out in five hours (Patel “Kindle Sells Out in 5.5 Hours”).
14 The first Kindle was only sold in the U.S., due in part to the difficulties of finding U.K. and European 
network providers for the internet enabled features of the device, but imports appear to have been 
fairly widespread, if largely undocumented, in these territories. The absence of internet connectivity 
ensured that it was never going to be of significant interest outside the U.S. (though anyone with an 
Amazon.com account could purchase the device), but reports in the national and international press 
were certainly fuelled by reporters able to actually interact with the new equipment.
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the adoption of portable MP3 audio players, i.e. exploding the market, maximising the 
profits, and, more cynically, tying readers to a particular company's hardware15. The 
Kindle seemed, and was hailed to be that device16. It continues to be tremendously 
successful, it's third iteration leading the dedicated e-reader17 market by some margin18, 
and remaining the by-word for the new reading equipment.
After many months of rumour19, Apple, the maker of the iPod, held a press 
conference on 27 January 2010 to officially announce the launch of the Apple iPad, a 
tablet computing device (see footnote 8) which caught the interest of e-reading 
commentators with its capacity for displaying e-books in colour (unlike the 
monochrome Kindle), on an arguably more intuitive touchscreen, and with greater 
capacity for annotation. The iPad was officially released in the United States on 3 April 
2010 and in the U.K. (as well as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Spain, and Switzerland) on 28 May20; the second iPad launched on the 11 March 2011, 
and to the U.K. and 24 other countries on the 25th. For many, the iPad represents another 
“true” start to the mass adoption of electronic reading; the sales for its two iterations 
thus far are huge21, and outstrip those of the Kindle (though, as a multi-use device, it 
still leaves the question of where the most e-reading occurs unclear). The flexibility of 
the equipment may mean that as electronic reading materials and versatile tablet 
computing become normalised the desire to carry one device which combines all of the 
day-to-day functionality of the current range of digital media will win out.
But this thesis is not about future gazing, about suggesting which particular form 
15 See for instance “The 'iPod for Books': Is It Game Over for Paper?”; Wilson “Has the iPod for Books 
Arrived?”; Munger “What the iPod for Books Needs to Be”; or Sebastian Mary's attack on the whole 
“hackneyed idea” in “Will the Real iPod for Reading Stand Up Now Please?”
16 See Hansell “Amazon Pitches a Wireless iPod for Books” or Waugh “The iPod For Books?”
17 Dedicated single-function device (SFD) or “single-use” e-readers focus on providing the writing space 
for book length materials as their main or only goal, most often attempting to emulate aspects of the 
codices which some hope, others fear, they might supplant. Tablet devices, to which we will turn very 
shortly, don't have this focus, attempting to be versatile screens capable of presenting a diversity of 
media equally capably. The term “tablet” (sometimes “slate”) for this type of equipment evokes some 
of the earliest writing spaces in the historical record.
18 “Shipments of e-readers…hit 5.1 million worldwide in the fourth quarter [of 2010], up 90% from the 
prior quarter and 116% from a year ago…Amazon remained the undisputed leader in the e-reader 
category, accounting for 59% of devices shipped...followed by Barnes & Noble at 11%, Sony, 5% and 
BenQ and Hanvon, each with 4%. Amazon gained 14 percentage points in share during 2010 and 
Barnes & Noble 3 points. In contrast, Sony's share has shrunk from 19% to 5% in the face of growing 
competition” (Walsh).
19 See Matt Buchanan's guide at Gizmodo, “The Exhaustive Guide to Apple Tablet Rumours” which 
tracks patent rumours back to May 2009.
20 See Apple's press release “iPad Available in Nine More Countries on May 28.”
21 Apple “sold some 15m iPads in 2010, the year in which the device was launched, and according to 
one forecast it could sell more than 40m of them in 2011...In 2010 iPads accounted for about 80% of 
total tablet sales” (“Taking the Tablets”).
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might come to predominate and why. E-reading is here, in myriad forms, and companies 
and apparatuses will spring up with increasing frequency. What this thesis will consider, 
however, is the discourse which surrounds these devices, a discourse which reveals 
something about their nature and reception, and what this might have to tell us about 
our wider experience of everyday life as tool users. Because beyond the interest, beyond 
the enthusiastic sales figures and adoption rates, digital reading has prompted concerns 
from bibliophiles, academics, high-school teachers, bloggers, parents, journalists, book-
shop owners, librarians, and myriad other commentators from all levels of public 
discourse22. Their voices represent an often surprisingly coherent resistance to e-
reading, one unmatched in voracity or constancy by its supporters. In-line with their 
most heard arguments I will invoke the Kindle and the iPad as representative devices of 
the current moment, but it is the resistance voiced which will most concern us here, a 
resistance the roots of which, this thesis will argue, emerge from somewhere deeper 
than the mundanities of voguish new tools and tap into some of our most fundamental 
concerns with being in the world. Though they will be tied, therefore, to the particular 
devices of the day I do want to position these concerns as something enduring in 
themselves.
Over the course of my argument here I would like to offer discussion of, and 
attempt potential explanations for the widespread popular resistance to electronic 
reading as it is represented in the mainstream media and public discourse of computer- 
and typographically-literate Anglo-American society. I must explain this paring down.
The effects of electronic reading and its associated equipment, certainly extend 
beyond the U.K. and North America, and will carry specificities even in different 
regions of those limited areas. My discussion will be restricted, however, to the 
predominant arguments found in the professional and lay media of these countries as 
they encapsulate the attitudes of faith and fear in the face of technological development 
that I would like to address. Cultures more dependent on the widespread deployment of 
complex or “high” technology in domestic life have markedly different attitudes to 
22 See, for instance, Sven Birkerts, The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an Electronic Age; 
Robert Coover “The End of Books”; Caleb Crain “Twilight of the Books”; Alan Kaufman “The 
Electronic Book Burning”; Mark Ruxin “The Death of Touch and the Lost Joy of the Unexpected”; 
Christine Shaw Roome “I’ve Got the Screen Eyes to Prove it: How do Ebooks Really Compare to 
Traditional Books”; Sarah Schofield “Ten Things I Hate About eReaders”; Ben Ehrenreich “The 
Death of the Book”; Shane Richmond “The Printed Book Is Doomed: Here's Why”; Sam Leith “Is 
This the End For Books?”; David Dobbs “Is Page Reading Different From Screen Reading?” Susan 
Greenfield “We Are at Risk of Losing Our Imagination”; Gary Frost “Reading by Hand”; Anne 
Mangen “Why Bother With Print?”; and Max Bruinsma “Watching, Formerly Reading.”
12
digital reading represented in their media. In Japan for instance, where care for the 
elderly increasingly includes robotics and all digital devices are expected to host an 
enormous catalogue of secondary abilities, long-form keitai shosetsu or “portable 
novel” reading on mobile phones has been established since 2006 (with half of Japan's 
best-selling novels in 2007 written for, and sometimes on, mobile phones (Yourgrau)). 
Though the form is often reviled by Japanese academics the resistance to a move away 
from codices still seems more muted; the novelty of the complex apparatus is gone, only 
its upper limits are questioned.
South American, Eastern European, African, Australasian and parts of the 
Middle and East Asian markets are often considered to be less lucrative to the American 
companies dominating the burgeoning e-reader market, and the penetration of the iPad 
and Kindle into these territories is both delayed and limited. As one study into e-reading 
notes “adoption rates [of e-readers] are projected to reach 15 percent to 20 percent of 
the population in developed countries...The United States and Korea are setting the pace 
and could see such penetration rates by 2015. Other countries, particularly those in 
Europe, will lag but eventually catch up” (Béhar et al 3); Africa and Middle and East 
Asia aren't even mentioned23. The debates in these geographical areas are very different, 
and in many cases become tied to literacy rates, the viability of internet access, or the 
democratic access to any kind of reading materials. Arguments surrounding e-books' 
deficiency in comparison to the codex, though important, can also smack of privilege 
when it is only through philanthropic ventures such as the One Laptop Per Child 
(OLPC) project that extensive reading can even becomes a viable option in some 
regions, and such issues highlight the specificity of Anglo-American concerns on this 
23 An overview of the countries the Kindle can be shipped to can be found in the Blog Kindle article 
“International release of Kindle 2!” Updated details on the various restrictions on wireless or 3G 
networking capabilities around the world with a comprehensive list of countries able to use these 
features can be found at the Kindle Word blog post “Listing of Countries with Free 3G and 3G 
browsing enabled - UPDATED.” The list of countries excluded is telling:
 
Afghanistan,  Algeria,  Azerbaijan,  Bahrain,  Bangladesh,  Brunei  Darussalam,  Burkina 
Faso, Canada, Chad, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan,  Lebanon,  Libya,  Malaysia,  Maldives,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Morocco,  New 
Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,  Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, 
Thailand,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Turkmenistan,  United  Arab  Emirates,  Uzbekistan,  Yemen 
(“International release of Kindle 2!”).
Few countries have been added since the Kindle 2 announcement, though Canada and New Zealand 
notably now have access. As described above, the iPad is currently only officially available in 25 
countries, marked along similar lines.
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subject.
An equally significant, though perhaps more prosaic reason for my focus comes 
from myriad language barriers limiting the scope of my exposure to the popular 
discourse on technology and e-reading from other regions, particularly their 
communities of bloggers, a resource that has been invaluable to the arguments put 
forward here, and without which this project could not exist.
In the absence of more global concerns, the thesis will centre around the notion 
that Anglo-American attitudes toward bound-book reading position it as more “natural” 
than its “technological” relative, and that this belief rests upon three larger concerns 
which do travel: our relationship with technology more generally, our existence as 
embodied beings, and our deployment of metaphor as an aide to understanding novel 
situations. Drawing on the popular manifestations of these concerns as they relate to e-
reading, and as mentioned above, I will array my discussions around three phrases: “e-
reading isn't natural”; “e-reading doesn't feel right”; and “e-reading is making us 
stupid.” I want to investigate where these notions might come from, how legitimate 
their claims may be, and to some degree, to wonder if they're not, at root, much the 
same complaint: that reports of poor haptics and user stupidity stem from a perceived 
unnaturalness. Such ideas will be addressed in the wider context of the use and 
reception of technology generally.
This is certainly not a thesis against the idea of resistance, but the “mainstream 
media’s often hyperbolic discourses…construct the new digital media’s impact in terms 
of simplistic utopic/dystopic binary oppositions that foreclose reasoned and sober 
debates around digital and computing technologies’ actual uses and effects” (Everett & 
Caldwell). Whilst much nuanced discussion of the issues occurs outside of editorials, 
the language which must be deployed has been hijacked and reduced, particularly terms 
like “technology,” “intelligence,” and “natural”; the words we are forced to use to 
ensure basic comprehension of the issues have either come to possess excess weight or 
have been emptied of meaning entirely, become vessels for half-understood agenda or 
misplaced hopes and fears. I will pay particular attention to the language that is used, 
however sensitively, especially that surrounding technology, to attempt to build a new 
vocabulary for such discussions whilst also demonstrating that to understand this 
current phenomena is to start to better understand our bodies and our minds, whether we 
realise it or not.
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The first chapter will begin with by considering the claim that e-reading is 
“unnatural,” particularly when juxtaposed to reading from a codex, and situate that idea 
within a history of attitudes towards technology more generally as expressed in the 
media, online, and in literature, from the Luddites and Romantics of the early 1800s to 
the American Romantics (Thoreau, Emerson, Williams) and onto the “neo-Luddites” of 
the twentieth century, a loosely cohered philosophy to be found in manifestoes, art, and 
direct actions identified by Steven Jones in Against Technology.
As this is a project primarily concerned with understanding embodied 
interactions I will focus on the notion of “visceral insulation” (Taylor 98), the idea that 
technology somehow gets between us and our environment, forming an unwanted 
mediating layer that deprives us of our natural engagement. This chapter, and portions 
of the second, hope to show that far from being somehow unnatural, the use of 
technology is at the heart of human action; technology, I will argue, is not the privileged 
domain of countries capable of producing highly complex artefacts, but instead 
underpins every human culture. This doesn’t represent a deterministic argument, no 
technology can produce precisely quantifiable, predictable, or homogenous effects on 
the cultures in which it exists, but it is an assertion that the extensive use of technology 
is a determining factor in what makes us different from other animals and different from 
one another. The arguments of this chapter rest on the assertion that if the word 
“technology” can be used to describe something outside of our nature, and yet we are 
left with no word for the equipment which is inextricably interweaved with our 
everyday existence and history, then there is a failure of terminology which must be 
resolved. This need has become acute: as artefacts which are referred to as 
“technologies” become an ever increasingly significant part of our culture’s way of life 
it becomes proportionally more vital to make that word into a subtle term which does 
work for us in contemporary debate. As such I will consider how the term has been 
deployed from its etymological roots, through various historical permutations (drawing 
on Leo Marx's excellent essay “Postmodern Pessimism”), and on into contemporary 
day-to-day use and attempts at theoretical rigour (Heidegger's “The Question 
Concerning Technology” being the most often cited attempt). With this example of 
technology's diversity, rather than specificity, in place I will advance my own definition, 
a definition which I believe is more sensitive to the intimate ways in which we are able 
to deploy equipment and which positions “technology” not as a class of objects, but as a 
type of interaction.
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I will describe four key attributes an experience should possess if we are to think 
of it as being “technological”:
• Extension - it extends our abilities.
• Communality - it exists as part of a cultural milieu.
• Incorporation - the artefact used can be “incorporated” via skilful use into our 
body image.
• Morphability - it has the capacity to alter some aspect of ourselves over 
continued use.
If an interaction with an artefact does not conform to these attributes I will instead 
suggest that the object is better understood as a “device,” simply equipment for 
achieving a goal, and suggest, contrary to “common sense” approaches, that we would 
be far more accurate to consider some highly complex mechanical, electrical, and digital 
artefacts as not being technologies at all, instead saving that term for a particular kind of 
human engagement. Talking about any kind of homogeneity when it comes to human 
beings, however, is clearly fraught with reductionist/determinist pitfalls, not least 
because of our unique ability to modify our own pre-programmed drives and 
behaviours, often via cultural products, and with a plasticity unknown elsewhere in 
nature. But I would like to suggest only that to say that we don’t have some common, 
repeated, and manifest traits from which we might identify the human race, however 
surmountable, seems both strange and misleading24. I will, throughout, often appeal to a 
biological base to our actions as readers which, whilst certainly not defining, are largely 
inescapable. Our bodies and the cognition that comes with them are products of 
evolution, and to ignore or write off that development, rather than seeing by how much 
we have strayed or can stray from it is not the path to a clear and subtle understanding 
of how we interact with our environment.
With a definition of technology established I will go on to argue that printed 
books are as “technological” as any e-reader, and that they are also as natural, in some 
aspects, and unnatural in others, as one another. This chapter will end with half of the 
working terminology for the project overall and an introduction to how we encounter 
24 Antonio Damasio, in Decartes' Error, for instance identifies “somatic markers,” the sameness of 
signals from the body that we experience each day, as the defining reason for continuity in our sense 
of self (165-203).
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our technological objects, particularly e-readers which are clearly performing, or trying 
to perform each of the four elements described above as readers adjust to them.
“E-reading doesn't feel right” is the starting point for the second chapter which 
considers the phenomenological experience of encountering objects, any object, and 
“getting used” to them. This chapter will argue that our aim in engaging with equipment 
is to promote successful interaction in the world for whatever value we currently 
attribute to “success.” When we deem any interaction as unsuccessful we are prone to 
investing significant time in ensuring that the next occasion that the action must be 
performed will go more smoothly, or the outcome will be achieved to our satisfaction, 
particularly if we believe that the artefact will promote particularly useful action (e.g. 
car driving, learning to use a computer) or is seemingly unavoidable (e.g. learning to 
read). E-readers are objects which appear, for many people, to be an impediment to 
previously successful action, and I would like to explore both why this might be the 
case, and why I believe that the impediments, such as they are, can for the most part be 
overcome. This idea of “getting used” to e-readers will be considered 
phenomenologically in that I hope to show a mechanism at the heart of the experience 
which tends to be true for all engagements with unfamiliar artefacts.
The chapter begins with an exploration of the importance of the body, touch, and 
gesture in thinking and reading drawn from Cognitive Psychology (Shaun Gallagher, 
Frank Wilson, Merlin Donald25), Philosophy (particularly the phenomenology of 
Husserl, Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty), and popular report. These discourses 
will underpin the argument that one of the main reasons that we are so proficient with 
the codex, and so able to receive its physical suggestions, is that we have built up expert 
use of it through intense practice, establishing common “gestures” of use, and we are 
conditioned to its specificities in a way that many readers are not, yet, with electronic 
texts. But what does it mean to get used to something?
In order to approach this idea the chapter outlines the basic evolutionary 
mechanism of adaptation to the environment in biological forms, the fundamental 
“getting used” in the natural world, and then takes that idea to the discipline of 
25 Throughout the thesis I will also be engaging with numerous Cognitive and Neuropsychological 
studies from experimental practitioners less well known outside of their host disciplines (Gallagher, 
Wilson, and Donald have all produced works which are attractive to lay audiences and have sizeable 
readerships). These studies, presented in scientific papers, have for the most part, never been 
discussed in Humanities circles, and several were only conducted within 18 months of writing this 
work.
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Evolutionary Epistemology. The psychologist Henry Plotkin sees the evolution of 
creatures' bodies, as well as their cognition, as being a growth in a species' knowledge 
of the world, hence their forms represent an epistemological claim. My argument will 
be that our artefacts are also evolved, that they adapt to their environment of users, and 
in this way their bodies too can be seen as instantiations of knowledge about their 
world. In this way artefacts, e-readers for example, can get used to their users and we 
can read evidence for this in the rapidly emerging generations of e-readers beginning to 
know their audience. As far as I can tell, though other writers have considered the 
evolution of artefacts26, there has been no deployment of evolutionary epistemology to 
consider the significance of artefacts' materiality.
With this mechanism in place the chapter will turn to the other side of adapting 
to equipment, the user, and consider the phenomenological experience of our own 
adaptation to novel objects. I will appropriate the term eidos from Husserl (and before 
him a tradition extending back to Plato and Aristotle) to describe not something's 
essence, as it has come to mean, but the features that we perceive of an object which 
makes it what it is to us. As we adapt to an object I will argue that it's eidos changes 
without any change occurring in the thing itself; as we familiarise ourselves with e-
readers our eidos of them alters such that they cease to feel alien, becoming literally 
new items to our experience without ever changing in themselves.
Other terms from Husserl's work, “givenness,” “constitution,” or the contested 
term “noema,” describe similar effects, but aside from the issues I have with these terms 
(which will be discussed more fully in the chapter) they are indelibly associated with 
Husserl's assertion that phenomenological appearances emerge directly from things “as 
they are.” By refashioning eidos, however I get to preserve the weight of that term 
whilst altering the metaphysical assertions which underpin the changing face of 
perceptions. Although it is not the primary focus of this chapter, the relatively new field 
of Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) structures the underlying metaphysics of the 
phenomenological assertions outlined here, particularly as it's voiced by Harman (Tool-
Being, Guerilla Metaphysics) who uses Heidegger's tool analysis (vital to the arguments 
on “incorporation” in the first chapter) to produce a new understanding of objects. OOO 
has a persuasive interest in the lives of objects themselves, independent of their 
apprehension even by the cause and effect of other inanimate forms. My arguments, 
26 See for instance Walter Vincenti What Engineers Know and How They Know It; George Basalla The 
Evolution of Technology; and Carl Mitcham Thinking Through Technology: The Path Between 
Engineering and Philosophy.
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throughout, are about materiality and the influence of the physics of things upon 
cognition, and I outline an aside on Harman's conception of OOO as an 
acknowledgement that agency in these performances of “getting used” is spread onto 
the things we use just as much as it is displaced from our minds and onto our bodies in a 
post-dualist understanding of thought.
The chapter concludes with a consideration of how we might get used to e-
readers specifically, suggesting that it is not only possible but likely if we persist in 
using them frequently, refining our skill and feeding suggestions from our own use into 
their ensuing generations; there is nothing so alien about their form that we cannot 
adjust to them if we perceive a worth in doing so.
The last chapter is built around the idea that the new equipment for reading can 
somehow make us more “stupid,” the phrasing drawn from Nicholas Carr's now 
notorious article for The Atlantic “Is Google Making Us Stupid?” Whilst Carr's 
argument is not directly concerned with portable e-readers, I will demonstrate how 
deeply intrenched ways of thinking associated with the internet have become in all 
forms of screen use, particularly with regard to hyperlinking, and as such why we must 
consider them in order to understand the newest reading artefacts. The chapter therefore 
begins by outlining numerous examples of readers concerned with how reading on 
screen, particularly the fractured reading practices undertaken online, have disrupted 
their, and others' ways of apprehending information.
Putting aside the forms of content consumed, I want to consider whether the 
artefacts of e-reading themselves could have an effect on cognition. That certain kinds 
of thinking can be fostered by the particularities of artefacts will have been partially 
explored in the second chapter, but the third focuses expressly on e-readers and codices 
as “objects-to-think-with” (Turkle, Life on Screen 48), artefacts which promote 
particular ways of thinking. By drawing on the psychologist James Gibson's notion of 
objects “affording” certain activities, this chapter will use George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson's studies of our deep reliance on metaphor, particularly when encountering 
unfamiliar scenarios, to explore the notion of “material metaphors.” The three terms, 
objects-to-think-with, affordances, and material metaphors, all point to how the use of 
things can alter how we think, but the form of e-readers, far from promoting stupidity or 
stifling novel thought in fact seem more adept at enacting the complexities of post-
structural and postmodern philosophies concerned with breakdowns of hierarchy, 
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networks, and emergent properties, thereby enhancing the user's ability to question 
received wisdom, a function that the emergence of writing some few thousand years ago 
also achieved.
As we will see, however, this apparent promise risks restriction when the 
affordances of the codex are positioned as the “natural” or default way of engaging with 
written text. Linear access in particular will be criticised as the sole mode of 
engagement suited to our most significant thought processes, and the hangovers from 
this viewpoint will be explored in their manifestations in the new equipment. In this 
regard a term from archaeology, “skeuomorph,” will be used to describe the repetition 
of book-like metaphors in digital forms which no longer require their strictures.
The third chapter concludes with “media-specific analyses” (Hayles, “Print is 
Flat...”) of three writers, E.E. Cummings27, Mark Z. Danielewski, and Jonathan Safran 
Foer, who responded to the means of production of their era and, in the case of 
Danielewski and Foer, address the threat of digitisation to printed pages and the codex 
form. These writers have each transformed the pages of their work into material 
metaphors, offering expanded capacity for meaning making, and again Danieleski and 
Foer show that far from limiting thought, digitisation, as a companion form or even a 
threat, can promote novel and nuanced ways of thinking about otherwise stagnating or 
invisible quotidian forms.
Over the course of the thesis I would like to demonstrate how we might bring the 
latest insights from Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience to bear on these three broad 
issues of naturalness, haptics, and intellectual impediment, particularly in their views on 
and meeting points regarding the impact of our embodiment on encountering objects in 
the world28. In this way I hope that the project sits at an intersection between English 
27 For a discussion of the capitalisation (or not) of Cummings' name (often written as “e.e. cummings”) 
see Norman Friedman “Not 'e.e. cummings',” and “Not 'e.e. cummings' REVISITED.”
28 This combination is hardly unprecedented. For several examples of how phenomenology has been 
incorporated into Neuropsychology see Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological 
Mind 30-40. Gallagher and Zahavi describe a concept of “front-loading phenomenology”:
Just as experimental designs can be informed by specific theories, experiments can also 
be informed by phenomenological insights - that is, insights developed in independently 
conducted  phenomenological  analyses,  or  in  previous  neurophenomenological 
experiments.  In  such  cases  phenomenology  is  ‘‘front-loaded’’ into  the  experimental 
design,  [though]  there  may or  may  not  be  any  phenomenological  method,  or  even 
introspection in the strong sense,  explicitly used in the experiment itself (Gallagher, 
“Experimenting” 125).
For more examples of front-loading phenomenology see Larssen et al, “The Feel Dimension...”
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Studies, Philosophy, the Digital Humanities, and the nascent “cognitive turn” in literary 
studies. As mentioned in the description of chapter two above, the thesis also draws on 
Evolutionary Biology's philosophical implications for theory of technology, and there is 
a clear reason for the broad spread of ideas that have been put to work here: There 
simply isn't a formulation of how people encounter these new artefacts, we have 
relatively little conception of how people approach them, interact with them, and on 
what terms, and as such we're also ill-equipped to learn from their deployment. Anne 
Mangen, a Psychology researcher whose work specifically deals with reading on screen, 
argues that
[t]he feeling of literally being in touch with the text is lost when your 
actions - clicking with the mouse, pointing on touch screens or scrolling 
with keys or on touch pads - take place at a distance from the digital text, 
which is, somehow, somewhere inside the computer, the e-book or the 
mobile phone. Because of this ontological intangibility of the digital text, 
our phenomenological experience - reading - of the digital text will differ 
profoundly from that  of  a  print  text.  The print  text  is  tangible  -  it  is 
physically, tactilely,  graspable,  in ways that digital  texts are  not (until 
they are printed out and hence no longer digital).  Such a difference is 
phenomenologically  distinct,  meaning that  it  will  have  significant  -  if 
theoretically overlooked - consequences for our reading of the different 
texts (“Hypertext...” 408).
The third chapter will deal with the notion of “intangibility” that Mangen raises here, 
but what is important to note from the outset is Mangen's assertion that such vital bodily 
interactions (bodily on both sides of the interaction) have been overlooked. She notes 
that “[s]everal studies point to the importance of addressing the multisensory dimension 
of digital reading...without really pursuing the issue any further” (Mangen “Hypertext 
fiction reading”)29; such information, I have argued, instead remains bound up within 
personal reports and the language used to report, whether it be popular, journalistic, 
academic, amateur, or literary, and as such the work of English Studies researchers 
familiar with interpreting written materials is vital in divining the effects of the medium 
currently being played out.
29 Mangen cites the following studies in this regard: Back “The Reading Senses”; Bearne “Rethinking 
Literacy: Communication, Representation and Text”; Kress Literacy in the New Media Age; Mackey 
Literacies Across Media: Playing the Text; Mackey Mapping Recreational Literacies: Contemporary 
Adults at Play; Merchant “Writing the Future in the Digital Age”; Walsh “The ‘Textual Shift’: 
Examining the Reading Process With Print, Visual and Multimodal Texts”; Walsh, Asha, and 
Sprainger, “Reading Digital Texts.”
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One final piece of terminology which needs to be clarified from the outset is my 
use of the term “codex.” Most writers on the subject of the digital texts which act as 
replicants of print use the terms “e-book” for the artwork, “e-reader” for the device 
which holds the e-book, and “book” or “p-book” to describe the emulated printed 
corollary. What this emphasises is a norm of print from which an e-book can only ever 
be a deviation (and normally, as we'll see, a denigrated one). But I want to take and 
apply Derrida's notion that it isn't “appropriate to conflate the question of the book with 
that of technologies of printing and reproduction: there were books both before and after 
the invention of printing, for example” (Paper Machine 4); “book,” as I'm using it here, 
refers simply to a written work of a length which would distinguish it from an essay or 
short story. The term is not precise (and I do not use it often) as my concerns here are 
rarely with content, more with the form and physicality of their presentation. I will 
instead deploy the terms “codex,” or, less often, “printed book” to describe a printed 
work of this size bound down one side, and “e-book” to describe the digital equivalent, 
however it may be presented. This, I hope, will continually reinforce the medial 
specificity that I'm concerned with without privileging one side as the “true” 
presentation of the book. Book, after all, is a less than precise word in and of itself:
All of our words for book refer, at root, to forms no longer recognizable 
as such: biblos being the Greek word for the pith of the papyrus stalk (on 
which texts in the Greco-Roman world were inscribed); libri being Latin 
for the inner bark of a tree, just as the Old English  bóc  and Old Norse 
bók referred to the beech tree. Likewise 'tome' is from a Greek word for a 
cutting (of papyrus) and 'volume' is from the Latin for a rolled-up thing - 
a scroll, which is the form most texts took until they were replaced by 
folded parchment codices. Prior to the late 13th century, when paper was 
first  brought  to  Europe  from  China,  the  great  works  of  Western 
civilization were recorded on the skins of animals. The Inca wrote by 
knotting strings. The ancient Chinese scrawled calligraphy on cliffs. (Do 
mountains  count  as  books?)  The printed,  paper book,  as  we know it, 
dates  only  to  the  mid-fifteenth  century,  but  those  early  Gutenberg 
exemplars were hardly something you’d curl up with on a rainy Sunday 
afternoon. The book as an affordable object of mass production...was not 
born until the 19th century, just in time for the early announcements of its  
death (Ehrenreich).
Perhaps the most important distinction in my use of “codex” is that it is intended to 
invoke the “book” of the popular imagination to which Ehrenreich finally settles in the 
above quotation. When the commentators discussed over the next three chapters say that 
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“books are natural” or “books are under threat” their readers knows exactly what they're 
referring to: mass market paperbacks, library books, second-hand book store books, 
and, to some extent, good looking hardbacks (at least in the discussions from 
bibliophiles). Certainly there is imprecision to this use, and yet it is widespread. The 
transcendent, Platonic book to which they refer is not a historically contingent medial 
instantiation, it is an eternal Penguin Modern Classics. Everything that falls roughly 
within range of this ideal will simply be called a “codex” or “bound/printed book” from 
here on out.
This thesis is based on the belief that a fundamental change in our reading 
practices will occur as we move from codex to e-book, but the fact remains that we 
cannot know what the effects will be, only that their possibilities need to be considered 
ahead of time. Such a conclusion can be drawn due to the extensive work in Book 
History Studies on the emergence and standardisation of reading practices over 
generations of engagement30. Though their often tend to be chapters addressing 
digitisation in recent Book History works, as yet there exists no extended study of how 
readers approach texts on portable digital equipment, particularly from a 
phenomenological point of view31. This comes by design of course, Book History is just 
that, a historicising practice, and we are only just approaching a time where such 
histories are even possible to write. The psychological approach that I'm advocating 
here allows for phenomenological considerations whilst working with and within a 
change which is occurring around us. In order to work with the current, the untested, 
this thesis associates its discussion not with Book History, but with fields which are 
capable of already having produced testable data as well as theory, fields not typically 
considered from within the Humanities. But we must seek out the moments of 
potentially pivotal importance as they arrive and assess them well; part of the role of the 
Humanities has surely become the identification of such potential sites. The birth of 
portable and widespread e-reading represents a genuine opportunity to learn as we upset 
one of the most defining evolutionary forces in our lives: the item under discussion is 
30 See for example Jeffery Masten, Peter Stallybrass, and Nancy J. Vickers Language Machines; Warren 
Chappell A Short History of the Printed Word; Roger Chartier The Order of Books; Elizabeth 
Eisenstein The Printing Press as an Agent of Change; David Hall Cultures of Print: Essays in the 
History of the Book; Adrian Johns The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making; D. F. 
McKenzie Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts; and David Finklestein and Alistair McCleery The 
Book History Reader.
31 David Levy's Scrolling Forward seems a notable exception, but again his focus is not on e-reading 
specifically.
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not just reading, but the external storage of information, and the use of technology. It's a 
shock to no one, however, that writing can often capture the personal experience of the 
world in far greater detail than any experiment; as the Evolutionary Cognitive 
Psychologist Merlin Donald puts it
[l]iterature affords us a great luxury, one that we lack completely in the 
clinical  study  of  consciousness  because  even  the  most  experienced 
clinicians remain outsiders to their patients’ minds and are constrained by 
the formal, conventional nature of their encounters with others. Fiction is 
not so fettered. It is entirely the product of the imagination, and therefore, 
writers are not so bound by convention. Their perspective provides a…
reality check, built from expert observations but from the inside. For this 
reason alone, literature must become part of our database. It is perhaps 
the  most  articulate  source  we  have  on  the  phenomenology of  human 
experience (So Rare 78).
I hope that this project contributes toward reversing this flow somewhat, making more 
of the obvious and numerous links between the fields invoked in the discussion of 
electronic reading devices. To intentionally blind ourselves to aspects of the object 
under discussion is a non-workable strategy if we wish to progress in our understanding, 
but for most of us, myself certainly included, polymathism simply isn’t an option. And 
yet I firmly believe that “some knowledge is better than none” (Donald, Origins 202), 
provided that we realise and acknowledge our limitations. In her own work on 
embodied readers and texts Karen Littau invokes ideas of “neurochemical” alterations 
to, and “literal rewiring” of brains via reading on screen (56-57), but she goes no 
further, providing little evidence for her claim. I think that this slip, which comes in the 
midst of an otherwise excellent argument, stems from an unavoidable acknowledgement 
that Neuropsychology had much to offer her project’s thesis of the importance of not 
neglecting the body which interprets, or aids interpretation of a text. But recourse to a 
few lines of abstract “science,” a mere payment of lip-service, is not enough; there must 
be an attempt to engage, at the same time as acknowledging when to refer the reader to 
the relevant materials if they wish to pursue the roots that lie beneath the borrowed idea, 
metaphor, or concept. At this stage dialogue, generosity, and deference to established 
expertise where necessary is what is required, and I hope that I have moved in these 
directions wherever possible.
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Chapter 1 - The Tools of Our Nature
When the perverse ingenuity of man has outered some part of his being in material 
technology, his entire sense ratio is altered. He is then compelled to behold this 
fragment of himself ‘closing itself as in steel.’ In beholding this new thing, man is 
compelled to become it.
- Marshall McLuhan, New Media 195
The idea of humans versus technology is wrong...Technology is at least as critical to our 
identity as our soft tissues.
- Timothy Taylor, The Artificial Ape 189
“The use of technologies in reading is ‘unnatural.’” This stance ranges throughout the 
popular discourses surrounding resistance to digital reading devices, from Sven Birkerts' 
assertion in The Gutenberg Elegies that he is “an unregenerate reader, one who still 
believes that language and not technology is the true evolutionary miracle” ((1996) 6) to 
David Gelernter's solution for digital technology being useful, but the codex being 
somehow “right”: “I assume that technology will soon start moving in the natural 
direction: integrating chips into books, not vice versa” (“The Book Made Better,” my 
emphasis)32.
By using that word, “resistance,” I fully intend to invoke a political, moral, or 
ethical claim to avoiding or repudiating the move toward a new norm of electronic text, 
to allowing a generation to grow up reading from screens rather than paper pages. Such 
resistance is at the heart of contemporary discussion of reading, and Birkerts is amongst 
the most eloquent, and most read, detractors, picking up on this language of the 
unnatural throughout his work. His playing up of a dichotomy between the reader’s 
“natural” interaction with a bound book and the “unnatural” processes of reading on a 
multimedia screen recurs frequently throughout the …Elegies: “[r]unning the eyes down 
column-inches of print is part of the former way of processing the world, but it is no 
longer the natural mode for many. Not when bits of information stream in from every 
32 Gelernter would like to see codices augmented with certain digital elements; his examples include 
making it “beep” if you've misplaced it, or being able to search its text online (though why he prefers 
this option over a parallel searchable digital copy on his home computer that he simply chooses not to 
use for primary access is not explained), whilst maintaining the codex's functionality if the electronics 
fail.
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source, there to be isolated and studied as needed” ((2006) 238). It is clear from 
Birkerts' phrasing here that this new mode may have become the default, but to him it 
seems far from natural. This way of thinking reaches its apotheosis in the following: 
“[w]hat [codex] reading does, ultimately, is keep alive the dangerous and exhilarating 
idea that a life is not a sequence of lived moments, but a destiny. That God or no God, 
life has a unitary pattern inscribed within it” ((1996) 85). This final quotation gets to the 
crux of the resistance to “unnatural” reading practices: for those set most firmly against 
digital reading technology, codex reading, and all of its related practices, has become an 
almost religious or spiritual experience, tapping into something at the centre of who we 
are. In this regard Alan Kaufman, in a ferocious article entitled “The Electronic Book 
Burning” says of his hatred of digitisation:
My books have been hardwon. What made it all seem worthwhile was 
the book, the physical item, a kind of sacred and appropriate temple for 
the text contained within. Had I been told from youth that my literary 
destination  would  be  some  7  inch  plastic  gizmo  containing  my  texts 
shuffling alongside thousands of other 'texts' I would have spit in the face 
of such a profession and become instead a hit man or a rabbi...To me, the 
book is one of life's most sacred objects, a torah, a testament, something 
not only worth living for but as shown in Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451, 
something that  is  even worth dying for.  And yet,  though I  have  been 
willing to sacrifice everything for the books I have written, compiled or 
just read, though I have given the days of my life, my years, my youth 
and adulthood to the book, as both sacred object and text,  I  am now 
witness to the culture turning away en masse from the book. The world is 
moving  to  embrace  the  electronic  media  as  its  principle  mode  of 
expression. The human has opted for the machine, and its ghosts, over 
the haptic companionship and didactic embodiment of the physical book.
Not all commentators would go this far, of course, and I suspect that many of those who 
imply or deploy that word “unnatural” would deride Birkerts’ and Kaufman's polemic. 
But it does feel as if each instance somehow stems from a common pool, and part of the 
function of this chapter will be to investigate why the rhetoric of the unnatural is so 
pervasive in such resistance. As we shall see, however, this leads us out to a wider idea 
of the resistance to technology more generally, an idea which cannot be ignored if we 
want to best understand the concern with a move toward e-reading.
Technology, too, suffers this tag of the unnatural, the sacrilegious. As I intend to 
demonstrate, however, there is no such thing as “technology” by any persuasive 
definition, nothing we can point to or touch, or describe consistent properties of, 
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particularly in its day-to-day use. Technology is a consensus description of sets of 
artefacts and practices, but one which is singly unidentified as such. When we group 
items under the term “synthetic,” for instance, they have a common property to which 
we can point: the term describes items which do not occur without processing of some 
kind. When we identify items, rituals, events, or people as “religious,” or religiously 
significant, there may be no materially quantifiable property, but we can certainly 
describe why we might consider something or someone as such with little effort, 
appealing only to their immediate relation to some well defined cultural construction. 
“Art” is a perennially challenging category of artefacts and effort, but we can still make 
appeals to creativity, novelty, craft. There may be extensive arguments and 
recalibrations, particularly at the margins of what has traditionally been accepted as 
such, but at least the existence of the discussion makes the fluidity of the categorisation 
apparent. The same is not true, however, of “technology”; technology somehow just is, 
remaining resistant to nuanced definition even in its outlying cases: is a hammer a 
technology? Is it of the same order of things as a computer? Is complexity enough to 
distinguish between the two? This has led to a strange scenario where a commentator 
such as Birkerts can describe reading a book as the most “natural” thing in the world, 
but reading on a screen as a technological twist too far; this is possible, and acceptable, 
for the sole reason that most of us do not have a working definition of technology which 
excludes such an assertion. And yet I believe that a viable working definition can and 
should exclude Birkert's contention, and that any definition which fails to do so simply 
doesn't recognise the power technology wields over every human life. This, then, is 
where my argument will begin, by outlining a definition of technology so that we might 
better understand the resistance to the new digital implements of reading as existing in a 
continuation of an “adversary culture” (Marx “Technology: the Emergence...”) with a 
long history and similar motivations aimed at the notion of “technology” at large. I will 
suggest that to say that any technology is somehow unnatural reveals the glaring need 
for a more nuanced definition of the term, one sensitive to our embodiment's relation to 
our equipment. As we shall return to throughout this work, changes in the artefacts of 
reading provokes such discussion as the reading experience is one of the most intimate 
technological engagements we can achieve, and both as bodily as dancing and as 
unnatural as driving a car. To better understand the term “technology” is to better 
understand the books we read, and as such I hope it will prove the right place to begin.
27
For nature, against technology
The history of resistance to what we would commonly call technology is most often 
traced back to the start of the industrial revolution and the Luddite movement33 which 
saw outbreaks of violent dissent against the new machines of agriculture and production 
in the wake of widespread unemployment. Richard Bulliet, however, traces an even 
earlier history in “Determinism and Pre-Industrial Technology,” the medieval Middle 
East being his case in point. Bulliet questions the notion of inevitability in a linear 
teleological progression of technological development, his research demonstrating that 
communities resisted adopting certain efficient technologies such as alternative yoking 
mechanisms for beasts of burden, the use of wheeled transport and wheelbarrows, and 
even early forms of print, all of which were deployed by geographically proximal 
cultures. The reasons he cites for such refusal include class-based resistance, but also 
ethnic and lifestyle factors, an attitude of “us and them” with relation to the surrounding 
cultures which prevented adoption of outwardly superior technological contrivances. It 
is easy to see how such moralism might feed into resistance with the belief that “they do 
x, we're superior to them and yet we use y, therefore y is correct/right/natural.”
The reasons to resist technology, then, are numerous and have become deeply 
rooted around the world, significantly predating the proliferation of the complex 
artefacts which seem to mark out various contemporary cultures as being somehow 
more technologically minded. From the Enlightenment onwards, however, romanticised 
(and Romantic) resistances appealing to a return to natural living became increasingly 
widespread in direct proportion to the perceived impact of technology on the average 
citizen's daily life. Jones identifies a movement, “Neo-Luddism” (Against Technology 
20), which draws upon the Luddite history, if in somewhat bastardised fashion, and can 
be taken to encompass viewpoints as diverse as a continuation of the original Luddite 
fear of displacing human labour with mechanical apparatus, to a full blown 
“technophobia,” a more general fear of the negative potential inherent in increasingly 
complex technologies. Jones says of modern resistance to technology, and its extreme 
Neo-Luddite forms, that
[m]any assume that to resist technology is a folly (if a noble one). The 
original  historical  Luddites  in  England  circa  1811,  the  workers  from 
33 See for instance Steven Jones Against Technology: From the Luddites to Neo-Ludditism and Nichols 
Fox Against the Machine: The Hidden Luddite Tradition in Literature, Art, and Individual Lives.
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whom we  get  the  name,  have  mistakenly  been  made  into  the  poster 
children  for  this  assumption.  Today  'Luddite'  often  means  'deluded 
technophobe'...[D]etermined weavers and cloth finishers, skilled artisans 
demanding  fair  wages  and  control  over  their  own  trade,  were  often 
wrongly interpreted as champions of the simple life and of nature,  as 
voluntary  primitives  and  Romantics...[But,  Jones  argues,  it  was  the 
Luddites'] right to their technology [that] they fought to protect, not some 
Romantic  idyll  in  an  imagined  pretechnological  nature  (Against  
Technology 3&9).
Todays Neo-Luddites are, if not always apolitical, then certainly not always fighting for 
workers' rights, instead embracing an idyllic pretechnological state that modern society 
thwarts any attempt to move towards. I am certainly not suggesting that contemporary 
fears, however they are manifested, are unfounded, indeed the contemporary crises of 
global warming, oil spills, water shortages, grain riots, GM crops, and antibiotic 
resistant “superbugs” are continual reminders that questioning the unrelenting pursuit of 
technological progress is essential to any hope of a responsible consumer society. Jones, 
however, also acknowledges a problem in uniform resistance: “There are undoubtedly 
real technology-based conspiracies or patterns of connectedness at work behind the 
scenes and a general suspicion in this regard is not paranoid in the clinical sense: It is 
prudent citizenship...But the nature of any paranoid response is a tendency to 
universalize its fears” (Against Technology 176). The strength of the resistance shown 
toward digital reading seems to be a case of this universalised fear, demonstrating that 
the questioning of technological change may also prove detrimental if left unquestioned 
itself. Screen reading might mark a potential ecological improvement over the current 
printed book industry34, may allow for greater and more democratic access to cultural 
works from all literate cultures35, might encourage a generation used to television and 
computers not to abandon reading36, and might even simply be a convenient way to 
access written material. If the resistance to it is just a slavish adherence to an older trend 
of cynicism in the face of the new then, no matter how useful or practical that trend, it 
deserves to be interrogated.
34 A round up of blog posts and newspaper articles on this discussion can be found at the eco libris site 
(“ebooks vs paper books”). The consensus seems to be cautiously in favour with one sizeable caveat: 
don't upgrade your e-reader too regularly.
35 See for instance the Worldreader and One Laptop Per Child projects which provide libraries of digital 
texts to developing countries, the Worldreader project in particular providing work from Sub-Saharan 
African publishers and authors.
36 See Lauren Barack “The Kindles Are Coming” report for the School Library Journal which discusses 
children's increased enthusiasm for reading on electronic devices for reasons of portability, secrecy 
(keeping how much reading they're doing from friends who might judge the activity), and novelty.
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As I have suggested, codex reading has become built into a dialogue of the 
“natural,” with screens and digitisation being positioned, by definition, as occupying an 
opposed unnaturalness. Nature is often, now, seen as the privileged term in a dyad with 
culture, artifice, or even the human, but “[m]uch of the extravagant hope generated by 
the Enlightenment project derived from a trust in the virtually limitless expansion of 
new knowledge of - and thus enhanced power over - nature” (Marx, “Postmodern 
Pessimism,” 239). It is a resistance to this project of dominion which shapes Neo-
Luddite critique, most extremely seen in the extension of Rousseau's “noble savage” 
(the most typically Romantic of resistances) to the anti-technology, anti-civilisation 
“anarcho-primitivism” touted by the philosopher and self-professed Neo-Luddite John 
Zerzan37 and his sympathies with the manifesto of Theodore Kaczynski, the 
Unabomber38. More moderate resistant voices do, of course, exist, for example in the 
work of John Gray whose Straw Dogs questions the modern faith in the progress of 
technology as a replacement for religious belief, and earlier in the American 
Romanticism of Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and William Carlos 
Williams where we can sense much the same way of thinking:
Men have become tools of their tools (Thoreau 61).
Here  are  great  arts  and  little  men.  Here  is  greatness  begotten  of 
paltriness...Every victory over matter ought to  recommend to man the 
worth of his nature. But now one wonders who did all this good...’Tis too 
plain that with the material power the moral progress has not kept pace. It  
appears that we have not made a judicious investment. Works and days 
were offered us, and we took works (Emerson “Works and Days”).
Machines were not so much to save time as to save dignity that fears the 
animate touch. It is miraculous the energy that goes into inventions here. 
Do you know that it now takes just ten minutes to put a bushel of wheat 
on the market from planting to selling, whereas it took three hours in our 
colonial days? That’s striking. It must have been a tremendous force that 
would do that. That force is fear that robs the emotions: a mechanism to 
increase the gap between touch and thing, not to have contact (Williams 
182-183).
Technology is about placing a mediating layer between us and the world to Williams, to 
save “dignity” as he scornfully puts it, a move away from our visceral interaction with 
37 “It seems to me we're in a barren, impoverished, technicized place and that these characteristics are 
interrelated” (Zerzan, “Against Technology” 1).
38 See Zerzan's Elements of Refusal, Future Primitive, and Running on Emptiness, and Kaczynski's 
“Unabomber Manifesto” (originally titled Industrial Society and its Future).
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the physical for the sake of an unnatural propriety. There's also a sense of this mediation 
in Birkerts and Kaufman's work, that the new technology separates us from a rich 
physical world of which the bound book is a unique part39. Again, elements of this 
discussion are widespread online, with innumerable blog posts on the pitfalls of screen 
reading appealing to a perceived separation from material existence. The following is 
typical of such: “eReaders give nothing away about the journey you’ve taken with a 
book. No dog-ears, smells or smudges. They don’t express a life shared with a story. In 
the future, people won’t lovingly pass on the battered books they read repeatedly as 
kids” (Schofield, “Ten Things I Hate About eReaders”)40.
Andrew Feenburg also discusses technology in general in light of its mediation 
of our embodiment:
God  creates  the  world  without  suffering  any  recoil,  side  effects,  or 
blowback. This is the ultimate practical hierarchy establishing a one-to-
one relation between actor and object. But we are not gods...Technical 
action represents a partial escape from the human condition. We call an 
action  'technical'  when  the  actor's  impact  on  the  object  is  out  of  all 
proportion to the return feedback affecting the actor. We hurtle two tons 
of metal down the freeway while sitting in comfort listening to Mozart or 
the Beatles (48).
Technology allows us to temporarily exert a dominion usually beyond us, diminishing 
our perceived effort whilst maximising our output, and making us come closer to the 
work of a God immune to Newton's third law, hampered only by our persisting 
embodiment. But the price is its acting as a barrier, an escape from the human, 
barricading us from and inoculating us to the world.
However, this isn't necessarily an aspect of a peculiar modern technology, it's an 
aspect of tool use that goes back thousands of years. What is different may simply be 
the extent to which such “visceral insulation” is deployed in every aspect of modern 
life:
the  comforts  of  modern  civilization  reduce  the  amount  of  food  we 
39 We will see more of this in a discussion of Birkerts' notion of the relative “weight” of printed and 
digitised pages in chapter three.
40 Scofield's post is a good example of common problems with the new reading equipment emphasised 
in the popular resistance to e-reading, particularly perceptions of fragility (“an e-reader will break if 
my cat sits on it”), expense (Scofield invokes an imaginary phone call to a bus depot to negotiate an e-
reader's safe return versus the sad, but relatively unproblematic loss of a codex), and battery life 
(“[t]hey rely on a battery which is bad for the environment, and impractical for camping”).
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biologically need to burn metabolically in order to keep our bodies warm. 
But  the  technology  that  insulates  us  from  cold  and  exhaustion  also 
insulates us from the psychic rawness of nature. Visceral insulation is the 
trend toward disengagement from the actuality of hunting, killing, and 
gutting, or, in the case of domesticated animals, of rearing for the table 
and  then  physically  dispatching...Visceral  insulation  is  a  reverb  of 
increasing technology (Taylor, Artificial 98).
Undoubtedly, modern technology is connected to a distance from some of the harsher 
realities of keeping a large population fed, clothed, and sheltered, but is this a defining 
aspect of the technology or a particular cultural application? Taylor's discussion of such 
insulation in food production from “late-fourth-millenium” Mesopotamia would suggest 
the latter: found at archaeological sites exploring ancient Mesopotamia are
thousands of ugly and cheaply made artifacts known as...BRBs [bevel-
rimmed bowls]. These Urak-culture artifacts are the earliest prototype of 
the Styrofoam fast-food container: sun-dried, thick walled, conical sided 
pottery bowls for holding food...[E]ach was...filled, probably only once, 
with  a  basic,  no-frills  worker's  ration  of  barley  porridge.  Sufficiently 
refueled to continue with the corvé labor that was needed to build large 
civic  works...the  worker  (probably  a  slave)  simply  threw  away  the 
BRB...What the BRBs mean is that we know that there were by this time 
people in the world who had lost  the direct chain of contact with the 
source of food that they ate...The psychological effect of BRBs should 
not  be  underplayed...;  now  that  food  was  prepared  centrally,  animals 
were killed centrally. Or, in fact, away from the center, as that is what a 
'shambles' was - the zone of the city where slaughter and butchery took 
place, out of sight. The appearance of this type of mass-produced fast-
food vessel was part of an intensifying retreat from the wild, and an ever-
greater control over the terms of death (Artificial 98-100).
Technology, then, is long associated with distancing us from our environment, and this 
might well contribute to certain Neo-Luddite positions, but it is unclear to what pristine 
past might be being harkened, what time where contact with the earth went unmediated 
(it certainly wasn't recent), an idea we will continue to pick up on throughout this 
chapter.
The resistance to modern technology, particularly the scare stories surrounding 
the effects of digitisation which we'll return to in the third chapter, have recently begun 
to be analysed, or lampooned, in light of their historical counterparts41. Kathrin Passig, 
41 Vaughn Bell, author of A Better Pencil, a book length discussion of this situation of the new amongst 
the old, also provides a short history of scares surrounding new media including writing, radio, and 
mandatory education in his article “Don't Touch That Dial! A History of Media Technology Scares, 
From the Printing Press to Facebook.”
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for instance, identifies some “Commonplaces of Technological Critique,” arguments 
which have been put forth recurrently over recent years as generic criticisms of new 
equipment including:
• “What the hell is it good for?” - A phrase IBM engineer Robert Lloyd asked of 
the microprocessor in 1968.
• Who wants it anyway? - Harry M. Warner, one quarter of the Warner Brothers 
studio founding family team, is said to have asked in 1927 “Who the hell wants 
to hear actors talk?”
• “It is high time at this point to think about what the innovation is doing to the 
heads of children, adolescents, women, the lower classes and other easily 
impressionable citizens...Those weaker than I am can't handle it!” - “People 
read ...what is true and what is false mingled together, without examination, and 
they do this purely out of curiosity, with no real thirst for knowledge...Idleness 
becomes a habit and creates, as does all idleness, a relaxation of the soul's 
energy” a warning from the Universal Lexicon of Upbringing and Teaching in 
1844.
• “If the new technology has to do with thinking, writing or reading, then it will 
most certainly change our techniques of thinking, writing or reading for the 
worse” - “For critics around 1870, the postcard sounded the death knell for the 
culture of letter writing, while in February 1897 the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association discussed whether 'typewriters lower the literary grade of 
work done by reporters.'”
Such history of railing against new technologies, and often in predictable fashion, 
suggests two important ideas for the argument of this chapter, and for the thesis more 
generally: i) that people frequently consider a move away from the equipment they are 
used to using as being at the very least problematic, and at worst an outright threat, and 
ii) when technologies have been around for a while they can seem to be a part of the 
natural order: “it's not these older technologies we have to worry about, it's those new 
ones that pose a threat, that strip us from the world.”
The philosophy of Martin Heidegger is often identified as anti-technological in 
its stance against modern forms, particularly in “The Question Concerning Technology” 
where he outlines his concern as to the essence of contemporary technology acting as a 
restricted “unveiling” of the world. Perhaps the most vivid example of comparing the 
old and the new in that essay is his juxtaposition of the windmill and the hydroelectric 
dam: the windmill works within and alongside nature, whereas the dam tames it, 
encountering the river as good for the single purpose of producing electricity. Heidegger 
is often read as seeing our attitudes toward technology as corrupting and making 
impoverished our view of the world, where nature is revealed simply in its having a use 
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value, as being a “standing reserve” of materials, a means to an end and nothing in 
itself42. This too can be seen as a form of visceral insulation, a keeping of us from the 
world “as it is,” our faith in domination misguided as we only tame a certain aspect of 
the environment in which we act. Heidegger, however, knew the importance of 
technology in day-to-day life and, though it certainly concerned him, his approach is 
more nuanced than a simple “anti-technology” screed: “For all of us, the arrangements, 
devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It 
would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as 
the work of the devil” (Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking 53). It remains somewhat 
ironic, however, that I will shortly require Heidegger's work in instigating and fleshing 
out my definition and naturalisation of technology here.
How do we define technology?
The existence of such rich precursors to contemporary resistance should make it rather 
unsurprising that a seam of such voices have passed into mainstream consensus. I have 
already said that I do not believe that the questioning of technological change or 
progression should be written off, but saying that there is valuable reason for 
questioning or resisting technology suggests that there is an identifiable category of 
things which are being resisted, and yet this doesn't seem to be the case. The fluid use 
that the word “Luddite” has acquired - able to describe both the original mill workers 
campaign against job loss for the sake of machinic efficiency, and the Neo-Luddite who 
elects not to use email because they still like to send paper letters - indicates that 
perhaps something may be amiss. The problem is not solely that the politics has been 
evacuated from the term, rather that “Luddite” has come to mean any resister of 
technology, and this is a category that somehow includes mill equipment and email and 
seemingly everything in between. It is a category, if we believe Birkerts, that includes 
the Kindle, but not the printed book. Where is the boundary line which delineates which 
items should be included under the term? Langdon Winner suggested that technology 
could be defined as having moved from being “something relatively precise, limited, 
and unimportant to something vague, expansive and highly significant” (8), a definition 
unfortunately fairly close to a definitive description of the contemporary usage. W. 
42 For a good overview of Heidegger's attitudes to technology over his career see Ronald Godzinski Jr. 
“(En)Framing Heidegger's Philosophy of Technology.”
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Brian Arthur overstates the case somewhat when he protests that “we have no 
agreement on what the word 'technology' means, no overall theory of how technologies 
comes into being...and no theory of evolution for technology” (Nature of Technology 
12), as we will see in the second chapter there have been a great many theories on how 
technology comes to pass, but the significant point is the lack of consensus in all aspects 
of technology: what is being argued about is rarely agreed upon.
When the Luddites were dismantling the machines which threatened to supplant 
them, the word “technology” was not in use:
When the Enlightenment project was being formulated, after 1750...[f]or 
another  century,  more  or  less,  the  artifacts,  the  knowledge,  and  the 
practices  later  to  be  embraced  by  'technology'  would  continue  to  be 
thought of as belonging to a special branch of the arts variously known as 
the 'mechanic' (or 'practical,' or 'industrial,' or 'useful) - as distinct from 
the  'fine'  (or  'high,'  or  'creative,'  or  'imaginative')  -  arts  (Marx, 
“Postmodern Pessimism” 242).
The word is derived from the Ancient Greek techné (craftsmanship, craft, art) and logos  
(ground, word, order, knowledge, reason), but would not start to become deployed in its 
modern usage until “the era when electrical and chemical power were being 
introduced...[W]hen these huge systems were replacing discrete artifacts, simple tools, 
or devices as the characteristic material form of the 'mechanic arts,' the latter term also 
was being replaced by a new conception: 'technology'” (Marx, “Postmodern 
Pessimism,” 245-24643). Marx sees here, built into the initial deployment of the word, 
the mediation identified negatively by William Carlos Williams and euphorically by the 
architects of the Enlightenment before him: technology's 
relative abstractness, as compared with 'the mechanic arts,' had a kind of 
refining, idealizing, or purifying effect upon our increasingly elaborate 
contrivances for manipulating the object world, thereby protecting them 
from Western culture's ancient fear of contamination by physicality and 
work. An aura of impartial cerebration and rational detachment replaced 
the sensory associations that formerly had bound the mechanic arts to 
everyday life, artisnal skills, tools, work (248).
43 For more on the roots of the modern use of “technology” see Leo Marx, “Postmodern Pessimism,” 
247-249 and “Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept.” Carl Mitcham's Thinking 
Through Technology also deals with the problems and numerous historical definitions of technology 
(143-154). See also Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek Philosophy of Technology 206-244 in this 
regard.
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In work from modern philosophers and academics such as Bernard Stiegler (Technics 
and Time), Martin Heidegger (“The Question Concerning Technology”), Jaques Ellul 
(The Technological Society), José Ortega y Gasset (Meditación de la técnica), Paul 
DeVore (Technology: An Introduction), and Michel Foucault (“Technologies of the 
Self”) there have been repeated attempts to redefine or augment our notions of what 
“technology” actually refers to, and whole studies have been undertaken in the pursuit 
of a definition with which to begin pedagogy of the subject (Hansen and Froelich)44. 
That such projects must occur suggests that how we currently deploy that word is at best 
unsatisfactory, and at worst obfuscating and misleading. At the heart of the work of 
these thinkers is the idea that technology is more than just material things, that the term 
should include practices and mindsets as well as implements. In contemporary historical 
research this trend is best seen in the deployment of the term “technological system” to 
replace the solely artefact centred discourse that the study of technology had become:
There seems to be a general agreement that any definition of technology 
must  begin  with  material  objects,  but  in  many  cases  the  definition 
extends well beyond the material core...Cultural critics such as Jacques 
Ellul and Lewis Mumford have argued that knowledge and ideology are 
inherently  part  of  the  meaning  of  'technology'...In  recent  years,  the 
meaning of 'technology' has been broadened as historians have come to 
favour  the  'technological  system'  rather  than  the  'machine'  or  the 
'invention'  as  the  basic  unit  of  analysis  (Williams,  “Political  and 
Feminist...” 218).
Even though there has been a move away from artefacts as the definitive subjects of 
history of technology, Marx takes care to remind us that “[a] system is 
'technological'...only if it includes a significant material or artifactual component” 
(“Postmodern Pessimism” footnote 245). Whilst I will argue that it need not be the case 
to define technology by the artefacts around which it is often arrayed, it is absolutely the 
44 Stiegler is most interested in technical (as opposed to natural) objects after Aristotle; Heidegger deals 
with modern technology's treatment of nature as standing reserve; Ellul mostly concerns himself with 
technique, the skills available to a culture clustered around its artefacts, but also lays out a multiple 
point definition of modern technology (79-147); Ortega y Gasset saw technology as fundamental to 
human existence, and as what separates us from nature, but though he considered this to be our natural 
and ideal state, one foot in the world and one foot in the world we make for ourselves, he also saw 
modern technology as of a new order and one that could be too distancing; DeVore saw his object of 
study as “the creation and utilization of adaptive means, including tools, machines, materials, 
techniques and technical systems, and the relation of the behaviour of these elements and systems to 
human beings, society and the civilization process” (xi); Foucault considers the four “specific 
techniques that human beings use to understand themselves,” technologies of production, sign 
systems, power, and of the self; Hansen and Froerlich present prior discourses, but largely leave the 
issue of definition to their readers.
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canonical opinion in every level of the discussion of technology45. The principle 
problem with “technological system” as a more nuanced alternative is that you cannot 
point to one and they are hard to describe, requiring books and papers (at least) to 
outline. I think that this is a loss, and that we can save the word “technology” so that an 
academic usage might be improved upon and yet allow us to still be able to talk about 
specific items relatively independently of the conditions in which they sit, not to say 
that context isn't paramount, but so that we might retain the ability to say “this 
technology” and refer to a particular thing. A “technological system” might be the right 
term for the cultural surrounds of an artefact, instances of which are under extensive 
use, but it doesn't tell us anything about the phenomenological experience of that 
artefact and its classification as an object unless we have a sensitive definition of 
technology to begin with. A cultural aspect is one criteria which defines a technology, 
but it shouldn't be the only thing.
“Technology” remains a remarkably loose term; we might often agree on the 
objects under discussion - computer: yes, coriander: no -, but the specifics of why this 
might be so are vague. What makes a hammer of the same order of objects as an 
industrial press? Does everyone experience this mysterious parity in identical ways, 
allowing for the consensus, or does “technology” define items across a range of 
unrecognised and untheorised responses? What sort of impact on our lives might be 
common to objects defined as technologies? The answers to these sorts of questions can 
be found in most of the works cited above, but the internal contradictions, the consensus 
on the physical, the rigid distinction between more “natural” simple technologies and 
the complexities of modern technologies all point to a need for further work in this area.
I'll begin my own proposed definition by establishing a set of terms that I will 
use throughout this work principally: “technology,” “device,” and “equipment,” but also 
“extension,” “communality,” “incorporation,” and “morphicism.” I also intend to show 
that not only is this specificity essential to attempting nuanced discussions of 
technological artefacts, but that the outlined terms also reveal items as technological 
45 Though this position is not without its detractors, such as Foucault's work in “Technologies of the 
Self” or this description of technological systems from Deleuze and Guattari:
technology  makes  the  mistake  of  considering  tools  in  isolation:  tools  exist  only  in 
relation  to  the  interminglings  they  make  possible  or  that  make  them possible.  The 
stirrup entails a new man-horse symbiosis that at the same time entails new weapons 
and new instruments. Tools are inseparable from symbioses or amalgamations defining 
a Nature-Society machinic assemblage. They presuppose a social machine that selects 
them and takes them into its 'phylum': a society is defined by it amalgamations, not by 
its tools (99-100).
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which would never have, traditionally, been thought of as such. It will be this expansion 
of what might be considered under the term “technology” that will allow us a way-in to 
the next chapter on the “feel” of electronic reading, a chapter which will also further the 
phenomenological experience of technological interaction suggested here.
A common sense definition of technology
So abundant is the use of technology in all human society, from hand tools and basic 
weapons to industrial machinery and nuclear bombs, that the question I’d like to begin 
with seems redundant at fast glance, an elaborate point of clarification perhaps: what is 
a technology? If “technology” refers simply to external tools for getting work done then 
we can be certain that humans have technology at their hearts. We can look at the lives 
led by any nomadic or settled people, in any human habitat, from Inuit tupiq to Bedouin 
bayt char, from favelas to penthouses, and the defining trope of homo sapiens’ existence 
is the use of equipment which extends our ability to ensure our thriving survival. Karl 
Marx saw this placing of ourselves out into the world in our made artefacts as a 
fundamental need: “Humanity needs objects as objects of its life-expression...The true 
human life becomes the externalized life” (“Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts...” 167). As David Rothenberg notes, “[t]echnology is the first act of 
humanity for Marx. Living through techne, we transform nature into history and thus 
into meaning. We cannot do this just by thinking about our place in the world, but only 
through working with the world...carving a world out of nature. Because we are human 
we look for our world outside of ourselves” (Rothenberg 74). Recent archaeological 
evidence offers support for Marx's belief, suggesting that basic tool use, what many 
would see as the first technological interactions, may have been a part of our hominid 
ancestry for over three million years46, but without doubt it has been a part of Homo 
sapiens’ life since its very beginnings, shaping our social structures, eating practices, 
and basic survivability. Taylor states this baldly: “There are seven species of great ape 
on the planet. Six of them live in nature. One cannot live without artificial aid. Humans 
would die without tools, clothes, fire, and shelter” (Artificial 1). Taylor's work 
demonstrates the intimate and inseparable relationship between humans and their tools 
evidenced throughout the archaeological record, and suggests that this combination may 
have actually allowed our species to evolve:
46 See Shannon “Evidence for Stone-Tool-Assisted Consumption...”
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for females at least, some of the 'hands-free' benefits of bipedalism are 
undermined by the need to transport young and keep them safe...[T]hen 
comes the breakthrough: an inspired female picked up a twisted loop of 
animal skin - perhaps some sun-toughened membrane at  a scavenging 
site, or some scorched but not burnt pelt from the embers of a bush fire.  
With the infant seated and the strain off the arm, energy requirements for 
moving with the child plunge, by a massive average 16 percent. So the 
pressure to make this discovery, even to remake it more than once, is 
huge...Although  carrying  slings  do  not  in  themselves  drive  brain-size 
increase, they certainly encourage it. Rather than having to fit a larger 
and larger cranium through a pelvic  girdle that  has contorted itself  to 
support an upright frame, helpless babies can be catered for in a pouch. 
That  they remain  helpless  -  a  week,  a  month,  a  year,  several  years  - 
becomes less critical. So sling technology removed the glass ceiling on 
the degree of ontogenetic retardation (in primate terms, premature birth) 
that genus Homo could begin to accommodate. And that, of course, is the 
solution  to  growing  larger  brains:  you  do  it  once  outside  the  womb 
(Artificial 123-124).
Taylor's thesis is vital in demonstrating just how fundamental tool use is to humans; 
with the theory outlined in the above quotation he positions it so deeply at our heart that 
we could not have come to exist without it.
The phenomenologist and philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty further describes 
how the extension of our bodily capacity continues to help in building up the various 
milieu in which we exist:
The body is  our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it  is 
restricted  to  the  actions  necessary  for  the  conservation  of  life,  and 
accordingly  it  posits  around  us  a  biological  world;  at  other  times, 
elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to 
figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: 
this  is  true  of  motor  skills  such  as  dancing.  Sometimes,  finally,  the 
meaning aimed at  cannot  be achieved by the body’s natural means; it 
must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself 
a cultural world (The Phenomenology of Perception 169).
This thesis will often return to the implications of this quotation because it holds a 
number of key points for the arguments presented: first, that a body is the necessary 
requirement for experiencing the world; second, that there is a root biology necessarily 
related to Darwinian selection which contextualises that body; third, that there is an 
intimate connection between meaningful movements such as dance and the 
“instruments” of technology; fourth, in disagreement, that instrument used can be 
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considered to be “natural” under certain conditions; fifth, that the use of such 
instruments is a projection of previously internalised, or restrictedly externalised 
experiences and meanings; and sixth, that the use of equipment is intimately bound to 
the culture in which the using body sits. Again, in this quotation we see that bodily 
extension is crucial, but somehow “unnatural.” Is this how we should consider our 
technologies in general?
Let’s attempt an initial common sense definition of technology, one which might 
encompass the entire spectrum of human tool use, from hammers to computers: 
Technologies are the implements onto which we offload tasks in order to reduce our 
expense of time or effort, and humans have proved themselves uniquely suited to their 
invention and use. Our interactions with such items are “technological”; “a technology” 
is an instance of an artefact with which we interact in order to accomplish something we 
could not by ourselves, e.g. a car, a hammer, a computer. This I would take to be a fair 
starting point as a contemporary definition of technology. When Heidegger asked “The 
Question Concerning Technology” he also began with what he saw as a common sense 
definition:
We ask  the  question  concerning  technology  when  we ask  what  it  is. 
Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One says: 
Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human 
activity…[This] definition of technology is indeed so uncannily correct 
that it even holds for modern technology, of which, in other respects, we 
maintain  with  some  justification  that  it  is,  in  contrast  to  the  older 
handicraft technology, something completely different and therefore new. 
Even the power plant  with its  turbines and generators is  a  man-made 
means  to  an  end  established  by  man…[T]his  much  remains  correct: 
Modern technology…is a means to an end (312-313).
Aside from introducing the matter of complexity in technology (which he rules out, 
rightly I believe, as significant to a “standard” definition in any case), Heidegger gets to 
the same point from common sense here: technology enables, technology is a human 
activity. It is important to note that even when he progresses away from his original lay 
definition, Heidegger keeps technology at the heart of human experience and as to 
providing a “means to an end,” a method for getting things done.
Why do we need to redefine technology?
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With our initial definition in place it is important to ask why I believe we need to 
abandon, as Heidegger did, the definitions of technology that we already have which 
use these assertions as their base. In short, it is essential because they are not specific 
enough to deal with our complex interactions with items which extend our abilities. 
Some things are blithely referred to as technological, a supercomputer or particle 
collider say, when we encounter them in much the same way as we would a worn-down 
inscription on an unfamiliar monument - we are dimly aware that there is a meaning 
attached to the object, that there is information others may have gleaned, but to us it is 
inaccessible, corrupted, and so smoothly excluding as to be ignored as an inert facet of 
the world. This doesn’t seem to describe our simply understood and precise interactions 
with a hammer or a knife in the actions for which they were designed, and yet these too 
are certainly technologies, the technologies from which all of our current interactions 
have emerged. A nuanced definition of technology should be able to account for the 
experience of the knife and of the collider, to account for initiate and expert use, and to 
recognise that each individual’s encounters are not of the same order. As David 
Rothenberg has argued, a “successful explanation of technology should not blur 
saxophones and motorcycles, nuclear power plants and ball point pens, all into one 
wrong turn in the story of our species” (xiv).
A second, and equally important reason for the clarification, is that this chapter, 
and this thesis as a whole, will argue that the use of equipment is intimately a part of 
what it means to be human, that we use equipment in order to apprehend the world, to 
define our place within it, as extensions of our bodies and cogntion. Any definition of 
technology should also be able to account for the centrality of such activity in our lives, 
and render the phrase “technology is unnatural” as untenable.
In order to avoid using the term “technology” unspecifically I will use the 
archaeological/historiographical/material cultural term “artefact” to describe an object 
produced or affected by human labour, and Heidegger’s term from Being and Time, 
“equipment,” used in its simplest sense: items for getting something done; “[w]e shall 
call those entities which we encounter in concern ‘equipment.’ In our dealings we come 
across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement” (97)47. I 
will tend to favour this latter term as it has at its core, the notion that we encounter such 
items “in concern,” purposively, for “our most basic way of understanding equipment is 
to use it” (Dreyfus, Being 64). This commitment to use must remain in any definition of 
47 For more on Heidegger's use of the term “equipment” see Dreyfus, Being 62-64.
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technology: a technological interaction cannot occur by accident.
Gestalts
Chapter two will consider our perception of and interaction with objects in the world 
more generally, but it is important even at this stage to introduce the idea that we don't 
encounter things in their totality, but instead as an assemblage of what we know and 
what we perceive. Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty described this inability to 
apprehend an object completely as its “horizon”: I am restricted by my body and 
experience of time to only seeing a single plane of an object from a single vantage point 
under a single set of conditions, and am never aware of what occurs within the thing - 
this horizon is insurmountable. We'll return to these ideas, but for now I'm more 
interested in suggesting what makes up a technology, where its boundaries lie.
We encounter objects, all objects, as gestalts, but it is perhaps most obvious with 
the artefacts we create. I’m adopting George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s use of the 
word from their Metaphors We Live By, that of a collection of things that we tend to 
encounter together more frequently than we encounter any of the elements by 
themselves; Lakoff and Johnson say that gestalts “recur together over and over in action 
after action as we go through our daily lives…[T]he complex of properties occurring 
together is more basic to our experience than their separate occurrence” (71). For 
instance, I don’t encounter my computer as a whole when I interact with it, I encounter 
the gestalt, my gestalt, of the computer. To explain this, consider the naming operation 
described in the opening paragraph of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus where they say: “We have assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. 
Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit…Also because it’s 
nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it’s only a 
manner of speaking” (3). Names don’t refer to singular coherent beings for Deleuze and 
Guattari, they are convenient signifiers to describe the polyphonic mass occurring in 
one body, as convenient as saying “the sun rises” and not having to think about the 
optical illusion caused by planetary orbits. In much the same way, I have long used that 
same word “computer” when at first I simply meant “keyboard, mouse, screen, tower, 
and Microsoft Word,” the relatively small gestalt of my first interactions, and now 
intend all the aspects I have accrued knowledge of over years of use. I don’t encounter 
the entirety of the object in the same way I might appear to with a hammer, a simple 
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gestalt of shaft and head48, most of the computer remains inaccessible to me. But then 
the thing breaks and I have to open it up, see where the fan is and how it can get so 
clogged with detritus that it needs a vacuum and a cotton bud to fix it up. And then, as 
that wasn’t so hard, a bit later I crack it open again and learn how to change out RAM, 
maybe add a hard-drive. My point is that the gestalt of the computer is both 
idiosyncratic and maleable; I can add to what the word “computer” means to me. I 
encounter the computer as a delimited, but non-intersubjective thing, even if I say “that 
computer over there,” because amongst the world’s computer users we are unlikely to 
agree on what exactly it comprises of. The horizon of the specific computer alters as we 
engage with it in different ways, and thereby alters what we intend by the word when 
we describe the class of equipment. Borges' “Funes the Memorious” comes to mind, a 
short story describing the fate of Ireneo Funes, a teenager with a perfect memory of 
every aspect of the world that he has seen. Funes cannot conceive of how the word 
“dog” “embraces so many unlike individuals of diverse size and form; it bothered him 
that the dog at three fourteen (seen from the side) should have the same name as the dog 
at three fifteen (seen from the front)” (Labyrinths 93-94). “Computer” also so changes; 
if I don’t know that something is a part of a computer then I’m not referring to it when I 
say the word, I’m just setting my own personal boundaries of interaction under a word 
that everyone else is using to do the same thing; I’m saying that the sun rises.
It is the gestalt which determines the actions I conceive of as being enabled by 
the implement, rather than some realistic totality of the artefact's strictures. What would 
it mean to say that a computer or an e-reader is a technology under these conditions? 
Only that we perceive our interaction with the gestalt we have access to as being 
somehow technological49. This still says nothing about why the gestalt should be 
considered as a technology, however, unless the only rubric for a technology is that it is 
an item used to achieve a goal. As previously stated, it is this assertion that must be 
enriched and to which we must now turn.
Four criteria
48 Even then we might well say that we do not have access to the entirety of the hammer, we may be  
unaware  of  any  number  of  things  which  contribute  to  its  makeup -  the  glue  which  binds  it,  its 
molecular or atomic structure, its stress fractures and imperfections, weak and sweet spots, etc. For 
more on the always hidden aspects of objects see Harman Tool-Being throughout.
49 This notion of gestalt artefacts will be important as the perception of some combination of elements 
might be seen as technological whilst another may not.
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I will defend my reasoning for each of the following criteria, but first I’d like to simply 
outline what I take to be the minimum effects an interaction with an artefact has to 
cause or enable in order for that artefact to be considered a technology. To begin with, to 
make the topic as approachable as possible at first pass, we will consider only 
contemporary human interactions with objects most would likely readily define as being 
technologies under the common sense definition outlined above, items such as tools, 
weapons, computers, cars, and e-readers. Only later will we move on to interactions 
which may prove more controversial to define as being technological.
The four criteria I believe equipment must abide by in order to be considered as 
“technological” are:
• Technologies EXTEND our means or abilities to accomplish tasks.
• Technologies are COMMUNAL, existing only in communities of users.
• Technologies are able to become, if only temporarily, skilfully 
INCORPORATED into our bodies and minds.
• Technologies have an effect on their users, they are MORPHING.
So: Extension, Communality, Incorporation, and Morphicism; it is on these terms which 
I will defend aspects of digitisation, and problematise aspects of codex reading, not in 
order to point score for either side, but instead to show how a fuller understanding of 
technology allows for a more thorough consideration of how we represent and consume 
written works.
Extension
For a gestalt artefact to be considered a technology, i.e. equipment at the heart of a 
technological interaction, it must extend our capabilities. This assertion is deeply rooted 
in any lay definition of technology, and also in Heidegger’s notion of equipment. When 
we approach an object with a concern or purpose it is because we are able to achieve 
something through our dealings with it that we could not achieve by ourselves, or the 
interaction saves us time or effort (again this is about achievement, of a faster speed, or 
a less tiring process). We shouldn’t, however, think of technologies as merely 
implements which exist outside of ourselves to which we must turn in order to perform 
a task, but instead as equipment which alters the set of default practices we consider 
ourselves able to achieve in their absence, i.e. if something changes the practices 
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available to us then it moves toward being considered as a technology. We could not 
travel at speed without cars and planes, we could not type and print without computers, 
we could not have hunted effectively without spears nor butchered the catch without 
knives, and we cannot even intend to do so without these items:
it is not too much philosophy to say that the emergence of technology 
was and is intimately connected with the extension of the range of human 
intentionality. Without a car...I could not have intended to go fishing..., 
given  the  distance  involved;  without  a  stone  tool  technology,  our 
prehistoric ancestors could not have had the intention to kill big game...
[T]he existence of objects, such as saucepans, not just allows actions but 
suggests them (Taylor, Artificial 152).
This is what makes invention such a significant skill - the identifying of gaps in human 
experience which might be reliably filled by a new apparatus which expands the 
repertoire of what we are able to achieve is not the experience of the average user of 
equipment, though it is, in whatever flash of insight, theoretically available to anyone. 
When it comes to reliable and repeatable equipment use we still pride those individuals 
capable of spotting gaps in our experience, but this isn't an aspect of what makes 
something a technology.
Marshall McLuhan suggested that media technologies are augmentations 
(extensions) of our basic discursive apparatuses; the phone, for instance, augments the 
mouth and ear, the television the eye, the clothing the skin etc. (The Medium... 31-40). 
All technologies must extend some aspect of ourselves in this way, whether relatively 
trivially such as a shoe extending the range of abilities achievable by the foot (covering 
rough terrain, sports use, etc.), or profound, such as the spear’s extension of the hunter’s 
arm, allowing for an immense shift in our culture and comestibles, and every change 
that is entailed by such a shift. This capacity for extension, or at least our panoply of 
extensive interactions, is a uniquely human trait: “We alone on the planet seem capable 
of creating and exploiting such a wide variety of action amplifiers, ranging from 
hammers and screwdrivers, to archery bows and bagpipes, to planes, trains, and 
automobiles” (Clark, Supersizing 157). Extension via equipment, far from being 
somehow outside of our nature, is a norm in all human societies. When a Neo-Luddite 
suggests that technology is unnatural are they suggesting that “natural” means “not 
human,” that technology is the not-human, an extension too far; can anything human be 
natural? To say that something is unnatural because it is human is simple enough, and 
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holds in all cases, but the resistant commentators seen at the start of the chapter are 
certainly not using “unnatural” in this way; some things are described as unnatural 
because they don't fit the human form or a preferred way of being in the world. The iPad 
doesn’t feel wrong in the hand because it is a human thing and therefore unnatural, 
instead, the arguments go, it is because it doesn't conform to the human that its 
unnaturalness is made apparent. In the quotation from Williams above it is not that 
human labour is unnatural, but instead that the machines that separate us from the world 
prevent an interaction which is somehow natural in itself. In saying why technology is 
natural or unnatural we must also therefore come to some preliminary conclusion as to 
what “natural” even means. To say simply that it is just the not-human is to construct 
nature artificially, by sterile différance. There seems to be an often deployed definition 
of nature, however, which allows in some human interactions as long as they are 
visceral. Tribal life or antiquated methods of production are often seen as more natural 
because they are somehow “in touch” with that non-human world, because they don't 
have a strongly mediating layer of equipment between us and things as they are, a 
noumenal world. A trowel is different from an industrial digger in this regard, the 
former allows us to get our hands dirty. The use of the body as far as possible without 
equipment is positioned as the more natural mode of engagement so that when it is said 
that technology, as a class of objects, is unnatural it is implied that it moves the body 
further away from the work to be done, or the substance that the work is performed 
upon.
This doesn't seem right, however, as much of the work to be done is inspired by 
prior extension, extension which allows us to even conceive of the desired outcomes. A 
trowel or spade may seem to place less distance between its user and the world worked 
upon than the industrial digger, but the digger could not have been conceived of without 
the use of the spade; the work to be done doesn't alter in kind, but its extent and our 
perception of effort in achieving it does. Inherent, then, in this discussion, are two broad 
kinds of “natural”: i) a pre-human world in which we are most natural when we are 
most inert and ii) a pre-extension “human nature” which we deviate from when we 
place a greater distance between our bodies and the work in the world. I will say it 
plainly: i) is a philosophical/ethical/ecological question which should have no bearing 
on the definition of technology. Doing damage to a pre-human nature (if such exists in 
your milieu) with a tool or any other artefact is just a more efficient way of marauding 
unaided, pulling each blade of grass up with the fingers and kicking over every tree. 
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How we choose to act in the wold may well be against a pre-human nature, but it 
doesn't help us to define the tools with which we act even if those tools seem to promote 
new abilities. A kitchen knife offers both chopped carrots and a back-alley stabbing, and 
whilst the availability of these extended abilities are part of what the tool is to us, and 
therefore a part of defining whether it is a technology or not, which action we choose to 
undertake isn't. i) is part of a discussion of nature, and may or may not be true, but for 
our purposes it says nothing about the naturalness or unnaturalness of technology, nor 
the special cases of codex/e-reading.
ii) is more interesting for our discussion here. Technology is unnatural if it is not 
in our nature or it removes us too far from the world. Tool use and extension, I hope, is 
obviously within our nature when it comes to hammers and spears, but we perhaps 
blanche a little more at the thought of cars and colliders. We will continue to explore 
this idea of distance from the world on into the next chapter, and I hope to fully confirm 
the use of technology as being a part of our human nature. In this way I hope to refute 
the idea of technology as being inherently unnatural (at least as far as these two broad 
distinctions are concerned) and to show that electronic equipment for reading is no more 
or less natural than a codex.
Extension:  The  e-reader  and  the  codex  extend  our  ability  to  store  
information and alter our conception of what we can achieve.
Communality
For a gestalt artefact to be considered a technology, i.e. equipment at the heart of a 
technological interaction, it must exist in a community of users, prompters, or refiners. 
This criteria is indebted to the work of “technique” philosophers such as Ellul who 
consider technology to be defined by the mode of thought that it prompts in a society, 
something captured, at least in part, by the historiographical term “technological 
system.” I would like to suggest, however, that the best way to understand technology 
lies not in its either being the artefact(s) under consideration, or its/their cultural 
entailments, but instead a blend of the material, the personal, and the social as they 
affect a particular interaction. Here I will introduce the idea that equipment is 
encounterable without that encounter being technological.
“A technology” is always a shorthand for a set of specific community-structured 
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interactions clustered around an artefact which is itself an encounterable yet alterable 
gestalt. Under the criteria of “communality” comes the notion that technological 
interactions are always motivated and structured by communal pressures. Note that 
when I say “communality” I have explicitly chosen it over “culturality.” “Culture” is a 
loaded term, and can imply fairly strict delineations; “community,” on the other hand, 
can be any grouping from societies down to subcultures, small groups, or even pairings. 
Any of these different sized communities can exert quasi-cultural effects, where 
“cultural” refers to the set of pressures a community exerts on its members. By avoiding 
the term “culture,” if not “cultural,” we can account for the existence of newly 
developed technologies in niche groups such as computer hackers, circus performers, 
inventors, Formula One teams, or quantum-physicists, equipment which would not be 
encountered, I will argue, as technological by the wider society in which those groups 
exist.
To further define communality, let’s consider the inception of tool use: 
“Innovative tool use could have occurred countless thousands of times without resulting 
in an established toolmaking industry, unless the individual who ‘invented’ the tool 
could remember and re-enact or reproduce the operations involved and then 
communicate them to others” (Donald, Origins 179). When a single being, through trial 
and error, was able to crack open a hard shelled nut with a rock for the first time they 
did not create a technology, and their interaction with the rock was not technological. 
Technologies emerge when that work is driven by cultural pressures and enters into a 
community. It is in a community that the drive to repeat such tasks is refined, through 
being able to access food others can’t in this instance, thereby achieving hierarchical or 
survivable advantage, or through a community’s inspiration to attempt experiments in 
the first place and in the future.
Beyond motivation and support for new creations, it is community that provides 
tool users with various skill sets and practices which it would be impossible to accrue 
through a lifetime of trial and error:
humans link with a vast and diverse cultural matrix in early infancy and 
profit  from  the  rich  storehouses  of  knowledge  and  skill  that  have 
accumulated in our cultural memory over many millennia…The human 
brain is the only brain in the biosphere whose potential cannot be realized  
on  its  own.  It  needs  to  become  part  of  a  network  before  its  design 
features can be expressed (Donald, So Rare 150&324).
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This assertion is crucial to the thesis of Donald’s work in A Mind So Rare - his placing 
of consciousness as the driving force of human evolution is supplemented by the idea 
that it is as communal agents, able to offload skills and problems into a “cultural 
memory” to be drawn on as needed, that we were able to emerge as skilled equipment 
users, technically adept and able to adapt rapidly to whatever environmental pressures 
we might face. Donald states that we cannot reach capabilities that most of us would 
consider to be fundamental without enculturation; there are elements of our minds 
which will not come “on-line” until we are embedded amongst cultural pressures. Our 
capacity for spoken language use, for example, though we are genetically predisposed to 
rapidly acquire it (or some form of abstract symbolic representation such as sign 
language), will lie dormant until cultural pressures prompt it into being. We will also see 
in the next section that the pedagogical requirements of any apprenticeship, including 
learning to drive and even how to use a computer, demonstrate that culture is a 
fundamental requirement of achieving any reliable skill set. “Our cultures invade us and 
set our agendas,” says Donald,
[o]nce we have internalized the symbolic conventions of a culture, we 
can never again be truly alone in semantic space,  even if  we were to 
withdraw  to  a  hermitage  or  spend  the  rest  of  our  lives  in  solitary 
confinement. Big Brother culture owns us because it gets to us early. As a 
result, we internalize its norms and habits at a very basic level. We have 
no choice in this (So Rare 298-299).
A significant aspect of the definition outlined here is that technologies exist only 
in extended webs of interaction by multiple parties, and part of encountering an artefact 
as a technology is the common experience of it as such. There is no reason to practice 
the skilful use of equipment outside of a community, no evolution of use will occur 
without sustained interaction by multiple members of a group; use stagnates without a 
cultural drive to excel.
“Communality,” then, is the requirement only that a technology cannot exist as 
such in the mind of just one person (we will later consider another branch of 
interactions with equipment, devices, which are non-technical/technological, and we 
will see that one of its defining characteristics is its occurrence comparatively 
independent of a community’s cultural pressures). The standardised use of an artefact in 
a community is one “mark” of the technological50.
50 Extension is too fundamental to be considered an indicator that a particular interaction should be 
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One final point about communality inspired by Donald’s words above: can 
someone create a technology if they retreat out of any community interaction to live 
alone? If someone working in the woods for long stretches, for months or years, comes 
up with new equipment for accomplishing a task, a new tool say, can their interaction 
with it be thought of as technological, will it become a technology for them where no 
community exists to aid its standardisation? I believe so, because that person, in this 
special case, brings their community with them, much as Donald describes. Shaun 
Gallagher and Dan Zahavi similarly see this community effect in shaping our perception 
of objects: “something affords me possibilities, only because I have seen some of those 
possibilities actualized by others...[A]lthough they may not be perceptually present, 
they are potentially and implicitly involved in the very structure of my perception” 
(Phenomenological Mind 103).
I don’t believe, however, that a technological interaction is possible from a 
person with no prior knowledge of a community. The experiences of so called “feral” 
children51, for instance, have told us much about the brain's dependency on cultural 
forces for it to reach its full symbolic capacity: “Socially isolated humans do not 
develop language or any form of symbolic thought and have no true symbols of any 
kind. In fact, the isolated human brain does not act like a symbolizing organ…It is 
apparently unable to generate symbolic representations on its own. It does so only 
through intensive enculturation” (Donald, So Rare 150). The same can be said of a child 
who is too young to take on board the pressures of its own limited milieu; cut off from 
communal pressures technological interactions are impossible. But such interactions can 
become standardised in the gaze of an internal community which continues to shape the 
mind of our creator in the woods. This could only be empirically evidenced by the types 
of equipment which would be produced by people of different cultures entering into 
isolation: they would, presumably, reflect the cultures from which those persons have 
been exiled, showing what values have been instilled, what is most important, the 
preference of efficiency or craft, etc., but without systematic study this must remain 
speculative. For the moment it will instead suffice to say that community forces, both 
immediate and internalised, shape which aspects of the gestalt artefact are encountered 
and privileged, what interactions might occur, and the drive to produce such interactions 
considered as technological; extension is the interaction under consideration, not a potential mark of 
its nature.
51 For more on feral children see Michael Newton's Savage Boys and Wild Girls: A History of Feral 
Children.
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in the first place.
Communality:  E-readers and codices  exist  in communities of  users of  
every scale, from international groups of millions or billions down to  
small  groups  of  specialists.  These  communities  structure  every  user's  
interactions with these artefacts, determining to some extent the gestalt  
that is encountered and the uses to which it is put.
Incorporation
For a gestalt artefact to be considered a technology, i.e. equipment at the heart of a 
technological interaction, it must have the capacity to be incorporated into the user’s 
body schema through skilful use. When we encounter an artefact as equipment we can 
refine that usage, standardise it, and go some way to making it automatic. When we first 
use a saw for instance, the jarring back and forth as the teeth catch in the grain are a 
world away from the expert carpenter’s easy push and draw. Here lies another problem 
in a unifying definition of technology: if encountering a saw in use can be considered as 
a technological interaction then should that term apply equally to both uses of the 
equipment? Certainly both the novice and the expert user are extending their range of 
considered abilities, neither could hope to cleanly break the wood without the 
equipment, but the modes of interaction are so significantly different from one to the 
other that we should consider one to be technological and the other not: we can say that 
the novice’s experience is not technological, and that they do not encounter the saw as a 
technology. Even if the saw exists with communal pressures for the user, for instance if 
they have entered into an apprenticeship, and they are entering the discourse 
surrounding the use of the tool which shapes the gestalt encountered and the interactions 
attempted, we should not consider their initiate experience to be of the same order as 
that of the master teaching them, despite the meeting of the first two criteria, extension 
and communality. The notion of “incorporation” is the criteria to be met in order to 
enable us to make this distinction, and it applies to computing, car driving, and 
machine-gun firing as readily as it does to simple tool use.
What distinguishes the expert user is that the saw feels like a true extension of 
their abilities. It is not just that the tool opens new possibilities, but that those new 
possibilities are encountered by a body augmented by the equipment; the equipment is 
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properly thought of as a part of the body during expert use, a soft-assemblage where 
components temporarily come together, and are just as easily separated, but when so 
joined allow for a function far greater than either component of this new machine in 
isolation. Andy Clark describes such a union between user and technology as 
“transparent”:
Transparent technologies are those tools that become so well  fitted to, 
and integrated  with,  our  own lives  and  projects  that  they  are…pretty 
much invisible-in-use. These tools or resources are usually no more the 
object of our conscious thought and reason than is the pen with which we 
write,  the  hand  that  holds  it  while  writing,  or  the  various  neural 
subsystems that form the grip and guide the fingers. All three items, the 
pen, the hand, and the unconsciously operating neural mechanisms, are 
pretty much on a par. And it is this parity that ultimately blurs the line 
between the intelligent system and its best tools for thought and action…
There is no merger so intimate as that which is barely noticed (Natural-
Born 28-29).
In order to understand how the body can achieve such a synthesis, and to defend its use 
as one of the defining traits of a technological interaction, I will take some time to 
explore its discussion in several academic discourses, principally from philosophy and 
neuropsychology. Incorporation is probably the most controversial of the four criteria, 
but it is vital to what this chapter is trying to argue: Technologies are indeed a class of 
thing, but those things, as experienced, are constrained only by the perception of users. 
If a user experiences an artefact as a technology then that is what it is, if they do not 
then it is not. This is one way to understand the perceptual difference between those 
who enjoy reading on screen and those who are troubled by it: the first group have, or 
are on the way to forming reliable technological interactions with the equipment. The 
four criteria are intended only to define the terms of an experience which might be 
appreciated as technological, and the criteria of incorporation eliminates a substantial 
amount of artefacts from that class “technology.” To make it clear: the novice or 
inexpert user encounters, in some significant way, a different artefact to the expert who 
brings the object “on-board” with their body. If artefacts are only ever apprehended as 
gestalts then experienced use alters the size and complexity of the collection. We will 
return to the implications of these ideas in more detail in chapter two; for now I will 
limit the discussion to the act of incorporation.
Firstly I’d like to introduce the notion of a body schema, a classical neurological 
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paradigm which has been reinvigorated by contemporary research. The body schema is 
essentially the mind’s internal representation of the material body’s external boundaries 
and position in space:
The  somewhat  anecdotal  concept  of  body  schema  has  been  greatly 
enriched by modern neuroscience…First it has been found that besides 
proprioception[,  the  awareness  of  one’s  limbs  in  space,  particularly 
focussed on feedback from joints],  other sensory modalities (typically 
somatosensory[,  sensory  reception  from  skin,  muscle,  bone,  internal 
organs,  and  cardiovascular  system,]  and  visual)  are  crucial  to  its 
construction…Second,  single-neuron  recordings  in  the  monkey  brain 
have changed the vision of a ‘purely perceptual’ construction of a body 
map in the brain towards a more multicomponential, action-oriented one. 
In this view, multiple fronto-parietal networks integrate information from 
discrete regions of the body surface and external space in a way which is 
functionally  relevant  to  specific  actions  performed  by  different  body 
parts (Maravita & Iriki 79).
Angelo Maravita and Atsushi Iriki here outline how that mental representation of the 
gross bodily form is created and constantly updated, and part of that updating includes 
an action element: rather than just forming from idle sensory perception, the body learns 
about itself by acting, becoming aware of how its surfaces and forms functionally relate 
to an immediate environment52. Donald refers to this body schema as the “perceptual 
homunculus,” our sense of perceptual self:
It does not tolerate blatantly contradictory messages...A unified personal 
homunculus  is  a  crucially  important  point  of reference for calculating 
position,  for  coordinating  movement  velocity  and  direction,  and 
especially  for  interpreting  and  directing  self-action.  To  achieve  this 
satisfactorily,  the  sensory  homunculus  must  convey  an  accurate 
impression of our own bodies, located in an objective, three-dimensional 
space...This perceptual homunculus is no illusion, but it  should not be 
confused with the Cartesian homunculus that is currently under attack 
from  so  many  scholarly  quarters.  That  abstract  eighteenth-century 
philosophical category does not do justice to the body-based homunculus 
52 For a survey of the confusion in distinguishing between body image and schema in psychology, 
cognitive science, and phenomenology see Shaun Gallagher (How the Body 1-24). Gallagher identifies 
the body schema as
neither a perception, nor a conceptual understanding, nor an emotional apprehension of 
the body. As distinct from body image it involves a prenoetic performance of the body. 
A prenoetic  performance  is  one  that  helps  to  structure  consciousness,  but  does  not  
explicitly show itself in the contents of consciousness (29).
A body image, a conceptual understanding of our body in space, separates us from our environment, 
whereas a body schema acts in concert with, or even incorporates aspects of that environment (38).
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I am describing, which is nothing less than the integrated neural footprint 
of our embodiment, a deeply rooted perceptual and motor phenomenon, 
and  the  underpinning  of  a  unified  physical  selfhood.  Our  complex 
egocenter is really a brain model of the physical self and the primary 
source of self-awareness (So Rare 135).
To separate our minds from our bodies is to fall into the trap of Cartesian dualism, to 
suggest that there is a self that somehow exists as a “ghost in the machine” of our 
physical existence. The perceptual homunculus is not akin to this idea, but it does 
recognise that there are components of our being that, though fully integrated with and 
constructed by our physical experience, are nonetheless experienced as virtual 
phenomena at the last instance; the perceptual homunculus, or body schema, is made up 
of our cumulative mental representations of our physical form and used to guide our 
actions. When we use a hammer there is a large amount of virtual mental model 
building (one of the primary reasons for the existence of the homunculus) that occurs in 
order to allow us to accurately position the face of the tool for a good strike. For this 
reason I would like to suggest that it is this homunculus that can be extended by 
technological interactions, and that it is significantly altered during a process of 
incorporation. When the carpenter uses her saw it becomes softly assembled into her 
body schema; when we say that it extends the abilities of her arm we can also say that 
the mental representation of the assemblage of the arm alters to include the tool, and this 
new assemblage necessarily has new qualities, and therefore new abilities, over the 
previously skin, bone, and flesh “hard” assemblage of her pre-extension body. Walter 
Ong hinted at something similar when he said that “intelligence is relentlessly reflexive, 
so that even the external tools that it uses to implement its working become 
'internalized,' that is, part of is own reflexive process” (Orality 81).
When the carpenter uses her saw she no longer has to think about it, anymore 
than we must think about the pressures and tensions in our hands and arms when we 
reach to pick up an object53. The same cannot be said of the interactions of the novice 
53 Clark outlines this mechanism:
Posterior parietal subsystems…operate unconsciously when we reach out to grasp an 
object,  adjusting hand orientation and finger placement appropriately. The conscious 
agent seldom bothers  herself  with these details;  she simply decides to reach for  the 
object, and does so, fluently and efficiently. The conscious parts of her brain learned 
long ago that they could simply count on the posterior parietal structures to kick in and 
fine-tune the reaching as needed. In just the same way, the conscious and unconscious 
parts of the brain learn to factor in the operation of various nonbiological tools and 
resources,  creating  an  extended  problem-solving  matrix  whose  degree  of  fluid 
integration can sometimes rival that found within the brain itself (Natural-Born 31-32).
54
user who is cripplingly aware of every aspect of the interaction and the challenge of 
linking each discrete event together. Part of the teaching during an apprenticeship will 
be the repetition of motions, over and over and over, until conscious contemplation need 
no longer occur. This is a process identical to that of learning to walk in infancy: the 
body must learn how to co-ordinate its assemblage in such a way that it functions, 
unconsciously, as a seamless unit, in short it must form its body schema during use. As 
Clark describes it,
what is special about human brains, and what best explains the distinctive 
features of human intelligence, is precisely their ability to enter into deep 
and  complex  relationships  with  nonbiological  constructs,  props,  and 
aids…We have been designed, by Mother Nature, to exploit deep neural 
plasticity in order to become one with our best and most reliable tools 
(Natural-Born 5-7).
“Deep neural plasticity” describes the body schema’s, the perceptual homunculus’, 
constant updating and refining of itself, the deployment of novel strategies when inbuilt 
routines fail us, the brain's ability to “rewire” pathways to perform new tasks rather than 
relying on the ossified channels of past successful strategies, and the acceptance of 
external equipment into its fluid being. It is this drive to become one that we see in 
apprenticeship, the forcing of the painfully conscious into unconsciousness. This forms 
the basis of the second important assertion for the notion of incorporation: technological 
use is skilful use; skilful use is unconscious; in order to differentiate between the 
experience of the novice and the expert we will say that the expert encounters the 
equipment of their expertise skilfully; thus the expert experiences an unconscious, 
skilful interaction with their equipment, a technological interaction, whereas the novice 
does not - a saw is not a technology to the initiate. Incorporation is the skilful 
deployment of equipment in extension rehearsed into invisibility. “Skill results from 
rehearsal, systematic improvement, and the chaining of mimetic acts into hierarchies…
Whether we are learning to weave, manufacture tools, or cook food, we must learn a set 
of basic action sequences, generalize them, and rehearse them until they become second 
nature” (Donald, So Rare 264). This goes some way to explaining why the Large 
Hadron Collider is not of the same order of objects as my mobile phone. The criteria of 
incorporation, perhaps unintuitively, tells us that as I do not experience the Large 
Hadron Collider skilfully, invisibly, then I do not encounter it as a technology.
This idea of invisibility has been represented in various ways across various 
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disciplines, though to my knowledge no one else has suggested that it should be 
considered as a defining element of what constitutes a technology. I would like to 
consider a few of these representations to better elucidate and justify the notion of 
incorporation before looking at some further implications of the criteria.
Let’s first take a literary example, though one which also draws on the evidence 
of neuroscience. David Foster Wallace’s treatment of human reaction times in tennis, 
detailed in his essay for The New York Times on Roger “Federer as Religious 
Experience” is such a perfect description of the act of incorporation that I am attempting 
to outline that it is worth quoting at some length:
Mario Ancic’s first serve…often comes in around 130 m.p.h. Since it’s 
78 feet from Ancic’s baseline to yours, that means it takes 0.41 seconds 
for his serve to reach you…This is less than the time it takes to blink 
quickly, twice…The upshot is that pro tennis involves intervals of time 
too brief for deliberate action. Temporally, we’re more in the operative 
range  of  reflexes,  purely  physical  reactions  that  bypass  conscious 
thought. And yet an effective return of serve depends on a large set of 
decisions and physical adjustments that are a whole lot more involved 
and intentional than blinking, jumping when startled, etc…Successfully 
returning a hard-served tennis ball requires what’s sometimes called “the 
kinesthetic sense”...English has a whole cloud of terms for various parts 
of this ability: feel, touch, form, proprioception, coordination, hand-eye 
coordination,  kinesthesia,  grace,  control,  reflexes,  and  so  on.  For 
promising junior players, refining the kinesthetic sense is the main goal 
of the extreme daily practice regimens we often hear about…The training 
here is both muscular and neurological. Hitting thousands of strokes, day 
after day, develops the ability to do by “feel” what cannot be done by 
regular  conscious  thought.  Repetitive  practice  like  this  often  looks 
tedious or even cruel to an outsider, but the outsider can’t  feel what’s 
going on inside the player - tiny adjustments, over and over, and a sense 
of each change’s effects that gets more and more acute even as it recedes 
from normal consciousness.
The complexity of using a tennis racquet accurately and at speed requires hours of 
practice in order for it to be truly accepted into the body schema. This is because of the 
fine grain of the control required. It can be likened to using a pole to extend our reach - 
if we stand on one side of a room and reach across it with a long broom handle we 
might, with very little practice, be able to hit something hanging from the ceiling, like a 
piñata, on the other side. Flicking a light switch, however, would be far harder, taking 
many attempts to determine heft and balance accurately etc. A single returning stroke in 
expert tennis play is maybe comparable to using the broom handle to type a short word 
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on a computer keyboard suspended on the opposite wall. In 0.41 seconds. The only way 
to achieve such results is to make the racquet as dextrous a part of the body as the hand 
which holds it54. As Wallace goes on to point out, this is the same process by which 
people learn to drive cars. The novice driver does not experience their ever-growing 
gestalt of the vehicle as a technology, but slowly, as their expertise increases, they will 
sublimate all of the little gestures and sweeping movements that must occur in order to 
control a car and assess the driving environment, and it is only at this point that their 
interaction might properly be considered as technological.
The neurologist Frank Wilson, in his work The Hand, writes about the act of 
becoming one with objects, and it is from the following quotation that I have 
appropriated the term “incorporation”:
this phenomenon itself may take its origin from countless monkeys who 
spent countless eons becoming one with tree branches. The mystical feel 
comes  from  the  combination  of  a  good  mechanical  marriage  and 
something in the nervous system that can make an object external to the 
body feel as if it had sprouted from the hand, foot, or (rarely) some other 
place on the body where your skin makes contact with it…The contexts 
in which this bonding occurs are so varied that there is no single word 
that  adequately conveys either the process or the many variants of its 
final  form.  One  term that  might  qualify  is  ‘incorporation’ -  bringing 
something  into,  or  making it  part  of,  the  body.  It  is  a  commonplace 
experience, familiar to anyone who has ever played a musical instrument, 
eaten with a fork or chopsticks, ridden a bicycle, or driven a car (63).
Again, the body schema is restructured to incorporate external material objects into its 
perceptual model; the boundary line of the skin no longer functionally applies. Whether 
this opens up the idea of monkeys experiencing tree branches as technological depends 
on how we negotiate the second criteria of “communality.” Is there a cultural pressure 
for monkeys to deploy tree branches in locomotion? Would a monkey raised in isolation 
spontaneously deploy the brachiating swing so typical of their species in the wild? If 
not, if there is a strong cultural element to the monkey’s movement through the 
54 In their review of the contemporary field in cognitive psychology, Maravita and Iriki look at tool-use 
studies which support this notion of complexity requiring proportional training:
Intriguingly, whilst in some studies on humans the reported behavioural effects of tool-
use  occurred  without  any  specific  training…,  in  other  studies  substantial  tool-use 
training was required to elicit these effects…It might be that simple acts, like pointing…
or reaching with a stick will show behavioural effects without training, whereas more 
complex tasks involving dextrous use of a tool, such as retrieving objects with a rake…, 
require some training before any behavioural effects will emerge (84).
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branches, then perhaps we should also consider that to be a technological interaction. 
My argument is not, unlike Heidegger's original common sense definition, that 
technology is an exclusively human preserve, only that the extent to which we can bring 
a vast array of equipment “on-board” is a uniquely human trait; that it is not ability, but 
malleability which singles us out.
In their review, Maravita and Iriki consider the mechanism for such acts of 
incorporation, examining in particular the research into 
[w]hat happens in our brain when we use a tool to reach for a distant 
object…Recent  neurophysiological,  psychological  and 
neuropsychological research suggests that this extended motor capability 
is followed by changes in specific neural networks that hold an updated 
map of body shape and posture (the putative ‘Body Schema’ of classical 
neurology).  These  changes  are  compatible  with  the  notion  of  the 
inclusion of tools in the ‘Body Schema,’ as if our own effector (e.g. the 
hand) were elongated to the tip of the tool (79).
The evidence presented in this review provides empirical support for Wilson’s notion of 
incorporation, and also for the distinct criteria of technology to which I have attached 
that term. Maravita and Iriki begin by describing the neuroanatomical discovery of 
“premotor, parietal and putaminal neurons that respond both to somatosensory 
information from a given body region (i.e. the somatosensory Receptive Field; sRF), 
and to visual information from the space (visual Receptive Field; vRF) adjacent to it” 
(Maravita 79). This is to say that there are “bimodal” neurons which fire both in 
response to the somatosensory sensation (physical experience) of a body surface such as 
the hand, and also in response to visual stimulus in the area immediately surrounding 
that surface. Referring to two studies in particular, one conducted by Iriki55, Maravita 
and Iriki outline the training of Japanese macaques to use a rake to reach for a food 
pellet dispensed out of their (the macaques) reach56. “In these monkeys, neuronal 
activity was recorded from the intraparietal cortex, where somatosensory and visual 
information is integrated” (Maravita 79). The studies aimed to record the activity of the 
bimodal neurons in this area. When using the rake for a sustained period of time, 
training its use, the monkeys' bimodal neurons fired in response to visual stimulus 
surrounding not just the hand, but also in the area around the tool; the mind of the 
55 Iriki et al “Coding of Modified Body Schema...” and Ishibashi et al “Acquisition and Development of 
Monkey Tool Use.”
56 Japanese macaques “rarely exhibit tool-use behaviour in their natural habitat” (79).
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macaque had begun to treat the rake as a part of its body, it had been incorporated into 
its body schema57.
(Maravita and Iriki 80).
Maravita and Iriki conclude from this evidence that “[s]uch vRF expansions may 
constitute the neural substrate of use-dependent assimilation of the tool into the body 
schema, suggested by classical neurology…Hence, any expansion of the vRF only 
followed active, intentional usage of the tool, not its mere grasping by the hand” (79-
81)58. Here we have crucial evidence of the nature of encountering equipment in use, 
rather than as an uninteracted-with object; incorporation into the body schema only 
occurs during interaction. A hammer held at one’s side, or on one’s belt, is not in skilful 
use, and is not therefore encountered in a technological interaction. It is only during the 
deployment of an artefact as equipment that the experienced gestalt can be considered 
as a technology, i.e. a technology comes into being only during use.
57 Evidence for incorporation during human tool use supports the findings of the more invasive 
procedures used to study the macaques. See for instance Carlson et al “Rapid Assimilation of External 
Objects Into the Body Schema.”
58 For a similar, though perhaps less compelling (as less invasive) example of incorporation in humans 
see Berti et al “When Far Becomes Near...” In this study a patient who suffered from near space 
“neglect” in the right hand side of their field of vision following a stroke (i.e. the patient perceived 
nothing in their right hand field of vision which the brain would code as being “near” to (as opposed 
to “far from”) them) was nevertheless able to perceive objects coded as “far from” on both sides. 
When using a tool visible in their right field of vision the patient could extend the effects of their 
neglect to objects which became coded as “near” because in reach of the tool, i.e. the brain 
incorporated the tool to such a degree that it's reach equated the arms reach in causing the brain to 
code items as near or far; “the tool was coded as part of the patient’s hand, as in monkeys [in Maravita 
and Iriki's review], causing an expansion of the representation of the body schema. This affected the 
spatial relation between far space and the body...[P]eripersonal space was expanded to include the far 
space reachable by the tool” (418).
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Consider throwing a stone at a seagull: this is not a technological interaction. 
But refine the skill to a reliable hunting technique and suddenly the stone is an artefact 
at the heart of a skilful experience. We can think of computers in the same way: 
stumbling around the screen, hunting and pecking at the keyboard, having icons pointed 
out to you, learning how to double click with sufficient accuracy and speed (anyone 
who’s forgotten the difficulties of such things should attempt basic tech. support for any 
user who has managed to remain basically insulated from our culture's obsession with 
screens), these are not technological interactions. But to the experienced computer user 
(and what they have made that term mean for themselves with regard to their gestalt), 
the computer forms the heart of a technological interaction. The physical artefact is not 
a technology on its own terms, it cannot be, anymore than can the stone. It is only a 
technology when encountered at the heart of a specific skilful interaction; the stone is as 
equally capable of being encountered as a technology as a computer when the 
interaction is of a particular type, meeting particular criteria
Let’s move away, briefly, from the evidence for incorporation to be found in the 
neurosciences, and turn to phenomenology. We have looked already at Heidegger’s 
“Question Concerning Technology,” and also his definition of equipment, at least in a 
limited capacity. The use of that equipment, however, is what is central to his search for 
“The Worldhood of the World” in section three of Being and Time, and the skilful 
actuation of that use is something very similar to my own use of the term 
“incorporation.”
Heidegger states that “[w]e shall seek the worldhood of the environment 
(environmentality) by going through an ontological Interpretation of those entities 
within-the-environment which we encounter as closest to us” (Being 94). Heidegger’s 
task is to get to the nature of (the) world itself, and our Being within it, Dasein, 
something he believes we can only start to approach through the ontological study of 
the items in our environments which we draw closest to ourselves. It is due to the 
intimacy of our dealings with equipment, Heidegger states, that the nature of the world 
can begin to be revealed. If, as Merleau-Ponty suggested, tool use can become part of 
our medium for “having a world,” then a better understanding of how we function as 
technology deploying beings may well be a step toward establishing how we encounter 
the environment around us, not necessarily the world “as it is,” but the world as we 
build it through models from visualisation, physical experience, virtual experience, and 
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technological encounter - visual, somatosensory, internal mental, and technologically 
extended feeds for the perceptual homunculus.
There are two ways in which we can experience objects in the world for 
Heidegger59: in a theoretical stance where we encounter Things which are “present-at-
hand,” available for observation, but unavailable to experience as they are, and in use 
where we can encounter equipment as what it is, as ready-to-hand:
Only because equipment has  this ‘Being-in-itself’ and does not merely 
occur,  is  it  manipulable in the broadest sense and at  our disposal. No 
matter  how  sharply  we  just  look…at  the  ‘outward  appearance’…of 
Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-
to-hand...the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we 
seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it 
become,  and the  more  unveildly  is  it  encountered  as  that  which it  is 
(Being 98).
When we are not using the hammer it is a Thing in the world, present-at-hand, and 
much as we may look at it we cannot access its nature. When we deploy it in a task, 
however, we start to gain some sense of it, we focus not on it, but on the work to be 
done. It is, unintuitively, in this unfocusing that we experience a “primordial” 
relationship with the hammer: “In its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, 
withdraw...That with which our...dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves...
[T]hat with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work” (99). It is this 
understanding of the ready-to-hand which is so crucial to our criteria of incorporation.
Heidegger’s concern is with getting to Things as they are; our concern with 
readiness-to-hand, however, is in seeing how the primordial relationship describes 
incorporation into body schema. But these differing concerns are both fundamentally 
connected in a notion of incorporation: in this reading, Heidegger’s conception of a use-
driven relationship with equipment is the very same homo sapiens trait of invisible 
skilful use that we have been discussing. When something is ready-to-hand we cease to 
concern ourselves with its nature as conscious consideration bars us from true 
incorporation; it is only in its invisibility that we come closest to it. For Heidegger this 
allows us to encounter the object as it is, for our concerns it allows us to bring that item 
59 This chapter will utilise a widely accepted interpretation of Heidegger's tool analysis and division 
between presentness- and readiness-to-hand. In the next chapter we will be more concerned with 
Graham Harman's more radical reading in Tool-Being. Whilst I sympathise, as will be seen, with 
Harman's project, the more mainstream use of Heidegger's terms are too useful to us here to be 
nullified.
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into our perceptual map of ourselves so that the only focus is on the work to be done, 
not the assemblage which accomplishes it. Technologies, in short, are ready-to-hand. 
This understanding of readiness-to-hand and incorporation are interchangeable, the only 
difference being the assertion of what it reveals, an aspect of the world on the one hand, 
or an aspect of human interaction with artefacts on the other. Our tools function as part 
of the apparatus which provides us with a conscious phenomenological world, and the 
rest of that apparatus is made up of the other feeds to the perceptual homunculus: the 
visual, the somatosensory, and the virtual. It is on each of these feeds that technology 
can have an effect.
The most significant effect of adopting this third criteria is just how many 
objects described as technologies under the common sense definition are suddenly ruled 
out as such. The criteria of incorporation introduces individual phenomenological 
concerns in order to differentiate between amateur and expert use, and in so doing 
renders a large amount of complex technological equipment as not technological at all. 
Under this criteria if you’ve never seen or heard of a mobile phone then it is not a 
technology to you, you could not have a technological interaction with it, it would just 
be a thing in the world, not even equipment. But through use it can start to function as 
equipment: the cultural pressures of your community drive the adoption and 
perseverance of that use, codifying and standardising it, and when this starts to occur 
the range of abilities available to the ear and mouth are extended in McLuhanist fashion. 
When you’ve texted and texted and texted, and chatted and chatted and chatted, and 
when you feel it buzz in your pocket and you don’t even think, your hands already 
know what to do, and they fumble the thing up to your face with the call already 
answered because you know that’s how to avoid that little delay between pressing the 
button and it actually connecting… that is equipment incorporated, a technological 
interaction, and one which might, as a shorthand, lead you to describe the mobile phone, 
as a category of objects, as a technology.
It is not enough, however, to just use an item. We may get some sense of the 
equipment, but true readiness-to-hand, true incorporation, comes from rehearsal into 
skilful use. As Clark states, drawing on the same study as that discussed above: “[t]he 
plastic neural changes…emphasized by Maravita and Iriki...suggest a real 
(philosophically important and scientifically well-grounded) distinction between true 
incorporation into the body schema and mere use” (Supersizing 38). A happy accident 
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of terminology makes the point very clearly here (Clark doesn’t systematically use 
“incorporation” as an established criterion for any particular event): the work that 
Maravita and Iriki discuss is an effective demonstration which augments Heidegger’s 
readiness-to-hand. The macaques had to be trained into displaying the bimodal 
functionality, but once it was there it became clear that a soft-assembled apparatus was 
created, truly incorporated because it was skilful. If Heidegger’s assertion is that we 
only experience aspects of the world as it is in “primordial” invisible relationships then 
it is surely not just in use, but in skilful use that this occurs, an idea that we'll come to 
again in the second chapter.
Incorporation also troubles the idea of technology as a mediating layer, or a 
visceral insulator between us and the world. If a tool is brought on board then our 
encounter with the world through it would seem much the same as with the assemblage 
of our arms. One might argue that touch is mediated by the tool, but isn't this as true for 
a spade as for a mechanical digger? A driver of the digging machine who has 
incorporated the apparatus and who can respond to the viscosities and densities of the 
earth does not seem so far removed from the gardener, if at all. Perhaps the prejudice 
stems from our disbelief that such nuanced incorporation can occur, but Wilson outlines 
examples such as mechanics and engines (The Hand 173-178 and 293-294) and crane 
operators (89-90) who have attained just this level of skill, and other examples can be 
easily found in the relationship between musicians and instruments, drivers and 
vehicles, hackers and computers, photographers and cameras, etc. etc. It doesn't seem 
right to call technology an unnatural mediator simply because some tools require more 
practice to incorporate than others. Do technologies become somehow more natural as 
skill increases (or rather more built into our nature as we make them part of ourselves)? 
The implications for the new and complex e-reader and the simpler and over-practiced 
codex are clear: might the codex have been rehearsed into an apparent naturalness rather 
than being so a priori?
One final assertion must be made about the criteria of incorporation in order for 
it to stand up as a defining criteria of technological interactions: incorporation can still 
present an interaction as weakly technological, even if it exists only in potential. Let’s 
take again the example of someone learning to drive. The car, when the novice first 
enters it, is not a technology, nor are their dealings with it technological. There will 
come, however, an in-between moment in the novice's learning when the equipment 
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they are deploying temporarily becomes invisible, only for a moment, when their hand 
reaches automatically for the gear-stick say, or the indicators are flicked off without a 
thought, when the mirrors are checked and the small manoeuvre executed without a 
conscious ticking through each micro-event, in short, where a particular skilful 
interaction occurs. At moments such as these the potential for incorporation becomes 
apparent. It is clear that it can be achieved, it is not beyond the user, and this is the very 
start of experiencing the car as a technology. We might say that at this moment the 
equipment “trends toward” being a technology; this is a tipping point. Such users might 
rightly speak of their dealings as technological because the range of abilities they 
experience as becoming available to the body schema has been extended, and they have 
also entered into a specific set of community relations and pressures. We will return to 
this idea shortly.
Incorporation: E-readers and codices can become invisible during use,  
allowing us to concentrate, for the most part, on the act of reading rather  
than the hand holding the equipment or the pages themselves. This is not  
to say that these things do not affect our reading, only that they do not  
occupy our conscious attention if we allow them to melt away. In this  
moment the body and either artefact form an assemblage for reading that  
is,  in  theory,  empirically  testable.  Regardless  of  the  brain's  neuronal  
mapping,  however,  the  phenomenological  experience  of  incorporated  
reading is of the melting away of the apparatus60.
Morphability
For a gestalt artefact to be considered a technology, i.e. equipment at the heart of a 
technological interaction, it must have the potential for a morphing effect upon the user.  
This is the final criteria of what we should require of an interaction with equipment in 
order to consider it as technological. I’ve already spoken of the uniquely human ability 
to rapidly incorporate a wide variety of equipment into the body schema, but 
morphability says that this must also be capable of a lasting effect if we are to consider 
that interaction as technological. In its simplest guise, morphability is the long lasting or 
60 This assertion will be problematised somewhat in the section on “devices” below. To pre-empt that 
argument, a technological interaction is fragile and if interrupted the apparatus will return to our 
concern; this experience is not rare.
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permanent extension of our conception of what we can achieve: a primitive hammer 
could make our ancestors know that they could gain access to hard-shelled nuts; now a 
car makes us know that we can cover a distance in a time far less then our biological 
walking gait could allow. The body schema is the virtual model of our boundaries and 
capacities and any medium-to-long-term change in this we can consider as morphing.
But even on the limited time scale of the individual human life (we will expand 
upon such a time scale after we have finished establishing the basic definition for 
individuals) there is more to morphability. There are the relatively subtle effects of 
practice, for instance, where minds and bodies are tested, strengthened, and honed 
through repetitive and concerted interaction: the touch typist has a skill unavailable to 
someone approaching the keyboard for the first time; the taxi driver’s senses are more 
alert to the particularities of the road than the learner; the hunter who deploys spear or 
bolas has a hand-eye coordination to rival the speed of the quarry. For the individual 
user, morphability is perhaps best represented by these plastic changes in the brain. The 
incorporation of any tool will result in a physical change to an individual over time, and 
over much larger than the short term (and poorly understood) rearrangements of 
memory. Michael Merzenich, for instance, demonstrated that regions of the brain 
dedicated to sensation can grow and shrink in proportion to their use, in particular 
focussing on the shrinking of the visual area and commensurate growth of the area 
representing the fingertips in blind readers learning braille61, and Norman Doidge 
describes a wide range of case studies of damaged and healthy brains in extraordinary 
conditions reshaping themselves over time (The Brain That Changes Itself). Such 
morphability, where our brains can restructure themselves in response to cultural and 
environmental requirements, are what make humans viable as a species - we’re not the 
strongest, fastest, or toughest, but we are the most adaptable, turning to anything in the 
world which might give us an advantage at any given time, and then doing our best to 
bring such items into the conceptions of ourselves to maximise the effectiveness of use. 
Clark sees this activity occurring in 
humans and other  primates…[which  are  ]constantly  negotiable  bodily 
platforms  of  sense,  experience,  and…reasoning…Such  platforms  are 
biologically primed so as to fluidly incorporate new bodily and sensory 
kit,  creating brand new systemic wholes. This is  just  what  one would 
expect  of  creatures  built  to  engage  in…‘ecological  control’:  systems 
61 See for instance Alvaro Pascual-Leone and Fernando Torres “Plasticity of the Sensorimotor Cortex...”
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evolved so as to constantly search for opportunities to make the most of 
the  reliable  properties  and  dynamic  personalities  of  body  and  world 
(Supersizing 37).
A “superplastic” brain (Donald, So Rare 210) such as ours, however, is one best 
suited to the expanded triggers of bimodal neurons detailed by Maravita and Iriki. After 
two weeks training the Japanese macaques' brains had altered so that they could 
measurably incorporate the rake after five minutes use and reach for the food pellet. But 
two weeks of training an adult human being can incorporate vastly more dextrous 
activities then simple reaching, and over time we are able to achieve the sort of 
staggering fine detail manifested by Wallace’s tennis players. All such acts of 
incorporation must be met by a physical change in the brain, and this is a manifestation 
of morphability. This leaves us with a sense of the body schema as always open, 
reaching out, and significantly transient. Though many aspects persist, it is largely due 
to the constraints of our physical shape rather than some ineffable “human-ness”:
It is a mistake to posit a biologically fixed ‘human nature’ with a simple 
wrap-around of  tools and culture;  the  tools and culture  are  indeed as 
much determiners of our nature as products of it. Ours are (by nature) 
unusually  plastic  and  opportunistic  brains  whose  biological  proper 
functioning  has  always  involved  the  recruitment  and  exploitation  of 
nonbiological props and scaffolds (Clark, Natural-Born 86).
Clark here paints a very different picture of equipment use than that of the resisters of 
modern technology we saw at the start of this chapter. Far from separating us from the 
world, to Clark our principle technological interactions bring us closer to our nature as 
beings in that world. In this regard technology isn’t “unnatural,” its what we do. Some 
people may not like the direction in which we are being morphed through sustained 
equipment use and the related cultural changes that go along with such action, but they 
cannot attack this as being wholly “unnatural.” Change is an effect of use, and use is our 
default mode of apprehension, like a shark’s first bite of an unfamiliar object.
Morphability, then, is the final criteria of technology. If it is not met then the 
interaction is not technological, but if the other criteria are in play then morphability 
will surely follow. Change is the effect of the other three criteria, but it should not be 
ignored. If we are trying to decide whether we should rightly consider something as 
technological or not, one of the first avenues we can pursue is: what does it change in its 
user? If the answer is hard to find then that makes for a fine indicator that a 
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technological interaction is not occurring because technologies alter users and require 
users altered to their properties.
Morphability: E-readers and codices both alter their users by acting as a  
substrate  for  writing  which  materially  affects  how we  think.  But  the  
artefacts themselves, rather than the material which they carry, are also  
morphing to  some degree,  representing a permanent  alteration  in  the  
conception of what the user can achieve.
Implications for the common sense definition
Let’s return to our original common sense definition: technology enables, technology is 
a uniquely human thing. I hope that it is now clear how deficient this definition is for 
any nuanced discussion of the experience of a class of equipment which is at the heart 
of human experience. When we say that technology enables us to do things that we were 
unable to do before then this is perfectly correct, but should every object which allows 
for new abilities to be manifested be called a technology? What about reaching for one’s 
car keys, lost at the bottom of a drain, with a length of bent coat hanger? Is this a 
technology, a technological interaction? The common sense definition would say yes, 
even though anyone using even a modicum of common sense would be able to tell that 
a makeshift key collecting hook is of a very different order of objects to the expertly 
used computer. As Wallace, Heidegger, Maravita and Iriki, Wilson, Donald, and Clark 
all assert in their various ways: skilled use changes the order of equipment we 
encounter.
The definition outlined here has drastic implications for a number of the 
artefacts which we would readily describe as being technologies as we are forced to ask 
a phenomenological question: who are they technologies for? Let’s take the example of 
a passenger plane. The common sense definition states that a plane is unequivocally a 
technology - humans use planes to do something that they previously could not. But 
when we deploy our new definition the question arises as to when we should say that a 
particular user’s interaction with the assemblage should be considered as technological. 
Here is the pilot’s use broken down into the four criteria:
• Extension - The pilot is able to achieve an activity - i.e. flying, or travelling great 
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distances, or moving large groups of people - that they could not have achieved 
before.
• Communality - The pilot has been through flight school, experiences cultural 
pressures at various levels (global, national, professional, fraternal) to interact 
with the plane as gestalt equipment in a certain way.
• Incorporation - The pilot’s available gestalt of the artefact will principally come 
from his interactions with the external boundaries of the plane (an awareness of 
its size for taxi-ing and turning), and the cockpit. The pilot can situate himself as 
a component within this assemblage, and this is a form of incorporation also62. A 
soft assemblage occurs where the pilot is able to perform activities functionally 
invisible to themselves: all the mirco adjustments of pitch and yaw done by 
“feel”63, every unfocussed reach for a dial to make a correction, or the automatic 
performance of pre-flight checks.
• Morphability - The pilot’s body schema has an increased range of abilities 
available to it. Hand/eye coordination will have been elevated; a feel for the 
plane will have emerged.
A pilot, then, could certainly describe his interactions with the plane as 
technological, or say that the plane, as a gestalt artefact, is a technology to them. But 
what of the aeronautical mechanic who works on the plane each day?:
• E - Not applicable. The plane, as a gestalt experienced during work undertaken, 
does not extend the abilities of the mechanic; they work on the plane with skill 
extending tools.
• C - The mechanic experiences a variety of cultural pressures to interact with 
their gestalt of the plane in a certain way.
• I - Whilst the mechanic is primarily incorporating her tools during skilful work, 
she might also have a sense of the feel of the plane, very different to the pilot’s, 
but again born of repetitive engagement. The intuitive checks and adjustments of 
the pre- and post-flight equipment, and a sense of the whole operating smoothly 
might well be considered a form of incorporation.
• M - Not applicable. The plane, as a gestalt experienced during the work 
undertaken does not have a morphic effect on the mechanic.
Finally we should consider the experience of the majority of interactors, the 
passengers:
• E - The plane allows for a new, though relatively uncontrolled ability: the ability 
to travel at speed through the air.
• C - There are specific cultural pressures surrounding the act of flying which 
62 See,  for  instance,  Edwin  Hutchins  chapter  on  pilots  being  incorporated  into  their  equipment  in 
Cognition in the Wild (117-174).
63 By feel I mean what, to the pilot, seems an ineffable sense of the whole: they make adjustments that  
feel right for the assemblage in which they situate themselves, and, far more often than not, they are 
the right adjustments. This stems from a deep skilful incorporation born of repetition, similar in effect 
to a dancer or gymnast’s almost uncanny awareness of the shape and position of their physical form.
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constrain, codify, and standardise the experience.
• I - Not applicable. Flying on a plane is a supremely conscious experience, and 
there is no way to incorporate the gestalt artefact that a passenger experiences. 
The passenger has no access to use the thing that they encounter.
• M - Not applicable. The plane itself is unlikely to have a lasting impact upon the 
passenger.
The new definition, when deployed, overhauls our consideration of mass aeronautic 
travel as a technology, as planes are a great example of an item that most of us do not 
encounter in a technological interaction. We are supremely conscious of it, well outside 
the community of those who actually use it in the skilful sense that has been discussed 
in this chapter, and we are largely unmorphed by its existence. It does extend our ability 
to travel, and if extension were our only criterion for a technology, as it is in the 
common sense definition, then it would be met. But it shouldn’t be. This allows us to 
distinguish our passenger’s interactions with, and experience of the plane as an object 
from those of the skilled pilot, and also to distinguish between the order of objects that 
includes skilfully used hammers and mobile phones, and the order of objects that 
includes passively sitting in a metal carrier. The current rubric of “technology” deployed 
in the popular press and far beyond cannot account for such distinctions, but I believe 
that the definition under discussion here can. When deciding whether something, not as 
a specific thing, but as a type, is a technology you would need to consider the majority 
in the audience that you’re addressing. For instance, in our society it would be typical to 
define cars and computers as technologies, colliders and industrial machinery as not. 
Technological determinism is far less of a problem under this more nuanced definition. 
Did the printing press technology cause the enlightenment? Did steam technology 
change the world? “Does Technology Drive History?64” Well no, it can’t do and can’t 
have done, because most people do not experience technological interactions with new 
inventions, only the effects of those minority of users who may have experienced such. 
This immediately contextualises technological use rather than giving a sweeping agency 
to the mere presence of certain objects.
Devices
64 See Marx and Smith's book of the same name for a discussion of the history and interpretations of 
technological determinism.
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With technology so defined we must turn to a different order of equipment, closely 
related, to refine the idea. What shall we call the class of artefact that we encounter in 
use, but that we do not have a technological interaction with? Certainly this still seems 
to be equipment - we encounter properties of the thing involved through use - but the 
“primordial relationship” is absent. I propose that we call this class of useable objects 
“devices,” as this still connotes a means for getting things done, but has none of the 
implications of intimate relations we have bound to “technology.”65
A device is a quick-and-dirty solution, to borrow an IT term, to a problem which 
exists for a single user at a single time, whereas a technology is a methodised and 
rarefied solution to a common problem in a community, a solution which both persists 
and affects.
An example of a device: if you drop your keys into a drain then you might turn 
to the available resources of the environment in order to retrieve them - you rush into 
your house, fetch that coat hanger, bend it into a crude hook, and, with a little difficulty, 
fish out the keys. This is a device; you interact with it as a tool, but not as a technology. 
It might extend your means, but once the task is complete your new device does not 
persist, and it has had no long-term effect on the way you interact with your 
environment. Taylor also provides a helpful anecdotal example from a fishing trip where 
he had to improvise a club from a nearby rock:
Sacrificing smoothness for weight, and balancing a moral need for swift 
dispatch against my affection for my own fingers, I used three or four 
medium-weight  blows. These unaesthetically but convincingly spit  the 
skull, knocking the eyes out. Things improved with the second and third 
trout, and the fourth was neatly sent to wherever trout go when they die 
(my  stomach  I  suppose).  Afterward,  Keith  [Taylor's  fishing  partner] 
tossed  our  expedient  artifact  back  into  the  water,  and  as  the  blood 
billowed off downstream, history evaporated. Unlike the rod, hook, and 
line,  the  improvised fish whacker  reverted to  being just  another  rock, 
unmodified and non-cultural (Artificial 45).
Taylor's fish dispatching device took practice to use well; we can see a process of 
incorporation here, and it also extended his abilities. The difference between it being a 
device or a technology lay in its communal function: community knowledge motivated 
65 Note that there is a similarity between my deployment of “device” and that of Albert Borgman in 
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. For Borgman a device is a piece of equipment, 
tangible or intangible, which separates the user from the realities of the work to be done and requires 
no skill (e.g. central heating vs. a wood-burning stove).
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the search for the equipment, but Taylor's method had no return to cultural existence; 
when the tool was discarded, when it ceased to be equipment in use, it disappeared.
The distinction between a device and a technology, I would like to suggest, is 
not a binary opposition, but instead an analogue scale. We can move from approaching 
an object as a device, to interacting with it as a technology, indeed this must occur 
frequently: it is the only way that technological change can arise as we can never 
experience any novel object as technological instantly, due for the most part to the third 
criteria of incorporation, a state which, as we have seen, requires rehearsal into 
unconsciousness, a task proportional to the unfamiliarity, complexity, and dextrous 
requirement of the skilful interaction. All technologies must begin as devices, novel 
solutions to particular problems, from which a process of refining and defining occurs; 
devices are “pre-technological” equipment which might trend toward technologies over 
time.
Let’s use our example of the coat-hanger-key-hook device and explore how it 
might become a technology, taking a similar generic trajectory to that which every 
technology must follow. The device already performs the first criteria: it extends our 
means by allowing us to reach into deeper and narrower gaps than we might otherwise 
have access to. As evidenced by the struggle to retrieve the keys on the first “fish” the 
device is not yet incorporated, the third criteria, but continued use could simply rectify 
this. And with all of these opportunities to rehearse the device into an incorporated state 
it is clear that key loss is a pressing problem in your community. Seeing someone else 
struggling, you might fetch your key-hook and demonstrate its use, and following a 
successful retrieval you might well discuss the implement, suggest modifications, 
recommend it to others. In this way the device can become a communal enterprise, 
standardising its use, the second criteria. As for morphability, our last criteria, who 
knows what sustained use by a community of users might cause? Most simply no one in 
the culture of key-hook users would see a small gap with tantalising objects for retrieval 
and consider them out of reach, there would have been a fundamental shift in the 
perception of abilities available to the user, particularly if the equipment, driven by 
cultural norms, was frequently kept about one’s person much like a mobile phone. With 
these criteria met the key-hook could now be approached as a technological artefact by 
its experienced users.
This may seem a flippant example, but if we consider how the expert users 
would approach the object - as everyday, as normalised, adapted to its use - then we can 
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see that it is a far cry from the way the initial user experienced it as she urgently fished 
for her keys. A process of “technologising” the device has occurred. Note that the object 
itself doesn’t need to change; technologising is not necessarily an augmentation of the 
equipment, but an alteration of our perceptions of the equipment we approach in use, 
and of our conception of what we can achieve with such.
What is the use of this distinction between technologies and devices? It allows 
us another way to distinguish between different ways of experiencing artefacts, to name 
the distinction between the novice and expert user’s experience, and to demonstrate that 
objects which we often refer to as technologies are often more appropriately thought of 
as a different class of equipment, devices, such is our experience of them. We are better 
off reserving the judgement of “technology” for specifically encountered equipment 
because it allows us to more productively theorise a certain kind of interaction. 
“Device” might also function as a useful term for those resistant to new equipment: in 
the case of e-reading any promoter of the new reading equipment must justify why a 
fully technologised artefact such as the codex is being replaced by what many will 
experience as a mere device. This isn't an easy attack to answer to, as we'll see in the 
second chapter's discussions of path dependance and skeuomorphs. For now it is enough 
to see that though resistant reader's might well be able to read on an e-reader their 
dislike of the task, their feeling of unnaturalness in comparison to the codex experience, 
may stem from its existence as a device and the seeming unlikeliness of the 
technologising process coming underway, or being worthwhile.
I have already spoken of the “trend” toward technology in device use. The 
refining of skill appears to be a human drive, very few items are sustained in culture 
where the most skilful users are merely “quite good,” there is always a cultural reward 
to those who can successfully incorporate equipment to the highest level, whether that 
be IT consultancy, guitar playing, cinematography, aeroplane piloting, car driving, or 
tennis playing. But it is impossible for technologies to remain entirely invisible and now 
we can say that the trend might be reversed and our experience can also move from the 
technological to the “device-ive.” At these moments the technology ceases to be a part 
of soft-assembled, unfocused use and becomes, instead, available to conscious 
contemplation. It is not that the work necessarily ceases, only that it is no longer the 
sole, or at worst not even the primary focus. Such times are marked by periods of 
mistake, intense concentration, and drops in speed and productivity.
Heidegger identifies three different types of cessation of perceptual readiness-to-
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hand: 
• “Conspicuous” equipment is that which is not as ideally suited to the task at 
hand as we had expected: “When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment 
becomes conspicuous (Being 103).
• “Obtrusive” equipment is marked by the absence of the equipment we truly 
desire to accomplish the work: “It reveals itself as something just present-at-
hand and no more, which cannot be budgeted without the thing that is missing. 
The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern” 
(103).
• “Obstinate” equipment places an obstacle in front of the work to be done.
If we reach for a ready-to-hand pen and begin writing, but it is of the wrong colour, not 
black, but blue, then it is no longer a technology, but a conspicuous device. If we only 
have a pencil, and we need a pen, then the pencil, otherwise perfectly ready-to-hand as a 
technology, is an obtrusive device which ceases the work to be done. If the pen 
encounters wet paper which blocks the work to be done then it becomes an obstinate 
device. Anything which causes equipment to return to consciousness can cause a drop in 
the intimacy of the interaction, breaking the soft-assemblage into its constituent parts 
(typically, though not always, at the boundary of skin and world), and rendering the 
item at worst a thing to be contemplated, and at best unready-to-hand even as we 
attempt to deploy it as equipment, a device not a technological artefact to be used. 
These phenomenological definitions of the transition away from readiness-to-hand are 
useful analogues to the transition from technology back to device66. 
Recent cognitive psychological investigation into Heidegger’s conception of a 
move away from readiness-to-hand also lend an empirical validity to this transition. The 
review conducted by Maravita and Iriki demonstrates how objects can become ready-to-
hand, but their work does not explicitly engage with Heidegger, and as such they do not 
look for whether the trend toward a skilful/technological interaction can be temporarily 
reversed. A 2010 study by Dobromir Dotov, Lin Nie, and Anthony Chemero, however, 
sought to lab test Heidegger’s assertions.
The study received attention from the technology magazine Wired, at first glance 
perhaps an unlikely home for such research, but the researcher’s findings certainly make 
for compelling popular science journalism:
66 For more on Heidegger's distinction between the three modes see the translators' footnote for Being 
and Time 104.
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An empirical test of ideas proposed by Martin Heidegger shows the great 
German philosopher to be correct: Everyday tools really do become part 
of ourselves…‘The person and the various parts of their brain and the 
[equipment] are so tightly intertwined that they’re just one thing,’ said 
Anthony Chemero...‘The tool isn’t separate from you. It’s part of you’ 
(Keim).
The importance of this study from Dotov et al for the definition of technology that I 
have presented here, in particular for the criteria of incorporation, is hopefully clear. As 
a supplement to the Marvita and Iriki review it provides compelling evidence for 
incorporation, but also for the transition from technology back to device that occurs in 
moments of forced consciousness.
Dotov, Nie, and Chemero set out to
lend  empirical  support  to  Heidegger's  phenomenology  and  more 
specifically his description of the transition between ready-to-hand and 
unready-to-hand modes in interactions with tools…Despite widespread 
attention in  cognitive  science and artificial  intelligence to Heidegger's 
work, this interest has remained largely conceptual and no effort has been 
made to put Heidegger's theory in an experimental framework. A search 
of  the  PsycINFO  database  on  December  10  2009,  found  no  articles 
concerning Heidegger that involved laboratory work.
The team's paper therefore marks the first attempt to empirically test explicitly 
Heideggerian ideas about tool use.
The experiments conducted by the team deployed a simple setup. Participants in 
the study were required to use a computer mouse to move an onscreen pointer in order 
to play a game. A blue dot would continually try and escape from a grey “pen”; the 
participant would try and use the onscreen pointer to “herd” the dot back into place. 
“What allows the participant to guide the target is that it always tries to escape away 
from the pointer in a semi-predictable fashion. To make an analogy to Heidegger's 
example, here the mouse plays the role of the handle and the on-screen pointer figure 
plays a role similar to that of the hammer striking face.” However, “[a]bout thirty 
seconds from the beginning of the trial a perturbation in the mapping between mouse 
movement and pointer movement instantiates equipment malfunctioning. It lasts a few 
seconds and then the situation returns to normal” (Dotov et al).
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A single frame (a) captured during the course of a trial  is  shown and 
visible inside it are the pen, the gray center, and blue and green dots for 
the target and pointer objects,  respectively. Representative pointer and 
target object trajectories on the screen from three-second excerpts with a 
normally behaving (b) and impaired (c) mouse are portrayed  (Dotov et 
al).
The researchers made predictions in line with Heidegger’s discussion of 
equipment: that the participant, as an experienced computer user, would “smoothly[, 
read 'skilfully,'] cope with the tool as…ready-to-hand,” and that during the perturbation 
the mouse as tool would become the focus of attention and distract the user from a 
simple secondary task (in this case counting backward in threes from a given number). 
Their method for testing the first half of this assertion stems from the monitoring of a 
certain type of “noise,” 1/f β, a power-law scaling in activity magnitude across the 
frequency range of data received from the analysis of the hand-tool system. Citing van 
Orden et al and Chen et al, Dotov et al 
argue  that  1/f  β noise  found  in  an  inventory  of  cognitive  tasks  is  a 
signature  of  a  softly  assembled  system  exhibiting  and  sustained  by 
interaction-dominant dynamics, and not  component-dominant dynamics. 
In component-dominant dynamics, behaviour is the product of a rigidly 
delineated architecture of modules, each with pre-determined functions; 
in  interaction-dominant  dynamics,  on  the  other  hand,  coordinated 
processes  alter  one  another’s  dynamics,  with  complex  interactions 
extending to the body’s periphery and, sometimes, beyond…we can take 
the presence of a 1/f  β long memory process as indicative of the activity 
of a smoothly operating system, softly assembled by virtue of interaction-
dominant dynamics…By looking for 1/f β noise recorded at the interface 
of  body  and  tool,  we  address  the  hypothesis  that,  while  smoothly 
operating  an  instrument,  a  human  performer  instantiates  such an  IDS 
[interaction-dominant system] spanning the extended body-tool system.
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In short, skilful use of a ready-to-hand tool will manifest itself in an invariant scaling of 
activity magnitude over a frequency range - 1/f β noise. This has, in prior experiments on 
human subjects, been linked to interactions where it is not the components (i.e. the parts 
of the body and the equipment) that dictate the effects of the interaction, but the nature 
of the interaction between the components that dictates its effects. In an interaction 
where the components themselves are subservient to the nature of their connection in 
terms of dominance then this is indicative of a “smoothly operating,” i.e. skilful, soft 
assembled system, not a collection of components, but a single active entity. Dotov et 
al's prediction is therefore technically laid out as the expectation of the presence of 1/f β 
type noise before and after the perturbation, and an absence of such noise during 
disruption, indicating a move from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand and, in our 
terms here, from a technological to a “device-ive” interaction.
These predictions were born out with a marked trend away from 1/f β noise 
during the disruption of the task, and its presence during fluid use:
The IDSs (delineated by the surrounding curves) are…softly assembled 
by virtue of rich interactions on multiple scales (double-sided arrows) 
among  the  components  (black  dots  and  hammer)...They  either  span 
across (A) or do not (B) the tool (hammer). It is assumed that the black 
dots stand for bodily structures (Dotov et al)67.
67 Further detail on the above schematic:
Customarily,  one  studies  such  systems by  collecting  a  time  series  locally  from the  
behaviour of a single point of observation (C), that is, from a single element. Next, if  
possible one establishes their character  as an IDS [Interaction Dominant System] by 
searching  for  power-law  scaling  of  certain  statistical  quantities  (D)...The  scaling 
coefficient α reveals long-range correlations characteristic of 1/f noise in the hand-tool 
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We can see from the above schematic that the components of the body are always 
assumed to be treated as an invisible IDS, but during skilled ready-to-hand use the 
equipment is allowed to come “onboard” and become a part of that system. This is a 
restructuring of the IDS in order to form a new assemblage which accommodates the 
tool in use. The schematic at (A) essentially shows the extension of the body schema as 
the virtual model of the self is updated to include the tool.
The conclusion of the researchers' analysis appears to support the notion of a 
transition from technology to device:
We are not arguing that the flow of interaction between tool and body is 
reduced in magnitude [during the perturbation], just that it is reduced in 
complexity.  The  mouse  keeps  providing  sufficient  local  stimulation 
through  the  eyes  and  the  sense-organs  of  the  arm  for  the  agent  to 
maintain overall control over it, as when one is holding a foreign object 
in hand and is trying to figure out a specific property of it.
At these moments the equipment is returned to consciousness, dropping out of an IDS, 
out of the body schema in order to be observed as “conspicuous” or “obtrusive.” It does 
not cease to be equipment, however, because we still encounter it in use; it's not that the 
work has become impossible, only that the experience with the equipment is not 
integrated in skilful control. This seems to ably represent a distinction between device 
and technology on the grounds of distinguishing between novice and expert use; the 
perturbation renders the expert user as unskilled.
Failures or challenges, as Heidegger and Dotov et al demonstrate, are disruptive. 
But unexpected success, perhaps at a task we were not even attempting to achieve, is 
also jarring as our perceptions are again altered. We look at the tool, marvel at our 
connection with it (thereby breaking that connection), and it may be some time before 
we are able to achieve that state again. Donald, in A Mind so Rare, argues that the work 
of the conscious mind is the mid-to-long term reflection on unconscious action, shaping 
that action, and shaping ourselves. Learning, as I’ve argued, is an entirely conscious 
activity until the activity is sublimated and able to be enacted unconsciously, skilfully. A 
in normal mode (A) and approaches the uncorrelated white-noise level in (B) (Dotov et 
al).
Note that white-noise is associated with random interference patterns. 1/f β type noise is sometimes 
called “pink noise.”
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beginner juggler will rehearse the coordination of hands and clubs or balls into 
unconsciousness by first very consciously examining the desired movements, and then 
attempting to adjust their own bodies to match a mental image of approximately, and to 
the best of their knowledge as an amateur, what is required. At times the objects being 
thrown will unexpectedly match the desired trajectories and be brought to consciousness 
through the novelty of success. For the most part they will be brought to consciousness 
as they have to be retrieved from the floor. When Heidegger talks about a becoming 
unready-to-hand he is, in essence, talking about these sorts of return to consciousness of 
a previously sublimated activity; “[a]lthough he concentrates on the special case of 
breakdown, Heidegger's basic point should be that mental content arises whenever the 
situation requires deliberate attention” (Dreyfus, Being 70). Often rehearsal in the 
beginning to intermediate skill levels are marked by a wildly oscillating movement from 
readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand, but it may be during these periods of 
transition that the greatest learning occurs. Little is learnt during conscious perception 
of the object, though a plan of action may be formed. Little is learnt during unconscious 
interaction, the objects, and the body manipulating them, are behaving as expected. But 
during our movements between these states, as the trend from unfocused action to 
consciousness, from device to technology, moves this way and that we learn much about 
ourselves and the objects we are attempting to tame.
How then is this distinction between devices and technologies to be mapped 
onto the assertions of unnaturalness in e-reading? Through the well-refined pedagogy 
and practice of our early years codex reading is refined into skilful invisibility, meets 
the four criteria, and should rightly be considered as technological for the typical 
experienced user in their typical interactions. Each new codex specifically encountered, 
however, will slip from this pristine position as we adjust to its weight, its inflexibility, 
and poorly cut or set pages etc., but within a few seconds the artefact once again seems 
to melt away, matching the ideal type in our minds which we identify as technological. 
Is it any surprise that when such expert readers encounter, or even consider the various 
apparatuses available for e-reading that some of them recoil? A lifetime's work of 
technologising suddenly to be faced with an unfamiliar device whose manufacturer 
purports it to be the same, or better than what is already known - this is rightly 
shocking. And those early uses, radically unfamiliar weights and sizes, misplaced keys, 
the requirement of manuals to help navigate nested menus, no paper to smell and touch, 
every instance jarring, conspicuous, obstinate, finally obtrusive as you put the thing 
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aside and say “how distanced we've become from the world, this is unnatural.” It's a lot 
to get used to and this will be the subject of chapter two.
Before we move on, however, I would like to complete the wider definition of 
technology prompted by this debate and draw the conclusions of this chapter.
Atypical technologies
With these definitions of technology and device hopefully functioning - for the 
equipment we commonly encounter as “technological” or the quick-and-dirty solutions 
to unique tasks we use in our daily lives, and the various positions along that continuum 
- I’d like to turn to extending the definitions out onto interactions which it may seem 
more radical to classify as technological. This is the vital move toward better 
understanding the claims that technology in general, and the digitisation of writing in 
particular, is unnatural.
In the same way that Richard Dawkins posited a Universal Darwinism68 that can 
include items of a hugely different order - e.g. the parity between the work of biological 
genes and cultural memes - I would like to suggest that the criteria that I have outlined 
for technological interactions with material equipment can be extended onto numerous 
orders of interactions with synthetic, organic, virtual, digital, or machinic equipment 
which abide by what might be termed a “universal technologism.” As with Universal 
Darwinism, the reasoning for this extension is to suggest that we might better 
understand our interactions with these equipment if we were to observe, not their 
metaphorical parity with an established function, but their real abiding by the same rules 
as that which is established, recognising that a difference in the substrate of their 
existence does not mark their function out as of another kind (this is a deception born of 
a physicalist bias), but instead merely masks such similarity, that the fundamental 
mechanisms by which they operate are agnostic to material concerns. I don't wish to 
belabour this point as our principle concern here is with tangible things, particularly e-
readers and codices, but a few brief examples are worth considering.
Let’s start with a fairly well-trodden example of an atypical technology, that of 
literacy. Jay David Bolter, in Writing Space, mounts an argument for considering the 
skill of writing (rather than the implement used) as a technology, but also considers the 
68 See Dawkin's paper of the same name for more on the notion that Darwinian rules will apply wherever 
in the universe selective pressures are enacted.
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frequent resistance to such an attitude:
Writing is certainly not innate. Yet writing can be taken in and become a 
habit  of  mind.  What  is  natural  seems  more  intimately  and  obviously 
human. For that reason we do not wish to dwell on the fact that writing is 
a technology; we want the skill of writing to be natural. We like our tools 
and machines well enough, but we also like the idea of being able to do 
without  them.  Putting  away  our  technology  gives  us  a  feeling  of 
autonomy and allows us to reassert  the difference between the natural 
and the merely artificial (36).
Here Bolter reasserts the received dogma of material technology as unnatural, with 
“tools and machines” being able to be “put away,” allowing for a return to a natural 
state, i.e. the breaking down of a soft-assembled system. Writing, however, is for Bolter 
both a technology and an element of a hard-assemblage with a biologically discrete user 
“taken in” as a “habit of mind.” It is important to note that this drawing-closer of an 
object through a technological interaction gives us a feeling that it is somehow natural 
in the intimacy of its use. If writing is a technology then how can it feel natural in a way 
that a computer or car doesn’t, objects which are so obviously outside of ourselves, 
particularly when compared to the abstract skill of writing? There is a lot at work here 
in producing such a disconnect between writing and our modern machines, but the 
primary distinctions are frequency of use and the length of time that our culture, not just 
individual beings within it, have refined the interaction under discussion. A single 
person experiencing a technological interaction with a complex computer system, for 
instance, would not automatically render that item a technology for the wider culture in 
which they are situated, and this can clearly be seen in the general public's relationship 
with the room-sized monoliths of the 50s. 
Consider also Plato’s famous critique of writing:
SOCRATES: They say that there dwelt at Naucratis in Egypt one of the 
old gods of that country, to who the bird they call Ibis was sacred, and the 
name of the god himself was Theuth. Among his inventions were number 
and calculation  and geometry  and astronomy,  not  to  speak of  various 
kinds of draughts and dice, and, above all, writing. The king of the whole 
country at that time was Thamus...To him came Theuth and exhibited his 
inventions...Thamus inquired into the use of each of them, and as Theuth 
went through them expressed approval or disapproval, according as he 
judged Theuth's claims to be well or ill founded. It would take too long to 
go through all that Thamus is reported to have said for and against each 
of Theuth's inventions. But when it came to writing, Theuth declared: 
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'Here is an accomplishment, my lord the king, which will improve both 
the wisdom and the memory of the Egyptians. I have discovered a sure 
receipt  for  memory  and  wisdom.'  'Theuth,  my  paragon  of  inventors,' 
replied the king, 'the discoverer of an art is not the best judge of the good 
or harm which will accrue to those who practise it. So it is in this case; 
you,  who  are  the  father  of  writing,  have  out  of  fondness  for  your 
offspring attributed to it quite the opposite of its real function. Those who 
acquire it will cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful, they 
will  rely on writing to  bring things to  their  remembrance by external 
signs instead of their own internal resources. What you have discovered 
is a receipt for recollection, not for memory. And as for wisdom, your 
pupils will have the reputation for it without the reality: they will receive 
a quantity of information without proper instruction, and in consequence 
be  thought  very  knowledgable  when they are  for  the  most  part  quite 
ignorant. And because they are filled with the conceit of wisdom instead 
of real wisdom they will be a burden to society' (96).
To cultures like our own, where literacy is now the default, Plato’s critique can sound 
unfathomably flawed. When we consider the structures, the education, and the 
development of thought that writing allows when it is incorporated, it is clear that 
writing is not an alien inhibitor, though it is, of course, an alterer, a morpher. Walter Ong 
suggests that this critique stems not from Plato’s revelation of some truth about the 
unnaturalness of writing, but instead from the act’s deployment in the Greek society of 
the time:
Plato was thinking of writing as an external, alien technology, as many 
people today think of the computer. Because we have by today so deeply 
interiorized writing, made it so much a part of ourselves, as Plato’s age 
had not yet made it fully part of itself69, we find it difficult to consider 
writing  to  be a  technology as  we commonly  assume printing and the 
computer to be (Orality 81).
Plato’s critique, when we consider it closely, is not wrong - the mode of Greek 
thought has withered under the influence of the move to the almost total ubiquity of 
literacy in Western intellectual life - but that does not mean that chirography has not 
been naturalised. Part of its power, as with any technology, is not that it exists, nor that 
it is available (it would be a hardline determinist indeed who would suggest that the 
mere availability of a technology shapes our cultures and ourselves), but instead that it 
has been adopted so extensively that it underpins the fabric of our society, resulting in 
Bolter being able to assert that we have managed to trouble some Rubicon between the 
69 For further discussion see Eric Havelock's Preface to Plato.
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“natural” and the “merely artificial.” When we are faced with considering whether 
interacting with a computer is natural or technological (or device-ive) we look to its 
closest natural (or naturalised) corollary: writing. It seems so alienated in such a 
comparison that we assert its technological/deviceive status without question - 
technologies and devices are, it would seem, the complex ways in which we (generally) 
improve the efficiency of tasks identified during more “natural” undertakings (e.g. cars 
for walking, televisions for attending an event, telephones for travel etc.). But we make 
a mistake in comparing computing to writing and marking their differences as a sign 
that one is a technology and the other is a natural process. Here, then, is an example of a 
technology that doesn't feel like a technology after extended use beyond the timescale of 
a single human life (we’ll consider technological effects over different stretches of time 
in the final section, on “granularities,” below). Literacy can and should be defined as a 
technology for all skilful users; let’s consider it under the four criteria:
• E - Literacy extends the capacity of our minds and working memory. It also 
extends the mouth and the ears in somewhat abstracted McLuhanist terms.
• C - Another quotation from Bolter sums up the communal aspect of literacy: it is
a technology for collective memory, for preserving and passing on human 
experience.  The art  of writing may not be as immediately practical as 
techniques  of  agriculture  or  textile  manufacture,  but  it  obviously 
enhances  the human capacity  for  social  organization -  by providing a 
culture  with  fixed  laws,  with  history,  and  with  literary  tradition. 
Eventually  writing  also  becomes  the  preserver  and  extender  of  other 
technologies,  as  an  advanced  culture  develops  technical  literature 
(Writing Space 33).
Writing only has use in a community; the reason of its existence is to pass signs 
between beings separated by time or space, or under pressures of silence.
• I - The quotation from Bolter that triggered this discussion makes the 
incorporation of literacy clear. It has become so deeply incorporated, so ready-
to-hand, so invisible in use that we very rarely consider what occurs when we 
read or write, it seems as natural as speaking to many.
• M - Literacy has altered our minds in a variety of ways, not least allowing us to 
approximate an external memory allowing for more complex thought and 
storage of that thought, giving rise to the notions of legacy and formal culture. 
Donald also states the more material consequences on the user:
Literacy skills change the functional organization of the brain and deeply 
influence  how  individuals  and  communities  of  literate  individuals 
perform their  cognitive  work…There  is  no  equivalent  in  a  preliterate 
mind  to  the  circuits  that  hold  the  complex  neural  components  of  a 
reading vocabulary or the elaborate procedural habits of formal thinking. 
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These  are  unnatural.  They  have  to  be  hammered  in  by  decades  of 
intensive schooling,  which change the functional  uses of certain brain 
circuits and rewire the functional architecture of thought (So Rare 302).
To Plato writing was a device that devalued what came before it. As it trended 
toward a technology for more and more users, however, writing was later able to shine, 
something Plato would never see. Plato was able to set writing up as an inefficient 
device by comparing it to the “natural” analytic mode of thought cultivated by the 
Greeks. But, as with comparing computers to natural writing, might this not hide the 
fact that analytic thought too was somehow technological?
I would like to pause here only to open a floodgate: I do believe that analytic 
thought can be thought of as a technology, but I also believe that dance, language, the 
use of fire, and a great polyphony of other things typically thought of as non-
technological, or natural, have existed as technologies over the course of human history 
because they abide equally well by the four criteria of technological interactions that has 
been set up here, if not always by the common sense definition which relies on a 
physical artefact which we can point at and label as a technology irrespective of the 
nature of the actual encounter of the gestalt experienced by discrete users70. In many 
ways what I am proposing returns to the etymology of “technology” identified by 
Heidegger: “The word stems from the Greek. Technikon means that which belongs to 
technē...[T]echnē is the name not only for activities and skills of the craftsman but also 
for the arts of the mind and the fine arts” (“The Question” 318). The definition that we 
have established throughout this chapter is sympathetic to this originary etymology; a 
universal technologism need not apply solely to material artefacts, nor to the results of 
actions that take the form of external representations. Instead we can say that this 
definition is agnostic to materiality in defining what should be considered as a 
technology, provided that the items under discussion abide by the four criteria we have 
outlined. This is again best illustrated by example:
70 There are some precursors to this idea. Foucault's four definitions of technology in “Technologies of 
the Self” is expansive in what it allows to be considered as technological, and Lev Vygotsky, in Mind 
in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes and “The Instrumental Method in 
Psychology,” argued for the existence of “psychological tools” such as language, writing, 
mathematics, drawing, mapping etc. which overlap with my notion of atypical technologies, 
functioning as intangible equipment. That said, the argument here is that the definition outlined in this 
chapter is potentially more capacious than that of either Foucault or Vygotsky, as well as offering a 
more particular reasoning for why such things should be considered as technological under certain 
conditions.
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Dance71
• E - Dance extends an individual’s self-perceived ability to communicate to a 
group.
• C - Dance functions as a technology in a community which is aware of the 
implications, the meaning and nuance, of the movements of the dancer. Part of 
the extension described in the point above is the need to communicate ideas 
which are either best expressed non-verbally, or cannot be expressed verbally, or 
to draw a group together via their standardised or recognised kinetic expression. 
Dancing for oneself is not a technological interaction, unless you are, in an 
unlikely though not impossible occurrence, using the standard techniques of 
your society in order to work through ideas which you might feel that you 
cannot linguistically.
• I - Dance is incorporated by expert users, and this is evidenced by actions which 
could not be consciously contemplated if they are to be strung together fluidly. 
This ability begins by the dancer making themselves supremely aware of the 
shape of their body in space during different motions, typically via pedagogic 
correction, through mirrors, or even via audience reaction. This heightened 
consciousness is then rehearsed and rehearsed until it disappears, for the most 
part, though it is still able to be interrupted by unexpected success or failure. The 
result is fluid expressive motion, where the dancer thinks about what it is that 
they want to convey and their general motions, rather the minutiae of the micro- 
and macro-movements required.
• M - The dancer’s body is changed by the practice of dancing, growing leaner, 
tauter, more flexible. In undemanding practice, where gross physical alteration is 
far less, a dancer will still have their mental image of themselves altered, a 
heightened awareness of their altered capabilities, and a way of thinking that is 
not coded linguistically, but visually, physically, kinetically.
The dancer can also make a particular dance (equipment for meaning) into a technology, 
and can also experience their own bodies technologically as equipment for dancing (we 
will return to this last idea very shortly).
If we shift the requirement of defining technology from being artefact-centred to 
equipment-centered, then the four criteria begin to hold in such unexpected encounters. 
This allows for what I consider to be a more accurate view of how humans experience 
their world: We experience a host of things in use, and as exploitable, whatever they 
may be, and objects of the mind, ways of thinking and practicing, are no exception.
Taylor, in his exploration of Tasmanian Aboriginal tool use in The Artificial Ape, 
comes to a similar conclusion (33-54). Before they were wiped out by European settlers, 
nomadic bands of Tasmanian Aboriginals survived without clothes, may not have been 
able to make fire (instead carrying it with them in “fire logs” after discovering its 
71 For more on the phenomenological experience of dance see Danielle Suzanne Vezina Phenomenology 
and Dance.
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natural occurrence), and rarely built roofed domiciles. This led to a society in which 
there was very little private property, nor much in the way of social hierarchy. Taylor 
argues that, contrary to prior anthropological opinion, these people were not somehow 
“backward” or tragic, but instead may have been perfectly adapted to their environment, 
minimising risk as best they could, and only keeping what was absolutely expedient. 
Commentators, both from the time of the European encounter and reporting on the 
incident since, who had compared the tools available to the Tasmanians to those used by 
chimpanzees missed the point says Taylor:
The  more  we  look  at  the  Tasmanian  Aboriginal  toolkit,  the  less  the 
parallel  with  the  tools  of  chimpanzees  (legitimately  enough  made  on 
formal  grounds) makes sense.  It is not just  that  the humans had more 
things, because with only two dozen items, it was not that many more. It 
is  that  their  technology was  not  an  add-on,  an  optional  extra.  It  was 
essential and embedded. Chimps can live without tools. Humans cannot 
(Artificial 52).
The Tasmanians of this period were as “technological” as any other human society 
because they did not just elect to use tools, but instead used precisely what they needed 
to thrive in their environment and could not live without them. That their artefacts are 
the simplest collection in the homo sapiens archaeological record did not make them 
any less vital or suitable to their purpose. By reconsidering what we mean by the term 
“technology” we might be able to come to similar sensitive readings of cultural 
differences more often, rather than seeing our “advanced” societies as having so 
progressed that all others, at least (but rarely just) in terms of technology, are now just 
waiting to catch up. Technology is at the heart of all human experience of the world; the 
only thing that marks out a developed society's technology is the complexity of the 
artefacts it has chosen to deploy in that experience. It is not even that these tools take 
longer to master, but that basic access is perhaps more complicated than with more 
simple tools. Most anyone can throw a spear to some degree, but relatively few can hunt 
in such a fashion; it takes longer to acquire the basic skills of using a car, e-reader, or 
computer, but does something we would recognise as expert use, as mastery, really take 
significantly more dedication than that of the hunter to his tools? More importantly, 
does a society which sees people wake up, hunt, skin, and prepare food, make tools, 
make weapons, and engage in a rich participatory (rather than passive) creative culture 
really seem less technologically minded, if we consider technology as rooted in the 
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human experience of the world, than a society where we wake, drive to work, input at a 
computer, drive home, prepare food, and watch television? The artefacts in the latter 
experience are of a higher complexity in terms of realising the extent of their gestalts 
and maybe in attempting initial use, but are the interactions really stronger in their 
impact, or their use more skilful; is watching television or microwaving a meal even a 
technological experience? Morphability, incorporation (as skilful use) and an 
equipment's embeddedness in a community seem far greater measures of the strength of 
a technology than the complexity of the artefacts at the heart of the interaction.
To consider one final piece of equipment, let’s look at whether the body itself 
can be a technology. Consider the schematics from Dotov et al reproduced above, where 
an interconnected system of black dots represent elements of the body as an 
incorporated assemblage into which the tool can be introduced during skilled use: we 
have to learn how to manipulate our bodies like this. Clark makes this point explicitly: 
“The human infant must learn (by self-exploration) which neural commands bring about 
which bodily effects and must then practice until skilled enough to issue those 
commands without conscious effort. This process has been dubbed ‘body babbling’…
and continues until the infant body becomes transparent equipment” (Supersizing 34-
35). In our infancy we are a collection of items held together by skin, our brains are a 
mess of connections which need to be whittled into shape, and our use of the equipment 
not that we have, but that we are, is less than skilful. Over time we can rehearse the 
manipulation of ourselves into unconscious use. But incorporation, here the 
incorporation of the unskilled self into the skilful self, is only one of the criteria for a 
technology. Skilful use of the body, the creation of the body schema, is certainly 
morphing, and certainly extends the range of options available to itself, but is it 
communal? Short of looking to the lazy thought experiment “would a baby left to its 
own devices, with no contact with anyone or anything, develop skilful use of its body?” 
this question is near unanswerable. For that reason I am uncomfortable in saying that 
our physical forms, or our body schemas in general are technologies, because I am 
unable to support it in a way that I find satisfying. But activities like dance certainly 
mark a return of our physical equipment to consciousness, psychiatry can device-ify our 
psychology, brainwave imaging has even made people’s hidden neurological activity 
available, in a limited way, to their consciousness allowing them to try and manipulate 
the images on screen by relaxing/tensing etc. At most times we encounter our body 
86
schemas as invisibly working equipment for dealings with the world, but we are, 
perhaps, the only species which can consciously reflect on aspects of such an 
engagement, from metacognitive analysis to a free-diver’s hyper-awareness of her 
breath, from yogic meditation to athletic refining of form. For these engagements a 
specific gestalt of body, the encounter with which Gallagher would call “body image,” a 
gestalt where the schema is tailored temporarily to a specific use is made available to 
consciousness and can then be re-rehearsed back into unconsciousness, altering the 
nature of the global schema. When the body is made into equipment for use the same 
gestalt experience becomes manifest; it is not the whole physical form that is 
encountered, but instead merely those required aspects which must be rehearsed and 
then trained into invisible automaticity. Perhaps we can think of these skills as rotating a 
single line on a Rubix cube. We have no way of manipulating the whole cube so we 
must focus on and rearrange only one element, an element which cannot exist 
independently, but must be worked on as if it were such and then returned into the 
general scheme of the cube, fundamentally altering the arrangement of the whole.
An argument against the theory deployed here might stem from the observation 
that if the body schema might itself be a technology, and if anything which abides by 
the four criteria can be considered technological, which, as we've seen, can be opened 
up to any number of esoteric things, then what isn’t a technology? But, of course, I’m 
not suggesting that everything is a technology, that our every interaction is a 
technological interaction, only that very many things can be. Not everyone is an athlete, 
not everyone is a philosopher, not everyone learns a new language, sees a psychiatrist, 
flies a plane, drives a car, or skilfully wields a hammer. A great many of the average 
person’s interactions with objects in the world are device-ive, but, near everything is 
available to be technologised. This is the curiously human outlook, what may separate 
us from other primates: our ravenous search for opportunity, to apprehend every aspect 
of an environment, including ourselves, as exploitable when needed. The awareness of 
our limits, physically and intellectually, is part of our basic cognitive agenda. We 
constantly check and recheck these limits, establishing the shape and reach of ourselves, 
and try and work around any resistances that impede the abilities inherent in the virtual 
images produced. “[H]uman minds and bodies are essentially open to episodes of deep 
and transformative restructuring in which new equipment (both physical and ‘mental’) 
can become quite literally incorporated into the thinking and acting systems that we 
identify as our minds and bodies” (Clark, Supersizing 30-31). This, I would argue, is the 
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scope of technology.
Granularities
There is a final assertion that must be dealt with out of necessity for completing our 
definition of devices and technologies and with which we'll conclude this chapter. This 
thesis focuses, and will continue to focus on objects which should be considered as 
technological, or not, at the timescale of the individual human life. As the move from 
one mode of interaction to the other, from device-ive to technological, is over an 
analogue scale we cannot point to the moment where a device becomes a technology 
with any degree of precision. We can only appeal to markers of technology, such as 
communality, morphability, or the perceived depth of incorporation, indicators of the 
relative strength of the equipment’s impact. There is also the point which I hope by now 
is clear: What is, for one person, a technological interaction can be, for another, device-
ive, and an artefact encountered as a device by one person can be intimately 
technological to some other user. For the most part we can attribute this to the practice 
of interactions; if one person is able to experience a technological interaction around an 
item then it will be at least possible for other people to acquire such morphing skilful 
use, at least within the culture in which the equipment is embedded. However, we might 
also think of equipment functioning in different ways at different times; if equipment 
persists, as technological items often do, beyond the lifespan of the originary users, then 
its impacts need to be considered anew.
Technologies have always changed us, and the introduction of any new 
technological implement will continue to alter aspects of ourselves, however subtly. For 
the individual, sustained interaction might produce only a modicum of effect over the 
course of a life, or rather a minute amount in relation to species-wide effects of use. 
Over longer timescales, however, societies may be affected by equipment in such a way 
that new practices emerge which have a profound influence over all the minds which 
enter into them. More extensively, a new technology might begin to punctuate the 
equilibrium of evolutionary stability, altering our genetic makeup as our environment 
places selective pressures upon us which favour that particular technological interaction. 
Examples of such might include harnessing fire, and domesticating dogs for hunting and 
tracking. Technology, as ever, appears to be a relative term.
For instance literacy, for skilled users, is a technology. But on an evolutionary 
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scale writing is just another device of exosomatic storage, so unskilled and unselected 
for as yet to be incorporated into the species. At a cultural level, over the period since its 
inception writing has had a profound morphical capacity on the societies in which it has 
been deployed, at least on a par with the changes it instills in its every user. And yet if 
every literate person died today writing would disappear entirely and would only come 
to pass again if non-literate societies reinvented it. This is why morphability is a key 
feature of defining technology: it acts as a marker, however small, at different levels of 
granularity. For an individual, writing is most often a technological interaction save for 
those moments when it is made unpleasantly unready-to-hand due to deficient 
equipment, in aporia, parapraxis, etc. At a further remove, at the level of the society in 
which the user sits writing is still a technology, extending that society's perceived 
abilities, what we might identify as its “boundary schema”:
the effects of external symbols did not stop with the reorganization of the 
individual  brain.  They  transformed  the  collective  architecture  of 
cognition  and  changed  how  the  larger  human  community  thinks  and 
remembers. They also enabled many new forms of mental representation. 
There are now entire classes of cognitive work that cannot take place 
without  external  symbols.  If  we  define  symbolic  technology  very 
broadly, including everything from musical and mathematical notations 
to  art,  circuit  diagrams,  and maps,  it  is  clear  that  most  of  our  major 
cultural institutions and a high percentage of our cutting-edge work are 
completely dependent on symbolic technology (Donald, So Rare 304).
But as we pull back, to see societies with varying literacy rates at different times and 
places, and even further to a species level, or a genus level, we can see that this 
“technology” of writing is just another method some of these strange apes deploy to 
communicate with one another. Suddenly, in comparison to their use of fire say, it 
doesn’t seem like much of a technology at all. And, we could also reverse this flow, 
consider finer details, finer grains, and look at the formation of individual words: at 
times technologies for meaning, at others mere devices deployed in the attempt to 
convey a new or difficult thought. And is a single letter a device or a technology? I hope 
that I have shown that any answer would have to include when, to whom, and why, and 
that any answer must necessarily vary across the grains.
“Technology” is not a fixed state. Dance can be a technology, but a dance can be 
a device. From an evolutionary perspective reading is a device trending toward a 
technology as literacy spreads; the harnessing of fire is a technology, and computing is a 
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device. At relative granularities fire and dance are of the same order, they are 
technologies. When we think about timescales longer than an individual life then we 
might think of how the effects operate on a subculture, culture, society, era, or species 
so that when we talk about an object as “technological” we might not experience it as 
such ourselves, but instead be addressing the communal aspect of the equipment under 
consideration, how it exists predominantly in a certain community at a certain time; 
there can be a consensus that most beings in that culture experience the object 
technologically. “Technology” is just a relative measure of the manifested strength of 
the effects of equipment use at various strata72. In this regard, granular considerations of 
technology, if pursued, may fall under Steven Connor's conception of a “Cultural 
Phenomenology”:
Cultural  phenomenology  would  aim  to  enlarge,  diversify  and 
particularise  the  study  of  culture.  Instead  of  readings  of  abstract 
structures, functions and dynamics, cultural phenomenology would home 
in  on  substances,  habits,  organs,  rituals,  obsessions,  pathologies, 
processes and patterns of feeling...'Cultural Phenomenology' strikes me 
as a good name for the work I have in mind because it would inherit and 
preserve from the phenomenological tradition an aspiration to articulate 
the worldliness and embodiedness of experience - the in-the-worldness of 
all existence...attending...to the affective, somatic dimensions of cultural 
experience.
In this way “technology” could remain a phenomenological description of interaction 
with equipment, as outlined here, and yet we would remain able to talk about its relative 
effects across swathes of time and the aggregate of multiple bodily experiences.
Conclusion
The argument of this chapter has been a rewriting of the “common sense” definition of 
technology which is insufficiently nuanced, and that e-reading, as opposed to 
encountering a codex, is no more or less natural than that interaction, though it differs in 
terms of the complexity of the apparatus itself and the simplicity of initial interactions 
72 We might compare this idea of looking at technologies as functioning differently at different 
granularities as being in line with Thomas Misa's call to study technology at the micro, meso, and 
macro scales (see Misa “Retrieving Sociotechnological Change from Technological Determinism”). 
The notion of studying technologies at relative granularities that I posit here, however, divides the 
strata temporally, whereas Misa's levels reflect the study of individual (common sense defined) 
technologies (micro) through to the effects of extensive technological systems (macro).
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with it; that such a discussion must occur about the latter is seen as a direct result of the 
former. It has been suggested that, regardless of the initial challenge, skilful use of 
either equipment requires comparable levels of practice, but codex reading, for the 
current generation in our society, is so normalised and over-practiced as to be apparently 
more in tune with our nature. To best understand this discussion it has been situated in 
terms of a history of resistance to new technologies which have used opposition to 
nature as their key rhetorical tool. I have argued that neither “nature” nor “technology” 
is particularly well defined in these arguments, and continues to be poorly defined in the 
contemporary debates around e-reading. Whilst I have not attempted a definition of 
nature I have tried to show that nature thought of as something non-human is irrelevant 
to defining technology despite its radical implications for the ethics of using tools in the 
world. Nature in terms of “human nature,” however, has been positioned not as in 
opposition to technology, but intimately bound to it. This assertion has been embedded 
in the definition outlined above, and in the four criteria which produce the 
phenomenological experience of technological interaction so defined. Below is an 
overview clarifying the terms “technology” and “device” that will be used for the rest of 
this work.
Technology
• A technological interaction concerns dealings in use which abide by the four 
criteria and, by necessity, emanates from an item of equipment.
• The term “equipment” is agnostic to materiality, it is merely the item around 
which a use-interaction sits. For reference to any kind of equipment at the heart 
of a technological interaction we can deploy the shorthand: “a technology.”
• An artefact at the heart of a technological interaction is more closely allied to 
common sense definitions of technology: it is material equipment from which a 
technological interaction emerges.
• The shorthand “a technology” best describes the perception of item and 
interaction; the item by itself is best described as “equipment,” “tool,” or 
“apparatus” dependent on its materiality.
• No equipment can be encountered in its totality, it is always a malleable and 
personal gestalt.
Device
• A device-ive interaction concerns dealings in use which do not abide by all four 
criteria and yet, by necessity, still emanate from equipment.
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• For reference to any equipment encountered in a device-ive interaction we can 
deploy the shorthand “a device” whether that be in learning, unskilled or initiate, 
or interrupted use.
• A device-ive artefact is often more closely allied to common sense definitions of 
technology: it is material equipment from which a device-ive interaction can 
emerge, and this can be easily mistaken for technology if it closely follows some 
of the four criteria.
• The shorthand “a device” best describes a combination of equipment and device-
ive interaction.
With these definitions in mind I hope that a binary between nature and technology 
appears inherently false. Technology isn't somehow against a pre-human nature because 
we choose how we deploy it, it cannot act by itself; technology isn't against an 
unextended human nature because it is bound to us, and may even have caused 
ourselves to be. Along these lines, and with some pleasing coincidences of terminology, 
Walter Ong offers a potent foil to the Neo-Luddite attitude:
Technologies are artificial, but…artificiality is natural to human beings. 
Technology, properly interiorized, does not degrade human life but on the 
contrary  enhances  it…As  musicologists  well  know,  it  is  pointless  to 
object to electronic compositions…on the grounds that the sounds come 
out of a mechanical  contrivance.  What do you think the sounds of an 
organ come out of? Or the sounds of a violin or even of a whistle? The 
fact is that by using a mechanical contrivance, a violinist or an organist 
can  express  something  poignantly  human  that  cannot  be  expressed 
without  the  mechanical  contrivance.  To  achieve  such  expression  of 
course the violinist or organist has to have interiorized the technology, 
made the tool or machine a second nature, a psychological part of himself 
or herself…Such shaping of a tool to oneself, learning a technological 
skill, is hardly dehumanizing.  The use of a technology can enrich the 
human psyche, enlarge the human spirit, intensify its interior life (Orality  
83).
Ong saw technology's human/humanising power when it was “properly interiorized,” 
but I have argued that something only becomes a technology when such internalisation 
occurs. But by so naturalising technology, or saying that computing and dance are of the 
same order, does this theory potentially do damage?  Does it weaken the important task 
of questioning the deployment of new technologies, including widespread e-reading? I 
would suggest not; it shifts the fight from worries about technology as an abstract and 
general concept, to worries that are more specific, such as the use of computing in all 
areas of life, the extent of our visceral insulation, or the demand for teleological 
progress and a consuming faith in science. It is a move toward specificity, not a 
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neutering of the debate. If we understand dance and computing as related - though 
clearly fundamentally different in their praxis, function, and effect/affect - then we 
might avoid irrational fears based on false binaries, and instead start to hone in on the 
real problems in our deployment of certain equipment. Our taking responsibility for 
how we attempt to interact with our environments must be based on an awareness that 
we only came into being as exploiters, turning to whatever we could in order to survive 
and upset a Darwinian evolution which would have selected us out of existence. There 
is no reason for us not to have humility in the face of this, but “[w]e can never escape 
the bio-technological nexus and get 'back to nature,' because we have never lived in 
nature” (Taylor, Artificial 199).
Once a technical mode of thought has been introduced we find it hard to 
challenge. Technical thought is valuable, technological systems are hard to set up, and 
it's difficult and time-consuming to rehearse devices into invisibility; there are, in short, 
many good reasons to be resistant, maybe even as a survival trait. As such, replacing 
what appears to be a fundamental technology (bound books) with what appears to be a 
hopelessly visible device (e-readers), perhaps unsurprisingly can feel like a weak move, 
bereft. That this is not the experience of an increasing number of users, however, is 
telling:
there’s  something  seriously  different  about  Apple’s  tablet...That 
difference can  be summarized in  two words:  It  disappears...Instead  of 
living inside a box with a URL bar and a bunch of buttons alongside 
other boxes and applications, content  takes over  the device...You’re not 
just  looking  at  [the  internet]  through  a  browser,  you’re  holding  [the 
internet] in your hands (Tweney “iPad hands on”).
If the benefits are worth it, and we can get used to the tools, then the technologising 
process can occur; it's what we do. It is to this idea of “getting used” to e-reading that 
we will now turn.
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Chapter 2 - The Nature of Our Tools
[K]nowledge...lives in the muscles, not in consciousness
- John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct 177
In the first chapter I considered the claim that digital reading devices are somehow 
“unnatural,” and addressed their relation to technology as a class of objects to try and 
better understand the concern. I'd like to take the language of technology established in 
that chapter, and its attitude toward digital readers as physical devices which might 
become technologies over time, and bring it to bear on a second assertion from the 
discourse of resistance to reading on screen: “E-reading doesn't feel right.” As with the 
assertion “e-reading/technology is unnatural,” this idea is familiar within the popular 
conversation surrounding the subject and yet requires a consideration of, at least, its 
philosophical, physiological, and psychological aspects in order to realise the 
complexity of the statement and to more fully understand why it is so compelling.
This chapter will look at four distinct topics: To begin with we'll consider some 
examples of the popular and academic discourses surrounding resistance to e-reading 
rooted in haptic and tactile concerns, developing a sense of the phenomenological 
experience of interacting with codices, e-readers, and tablets. I'll then introduce 
evidence from experimental psychology as to why haptics and gesture may be an 
integral aspect of reading, and of thinking more generally. I'd then like to look at why 
codices seem to feel so right in the hand, and to suggest that this is something born of 
repeated engagement over both single lifetimes, and generations. This is hardly a radical 
assertion in itself, but I'd like to couch the discussion in terms of defining an 
evolutionary epistemological mechanism, a method of artefacts accumulating 
knowledge of their users, by which spending time with a class of object which provokes 
a particular kind of interaction might induce a familiarity which feels somehow “right”, 
suitable, superior, or “natural,” to return to the language of the first chapter. Following 
this discussion of how artefacts get used to us, the chapter will conclude with a 
consideration of the philosophical implications for our getting used to artefacts, 
attempting to marry the phenomenological experience of the process of 
“technologising” with an awareness of the underlying ontological structure of 
encounters with tangible equipment drawn from Object Oriented Ontology73.
73 The reasons for my focussing on Object Oriented Ontology are best saved for the discussion itself, but 
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Reports on touch
In the same way that folk psychology has become recognised as a source of evidence74, 
so we can see the various reports of e-reading's unnaturalness and ergonomic 
inadequacies as a form of “folk phenomenology,” a description of experience stemming 
from first person analysis which the reporter often feels can be exported, with limited 
modification, to other experiencers of the same or similar phenomena. Thomas 
Metzinger, in one of the few available classifications of the term, describes folk 
phenomenology as “a naïve, prescientific way of speaking about the contents of our 
own minds - folk-phenomenology is a way of referring specifically to the contents of 
conscious experience, as experienced from the first-person perspective...and is 
characterized by an almost all-pervading naïve realism.” As folk psychology can often 
demonstrate useful examples, methods, and states to its academic counterpart, I would 
like to argue that folk phenomenological intuitive report has a lot to offer in terms of 
prompting us toward the issues that are central to negotiating what is qualitatively 
different about reading on a portable screen, indeed many of the reports already 
discussed in the first chapter would fall under the term.
Such an instance of inspiration also can be seen in the experimental design 
detailed in a cognitive science paper by Davoli et al75 considering the effects of holding 
a text in the hands as opposed to having it stand supported upon a desk. The team first 
established a folk phenomenological distinction between the two reading postures via a 
poll, and to the extent that this, and related discourse prompted their experiment into 
being, or caused them to adapt its design, we might see it as an example of, adapting 
Gallagher's term, “front-loading folk phenomenology”:
when it comes time to really read an electronic document (i.e., one of 
importance that we truly want to absorb), many people would rather print 
it  out to read than read it  in its electronic form. There are,  of course, 
functional advantages to a hard copy: It is portable, and it can be written 
on. Yet in our informal polling, these advantages are rarely invoked to 
justify the preference. Rather, a common response seems to be, “I just 
at heart the standpoint is appealing for our discussions here in its displacement of agency from solely 
human interlocutors; Object Oriented Ontology prompts us to consider both sides of an interaction as 
experiential.
74 For an overview of the promise and problems with folk-psychology see Andy Clark “Folk 
Psychology, Thought, and Context.”
75 Christoher Davoli et al “When Meaning Matters...”
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like  to  hold  it,”  as  if  having  the  text  in  one’s  hands  somehow 
fundamentally alters the way in which it is read (555).
The importance here is not the quality of the report, it's bafflingly vague, but that it 
exists at all and what it points toward: that holding reading material affects cognition at 
a preconscious level.
Similarly Lynne Truss, in her punctuation pedant's handbook Eats Shoots and 
Leaves, offers an illustrative folk phenomenological experience which seems to support 
this attitude: “Scrolling documents is the opposite of reading: your eyes remain static, 
while the material flows past” (181). Now, I don't agree with Truss' claim here, that the 
eyes don't move during reading when the material is scrolled rather than paginated, 
indeed all physiological data about eye movement during any form of reading would 
run counter to it76, but this doesn't negate value in the report - fluid scrolling (such as 
can be found in some iPad reading apps (Wattpad for instance), on websites, or in 
desktop documents), to Truss, doesn't feel like reading at all, in fact seems its opposite, 
where the eyes do no work and the experience feels passive compared to the 
overpowering warp and woof of the machinery.
Christine Shaw Roome, a professional fundraiser for an academic library in 
Canada, writing this year about her first experience of reading from an iPad for the blog 
Life as a Human, reports a similar position to that of Truss above: she wonders if she's 
now even reading a book at all, so drastically has the feel of the activity altered:
This did not feel like reading a book...[Her husband interrupts her] “I’m 
reading a book!” But, was I? I was missing the tactile features of the 
book, which often comfort me. The smell and feel of the book and the 
way you can see how far you’ve read by measuring the thickness of the 
pages. When I buy a book, I always take time to look at its design - the 
type face, the page weight and colour, the way the ends appear to be torn 
or are  cut  precisely.  The texture of the  cover and the photography or 
illustration that accompanies the title all draw me in and are part of the 
experience of enjoying a book. Sometimes, I buy a book just because I 
like how it feels in my hands.
Roome offers us a good survey here of the most familiar elements of the folk 
phenomenological debate surrounding reading on screen: it no longer seeming to be a 
book; it not feeling like a book; it not smelling like a book; the wedge of remaining 
pages being a consistent indicator of progress; and the object as aesthetic artefact.
76 See, for example, Dehaene's Reading in the Brain (13-18).
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The scent of physical books, old and new, is a frequently recurring issue in 
online and off-line debates of “the death of the book,” and one which has become such a 
shorthand for the deprivations of reading on screen that a spoof range of aerosols 
(SmellofBooks.com) did the rounds in various discussions of the subject77. The appeal to 
smell might seem an odd reason to cling to a medium, but, if nothing else, it shows how 
deeply passions run in this regard, or just how far appeals will go to demonstrate the 
sanctity of the old form - everything about it is comforting.
Such ideas are recapitulated in another blog post by Anna Dorfman. 
Commenting on Johnathan Safran Foer's novel Tree of Codes (a work that we'll return to 
in the third chapter), Dorfman makes a similar argument for what is important in the 
codex reading interaction:
I don’t see the act of reading as a purely word-based experience. Reading 
is also tactile. Reading should involve interaction between you and the 
text in your hands. The speed at which you turn to the next page (or flip 
back to the one before) matters. That accidental glimpse you got of page 
273 (while still only on page 32) while fishing around for your bookmark 
matters. The weight of the book in your bag - that subtle reminder that 
it’s  waiting for  you -  matters.  The paper stock matters!  The font,  the 
letter-spacing, the margin width! It  all matters!...And don’t even get me 
started on the smell of old paper and fresh ink!
What really comes through in these detailed experiences, besides the recurrence of 
olfactory satisfaction, is the importance of haptic interaction; the feel of the book in the 
hands is an important part of grounding the experience as what it is. When this is 
missing the effect is so profound, the cognitive dissonance so great, that seemingly 
unintuitive questions, such as those seen in Roome's account, arise: “Is this even a 
book?” “Is this reading?78” We can find some support for this idea in Polt's 
77 See for example Charlie Sorrell's “New Book Smell” at Wired's Gadget Lab blog, Alison Flood's post 
at the Guardian book blog, “Making Scents Out of Novels,” or the following: “Me, I’ve parted with 
most of my print library. For good. Ninety percent of my reading now takes place on-screen, although 
I’m uneasy about digital books living inside those intangible walled gardens. Can I pass them on to 
my kids, like my mother did with Camus to me? Will they keep my side notes? Will they smell?” 
(Martin Ferro-Thomsen “Reading Beyond Words”).
78 A similar idea can be seen in the following report from Max Bruinsma whose friend worries that her 
new activites with the written word somehow don't “count”:
I don’t read, someone I know well told me. She meant that she doesn’t read the way 
‘readers’ read. People who can spend hours on end with a book in a chair or on the sofa,  
occasionally turning over a paper page and appearing to have completely forgotten that 
there exists a world outside the sentences they are reading. No, she’s not one of those 
readers. But,  I  say,  you actually read the whole day through! You scan articles and 
books, browse through websites and online fora, open and answer emails, gloss over 
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phenomenology of the typewriter: “as long as you're habituated to a particular design, 
that design works better for you than any other - because the precise activity that your 
body is doing with that design can be done, strictly speaking, only with that design” 
(Polt, “Typology...”). Polt is talking here about the different potential layouts for 
typewriters, but he offers a glimpse of what might so puzzle Roome: when the substrate 
for reading alters so does the engagement; codex reading can only be done with a codex, 
it is a particular thing. The question then becomes whether that engagement is so 
superior as to warrant being identified as the “true” (or “natural”) form as in e-reading 
its particularities will, by necessity, disappear.
Lucien X Polsatron suggests that “the sole difference a paper book carries - in 
addition to the clearly superior epidermal pleasure it provides over that produced by 
touching plastic…is that the total weight of the text is constantly felt by the reader. This 
sensation perhaps gives the reader an impression...of possessing the whole of its 
meaning, an illusion whose loss could panic fragile souls” (35). This idea starts to close 
in on some of the detail motivating the folk phenomenological reports of resistance to 
reading on screen rooted in the tactile experience of the artefacts of reading: A paper 
book has come to represent knowledge, rather than just contain it, and its fixed and 
physical coherence, completed and separated from the world by its covers, projects the 
illusion of a definitive truth. The acquisition of knowledge and the “perfect” form of the 
codex are intimately associated, and we will return to the implications of the form of the 
bound book in the third chapter. Here, however, I want to continue to look at the 
significance attributed to knowledge gained from embodied books apprehended via 
touch.
An expression of this can be found in Birkerts' work on the subject, work which 
also has a strong folk phenomenology of codex reading underpinning its assertions:
Why, then, am I so uneasy about the page-to-screen transfer - a skeptic if 
not a downright resister?...I’m not blind to the unwieldiness of the book, 
or to the cumbersome systems we must maintain to accommodate it - the 
vast  libraries  and  complicated  filing  systems.  But  these  structures 
evolved  over  centuries  in  ways  that  map  our  collective  endeavor  to 
understand and express our world. The book is part of a system. And that 
system stands for the labor and taxonomy of human understanding, and 
to touch a book is to touch that system, however lightly (“Resisting the 
Kindle”).
newspaper headlines. Yes, but that’s not reading, she says.
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This quotation shows a distinct attitude towards the embodiment of the text: to touch a 
book is to experience a unique history of an evolved dynamic, and this will become 
more significant shortly. For Birkerts there is a history of haptic engagement which 
comes into play with every turn of the page, a kinesthetics (and, as we also saw with 
Roome, a kinaesthetics) which acts as a physical reminder of the forces and efforts 
which go, and have gone into understanding. When we turn pages we engage with the 
systematic pursuit of knowledge, but it's not enough just to look, we have to become, 
for Birkerts, for Roome, for Davoli's respondents, involved.
The requirement of involvement is what I think can motivate resistances to 
reading on screen which appeal to haptic concerns. We saw in the first chapter that 
equipment can seem to be a mediating layer between us and the world until we 
incorporate it into our body schema, in short when we become intimately involved and 
can undertake tasks in a way which feels “natural.” I would argue that we incorporate 
physical books, make them into technologies, via a heavily socialised progression which 
is standardised from a very early age; we create heuristics for the interaction with which 
we can shrink the scope of our attention down to the act and the act alone, provided that 
the equipment performs as is expected. Most of us are involved with codices, and all 
that they are able to stand for, from a time before we can remember, so it's unsurprising 
how deeply they can become embedded in our attitude towards the world and why we 
might be so resistant to a change in their form. To begin to understand this more 
specifically I'd like to consider the relationship between touch, gesture, and thought a 
little further beyond the folk phenomenological reports outlined above. Such first 
person reports are copious and readily available from any enthusiastic reader aware of 
the alternative reading mediums available to them, and are frequently nuanced enough 
to suggest that only paying attention to any one of these areas - the movements of the 
hands in gesture, the hands themselves, or the items that the hands encounter - will not 
be enough to understand what may motivate them. As such I will offer examples of 
work on each of these aspects which will hopefully be of use in recognising these 
accounts as significant, whilst also preparing the ground to suggest why they might also 
be surmountable, if not always in exactly the way that the reporters might wish them to 
be.
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Touching and Thinking
The unravelling (or should that be restitching?) of the Cartesian divide between body 
and mind led to the founding of several fields, the principal two, for our purposes at 
least, being Embodied Cognition in Philosophy and the cognitive sciences, and 
Phenomenology (predominantly a philosophical discourse, but, particularly in relation 
to Embodied Cognition, one which is making its way into scientific practice, as we saw 
in the first chapter). Phenomenology is built upon the importance of first person report 
when discussing matters of embodiment and perception, and will form the basis of our 
discussion about the mechanism of adjustment to objects which will occupy the second 
half of this chapter. But let's first consider what Embodied Cognition, and in particular 
its insights about the use of our hands and gesture, has to offer the discussion of the 
unimpeachable materiality of the codex.
Shaun Gallagher, in How the Body Shapes the Mind, makes it clear from the start 
of his project just how fundamental the body in motion is to thought79: “In the 
beginning, that is, at the time of our birth, our human capacities for perception and 
behavior have already been shaped by our movement” (1). From before we enter the 
world our bodies have been rehearsing actions which have primed us for existing in our 
environment, the ways that we'll move, and the ways that we'll take onboard 
information. From those very first moments, movement is established as reciprocal, 
primed to be responsive to its surrounds: “precisely and quite literally, we can see our 
own possibilities in the faces of others. The infant, minutes after birth, is capable of 
imitating the gesture that it sees on the face of another person. It is thus capable of a 
certain kind of movement that foreshadows intentional action, and that propels it into a 
human world” (1). For Gallagher, as for most, if not all supporters of Embodied 
Cognition, it is the specifics of our bodies in movement, or in the desire for movement, 
that forms a large part of what makes us human.
Embodied Cognition is the study of, and belief in the body's capacity to affect, to 
deeply structure the activities of the mind, radically opposed to the dualism of the 
Western philosophical tradition. Though not solely a scientific discipline or subset of 
Psychology, Embodied Cognition often relies on experimental Neuro- and Cognitive 
79 Gallagher's project in this work is to develop a language which cuts across phenomenology, Cognitive 
Science, and experimental Neuropsychology allowing for a cohesive way of discussing the body's 
influence on cognition.
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Science and psychological evidence for its claims. Those claims, however, can be both 
inspired by and in pursuit of philosophical or sociological ends; work in 
phenomenology formed the underpinning for its inception, and can still be found 
explicitly highlighted in work from George Lakoff and Mark Johnson80 and Andy 
Clark81.
Frank Wilson discusses issues we might readily describe as being the subject of 
Embodied Cognition in his work on The Hand. Wilson's research takes the idea that our 
bodies shape all aspects of our mental life and focuses in on the central importance of 
our hands to cognition: “I would,” he argues, “[say] that any theory of human 
intelligence which ignores the interdependence of hand and brain function, the historic 
origins of that relationship, or the impact of that history on the developmental dynamics 
in modern humans, is grossly misleading and sterile” (7). Part of what I'm hoping to 
establish here is a theory of at least an aspect of human intelligence, and as such I want 
to be sensitive to Wilson's admonishment and to consider the importance of the effectors 
which directly engage with our reading technologies. It is therefore the hands that will 
receive most of our attention here.
A number of anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists have argued for the 
impact of tool use, of the dextrous use of the hands with an object from the user's 
environment, as being integral to both the development of brain size in our primate 
ancestors82, leading directly to the evolution of homo sapiens, as well as to using that 
increased brain power to create language, language which would, for some cultures, 
eventually be made concrete and preserved in codices. Merlin Donald notes that 
[o]ddly  our  physicality...has  a  tight  relationship  with  our  capacity  for 
symbolic  communication,  which  evolved  so  recently.  This  includes 
language. All expressive systems are ultimately owned in the same way 
as any other motor system; that is they are self-rooted…The conscious 
mind  may  have  reinvented  itself  and  greatly  extended  its  reach  in 
language, but it has never lost its vestigial roots in embodiment. On the 
contrary, although human consciousness may have had to accommodate 
itself  to  the  emerging  symbolic  structures  of  complex  culture...it  has 
always referred back to its roots in the physical self (So Rare 137&135).
80 See Philosophy in the Flesh throughout.
81 See Natural Born Cyborgs and Supersizing the Mind. For more on the Embodied Cognition project 
see Margaret Wilson “Six Views on Embodied Cognition”; the excellent overview of “Embodied 
Cognition” at the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy; Lawrence Shapiro Embodied Cognition; and 
Francisco J. Varela The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.
82 See for instance Stanley H. Ambrose “Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution”; Beth Preston 
“Cognition and Tool Use; and Kathleen Gibson and Tim Ingold Tools, Language, and Cognition in 
Human Evolution.
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For Donald, as for the advocates of Embodied Cognition, every aspect of ourselves and 
of our experience of our environment or culture, however complex, however seemingly 
purely cognitive, comes back to our physical presence, and this might offer us some 
indication as to why the “feel” of reading is so important. The codex is our long 
established tool for reading, a technology at the granularity of society if not species, and 
the structures that the reading ability is bound to - semantic, visual, haptic, even 
olfactory - are all concerned with embodiment at the deepest levels83.
Wilson argues that
If language and the employment of the hands for tool manufacture and 
tool use co-evolved - effectively forging a new domain of hominid brain 
operations and mental potentials that we collectively refer to as ‘human 
cognition’ - then we should find analogous links, or reinforcing effects, 
between purposive hand use, language, and cognition in the individual 
histories of living people (The Hand 34).
He goes on to discuss the work of Patricia Greenfield, particularly her study “Language, 
Tools and Brain: The Ontogeny and Phylogeny of Hierarchically Organized Sequential 
Behaviour”:
She proposed that  the human brain organizes and oversees the child’s 
interactions with objects almost exactly the same way it organizes and 
oversees  the  production  of  speech.  These  two  specific  skills 
(manipulating objects and manipulating words), and the developmental 
chronology associated with the child’s mastery of those skills, proceed in 
such transparently parallel fashion that the brain must be: (a) applying the 
same logic or procedural rules to both; and (b) using the same anatomic 
structures as it does so (165).
Wilson sees in Greenfield's work clear support for his understanding of an evolved 
connection between language and the use of the hands in tool use. Further evidence for 
these assertions can be found in Stanley H. Ambrose “Paleolithic Technology and 
Human Evolution” where Ambrose sees the crafting of early tools as synching with the 
cognitive and linguistic abilities of early hominids. Striking stones together to produce 
blades “involve predominantly repetitive coarse motor control (percussion flaking). 
Primate vocalizations are also repetitive sequences of coarse motor actions.” But tools 
83 In chapter one we saw this with relation to repurposed neural pathways as discussed by Dehaene and 
Wolf.
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which combine elements
are hierarchical and involve nonrepetitive fine hand motor control to fit 
components  to  each  other.  Assembling  techno-units  in  different 
configurations  produces  functionally  different  tools.  This  is  formally 
analogous to grammatical language, because hierarchical assemblies of 
sounds produce meaningful phrases and sentences, and changing word 
order changes meaning. Speech and composite tool manufacture involve 
sequences of nonrepetitive fine motor control and both are controlled by 
adjacent areas of the inferior left frontal lobe84 (1751-2).
Ambrose uses this evidence, alongside the archaeological record, to support a 
hypothesis of at least the coexistence and likely the coevolution of language and tool 
use, each activity reinforcing and manipulating the other reciprocally. Such connections 
would seem to come hard-wired, and the neural pathways that evolved for effective tool 
use seem to have been piggybacked upon by the development of an inbuilt capacity and 
drive to acquire a symbolic language. This is unsurprising when we consider the kind of 
intelligence which already needs to be in place for sustained dextrous tool use with 
multi-part equipment. Tool manufacture requires the knowledge that if a stick is 
attached to a stone then it can, as a unit, be a more effective and accurate way of striking 
a target; a mental image must exist to enable the intentional repeated creation of such 
objects. Mental representations which prefigure or stand-in for some object in the world 
are as much a precondition for creating tools as they are for developing a sign system. 
This is why the use of multi-part tools is incredibly rare, close to non-existent in other 
primates: it's not that they are incapable of using them, or even, in theory, of creating 
them; the insurmountable challenge lies, for the most part, in their inability to conceive 
of them.
When combined with other environmental factors, other selective pressures on 
the young homo line, the emergence of the symbolic thought required for complex tool 
manufacture and use led to an explosion of changes in the brain and cognition:
[whilst n]o one knows whether brain enlargement is specifically related 
to increased tool use...it is known that tools did not become complicated 
in their structure, nor were they kept and transported for long periods by 
their users, until quite recently. It is a virtual certainty that complex social  
structure - and language - developed gradually in association with the 
spread  of  more  highly  elaborated  tool  design,  manufacture,  and  use” 
84 Ambrose cites Greenfield “Language, Tools and Brain” and Kempler “Disorders of Language and 
Tool Use” in this regard.
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(Wilson 30)85.
What then are the implications of this deep relationship between embodied tool 
users and the capacity for symbolic thought for our present day changes in the 
technology of reading? In short, we have inherited brains shaped by the fact that “for 
millions of years primate dexterity preceded the increase of brain size in the hominid 
genealogy. This circumstance [has] engendered a learning pathway based on discovery 
by manipulation and tactile observation” (Frost “Reading by Hand”). This idea is 
important and worth reiterating: the manifestation of the brain with which we currently 
live, of the body of which the brain is a part, and the embodied cognition that they 
manifest together are all products of evolutionary processes which have favoured, have 
selected for, ways of learning which are intimately linked to manipulating objects with 
our hands.
Contemporary research into gesture certainly appears to bear out this hypothesis 
and to support Wilson's assertion that we should find links “between purposive hand 
use, language, and cognition in the individual histories of living people.” Researchers 
have become increasingly interested in the connection between the body and thought (in 
no small part due to the debates prompted by Embodied Cognition), and work on 
gesture sits squarely within such discussion. A 2009 study conducted by Susan Goldin-
Meadow, Zachary Mitchell, and Susan Wagner-Cook looked at young students being 
taught the concept of “grouping.” Grouping is used in the solution of mathematics 
problems where a single term must stand in for several, e.g. 3+2+8 =___+8. The 
students taking part in the study had to learn to resolve such equations by finding the 
single digit which is equivalent to 3+2 to fill in the gap, i.e. they must understand the 
concept of adding numbers together to produce an analogue which balances the sum. In 
order to teach this, tutors were getting students to draw a little “v” shape with their 
finger under the 3 and the 2, physically tying them together. “Previous research has 
shown that students who are asked to gesture while talking about math problems are 
better at learning how to do them. This is true whether the students are told what 
gestures to make, or whether the gestures are spontaneous” (Campana). Sure enough, 
students understood the concept significantly faster with the grouping strategy than 
when the technique was not deployed. But the researchers also found, over the course of 
the study, that it didn’t matter where the students drew the “v” at all, i.e. it wasn't 
85 Ambrose's research supports just this notion.
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necessary to link the 3+2; it was simply the act of making the gesture which introduced 
and sublimated the concept in “the student, through the body itself” (Campana).
The findings of this research seem to potentially offer a way-in to understanding 
some of the (scientifically and philosophically) naïve reports of resistance to digital 
reading technologies that we encountered at the beginning of this chapter. Goldwin-
Meadow et al show just how important engaging the body is to learning: the students 
studied who made no gestures learned how to cope with the task at a significantly 
reduced rate to those who made an arbitrarily placed gesture that nonetheless evoked the 
concept under discussion. This has implications for understanding a shift in reading 
practices as the gestures of interacting with codices, the turning of pages, the feel of the 
remaining and consumed leaves held in each hand, dog-earing (or not), breaking spines 
(or not), all the physical attributes that make the act what it is are undoubtedly changed 
when the equipment changes. It may well be therefore, as Birkerts suggests, that there is 
something in the touching of a physical book that becomes combined with the reception 
of written knowledge to the extent that the folk phenomenological reports are indicating 
a genuine drop in capacity as some cognitive aspect(s) of the experience become(s) 
impoverished. Perhaps the gestures of reading print have come to prime the concept of 
knowledge acquisition, a particular way of thinking, and, as with the students in the 
above study, the denial of such gestures may interrupt or delay such thought. Suddenly 
the question of “is this reading at all?” starts to seem less obscure; in a very real way the 
act of reading changes, and may become a different way of thinking prompted by or in 
the absence of prompting from the movements of the hands.
In an earlier work from 200386 Goldin-Meadow had investigated gesture and 
found that it is likely to have a function beyond being simply expressive as
• We do it when talking on the phone.
• We do it when talking to ourselves.
• We do it in the dark when no one can see.
• Gesturing increases with task difficulty.
• Gesturing increases when speakers must choose between options.
• ...[and  i]t  turns  out…that  speakers  blind  from birth,  who have  never 
spoken to a visible listener and never seen others moving their hands as 
they speak, gesture when they speak. Moreover, they do so even when 
speaking to others they know are blind (Clark, Supersizing 123-124)87.
86 Hearing Gesture: How Our Hands Help Us Think.
87 I cite Clark here for the efficacy of his list of Goldin-Meadow's conclusions and to highlight the 
discussion of the study in scientifically-inspired philosophy.
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Gesture, then, is fundamental, an innate part of our body schema like swallowing or 
reaching, something we perform automatically, and yet something which can intimately 
affect learning. Clark discusses the use of gesture as a way of extending cognition from 
the brain into the environment by drawing on Goldin-Meadow's work to show another 
way, beyond physically enacting a concept as with grouping, in which gesture might 
explicitly benefit learning:
The physical act of gesturing, Goldin-Meadow suggests, plays an active 
(not merely expressive) role in learning, reasoning, and cognitive change 
by  providing  an  alternative  (analog,  motoric,  visuospatial) 
representational  format...Encodings  in  that  special  visuomotor  format 
enter...into  a  kind of  ongoing coupled dialectic  with  encodings  in  the 
other verbal format…This…creates points of instability (conflict) whose 
attempted  resolutions  [often]  move  forward  our  thinking  (Supersizing 
125).
In this way, gesture actually appears to take on some of the role of an interlocutor, able 
to enact or code contrary positions in a temporary physical working memory and 
producing productive conflict.
What is important to convey here is simply that when we purposefully, 
consciously or unconsciously, move our hands in space it plays a demonstrable role in 
meaning and producing meaning. But in truth we simply don't know the extent to which 
performing actions which require specific repeated gestures and sequences of actions 
with relatively uniform equipment might standardise those actions, their place in 
cognition, and our perception of their effects. Folk phenomenological report is therefore 
a vital source of information prior to and prompting further research, and the reports 
outlined at the start of this chapter certainly seem to point toward a collusion between 
the gestures prompted by print and satisfactory cognitive experience, as if the change in 
media is developing some thus far inarticulable drop in performance.
Recent cognitive and neuropsychological work investigating the specificities of 
how we use, position, and even perceive our hands in action also suggests that they can 
have implications for our attitude toward our environment, i.e. our hands in use can 
affect how we gain knowledge of and from things in the world. This kind of work lends 
further credence to the assertion of the centrality of gesture to learning and cognising 
that I'd like to invoke here, and the importance of research in this area is equally 
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supported by reports from the new domains of reading. For example, a particularly 
striking folk report demonstrating the evolution of new thoughtful gestures for the new 
media comes from the classicist James O'Donell's description of his automatic hand 
movements connecting an online practice with his thinking:
it's  my  fingers  I  notice...[W]hen  you've  asked  a  really  interesting 
question...it's  a  physical  reaction,  a  gut  feeling  that  I  need  to  start 
manipulating  (the  Latin  root  for  'hand,'  manus,  is  in  that  word)  the 
information...to find the data that will support a good answer...The sign 
of thinking is that I reach for the mouse and start 'shaking it loose' - the 
circular pattern on the mouse pad that lets me see where the mouse arrow 
is, to make sure the right browser is open, get a search window handy. 
My eyes and hands have already learned to work together in new ways 
with  my brain  -  in  a  process  of  clicking,  typing  a  couple  of  words, 
clicking, scanning, clicking again - which really is a new way of thinking 
for me (192).
We will consider the role of the internet in relation to e-reading and cognition in the 
next chapter. For now I simply want to establish that O'Donnell's report demonstrates 
that new equipment for accessing information has prompted not just new ways of 
thinking, but new gestures which match with and structure that thought.
There is an growing experimental cognitive and neuropsychological literature 
which would go some way to supporting O'Donnell's statement above. Conducted over 
the last five or so years, researchers have been considering how the use of the hands can 
prime our reception of the world, or, more bluntly, the use of our hands appears to shape 
perception. In Ed Symes et al “Grasp Preparation Improves Change-detection for 
Congruent Objects” a research group presented their subjects with a cycle of two 
images, one then another repeated several times, both portraying two dozen fruits and 
vegetables of various sizes88, but with one similarly sized object changing (i.e. all 
objects stayed the same bar an orange changing for a similarly sized apple, hard to spot 
in the first few exchanges). The subjects were asked to indicate when they had 
identified which object altered between the images by either a) squeezing a handle 
(power grip) or b) pinching a switch (precision grip). When the object that altered 
matched the grip that had been “primed” to register the subject's knowledge of the 
change then latency of response decreased significantly, i.e. when an apple changed to 
an orange those participants which had to register the change with a power grip (the grip 
88 All coloured blue or purple so they seemed relatively homogenous in all respects bar size and shape.
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that would be deployed when interacting with the changing objects in grasping) 
outperformed those subjects who had to indicate the change with a precision grip. 
Priming the grip measurably affected their perception of a scene; they were more ready 
to see things that they were primed to interact with89. It is therefore possible to conceive 
that the expectation primed by performing certain gestures might materially affect the 
reception of information: moving our hands in a “readerly” fashion may affect our 
reception of the text to come90. This would seem to indicate that a codex which primes 
such readerly gestures would therefore facilitate a certain mode of thinking that would 
be lost on an e-reader promoting different gestures. But what we see in O'Donnell's 
statement above is the training of ,mental practice associated with a new set of gestures. 
Unlike power and precision grips, readerly gestures, as with the gestures of any skill, 
have learned rather than innate associations. This would suggest that a reader coming to 
a digital device for the first time might well suffer from not entering that primed state 
(or maybe priming for a different mode, if the gestures of the screen are associated with 
a skimming kind of reading for instance). But if this is the case, over time the e-reader 
gestures can be normalised too; significantly anyone who began their reading life on a 
digital device would not suffer from these issues. Again, this must unfortunately remain 
speculative though the studies described above do point to the likelihood of at least 
some variation of this occurring.
To return to our dominant concern, I'd like to explore a further study in this area 
which explicitly discusses the implications for how our hands might affect our reading. 
As yet, the research presented has been little discussed outside of Psychology, but it 
89 Also see similar studies by Symes et al “When Motor Attention Improves Selective Attention...” and 
“Integrating Action and Language Through Biased Competition.” In each case “priming” affected 
perception. A study which is also worth attention in this regard is Reed et al “Grab It!: Biased 
Attention in Functional Hand and Tool Space”:
In four experiments that used a visual-orienting paradigm with predictable lateral cues, 
hands or tools were placed near potential target locations. Results showed that targets 
appearing in the hand’s grasping space (i.e., near the palm) and the rake’s raking space 
(i.e., near the prongs) produced faster responses than did targets appearing to the back 
of the hand, to the back of the rake, or near the forearm. Thus, the topology of the  
facilitated space around the hand is, in part, defined by the hand’s grasping function and 
can be flexibly extended by functional experience using a tool…An embodied theory of 
spatial attention implies that our bodies and our experience using our bodies should help 
influence how attention is distributed in space and, as a result, how visual stimuli are 
processed (237&243).
Again we see evidence for the incorporation of tools, in this instance extending the “active” plane of 
interaction, where perception and response are improved in the region facing the palm or to the active 
range of a tool.
90 This would make an excellent area of future study into embodied reading.
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would appear to support the folk phenomenological claim that a change in equipment, 
and therefore the gestures related to the activity, can have profound effects on the 
reception of written information. As a relatively little known study with direct import on 
the argument of this chapter it is worth discussing in some detail.
Davoli et al's study from 2009, mentioned above with regard to their poll on 
reading preferences, considers the hands' effects on perception, specifically the 
placement of the hands within the visual field during reading. The paper begins with a 
review of earlier works which addressed the brain's apprehension of the space 
surrounding the body (peripersonal space) and in particular around the hands as “several 
results have suggested that visual processing may be biased toward [this] space”91; such 
work “support[s] the conclusion that vision of the space around the hands is special” 
(556).
Davoli et al also note that “[s]everal studies have shown that the actions we 
perform with our hands can influence how we see92...These studies have revealed an 
intimate relationship between perception and action - in particular, the capacity for the 
latter to affect the former” (555), and it is into this discussion that the paper is situated. 
The team wanted to explore how use of the hands affected reading ability, in particular 
whether reading from a desktop mounted screen, where the hands are kept away from 
what is to be read, is detrimental to understanding semantic content when compared to 
reading with the hands holding the material. As already mentioned, prior work on the 
impact of handed action on perception 
suggest[s] that spatial processing is enhanced near the hands...Certainly, 
reading  is  a  process  that  requires  spatial  processing.  In  particular, 
efficient reading requires the precise control of movements of attention 
and the eyes through the text, as well as spatial memory to help retain 
one’s place on the page. It is thus quite possible that the preference for 
holding  one’s  reading  material  may  be  attributable  in  part  to  the 
enhancement of spatial processing that occurs near the hands (556).
This makes intuitive sense when we consider tool use, an activity which predates any 
act of reading: we need incredibly precise information about our hands' position in 
space when we dextrously and accurately manipulate equipment. But reading is, of 
91 See L. Reed et al “Hands up: Attentional Prioritization of Space Near the Hand” and Schendel and 
Robertson “Reaching Out to See...”
92 For example Bekkering and Neggers. “Visual Search is Modulated by Action Intentions” and Fagioli 
et al “Intentional Control of Attention...”
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course, not just about space and arrangement, it also includes content which requires 
semantic processing in order to produce meaning, and at the time of writing it simply 
isn't known to what extent the hands affect semantic processing. The study from Davoli 
et al marks the “the first test of that question” (Davoli et al 556).
Davoli's team initially conducted “sensibleness” tests, where participants were 
asked to rate sentences shown on screen as to whether they were intelligible or not, and 
then “Stroop tests,” a standard measure of semantic comprehension in experimental 
Psychology, where colour words (red, green, etc.) are displayed with the letters either 
matching (e.g. “red” written in red letters - congruent) or not matching (e.g. “green” 
written in red letters - incongruent) the content that they spell out. The tests themselves 
are well established in Psychology research, with predictable results93; it was only the 
ways in which participants were required to indicate sensibleness or congruency which 
gave the surprising outcome of the experiments. Participants completed each round of 
the task by pressing a button attached to either the left or right hand side of the physical 
screen to indicate, for example, congruence and incongruence (i.e. the hands would be 
in the visual field near to the content to be interpreted), or by pressing buttons to the 
same effect held on their left or right leg (i.e. the hands would be outside of the visual 
field away from the content).
The team saw three potential outcomes for the results: i) semantic processing, as 
with spatial processing, would be boosted near the hands ii) increased spatial processing 
comes at the expense of semantic processing iii) spatial processing is improved, but 
semantic processing is unaffected (556).
The placement of the hands certainly did have an effect on semantic 
apprehension, but not in the way that predictions extrapolated from our folk 
phenomenological evidence might suggest: “the present results...suggest that semantic 
processing is impoverished near the hands. This occurred despite the known spatial-
processing enhancements that have been reported” (558, my emphasis).
93 The “Stroop effect,” for example, has become the term for the delay in reaction time that occurs in 
reporting incongruent word/letter colour images. Original study by J.R. Stroop “Studies of 
Interference in Serial Verbal Reactions.”
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(557)
The team found a statistically significant, and in some cases dramatic drop in response 
times when a report of congruence or incongruence was indicated with the hands by the 
sides of the screen over being indicated with button pushes on the legs. This is striking 
(and unpredicted by the prior literature): despite the copious reports of preference for 
reading with a book held in the hands over reading from a desktop screen, Davoli et al's 
results suggest that this might actually be the less effective way of processing semantic 
information. The results were replicated in all three of the team's tests.
During the interpretation of the results the paper suggests that the effect 
demonstrated might represent
a trade-off between semantic processing and spatial processing that can 
be altered by hand proximity: The enhanced spatial processing that has 
been  observed  near  the  hands...might  be  achieved  at  the  expense  of 
semantic  processing...Indeed,  it  seems plausible  that  visual  processing 
near the hands would be biased toward the spatial properties of objects 
and away from semantic ones. Objects near the hands may be critically 
important  because  they  might  be  objects  that  need  to  be  grasped  or 
obstacles that should be avoided (560).
The incredible precision afforded to us by increasing the spatial awareness surrounding 
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our hands - and it really is remarkable, particularly when you compare even the infants 
of our species to our closest primate relatives -, this precision seems to come at a cost, 
and Davoli et al identify that cost as manifesting in a decreased semantic understanding. 
When our hands are near something the drain of producing a heightened spatial 
awareness interferes with the comprehension of a type of information required by 
another realm.
How then does this data relate to the origin of the folk phenomenological 
accounts of a preference for holding written material in the hands? It may be that the 
spatial component of reading vastly exceeds the importance of semantic processing, but 
this doesn't seem right; however important orienting yourself within the confines of the 
page or the sentence might be, surely comprehending what passes before your eyes is at 
least as, if not even more, significant? But if the reading experience might, in some 
cases, be improved by removing our hands from visual activity then why, as Davoli's 
subjects support, do so many people prefer to consistently print digitised reading 
material out and settle down with their hands primed to interfere with meaning? Davoli 
et al suggest that “it is possible that many prefer to hold a hard copy rather than read on 
a computer monitor because of expertise in reading in this manner. Might the practice 
that some have with reading in a certain medium outweigh the potential effects of hand 
proximity? The resolution of all these issues will require further study” (561). It would 
appear that, though the task of handheld reading is cognitively costly, for expert readers 
the repetition of particular gestures overcomes or compensates for what might, 
ironically, be described as an “unnatural” (as in a poor match between the task and our 
nature) engagement. Somehow we have gotten used to reading in this way, somehow it 
has come to offer something more than the extra semantic processing available through 
keeping the material at a distance. Familiarity, practice, and experience are the features 
which stand out as synching the activity with effective cognition, overcoming any 
deficit in the impoverished match between certain equipment use and thought, so much 
so that the detrimental (but rehearsed) is experienced as the preferable engagement.
This notion of practice, of getting used to something to overcome initial 
limitation will inform the bulk of the remainder of this chapter, but first we must 
consider the third and final aspect of physical interaction with equipment for reading, 
after the primacy of gesture and the influence of the hands in action: the physical 
presence of the artefact itself.
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Bookish bodies
The review of some of the cognitive and neuropsychological literature surrounding 
gesture and hands in action outlined above suggests that our tactile interaction with the 
world is of central importance to our understanding and learning. I'd like to consider the 
bodies of codices and e-readers, looking at some of the specificities in the experience of 
their use, but before we get into the argument of this section I'd like to offer a brief 
report of the experience of using the two types of e-reading equipment that I've been 
referring to.
Kindle 3
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Amazon's third Kindle is a matte charcoal frame with a QWERTY keyboard and 
additional buttons for navigation of its menus and submenus at its base. Four more 
buttons, one tall one short running up either side are responsible for page changes 
(whichever hand you hold it in a larger button can be depressed by the thumb to move 
the pages forward, whilst the smaller button on the opposite side is pressed by the first 
or middle finger to turn the page back). It's very light, about the size of a small 
paperback in length and width, and only a few millimetres thick. The Kindle is plasticky 
and can feel like a toy, but when used with a protective case gains some reassuring heft 
(Amazon's official cases are leather, and open much like a codex). The buttons creak 
slightly when you press them.
The screen itself is grey, not white or cream like a familiar printed page, due to 
the persisting contrast difficulties in the e-ink screen equipment94. In its every 
implementation the Kindle evokes an older order: the matte texture of the screen and its 
surrounds are reminiscent of home computers of the eighties, and the relatively low 
resolution of the device for image viewing also speaks to that era. The screen in use for 
reading, however, is uncanny in its emulation of ink on paper. We're so used to screens 
projecting light at us, emanating, and yet here we have a dullness, viewable from any 
extreme of angle, clear in the brightest sun and invisible in the dark. There's an irony to 
this wonder though, something at odds with the name printed at the top of the object: to 
kindle is to start something, a metaphor drawn from fire making. Kindling is scraps of 
wood and scrub and brush, but to kindle is to throw a spark among them, make them 
flare. Fire and technology have a mythical past of course: Prometheus took something 
special from the Gods and was punished for making it mundane, a spark for everyone. 
This is what the odd toy of the Kindle feels like, a banal magic soon forgotten and 
simply put to use.
94 Electronic ink, or e-ink is a screen substrate developed by MIT and later the E Ink Corporation. An e-
ink screen is made up of rough spheres filled with positively charged white, and negatively charged 
black pigment granules. By altering the current in a plate beneath the spheres either the white (clear) 
or black granules are drawn to the surface producing the screen image. For more on e-ink see 
http://www.eink.com/technology.html
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iPad 2
The second iteration of the iPad is large, the size of half a laptop screen, and heavy 
enough that its security is uncertain when held in a single hand, a different experience to 
the Kindle entirely. It's nothing but a shiny latex-black frame with an aluminium 
reverse; on its face it has one button which takes you “home” should anything go 
wrong.
The screen itself is a glossy and hyper-responsive high definition and full colour 
multi-touchscreen. A brush of a single finger “opens” the device, a tap on the 
appropriate icon launches iBooks (or some other reading programme), and pages are 
turned or scrolled with similar swipes. For all of the tangible buttons on the Kindle it is 
strangely infinitely less tactile than the iPad; the required movements of the hands feel 
instinctive on the plain screen. Thanks to an internal accelerometer the iPad knows if its 
being held in a portrait or landscape orientation, or whether it's been rotated 180º, and it 
alters its screen accordingly, adjusting in response to the posture of the user. One thing 
you can't help noticing is that, even on its lowest setting, it is unrelentingly bright, and 
the glare can become too much during sustained reading, particularly in low ambient 
light.
It isn't a single-use device, acting instead as an extremely portable computer only 
without the tethers and accoutrements usually accompanying that engagement. The iPad 
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speaks of infinitude, a frame that can be, that needs to be filled with anything, whereas 
the Kindle, at every step, offers boundaries of what and how things can be shown.
The iPad professes simplicity from the start, just a pad says the name, a 
scratchpad for notes, for getting things done. But this is my pad, where I do my things, 
where I have a surface onto which I can call anything I like, onto which I can conjure. It 
should not be underestimated how special this thing feels in comparison to a Kindle, but 
this actually isn't necessarily a coming out in favour of the iPad, at least for reading. The 
Kindle melts away during use almost instantly, and the tactile feedback of the page turn 
buttons requires no hunting or new ways of interacting which must be learnt (though the 
iPad feels instant in selection and gesture there is still something alien in its 
requirements; a strange realisation, but it took a while to stop marvelling distractingly at 
how I somehow knew just what to do). The Kindle borrows all of its fundamental 
features from other familiar arenas; though it's secondary abilities might frustrate 
(something we'll return to in the third chapter), in reading it works cleanly and 
efficiently. The iPad also functions relatively seamlessly, but again the novelty is harder 
to assimilate: the touchscreen; gestural page turns; the glare and reflective surface; 
remembering to keep it charged; reading in the dark where, surrounded by blackness, it 
seems to be the only thing in the world, these things stand out.
We saw in the first chapter how technology is often perceived as putting a 
mediating barrier between us and the world, acting as visceral insulation, but I went on 
to criticise that view by suggesting that technology can be involved in some of our most 
intimate experiences with things in our environment. When we talk about e-reading 
equipment not feeling right in this regard then there is the suggestion that the text is 
somehow placed behind the object, that there is an additional layer that must be fought 
through before it can be accessed, and that this insulating layer isn't present with the 
codex. We can assume, therefore, that at least some users experience disruptive formal 
differences between the artefacts.
Physical books have depth, whereas pages appear for the most part as mere 
surfaces; the language we commonly use suggests the lost dimension: in a book, on a 
page. But e-reading, emerging for most current users predominantly from internet based 
computer reading and maintaining some of the characteristics of that mode, has far more 
in common with the flatness of pages than with 3D codices. Things are on Wikipedia, 
for instance, not in it, because despite its status as an encyclopedia it deploys the 
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architecture of the internet, comprised of pages, nodes, and we can never see the whole 
system to talk about depth, only ever appeal to the idea of, at best, the ever spreading 
map, at worst an expanding cosmos. Similarly, when we read the e-book version of To 
Kill A Mockingbird do we find Boo Radley in it or on it? And if in, then how much does 
this remain a hangover from an older mode rather than the language catching up to the 
perception of the current experience? Trusse and Roome's reports of pages sliding by 
with no reassuring depth to hold on to certainly don't seem to match up with Atticus 
Finch occupying a space inside the work, instead he seems to merely reside upon it95.
These kinds of questions emerge out of our existence as embodied beings who 
are at their best when grappling with similarly physical objects:
To be situated in the world means not simply to be located someplace in 
a physical environment, but to be in rapport with circumstances that are 
bodily meaningful...Those possibilities that my body enables...,  just  as 
much as those activities that my body prevents or limits, and that define 
what is possible or impossible - these are aspects of embodiment that I 
live with, and through, and that define the environment as situations of 
meaning  and  circumstances  for  action  (Gallagher  and  Zahavi, 
Phenomenological Mind 137-138).
We define our environment, and our equipment, in relation to bodily positions and 
possibilities; as Merleau-Ponty argued in an earlier quotation, being embodied is the 
condition for us having a world to experience96. We are also primed to encounter 
95 Note that I offer up these notions only as an extrapolation of such folk phenomenological reports. In 
her essay “Print is Flat, Code is Deep” Hayles argues against exactly these types of assertion, putting 
depth at the heart of interpreting work found on screen by exploring the multilayered nature of digital 
texts from a base in machine readable code through to the human readable instantiation of the text on 
screen. But Hayles begins her argument by saying that this depth is ignored by textual scholars, let 
alone by the average reader who has little pressing reason to consider the equipment beyond their 
immediate experience of it. I'm therefore made more comfortable, not less, with offering these reports 
after Hayles' work; that essay exists because, for most readers, printed books have depth, coded books 
appear flat.
96 In this regard, and to which Gallagher and Zahavi are presumably referring in the above quotations, 
Husserl also characterised the body
as being present in any perceptual experience as the zero point, as the indexical 'here' in  
relation to which the object is oriented. It is the center around which and in relation to 
which  (egocentric)  space  unfolds  itself  (Hua  11/298,  4/159,  9/392).  Husserl 
consequently argues that the body is a condition of the possibility for the perception of 
and interaction with spatial objects (Hua 14/540), and that every worldly experience is 
mediated by and made possible by our embodiment (Hua 6/220, 4/56, 5/124) (Zahavi,  
Husserl 98-99).
The abbreviation “Hua” refers to the relevant volume/page number of the 34 volume collected 
writing of Husserl,  the  Husserliana editions.  Zahavi's  familiarity  with this immense body of 
work in the original German reveals his usefulness to anyone interested in Husserl's thought, and 
as  such  I  will  predominantly rely on his  interpretation of  Husserl  as  discussed in  Husserl's  
117
similarly tangible things in our environment; our radical dependence on our own bodies 
leaves us unhappy, particularly without training, in negotiating realms of seemingly 
pure thought or abstraction. This might go some way to explaining the response to the 
feel dimension of the e-reader experience. In a codex, the book and the medium are as 
physical as one another, they are the same thing, bound in an unchanging dialogue 
within that one item, and we've grown to understand that this is the reading (and 
writing) experience: essentially to acquire a specific and unique (though replicable) 
thing and to try and work out what it means to whatever standard we deem appropriate. 
The e-reader/e-book relationship is entirely different: “An electronic text literally does 
not exist if it is not generated by the appropriate hardware running the appropriate 
software. Rigorously speaking, an electronic text is a process rather than an object, 
although objects (like hardware and software) are required to produce it” (Hayles, “Print 
is Flat,” 79). The e-reader is as physical as any codex, though it establishes different 
gestures and actions during use, but the e-books that can be read on it (not in it) are 
ephemeral, ghostly, temporarily brought to the surface to establish a bond with the 
tangible object before returning to somewhere else, leaving the physical form of the 
equipment to mean by itself and in other contexts, other combinations97. We have other 
corollaries for this experience of course, in television, computing, cinema, and varieties 
of music players: these all deploy stable physical objects which can call up diverse and 
transient content even as they inflect its reception, and as such we should hardly be 
surprised by the new reading equipment. But perhaps it is to be expected that when we 
make the obvious comparisons with these media, rather than with printed books, a 
reader such as Roome might ask “is this even reading anymore?” Reading had always, 
until the advent of the moving image, meant interacting with an object which is the 
codex (or the scroll, or the parchment). Cinema, television, and computing changed that 
arrangement, and the establishment of e-reading threatens to make the shift irrevocable. 
There is something to be lost here, though it might well be trivial, at least in terms of its 
importance to future generations of readers: with screen reading the book and the object 
are taken apart, any assemblage of work and substrate will be soft.
Phenomenology.  My  own  understanding  comes  from  the  English  translation  of  Logical  
Investigations and  Ideas  Pertaining  to  a  Pure  Phenomenology,  as  well  as  from the  various 
articles and books cited throughout this chapter, but it is to Zahavi's expertise that I will, for the  
most part, defer.
97 Again, the claim here is phenomenological rather than ontological. As Kirschenbaum ably 
demonstrates in Mechanisms, data doesn't disappear, and isn't devoid of physicality, something we'll 
return to in the third chapter.
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In this regard, however, I'm grateful to Tim Carmody98 for his comments on an 
early draft of this chapter at my research blog. In a comment left there Carmody 
invoked Gerard Genette's The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence in 
negotiating this issue and offered the following response:
I'm all about this materialist-phenomenological approach to reading. But 
I think you may slight the way in which reading a book has always been 
a  complicated  interplay of immanence & transcendence...For  instance, 
the codex book has never been the material FACT of the work of art the 
way that a sculpture or painting is. Likewise, the physicality of reading 
the paper codex is harder to ignore now that we have a very different 
(and  on  its  face,  less  robust)  physicality  for  reading  all  kinds  of 
documents,  including  books...[W]hen  you're  working  through  the 
genuinely  phenomenological  (as  opposed  to  the  narrowly  empirical) 
account of reading a book, its transcendence,  the fact  that it  does not 
appear to be merely confined to that physical codex, is a genuine part of 
that experience.
This is an important point. The immanent instantiation of the printed text (in Genette's 
terms) is essential to understanding the artwork, but however much it conditions it, it is 
the sole site of the work: the transcendent text extends away over every edition, and 
every edition's history, and historical conditions and means of production etc., in short 
into the typical realms of Book History and Textual Studies. I'm certainly not trying to 
refute such notions, and Genette's distinction is elegant, but despite our reinvigorated 
interest in materiality after digitisation, and despite the transcendent artwork always 
already being present in printed works, I simply want to assert that the folk 
phenomenological discourse demonstrates that a change has occurred with a seeming 
breakup of the text down the lines I have described. I'm not trying to do the codex a 
disservice by saying that it often seems to be the whole phenomenological fact of the 
text in use by a typical reader; this is one of its wonders, and a wonder that doesn't 
translate in satisfying fashion to the e-book/e-reader experience.
One of the reasons for mourning the change in the physicality of reading 
technology that we must consider, therefore, is that the union of book and object may be 
a more effective textual instantiation than the e-reader and e-book theatre. Hayles, 
arguing against the abandonment of printed materials, suggests a possible example of 
such superiority: that “[k]eeping the [physical] book as a passive device for external 
98 Carmody currently writes for Wired magazine, but he also had a previous career as an academic 
specialising in reading and phenomenology.
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memory storage and retrieval has striking advantages, for it allows the book to possess 
robustness and reliability beyond the wildest dreams of a software designer. Whereas 
computers struggle to remain viable for a decade, books maintain backward 
compatibility for hundreds of years” (“Print is Flat” 84). We addressed some of the 
issues which might make e-readers seem unnatural in the first chapter, but it's worth re-
iterating here that the reports of reading on screen not feeling right seem to have at least 
a partial basis in what is perceived as an over complication of the reading engagement. 
Physical books conform to our bodies and minds as other objects in our extended 
history have: they don't need batteries, they're always “on,” they're relatively robust, and 
their workings are intuitive. The same cannot be said of e-readers. Again, a heightened 
complexity of basic use doesn't rule out adjustment, but initiates who are experts in the 
codex mode might well baulk at the switch. A related reason for a sense of loss in the 
seeming division of work and matter is that the physical book, in its uncomplicated 
materiality, resonates with our own bodies in a way that the e-reader as magic box 
cannot. Karen Littau states that “[t]he relation a reader has to a book is also a relation 
between two bodies: one made of paper and ink, the other flesh and blood. This is to 
say, the book has a body” (Littau 2). We've spent some time looking at the reader's body, 
but perhaps we need to consider not just the form of the bound paper book, but also its 
embodiment. “[T]echnologies[, of which bound books are illustrative examples,] are 
embodied because they have their own material specificities as central to understanding 
how they work as human physiology, psychology, and cognition are to understanding 
how (human) bodies work” (Hayles, Electronic 112). I want to take very seriously this 
notion that material equipment, such as a codex or e-reader, has a body which is worth 
understanding. To begin with it matches reported phenomenological experience, though 
the reports are harder to track down as the idea is tightly bound into the language we use 
to discuss or describe the form.
For instance, when discussing the history of the codex Bolter argues that “[t]he 
paged book became the physical embodiment, the incarnation, of the text it contained. 
Incarnation is not too strong a metaphor. Through printing, we have come more and 
more to anthropomorphize books, to regard each book as a little person with a name, a 
place (in the library), and a bibliographic life of its own” (Writing Space 86). There 
seems to be more than a degree of subjective report here, rather than a historicised 
statement of fact, but that's not to say that Bolter's is an idiosyncratic point of view, far 
from it. Littau's wider argument in Books, Bodies, and Bibliomania, for instance, rests 
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upon it, and Hayles notes that “[a]uthors regularly [think] of their books as offspring; 
characters in metafiction often tr[y] to peer out of the covers that contain...them to see 
the book as an object; the human form converge[s] with book technologies even in such 
inert metaphors as footnotes, spine, and appendix” (Writing Machines 39). And here we 
can see that implicit connection with ourselves: we describe books with the same words 
that we use to describe elements of our own material existence: 
Texts assimilate utterance to the human body. They introduce a feeling 
for ‘headings’ in accumulations of knowledge: ‘chapter’ derives from the 
Latin caput, meaning head (as of the human body). Pages have not only 
‘heads’ but  also ‘feet’,  for  footnotes.  References are  given to  what  is 
‘above’ and ‘below’ in a text when what is meant is several pages back or 
farther on (Ong, Orality 100).
Do we flinch at the thought of separating the book from a body which is referred to in 
such human terms? Such ideas introduce bodies into the discussion of the codex in a 
non-trivial fashion. Regardless of language, Hayles' reference to books as offspring, 
Bolter's anthropomorphism, and Littau's explicit pronouncement all speak to interacting 
with printed books as being a true meeting of bodies, and, as I said, I'd like to take this 
seriously.
Bodies over time
This section will explore how printed book bodies and e-reader bodies are products of 
evolution. That they are evolved seems an outcome of saying that they are embodied: 
embodied things in the natural (i.e. non-artefactual) world have only come about due to 
evolutionary processes. I'm not saying that these artefacts could occur without our 
influence, quite the opposite, but I do think that it makes sense to look at their 
development as an evolutionary event and that it is productive to do so, opening up new 
areas of thought to be put to work on these objects. To examine this idea I'll detail a 
basic and largely canonical theory of evolution which will provide us with most of the 
terminology that we'll need before suggesting some ways in which the metaphors and 
ways of looking at the world developed by Evolutionary Biology's impact on 
Philosophy can help us to understand the change in form from codex to e-book. These 
ideas need to be in place before I can present the main drive of this turn to evolution: 
understanding the bodies of reading equipment as having evolved allows us to use the 
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language of evolutionary epistemology to discuss equipment and technology in general 
(and reading apparatuses specifically) as “embodied knowledge,” and this offers a way 
to understanding the mechanism by which we adapt to changes in technology over time. 
This is important to our discussion of e-books because it suggests that any artefact can 
be adapted, and adapted to over time; no matter how “natural” codices may now seem, 
e-books can feel equally, if not more so after prolonged use.
Evolution begins with the meeting of two things: an individual organism (let's 
use an animal for our example) and an environment. The environment is simply the 
surroundings that the animal spends its time in, including everything within that space, 
members of its own species, plant life, weather, prey, predators, landscape, etc. etc. An 
animal is the expression of the genes passed on to it by its parents99. Environmental 
pressures, from what the mother eats during pregnancy to how much sunlight the young 
animal gets, can affect the way that genes are expressed, causing different selections to 
be made across the millions of ranges of available expressions made possible by the 
genetic instructions. The genes that an animal carries within it, inherited from its 
parents, are called its “genotype,” whereas the epigenetic selections from the genetic 
ranges that cumulatively make up the animal are called the “phenotype”: “the phenotype 
is the expression of that information in the flesh-and-blood individual that develops via 
a series of highly complex interactions with the environment” (Plotkin, Darwin 
Machines 95).
In evolutionary terms the animal is successful if it survives long enough to go on 
to reproduce, to pass on its genes by producing young after resisting the threats, and 
utilising the supports of its environment. This sets the stage for evolutionary effects. 
Reproduction and the influence of the environment on development are not evolutionary 
processes; evolution instead occurs because organisms and environments aren't fixed.
Environments can change in many ways, but lets take the example of a shift 
from a moist to a dry climate. In a relatively moist landscape many plants will have the 
99 Genes can be thought of as the fundamental but malleable instructions for building a body; they give a 
developmental range for every aspect of the animal, but like a recipe which recommends “a good 
pinch of salt” will mean that salt is always in the final dish, but the flavour will differ slightly or 
dramatically according to the interpretation of the instruction, so the expression of genes can vary 
across a range for each iteration. “Epigenesis” is the term used to describe the individual's final 
expression along such ranges. For instance a set of genes could state that a developing claw will grow 
between one and three inches long, and between half an inch to an inch wide; there is no specific gene 
for a two inch by one inch claw for example, genes just set boundaries, “additional information is 
gained from the environment during epigenesis - genes give some liberty for development” 
(Vehkavaara 213).
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perfect conditions to thrive and our animal, a four legged herbivore mammal, has plenty 
to eat low to the ground. As such the fact that it is short doesn't stop it being able to 
reproduce: it is born with a blend of its parents genes, those genes are expressed through 
its development (in and ex utero) within an environment which allows it to live long 
enough to pass on its combination of genes by reproducing. If, however, the climate 
were to dry out, then the grasses our animal eats would start to disappear and it would 
find itself struggling to acquire food. If it starves too quickly then it won't be able to 
reproduce and its particular combination of genes will disappear. With all of the grasses 
dying out, however, isolated trees start to thrive as they have increased access to the 
remaining available water. Over time, the height of the available vegetation migrates 
upward and our animal's shortness has a real impact on its survivability.
As stated above, a process of epigenetic selection from a myriad of genetic 
ranges results in the phenotypic expression of an animal. If an animal's parents 
produced perfect clones of themselves (or of a blend of the pairing), i.e. passed on 
exactly the same genetic material that they carried, then these genetic ranges (if not their 
expression) would stay the same. But this isn't what occurs: in the same way that the 
environment is unstable and continually changing, so reproduction is not the perfect 
transmission of genetic material. Instead mutations occur which alter the ranges a gene 
or set of genes will dictate. In a world where vegetable matter is growing further and 
further from the ground those animals who can reach it will survive longer, be stronger, 
and have a better chance of reproducing. In biological terms they are “fitter,” and we 
can think of this as their being a better fit for the environment they find themselves in. 
The ranges which produce our animal's neck are dictated by various sets of genes. In the 
drying out world the animals which express neck length at the higher reaches of the 
ranges will survive better, and the species' overall neck length range will therefore tend 
toward genes which more often express longer necks. Once in a while a mutation will 
occur which extends the range of neck length beyond its previous limit. If an animal 
carries these mutated genes, and during epigenetic development expresses toward the 
new upper limit of neck length and thus thrives, then these new rogue genes will 
become a part of the gene pool; their continued expression and success represents a 
change in the species. For our purposes here we can therefore see evolution as divided 
into three phases: variation, selection, and reproduction100.
100 To flesh out an understanding, two good introductions to evolution and its history as a concept are 
Mark Ridley's Evolution and Carl Zimmer's Evolution: The Triumph of an Idea.
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With an understanding of what I intend by “evolution” in place we can now 
consider whether material equipment, artefacts, could be thought of as having evolved, 
using printed books as our example. I should note from the outset that such an idea is 
not novel in and of itself, Peter Medawar going as far as to say that “[e]veryone has 
observed with more or less wonderment that the tools and instruments devised by 
human beings undergo an evolution themselves that is strangely analogous to ordinary 
evolution, almost as if these artefacts propagated themselves as animals do” 
(“Technology and Evolution”). But Medawar's example marks a distinction between the 
evolution of artefacts that I would like to suggest and that as it is more frequently 
discussed: “Aircraft began as birdlike objects but evolved into fishlike objects for much 
the same fluid-dynamic reasons as those which caused fish to evolve into fishlike 
objects.” To me it seems that there is a mistake of environment here, of how and why 
artefacts evolve. Fish evolved due to the pressures exerted upon them by an aquatic 
existence, but aircraft feel no such pressures; the three stages of variation, selection, and 
reproduction have no identified corollaries in this example, and this distinction is one 
that needs to be addressed if we are to use that term “evolution” with any validity.
The evolution of artefacts has its supporters and detractors who typically 
question the ideas of cultural and technological (in its various prior technical and 
common sense definitions) evolution as part of the discussion of the evolution of 
ideas101, or knowledge gains in science specifically, rather than with the physical bodies 
of the equipment themselves102. The detractors of the idea, whether considering the 
101 William James' “Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment” is almost certainly (in no small 
part due to the proximity of of its publication to Darwin's own work) the first theoretical application of 
evolutionary mechanisms to the progress of thought and ideas.
102 See for instance Walter Vincenti What Engineers Know and How They Know It; Richard R. Nelson 
Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth (“On the Nature and Evolution of Human Know-how” 
115-138); and Carl Mitcham Thinking Through Technology: The Path Between Engineering and 
Philosophy. In a more tangible realm, Karl Marx, in Capital, saw Darwin's then new theories as a way 
of explaining advances in technology as the work of the many in small improvements, rather than 
grand ideas coming from a talented few, and Tim Ingold notes that “artefacts, too, may be grown, and 
that in this sense they are not so very different from living organisms…Just as the form of the 
organism is not prefigured genetically but arises through a process of growth within a morphogenetic 
field, so the form of the artefact is not prefigured culturally but arises through the unfolding of a field 
of forces that cuts across its developing interface with the environment” (The Perception of the 
Environment 290). W. Brian Arthur's The Nature of Technology and George Basalla's The Evolution of 
Technology are both concerned primarily with the invention and increase in complexity of artefacts. 
Both writers assert the distinction of their described mechanisms from Darwinian evolution, although 
they both also accept that users deploy Darwinian selective pressures once the artefacts have been 
created. Lastly, Bernard Steigler, in Technics and Time, also presents a chapter on “Theories of 
Technological Evolution” (29-81). Stiegler is heavily influenced by the work of André Leroi-Gourhan, 
particularly L'homme et la Matière and Milieu et Techniques. Stiegler finds appeal in Leroi-Gourhan's 
theory of a “zootechnological determinism,” that as the fish “must” evolve toward the amphibian so 
the knapped flint “must” evolve toward the steel sword (L'homme et la Matière 13); there are only a 
few paths evolution can take, it operates within certain constraints. There is evidence for this idea, of 
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ideational or physical bodies, tend to appeal to a gross mismatch between biology and 
ideas or artefacts. But I hope that this impasse can be avoided from the start: there is no 
one-to-one match between the biological encoding of successful forms in organisms and 
the mechanism that I will suggest for the evolution of artefacts below. However, the 
description of evolution as I have outlined, stripped down to its elements, is broad 
enough to hold well in the adaptations of material equipment. We need not get bogged 
down in the minutiae of how DNA encodes particular responses to the environment, for 
instance, and whether this has a corollary in artefacts; if the three criteria hold for an 
identifiable “organism” and an identifiable environment, and produce adaptive results, 
then I would suggest that the term “evolution” is a productive description of events.
Firstly we need to define the individual (for the sake of clarity I'll abandon the 
term organism): the codex103. Next we need to define the environment which is going to 
place selective pressures upon it. With non-artefact entities the environment is easily 
defined: everything in the milieu in which it exists which can directly or indirectly 
impact upon its epi- or ontogenetic development or its surviving long enough to 
reproduce. But for artefacts, and for codices specifically, that milieu is more specifically 
defined, though the same principles apply: we are the defining selective forces for our 
artefacts, human users are the environment for our material equipment. Yes, conditions 
of, for instance, humidity fluctuate, and this can have a profound impact on the 
survivability of a codex, but whether or not it gets to reproduce (or be reproduced in 
response to this) is based on our allowing it to occur. Just as the vegetable matter's rising 
above the average neck length of our example animal was a way of the environment's 
“choosing” whether it got to reproduce, so we choose the fittest codex forms to be 
repeated, the one's that fit their environment, the ones that fit to us. That we can make 
this as a conscious decision rather than dispassionately enacting selective forces is 
irrelevant (and sometimes false); the end result is that the environment does or does not 
allow a new generation based on what has come before to emerge.
So if the individual is the book, and we are the environment, then we have at 
course: as we'll see, wood and hands guide the shape of saws, arms and jungle the length of knives, 
such constraints shape evolution. But I dislike the notion that we might be able to predict evolutionary 
processes, or that any path might have been certain: evolution, to be evolution, must be an emergent 
property, any apparent constraint could prove to be a mere failure of imagination except for the most 
extreme formulations.
103 Again, this is the codex of the popular imagination as described in the introduction. Codices are 
clearly multifarious things, with a huge variety of forms being included under that name over the 
history of writing (and, more specifically, in histories of that history). For the purposes of this 
discussion, however, the term “codex” will largely continue to refer to a generic printed and spine-
bound mass market paperback.
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least the arena for evolution to occur. Next the three phases of the evolutionary process 
need to be established.
i)  Variation -  Is there the capacity for mutation in the codex form? I 
think that we can obviously say yes: from Gutenberg's first huge bibles to 
hotel pocket Gideon's there is clearly a range of sizes. From early metal 
codices and bound velum to contemporary recycled paperbacks there's a 
range of materials. From lithographic to laser there's  a range in print. 
From handwritten  and illuminated  manuscripts  to  Times  New Roman 
there's a range of typography. In fact for every descriptor of the codex 
there's a range of variation. It is also clear that there are predominant 
ranges  for  this  variation  to  take  place  in,  with  odd  mutations  (e.g. 
oversize  atlases,  intricate  bindings,  die-cut  pages,  etc.)  extending  or 
altering those standards, with emergent stability representing a “species” 
change.
ii)  Selection -  For evolution to occur, pressures from the environment 
must  cause  a  match  or  mismatch  of  fit  for  the  individual.  Let's  use 
oversize books as the example. Most codices are a certain size because 
we, as the selecting environment, tend not to buy or use or demand books 
which we cannot easily hold or carry around with us. When there is no 
demand for  an item, market  forces (which,  as  they are related to our 
reception  of  books  in  a  capitalist  system,  are  part  of  structuring  the 
environment for a codex, perhaps something akin to weather patterns in 
the  non-artefactual  realm)  tend toward  ceasing  the  production  of  that 
item.  The  proliferation  and success  of  the  average  paperback book is 
based on a complex of selective pressures over generations of produced 
texts which increasingly came to match the needs of our bodies in motion 
amidst their cultural and economic milieu.
iii)  Reproduction - Lastly is there a way for the attributes of existing 
codices to be passed on to the codices which follow them? Is there a 
relationship between “parent” and “offspring?” This would require us to 
think of the codices which follow those currently produced as offspring. 
Or perhaps not. If we think of the collected group of codices as a gene-
pool104, then it doesn't seem unintuitive to see any individual codex as the 
phenotypic expression of a set of ranges that comes directly out of that 
pool, and that the continuing success of that expression contributes to 
maintaining  the  pool  as  it  is.  The  significant  difference  here  between 
organism and codex seems to be one of agency: the organism struggles 
against  the  environment  and  tries to  reproduce,  whereas  the  codex is 
innately passive. But what  causes variation, selection, and reproduction 
is  not  the  measure  of  whether  a  process  is  evolutionary.  In  Marshall 
McLuhan's terms, we are “the sex organs of the machine world, as the 
bee of the plant world, enabling it to fecundate and to evolve ever new 
forms” (Understanding Media 56).
I believe that we can also extend these ideas out to any artefact. By shifting toward 
104 The sum total of all of the living genetic combinations of a species.
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thinking of ourselves as being able to exert conscious or unconscious environmental 
pressures we can see any number of ways that artefacts iterate over time. Think of the 
progression of hammers from rocks of all sizes held in the hands of early primates to the 
now common form of a piece of specifically shaped metal on a wooden shaft. We can 
imagine all of the variations that occurred along that lineage, and the ranges of 
expression that still exist today, from small household ball-peen hammers, to lump 
hammers, mallets, and sledgehammers, and all emerging from very similar selective and 
reproductive methods as those detailed for codices. For every artefact the same process 
must have occurred; if there are elements to be varied then human users have and 
continue to apply selective pressures which will affect the next generation of the 
species.
An evolutionary epistemology of objects
My reason for wanting to establish an evolutionary model for artefacts is it opens up a 
branch of philosophy which might help us in our discussions of the process of getting 
used to the new reading equipment, and to artefacts more generally. If artefacts abide by 
the basic structures of an evolutionary processes then might we be able to consider them 
in terms of evolutionary epistemology (hereafter EE)?
Epistemology - the study of knowledge, acquiring knowledge, and knowing - is 
blended in EE with evolutionary theory to describe two increasingly distinct fields: i) 
evolutionary principles applied to the progress of knowledge, particularly in the 
sciences105 and ii) the study of knowledge acquisition in living beings, where cognition 
and knowing are seen as evolutionary adaptations, and bodies and the minds they 
produce are seen to reflect aspects of the world. The first branch is easier to explain in 
basic terms due to the approach that we've already taken here. Extending the three 
phases of evolutionary process onto thought, this conception of EE often suggests that 
there is a unit of selection in knowledge, possibly the meme106, which can be varied, 
105 See for example Franz M. Wuketits (ed.) Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology: 
Towards and Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge (in particular Erhard Oeser “The Evolution of the 
Scientific Mind”); Donald T. Campbell “Selection theory and the Sociology of Scientific Validity”; 
and Louis Boon “Variation and Selection: Scientific Progress Without Rationality.”
106 Richard Dawkins coined the term “meme” in chapter 11 of The Selfish Gene, “Memes: the new 
replicators.” For Dawkins a meme is the smallest unit of meaning spread via cultural phenomena. In 
his original formulation it is a relatively unsophisticated idea, a rough analogy to the gene for 
something which might be replicated in a purely cultural environment: “Examples of memes are 
tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or building arches…[M]emes 
propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the 
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selected for, and reproduced. This is an example of Universal Darwinism, and though 
the field attempts to explain subtleties such as the precise method of encoding 
information for the next generation, or the validity of making evolutionary claims about 
knowledge acquisition, the fundamental underlying mechanism is something that we've 
already addressed. Most theories of evolutionary approaches to technology fall under 
some variation of this first branch of EE.
The second branch is, if not necessarily more complicated, then perhaps less 
intuitive. It also rests on the fundamental principles of evolution, but its claim is not, or 
not solely, about the mechanism of human knowledge acquisition and transmission. 
This approach sees human knowledge as an adaptation, and, in some instances, that 
every evolved adaptation in an organism is best thought of as being knowledge. I'd like 
to adopt the vision of this type of EE that Henry Plotkin outlines in Darwin Machines 
and the Nature of Knowledge, as the elegance of his theory coheres with the bare-bones 
mechanism of evolution that enables Universal Darwinism to function. I would like to 
argue that Plotkin's approach allows us, through it's stripping out of the specificities of 
biological organisms' reproduction and genetic encoding of information, to talk about 
EE as it might apply to artefacts in their alternative environment of human use.
Plotkin's central idea is that as organisms adapt to their environments via 
evolutionary selective pressures, what successful individuals pass on to their offspring 
in each generation is not just genetic instructions for building new bodies within set 
ranges, but knowledge about the world that came before them (hence EE). His most 
striking example is that of the stick insect: a stick insect looks like a stick not because it 
tries or learns to, but because generations of stick insect ancestors survived more 
frequently the more that they looked like sticks and avoided becoming prey long enough 
to reproduce and pass on genes which stipulated increasingly stick-like ranges for new 
bodies to develop in. Plotkin argues that the stick insect's body has a knowledge of an 
aspect of the world far greater than its own mind is capable of.
This immediately raises the question “why use the word 'knowledge' to describe 
an adaptation?”, and Plotkin asks the question himself: “why take the further step of 
broad sense, can be called imitation” (192).
The most famous fleshing out of Dawkins idea is Susan Blackmore's The Meme Machine, but 
the term has also achieved pop cultural standing, becoming a meme of its own, describing rapidly 
spreading (and equally rapidly dissolving) inexplicably popular media events, small quirks (a 
particular photo, a turn of phrase, a way of acting) which suddenly seem to be everywhere (or 
everywhere within a subculture), acting as satire, taking on semantic weight, or simply provoking a 
laugh over email.
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equating adaptations with knowledge?...How can the wing markings of a moth[, for 
instance,] be knowledge?” (Darwin Machines 117). Plotkin defends the word choice on 
the grounds of looking at what knowledge means in “everyday life,” saying that 
“knowledge, in its most common meaning, denotes a mental state that bears a specific 
relationship to some features of the world” (4). When we say that we “know” something 
we're stating that there is parity between two things: “a brain state, which is a part of 
organismic organization, and the world itself...which is the feature of environmental 
order relative to which that brain state stands” (117). Knowing someone's name, or 
where our house is, or what a book looks like, we incorporate that information into 
ourselves in some way; we materially modify ourselves to reflect an aspect of external 
reality however imperfectly. For Plotkin there must be a brain state which represents the 
thing in the world, or the aspects of the thing in the world that we have access to (a 
point which we'll return to shortly): “knowledge is always something that comes in two 
parts. There is the 'knower's end' of knowledge, comprising feelings, brain states 
and...the means of expressing the knowledge; and there is the 'world's end' of 
knowledge, which is that aspect of the world that is known. All knowledge is a 
relationship between the knower and the known” (10-11). Now this is not to say that 
there's a miniature version of the world playing out within our brains, simply that for an 
act of knowing to occur there must be a state of cognition or of memory which has a 
physical instantiation and which maps to our experience of, recall of, or interaction with 
an object or state in the world, and in that sense we might be said to incorporate and 
represent it.
By envisioning knowledge in this fundamental stripped down fashion Plotkin is 
able to use the word to describe adapted biological organisms' relation to the world. 
Evolutionary adaptations, like everyday human knowledge, also always have a 
relational  quality.  Every  adaptation  comprises  organization  of  an 
organism relative  to  some  feature  of  environmental  order…The  wing 
markings of a moth stand in relation to the nervous system of a predator, 
specifically the way in which that nervous system is wired such that the 
‘eye’ [of the moth's markings] startles the predator and perhaps causes it 
to flee…All human knowledge has the same two-component relationship 
that adaptations have (116-117).
This matching of body or cognitive states to world states is the underpinning assertion 
for Plotkin's vision of EE. Adaptations conform the bodies of the evolved organism to 
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the worlds that housed its lineage; a stick insect's body is the sum total of the knowledge 
gleaned from the environments of its ancestors combined with its own experience of the 
present environment during epi- and ontogenesis. In this way stick insects incorporate 
an aspect of the environment into their being: simply, they are material instantiations of 
the knowledge that the environments which preceded them favoured insects which 
looked like sticks. As Vehkavaara describes it:
When  natural  selection  makes  changes  in  genetic  information,  this  is 
interpreted [in this branch of EE] to be a knowledge process, and if this 
change  is  adaptive,  it  means  the  increase  of  knowledge...Adaptation 
through natural selection can be seen as...evolutionary learning, where 
lineages,  populations,  or  species  (but  not  individual  organisms)  are 
considered as individuals that  are learning about  the conditions of the 
survival  of  their  'members'  -  these  'collective  individuals'  are  'testing' 
their  environments  by  their  'individual  individuals'.  These 
supraindividual  learning  processes  explain  how  individual  organisms 
have got...'a priori knowledge' (208-209).
Vehkavaara's description of the idea underpinning this branch of EE makes the 
relationship between adaptation and human knowledge explicit: think of a species as a 
whole as an individual and it becomes clear how this process is akin to a more mundane 
definition of knowledge - it pushes at the environment, learning by sacrificing the 
individuals of which it is comprised to selective forces, like turning the tumblers of a 
combination lock, sacrificing number sequences until the code is known and one state 
bears a successful relation to the other.
In this way, when we say that we know a stick insect looks like a stick in order 
to avoid becoming prey, our brains are simply performing a variation of what the stick 
insect's body does: conforming to an aspect of the world, materially representing it, 
spinning the tumblers until the knowledge fits. In fact the human ability to apprehend 
and reflect upon the world, such that we can make claims like “I know X,” is itself an 
adaptation, a manifestation of the knowledge that the environments which housed our 
ancestors favoured those individuals who were able to acquire knowledge faster than the 
pace of generations. This leads Plotkin to state that “[i]f adaptations are knowledge, and 
if what we commonly call knowledge (or better, our ability to gain knowledge) is an 
adaptation, then what in ordinary everyday life we call knowledge is actually a special 
form of [the] much wider phenomenon” that Plotkin calls “biological knowledge” (xvi).
The question now becomes whether if the development of artefacts can be seen 
130
as an evolutionary process, can the theories of this branch of EE also be applied to 
them? Are artefacts instantiated manifestations of knowledge of the environments which 
shaped their lineage? To my knowledge, no evolutionary theory of artefacts or 
technology in its common definition have explicitly drawn this conclusion. We might 
hear reference to artefacts as crystallised knowledge107, but I'm not aware of any theorist 
outlining a mechanism as to why this might be the case, something I believe Plotkin's 
vision of EE and an artefact-compatible theory of evolution can ably perform.
For our stick insect, her ancestors were a mix of more or less stick-like insects; 
the fact that she exists today shows that her ancestors were the most stick-like. The gene 
pool of early insects generated billions of more or less “sticky” bugs over time, through 
various mutations, and those that most resembled sticks, who were better camouflaged, 
avoided being eaten, and survived to reproduce and pass on their stick-like natures to 
their offspring resulted in our current stick insect - she is an instantiation of the sum 
total of the biological knowledge of the aspects of the environments incorporated into 
the bodies of her ancestors. If we want to say that equipment can be a similar 
instantiation then we must find some parity between an artefact and these aspects of the 
stick insect.
The modern machete is a ubiquitous tool in many tropical countries where it's 
used to cut away vegetation when travelling through dense jungle, to harvest tough 
crops such as sugar cane, and also for butchering practices where a cleaver is a common 
alternative in other parts of the world. It's essentially a long knife, around a third to half 
a metre long, often with a slightly curved blade that's typically set into a wooden or 
plastic two part haft bolted together through a full tang. The machete, for our discussion 
of EE, is the artefact (the non-biological corollary for the organism), and unlike the 
stick insect's experience, its community of potential users are its environment.
Variation in knife manufacture and design, as with codices, is clear: from the 
first stone blades used by early hominids through to multi-component contemporary 
cutting tools, the sheer variety of blade lengths and shapes, handle styles, materials, 
components, etc. is staggering. This is to be expected of a tool which has been put to so 
many different uses around the world and for so long; every human culture has found 
the need for a sharp edge. Each new development comes from a mutation derived from 
107 I'm thinking of Gillespie here: “Once we can see artifacts as crystallized forms of human labour, 
communication, and value, the importance of how they shape activity becomes clearer” (109). Whilst 
not explicitly citing knowledge here, Gillespie calls for an acknowledgement that artefacts embody a 
wide variety of tangible and intangible aspects of their users, and their users' histories.
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environmental effects which alters the range of a feature to be expressed. For example, 
in a culture where knife blades are typically between two and five inches, a 15 inch 
blade is a mutation which, if used successfully, permanently alters the potential set of 
blade lengths for future generations of knives.
The contemporary, relatively standardised machete comes from a process of 
selection dictated by its environment. The stick insect's ancestors ran the risk of being 
eaten if they were not significantly stick-like; for every mutation which made them 
more vulnerable, predators, a pressure of their environment, frequently stopped them 
living long enough to reproduce. But for every mutation which made their genes more 
likely to provide a range of form and colouring akin to their surroundings, a range of 
appearances more accurately fitting the vectors of a twig, then the environment 
“rewarded” that trait by allowing it to be passed on. The insects' bodies matched a world 
state which remained relatively consistent over generations, thus their biological 
knowledge of that aspect of the world grew, they had incorporated an appearance to be 
found in their environment into themselves and into the group-as-individual. Machetes, 
however, don't look like any aspect of their human environment, but I would argue that 
the same process of selection occurs. Fitness to the environment for artefacts is the same 
as for organisms in as much as success depends on matching a world state in such a way 
that the environment doesn't obliterate the traits of this particular instantiation. In a 
tropical climate the machete shape is the best fit for its environment. This is not to say 
that the machete matches the jungle, or incorporates an aspect of the jungle, it doesn't; 
the machete has no evolved knowledge of jungle environments. But it does have a 
knowledge of how part of its environment intersects with the jungle, how human users 
experience that terrain. A short stone knife is no use for swiftly clearing plant life, so 
when metal came along which allowed for thin, strong blades which could be carried 
easily it was adopted for that task (and simultaneously for many others). Metal also 
introduced the possibility for a new variable: blade length. A longer blade allowed for 
large slashing motions to be made - inefficient for precision work, but perfectly suited to 
human passage through tropical terrain. This is what the machete matches: the repeated 
moments where knife users met the jungle; this is the aspect of their environment which 
relates to blade length just as the individual stick insect is the product of past insects' 
repeated intersections with predators in their environment which are unable to 
distinguish between sticks and insects. Blades would have become longer and longer as 
users discarded shorter blades and created, or requested the creation of increasingly 
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machete-like knives; similarly, blades that were too long or unwieldy would have 
quickly disappeared as failed experiments, failed mutations.
This is the moment of reproduction. Stick insects, having successfully evaded 
the selective pressures of their environment, would mate and return their particular 
combination of genes to the gene-pool, causing new phenotypes to express them in new 
ways, more or less successfully. The machete doesn't have genes, and it can't facilitate 
the creation of the next generation of long bladed knives, but the third evolutionary 
criteria still stands. When the stick insect mates this is also an adapted behaviour and 
therefore an instance of knowledge. The ability to mate relies on knowing, in Plotkin's 
conception of the term, that there will be other stick insects in the environment with 
which mating can occur. When offspring are produced, an aspect of the environment 
(another stick insect in this case) has caused the organism's genetic material to be 
reproduced; in this way reproduction is a concert of individual and environment. 
Machetes have a knowledge of the forces of its environment of users: its traits also get 
reproduced when an aspect of the environment causes them to be, i.e. when a long 
bladed knife is used successfully an individual user is more likely to recommend it to 
other potential users, and to produce or request this trait themselves when they next 
need the tool. Thus a machete's blade is a knowledge not only of how humans encounter 
jungle plants when moving through them, or any other activity in which it is put to use, 
but also of the consumer forces which can allow such a blade to come into being and be 
repeated. Blade length is a heritable trait in knives.
In his discussion of EE, Vehkavaara argues that
The ability to  act  successfully  presupposes the knowledge how to act 
successfully.  Discursive linguistically  expressed  justification  is  not 
always necessary - if the ability to act is (successfully) demonstrated, no 
argument can overcome this ultimate proof of knowledge.  This kind of 
demonstrable knowledge connects us to other forms of life - every living 
creature needs at least some knowledge how to act successfully (in its 
environment).  Of course,  knowledge  does  not  determine  the  action  it 
enables, it is just the precondition for the action. Although an action can 
be seen as a presentation of knowledge, the actual action is not necessary 
for  the  existence  of  knowledge  -  knowledge  is  potential  action,  the  
power to do (210 emphasis in original).
I will return to this idea of successful action presuposing knowledge (it will prove vital 
to the final argument of this chapter), but for now I'd like to focus on the notion of 
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knowledge as the potential for action which might go some way to further assuaging 
doubt with regards to mapping the processes of the naturally-occurring onto the 
artefactual realm. A stick insect is put into action in the act of being a stick insect; a 
genotype is knowledge in potential, a living epi- and ontogenetically produced 
phenotype is knowledge in action. Every second that the stick insect is alive it 
demonstrates that it has a knowledge of the consistent aspects of the environments 
which led to its being, that there will likely be oxygen to breathe, food to eat, light to 
see by, predators to evade, and other stick insects to mate with. The machete differs in 
that it doesn't act second by second, it only acts during use; but really the stick insect 
also only ever puts its biological knowledge into action when it is in concert with its 
environment, it just happens to never be outside of that environment. A stick insect born 
into a vacuum doesn't act, it has nothing to know and simply ceases. A machete outside 
of use also doesn't act, it cannot demonstrate and therefore cannot prove its knowledge 
until that concert with its environment begins. But the moment that it is picked up it 
comes into action, and the ensuing success of its use is a measure of the accuracy of its 
knowledge; as David Rothenberg notes “[n]o machine stands apart from its creator, no 
tool makes sense outside of its use” (xv). This fact actually allows us to use the notion 
of an evolutionary epistemology of artefacts (EEoA) to better define the term artefact: 
anything that potentially manifests a fit with an environment, but that cannot perform 
the extent of its evolved knowledge without the impetus of another agent. Artefacts 
exist as potential knowledge until they are in use; they have, in Vehkavaara's terms, “the 
power to do.”
I chose the machete as an example because, as with the stick insect, we can 
reduce the discussion to what is functionally a single variable, comparing a range of 
blade length to a range of stick-like insect forms. In this way, as the stick insects stick-
iness stands in for any single organismic adaptation, blade length in the machete is 
made to stand in for any one variable of any artefact, from the weight of a hammer to 
the size of a silicon chip. To finish this introductory discussion of an EEoA, however, 
we need to turn our attention back to the complexity of the codex and the e-reader to see 
how this idea can affect our discussions of the former feeling haptically superior to the 
latter.
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Equipment for reading gets used to readers
A codex body is made up of myriad variables: mutations in form and size, bindings, 
prices, printing speeds, positioning of marginalia, materials, typography, variations of 
all parameters have been generated, selected for, and reproduced in successive 
generations by the environment of potential creators and consumers. Our ancestors 
ensured, as we continue to do, that these media artefacts became fitter, fitted to us, 
adapted108. And if all adaptations represent knowledge of an environment, then that 
means that books do not just contain knowledge, but that they are knowledge, 
manifesting the history of their ancestor’s interactions with the humans which held 
them. There seems to be a relationship here to the statement that Birkerts offered at the 
beginning of this chapter: “these structures evolved over centuries in ways that map our 
collective endeavor to understand and express our world. The book is part of a system. 
And that system stands for the labor and taxonomy of human understanding, and to 
touch a book is to touch that system, however lightly” (“Resisting the Kindle”). I would 
say, absolutely, that the structures of the printed book, and that surround the printed 
book, have evolved, but further that the codex doesn't just stand “for the labour and 
taxonomy of human understanding,” rather that part of its form is a knowledge of that 
understanding, an instantiation of the repeated moments where humans have tried to 
comprehend the world using the storage of script. To even touch a codex is to put it into 
action as a codex and demonstrate knowledge of this type. It is (perhaps) a more 
complicated relationship than the machete's bond with the repetition of human meeting 
jungle, but in the same way its success in action demonstrates the existence of this 
knowledge, even when it becomes challenging to articulate accurately.
We may feel uncomfortable with the idea that codices possess knowledge rather 
than simply store it, but this only reflects a prejudice surrounding the use of the word 
“knowledge”: When we say a stick insect has a knowledge of the world within its body, 
I suspect that its own ability to cognise to some degree takes on part of the weight of 
this unintuitive assertion. An artefact, a knife or a codex, however, cannot allow us to 
displace that same weight of a knowledge assertion onto its own cognisance. But as 
108 I realise that this suggests a teleological progression towards perfection, but of course this is far from 
the case. This apparent problem is solved by recognising the flux in any environment: sometimes 
codices are selected primarily on size, sometimes on affordability, sometimes on perception of 
exclusivity. With these and a thousand, a million more selective pressures, many in competition, we 
can see how a form can settles into a loosely fluctuating aggregate of desire rather than a simple 
perfection.
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we've seen, the argument is not to say that printed books are somehow conscious of 
their acquirements, anymore than stick insects choose to reflect an aspect of their world, 
machetes choose to cut through jungle, or our own hands are aware of their frequently 
conforming to objects which we would like to grip. In each instance a bundle of 
adaptations represent a transcription of a tumultuous past in physical form; in every 
printed book's body there is an element of the use of every printed book that came 
before it.
And maybe this is why e-readers can feel so wrong: bound books are a 
knowledge of a hard fought struggle, and our new artefacts, though they draw on the 
codex's knowledge, may seem for some readers to be back with the typographic 
amoeba. This could lead us to add another aspect to our definition of technologies more 
broadly: “A technology has a greater knowledge of its particular environment of users 
than a device does.” When we initially defined technology we came at it from the 
perspective of the individual user encountering a class of objects, and our definition 
reflected this. But now we can consider it from the artefact's perspective, where the 
group-as-individual's growing knowledge of its environment can be just as important. If 
the individual user doesn't feel that an artefact is sufficiently well fitted to them then the 
move from device to technology will always be impeded; an unwieldy thing, an 
overlong machete for instance, will never be incorporated, will always slip from 
readiness- to unreadiness-to-hand. This suggests that all e-readers need in order to 
facilitate an increasing move from being experienced as devices to be being experienced 
as technologies is time and generations. Contrary to the polarising folk 
phenomenological reports we've seen throughout this work so far, Davoli et al's study 
on hands affecting semantic content suggests that the most profoundly unintuitive 
equipment or method of performing a task can be normalised over time such that the 
practiced activity supplants a mode which would seem preferable. Equally important, 
however, is that the equipment and the method for the practice meet some threshold of 
usability.
It may seem a simple point, that in order to use something it must be useable, 
and that we get there by choosing usable things, but the language used to discuss 
technology, the familiar tropes of such discourse that we saw in the first chapter, 
demonstrate that we routinely miss this idea. Every drive to technologise something 
seems insurmountable, perhaps because we often start to put new equipment to use 
when it can be used to accomplish a task in barely adequate fashion for most users such 
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is its lack of knowledge: Early generations can be put to work by specialists and 
adopted by curious users before they are conformed to, putting off the less hardy with 
the suggestion that it will never be for them.
If there is nothing innately problematic about receiving information from a 
screen, but it simply doesn't feel right to do so in comparison to some prior form, then 
the suggestion would be that a growth in conformity with key aspects of human 
interaction with scriptural information is what is required. We might not be able to 
articulate exactly how this can come about, but we will certainly have a clear indication 
when it does: the e-reader in action in its environment of users will be a success, and 
that environment will repeatedly select for its traits109.
Knowledge is the term that I want to use for the total information that a thing 
has about the environment that it acts in. I've argued that the move from a device to a 
technology may depend on the knowledge that the artefact has of the user as an 
individual in an environment of users. But that process of technologising also comes 
from the user's attitude toward the artefact. If we have seen one mechanism of “getting 
used,” that of artefacts adapting to their users, then we now need to turn to a second 
mechanism: that of us getting used to them.
A phenomenology of understanding things - Eidos
The definition of evolved knowledge that I've outlined can be paraphrased as the total 
amount of information that an individual has about an aspect of the environment that it 
is in, where “information” refers to the what is known, however it is coded. The match 
between the machete blade and its potential users' meeting the jungle is knowledge that 
the machete has about its environment, its blade length codes the information known. 
This is an objective knowledge claim, where the accuracy of knowledge is predicated on 
it's provision of the potential for successful action (although the knowledge is produced 
by prior environments' work on ancestral individuals, the what is known refers to those 
aspects which persist for the environment of the current artefact). We also need a term, 
however, for individuals which possess information about particular objects within their 
environment. I propose the term “understanding” to describe this special case of 
109 What must be emphasised, however, is that digital reading equipment need not mimic codices, this is 
wasted energy, they need only to correlate with contemporary human experience. We will pick up on 
this idea further in the third chapter.
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knowledge; it too is an objective claim predicated on the potential for successful action. 
For instance, we, as individuals, have an understanding of a particular codex when are 
able to interact with it successfully110.
But this is too simple, as is the assumption of knowledge during successful 
action in the world. When we know, or when we understand something, when we 
breathe because our ancestors breathed, or when we pick up a machete and use it 
effectively, what is it that we access? We can never know everything about our 
environments, but only code limited information about it in our memory or, over time, 
in our bodies. In the same way we can never understand everything about an individual 
object, we only ever have a limited access to things. This is not a simple claim.
Husserl stated that nothing in perception is purely and adequately perceived, a 
claim that can be traced back at least as far as the Platonic forms, but is perhaps best 
exemplified in Kant's attempts with transcendental idealism (in Critique of Pure 
Reason) to unravel the confusion of phenomena (appearances) with noumena (things in 
themselves). For Kant, the thing-in-itself is unknowable, experienced only in 
representation. Dan Zahavi argues, however, that this isn't how Husserl conceives of 
phenomena; he first outlines an implicitly Kantian notion:
The phenomenon is the immediate givenness of the object, it is how it 
apparently  is.  If one wishes to discover what the object is really like, 
however, one has to transcend the merely phenomenal. It is a version of 
this  concept  of  phenomenon  that  one  can  find  in  large  parts  of  the 
philosophical tradition. The phenomenon is how the object appears to us, 
seen with our eyes (and thought with our categories), but it is not the 
object as it is in itself (Husserl 55).
But he goes on to assert that
[h]ad  it  been  this  concept  of  phenomenon  that  [Husserl's] 
phenomenology  [was]  employing,  it  might  have  been  nothing  but  a 
science of the merely subjective, apparent, or superficial. But...[o]n the 
contrary,  Husserl  operates with  a concept  of phenomenon that  can be 
traced  back  to  Antiquity.  The  phenomenon  is  understood  as  the 
110 I'm also keen to use the term “understanding” as it relates to Graham Harman's interpretation of 
Heidegger. Harman reads Heidegger's use of “understanding,” against Mark Okrent and Hubert 
Dreyfus, not as “know how” as opposed to theory, but instead as relating to a pre-theoretical mode, to 
refer to “that concealed layer of reality that underlies all conscious theory or conscious 
manipulation...it is nothing human at all” (Tool-Being 117). In this way, for Harman, all things can 
have an understanding of all things, and this adds value to my own use of the term which, whilst we 
will be concentrating on human interaction with artefacts, is in principle extendable beyond that 
meeting, from subject/object to object/object encounters.
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manifestation  of  the  thing  itself,  and  phenomenology  is  therefore  a 
philosophical reflection on the way in which objects show themselves - 
how objects appear or manifest themselves - and on the conditions of 
possibility for this appearance (Husserl 55).
When we know our environments, therefore, or when we understand something within 
them, it is not the things we appear to encounter that we know, but instead we are aware 
of the encounter itself as a manifestation of a thing, the knowledge/understanding of 
which we can judge only through successful action. When I said that the stick insect 
knows her environment she of course doesn't, she knows her ancestors' inheritance of 
past environments as they relate to particular elements of her own environment. But 
there are also always elements of even those specific things she's meant to know that 
escape her; her body does not access every aspect of what it means to look like a stick in 
her world, in fact it only relates to a tiny facet of the environment whilst the rest recedes 
from that knowledge; even her bodily knowledge of sticks is vanishingly discrete. It's 
maybe clearer to look at this idea in terms of understanding: When I interact with a 
codex as an object in my environment I feel that I can start to have an understanding of 
it, of what makes it what it is, but is this the case? For Kant I cannot ever know the 
thing itself (or rather cannot know if I know, cannot know if the representation matches 
the reality), but for Husserl I can move toward the thing, if only via accessing its 
representations; I only ever access what the thing performs in concert with my 
embodied perceiving111.
This notion of things retreating away from our intentions is important to 
understanding how we get used to interacting with artefacts and is, I feel, best captured 
by the new philosophical field of Object Oriented Ontology (OOO). OOO seeks to 
remedy a turn in Western Philosophy that Levi Bryant, one of OOO's originators, sees 
as developing after Kant's Critique of Pure Reason:
In beginning with the hypothesis that objects conform to mind rather than 
mind  to  objects,  Kant  who  genuinely  sought  a  secure  grounding  for 
knowledge  and  freedom  from  the  endless  debates  of  metaphysics, 
paradoxically rids us of the need to consult the world or objects. For as 
Kant himself observes, this shift or inversion allows us to discern how it 
is possible for something to be given in advance. Yet if the world is given 
in  advance,  then there  is  no longer any need to  consult  the  world or 
objects.  Rather,  philosophy,  at  this  point,  becomes  self-reflexive, 
111 For more on Husserl's attitude to what might be revealed about an object's formal and material 
ontology see Zahavi, Husserl 31-39.
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interrogating not being or the world, but interrogating rather the mind 
that regards the world...What goes almost completely uncontested is the 
general spirit of the Copernican Turn, wherein the world is to be thought 
as conforming to the human, rather than the human to the world. Thus, 
nearly  all  the  major  trends  of  contemporary  philosophy  are  direct 
descendants of the Kantian turn in one way or another (“Onticology - A 
Manifesto for Object-Oriented Ontology”).
Although I am primarily concerned with human phenomenological experience of 
technological artefacts, the ontology which underpins my arguments here is indebted to 
OOO's return to a focus on a material world to which the human conforms, and as such 
it is worth outlining its leading proponent's claims to more fully realise the argument of 
this section.
Graham Harman112, in Tool-Being interprets Heidegger's tool analysis (which we 
encountered in the first chapter's discussion of readiness-to-hand) as holding “the whole 
of the Heideggerian philosophy, fully encompassing all of its key insights as well as the 
most promising of the paths that lead beyond them” (15, emphasis in original). Against 
the more common readings that we've already discussed, Harman claims “that the tool-
analysis is neither a theory of...human praxis, nor a phenomenology of a small number 
of useful devices called 'tools.' Instead Heidegger's account of equipment gives birth to 
an ontology of objects themselves” (1, emphasis in original). For Harman, Heidegger 
uses the hammer's melting away during use as a metaphor for a wider ontology of all 
objects, the full implications of which could not be accepted even by Heidegger himself 
who remains distractingly fixated on the human as the site of cause for objects coming 
into existence: “Whatever Heidegger's intentions may have been, his theory of 
equipment applies to all entities...It is vital we not be misled by the usual connotations 
of the word 'tool'” (2). Taking two terms which have become familiar to us, ready-to-
hand (tools invisible in use) and present-to-hand (tools only observed or broken), 
Harman describes an existence for objects which will always retreat from the human, 
and in fact from all other objects they encounter; “readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) 
refers to objects insofar as they withdraw from human view into a dark subterranean 
reality that never becomes present to practical action anymore than it does to theoretical 
awareness” (1)113. The argument of Tool-Being is that no object is ever encounterable as 
what it is, and, against Husserl, that the phenomena we do encounter are never simple 
112 Another of OOO's original creators and the best known and most widely published of its practitioners.
113 Harman's sequel, of sorts, to Tool-Being, Guerilla Metaphysics, looks at the possibility for interactions 
between objects in spite of their always receding from one another.
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manifestations of things as they are. Adopting a notion from Xavier Zubiri, Harman is 
interested in the non-relational aspects of things114, the essences which recede from and 
precede all relations with anything in the world115. Harman uses Heidegger's ready-to-
hand tool as a description of the hidden life of things, their “tool-being,” and present-to-
hand “broken tools” to describe what we actually meet116. The tool/broken tool divide 
doesn't, for Harman, describe an ontic distinction between two kinds of thing as it does 
in the standard analysis, but instead describes two states present in every thing (45).
I won't adopt Harman's distinction of tool/broken tool, ready-to-hand/present-at-
hand here as those terms, in the conventional reading, still have too great a usefulness, 
particularly to my own argument; as we saw in the first chapter, readiness-to-hand as 
invisible extension during use is a real phenomenological and neurological feature of 
expert interaction, and as such I have not, and do not evoke Harman's reading when I 
use those terms. Instead of ready-to-hand/tool-being I will use the more conventional 
term “essence” to describe the life of the thing in itself, and I will side with Harman, for 
the most part, in saying that what we encounter is not a simple manifestation of the 
thing's essence, but instead a whole new object, a combination of self and thing: “If I 
stare at a bridge, this bridge-appearance is a parasite off of my Dasein, and could hardly 
be less independent. If not for me, this appearance could not exist. What is truly 
independent of me is not the occurent bridge, but the executant bridge, the bridge that is 
hard at work in enacting its own reality and all that this entails” (emphasis in original, 
125). The occurrent bridge is not born of the essential bridge alone, and the essential 
executant bridge acts independent of and inaccessible to me.
What Harman's notion of tool-being fundamentally asserts is that “[w]hen I 
encounter an object, I reduce its being to a small set of features out of all its grand, dark 
abundance...[M]y encounter with the object is relational, and does not touch what is 
independently substantial in the things” (125-126). At all times, however, we have 
complete access to things as they are to us, or, more correctly, as they are with us. This 
totality of subjective information I would like to term “eidos.” I will focus almost 
exclusively on the special case of understanding to explore this idea as we need to 
explicitly tie the discussion to readers resistant to new reading technologies in order to 
re-establish our argument so far, but I will also show that the term applies equally to the 
114 Harman draws on Zubiri's On Essence in this regard.
115 Unlike Zubiri, Harman doesn't believe that only certain things can possess an essence; in fact 
everything, and every combination of things, is an object with an essence and qualities which recede 
from any encounter.
116 This distinction is described in Tool-Being (44-49).
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stick insect's knowledge of the trees and the codex's knowledge of its environment of 
users, to the predator's understanding of its prey and the machete's understanding of the 
hand that holds it. The essential point from Harman's object oriented ontology to be kept 
in mind here is that an object is always trapped in two, an eidos we refer to and an 
essence we almost never meet. It's in that “almost” that I differ from Harman's 
approach, and start to move a little way back toward's Husserl's conception of the 
phenomenon as an expression of the essence of the thing. Harman states that “[t]ool-
being is never convertible into any form of the as-structure, not even partially” (219), 
where the “as-structure” (another Heideggerian term) is the level at which we 
experience anything “as” something: “Objects do not unleash their forces upon us 
unnoticed. Rather, we encounter them as what they are - not running up against 
concealed dog-effects, but rather dog-as-dog, tree-as-tree, heat-as-heat, even while 
something forever withdraws behind these phantasms” (47). When we experience, for 
example, codex-as-codex Harman's approach states that whilst this manifestation is tied 
to an essential thing, no aspect of its true reality can be hauled up to this level. Contra 
Harman, I do think that we can escape the as-structure, and that we do so in a very 
Heideggerian mode: during use. I will argue throughout this section that we get toward 
the nature of a thing by repeatable successful encounters with it. We will also see, 
however, that just because we can reliably and predictably interact with a particular 
object doesn't mean that we ever drill down as far as we might imagine; repetition offers 
only an asymptotic approach, never quite getting to the thing; we can always be 
surprised.
Using the word eidos to describe, not what something is, but why it is what it is 
has been a part of Western metaphysics since Plato. From its first technical use it has 
been a term to be appropriated by philosophers interested in things and how they come 
to be. The original Greek word meant simply something's outward aspect, its 
appearance117, but Plato uses the word, along with other terms118, to describe his eternal 
forms. Heidegger says that
[w]e, late born, are no longer in a position to appreciate the significance 
of Plato's daring to use the word eidos for that which in everything and in 
each  particular  thing  endures  as  present.  For  eidos,  in  the  common 
117 For more on the etymology of eidos see Novak 1-2
118 Including: phýsis, morphē, parádeigma, génos, ousía (Schäfer 157).
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speech, meant the outward aspect [Ansicht] that a visible thing offers to 
the physical eye. Plato exacts of this word, however, something utterly 
extraordinary:  that  it  name  what  precisely  is  not  and  never  will  be 
perceivable with physical eyes (The Question 20).
Later, in “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger again states that “Plato names this aspect 
in which what presences shows what it is, eidos. To have seen this aspect, eidenai, is to 
know” (The Question 163). This is the first reason for why I want to use this term eidos 
to describe our attempts at access in understanding: it's historical link to knowing 
(understanding) what something is when it becomes present that is linked to simply 
seeing, to the how something appears as if the appearance were the whole thing.
Aristotle's use of eidos offers similar justification for my use of the term here:
ειδoς δε τo τι ην ειναι εκαστoυ και τηυ πρωτηυ oυσιαν.
Eidos de lego to ti en einai hekastou kai ten proten ousian. 
By  eidos I  mean the essence of  each thing and its  primary  substance 
(Metaphysics 1032b1-2, ctd. in Novak 1).
Quite apart from the distinction between Plato and Aristotle's ideas of essence and 
substance, the repetition should be noted of the movement from sight, aspect, to the 
what-makes-something-what-it-is that Plato performed with his use of the term. There's 
also a pleasing coincidence in Aristotle's use in earlier work such as Categories, where 
it can mean “kind” or “species.”119 Though I don't wish to evoke this aspect here, when I 
talk about eidos being the what-things-are-to-us, the what-we-think-we-understand, 
there is a prior resonance with evolved knowledge. Similarly, Novak also outlines a 
number of further etymologically convenient links between eidos and our present 
concerns:
The term is a noun that is derived from the verb 'eido' which means 'to 
see.'  The  root  of  this  verb  is  quite  interesting  because  it  originally 
contained  a  letter  that  in  later  Greek  became  obsolete,  namely,  the 
digamma which had the sound of a 'w' or a 'v.' Thus, we can see this root 
at  work in the Latin verb 'video'  which also means 'to see'...A further 
interesting linguistic connection presumably exists with the Sanskrit term 
'veda'  which also designates a  cognitive  activity  such as  'knowing'  or 
'wisdom.' There is even a link with Old English in a term like 'wit', i.e., 
'to know' (1).
119 For more on the distinction between these uses of eidos in Aristotle see Michael Woods “Form, 
Species, and Predication in Aristotle.”
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Eidos is, as coincidentally as with Aristotle's “species,” historically tied both to visual 
media and to the act of knowing.
Later, Husserl used eidos “to mean the subject of the set of predicates which 
could not be removed from a thing after having submitted it to a process of imaginative 
variation in short, the essence of a thing” (Novak 5). Idea was used interchangeably, in 
the Platonic tradition that Husserl is evoking, to mean “form,” but Husserl distances 
himself from idea due to the weight placed on the term by Kant, opting instead for 
wesen (essence/character/being/creature) or eidos120. For Plato the unavailable Forms 
were what lay beyond every object causing them to be; for Aristotle it was the 
immanent essence in all things; for Husserl phenomenology is similarly an “eidetic 
science,” a seeking of what makes things what they are. The “eidetic variation” he 
advocates for reaching the essence of a thing is a thought experiment where aspects of 
the object are subtracted until it ceases to be identifiable as that object; all that is left, 
that “set of predicates” at the last point before it ceases to be the thing under 
consideration, is what makes it what it is, its eidos121.
I want to use the term eidos in a related fashion - with its links from Plato 
onwards to that which enables us to encounter objects in the world - to describe what 
makes something what it is for us. I suggest the emendation as I don't share Husserl's 
faith in our ability to reach objects as they are, and want to suggest, instead, that our 
“getting used” to things is evidence of an analogue scale of approaching things in 
themselves, an unachievable teleology where, at every stage, we seem already to know 
the thing itself but couldn't be further from it. My starting point for this idea is the 
following quotation from Harman: “Whereas for Husserl the hidden hammer-at-work 
might be brought into consciousness whenever we feel like it, Heidegger finds it 
impossible in principle to make the withdrawn reality of the hammer fully reveal its 
secrets. There will always be a subterranean depth to the world that never becomes 
present to view” (“Technology, Objects and Things in Heidegger” 3). We'll return to 
Harman's reading of Heidegger shortly, and the implications derived from the latter half 
of this quotation, but first we must clarify the current use of eidos.
120 See, for instance, their use throughout Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology.
121 Eidos as essence is an important part of Husserl's ontology (see Smith, Husserl 141-161) with deep 
relation to Husserl's conceptions of time, and I don't pretend to do it justice here, merely to 
demonstrate that Husserl's usage is tied to what makes a thing what it is, as opposed to my usage: 
what it is to us in this moment. Eidos, for Husserl, doesn't exist in time, it is an essence which 
transcends the specific instance. Husserl's essential ontology is too precise to be productively dealt 
with here; interested readers are referred to the opening chapter of Ideas I, “Essence and Eidetic 
Cognition” (5-32).
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In “The Question Concerning Technology” Heidegger uses the term poesis to 
describe a bringing-forth of the essence of what makes something what it is. In the way 
that we have already looked at individuals within their environment they are what they 
are because of the prior and current environments that put them into action; in the case 
of biological forms they are what they are independent of any encounter with another 
individual (Heidegger refers to this mode of bringing-forth, again from the Greek, as 
physis). Artefacts, as we've established, require use in order to put them into action in 
their environment, and this, I would argue, is poesis in the same way as the act of 
craftsmanship which creates them: it brings the equipment into what-it-is-as-equipment, 
rather than an object which, without human engagement, expresses no knowledge of 
anything because it has no relation to the natural, i.e. wider, spontaneous, enduring, pre-
user, non-artefactual environment. Eidos is the term I would like to use to describe what 
makes the non-dependent biological form what it is to us, as well as what makes the 
dependent artefact what-it-is-at-all as artefact. The term exists under the Heideggerian 
interpretation of poesis in as much as it is a bringing-forth for the individual who 
experiences it.
There are other phenomenological terms that I might have used instead of eidos, 
such as “givenness” - “how [an object] appears to us, how it apparently is” (Gallagher 
and Zahavi, Phenomenological Mind 21) - or “constitution” - “a process that allows for 
the manifestation or appearance of objects and their signification, that is, it is a process 
that permits that which is constituted to appear, to manifest and present itself as what it 
is” (Gallagher and Zahavi, Phenomenological Mind 24) -, or a heavily contested word 
from Husserl's work: “noema.”122 But givenness is too tied into appearances to intend all 
that I require, i.e. we can understand more about something than how it appears, optical 
illusions being a simple example. Constitution is more apt, but also more tied to the 
process of how something becomes what it is to us. In Logical Investigations, Husserl 
states that objects aren't in consciousness as if they were in a box: before we can get at 
122 For more on the trouble in reading Husserl's use of noema (the object-as-it-is-intended) see Zahavi's 
discussion in Husserl (58-60) where he details the distinction between “West Coast” and “East Coast” 
interpretations. Roughly, the West Coast interpretation sees noema as describing the object we 
encounter as ontologically distinct from the object “behind” that encounter, e.g. when we intend a 
pencil the object that we intend is an object of meaning independent of, though produced by, a thing in 
the world. In this interpretation the pencil that we intend comes between us and an object in the world. 
In the East Coast interpretation the object-as-it-is-intended is the object-that-is-intended as it is 
considered, i.e. it is not ontologically distinct, but instead a way of looking at the object as it is. 
Though not directly an interpretation of Husserl, as Harman's argument in Tool-Being progresses we 
can see that his conception of objects is tied to the West Coast interpretation of noema, though he 
accuses Husserl, in his faith in access to things, of occupying the East Coast position.
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them they are constituted as being by our intending what they are for us (275)123. Eidos, 
as I wish to use it, is not the process of constituting, but the totality of information 
available to our intending. Finally, I don't use noema for the same reason that I am using 
eidos: for the latter the historic weight adds to the meaning and offers, if not clarity, then 
coherence. With the former, however, it is a contested term even amongst Husserl 
scholars, the weight is negative, and an alternative is preferable.
From here on, when I talk about knowledge or understanding I will be referring 
to the partial access we have achieved to things as they are, to their essence, where 
something in our immediate cognition, memory, or bodies matches something in the 
world, a match that is demonstrable only by repeatable successful action. Eidos will be 
reserved for that which we refer to when we intend, not the thing itself, but the 
changeable gestalt that we feel we know or understand and act upon, the apparent 
object. However, for every successful intentional action that we perform, within an 
environment or with an object, we demonstrate that our eidos of the intended thing has 
come at least partially in line with some aspect of the thing's essence. We will return to 
this point again soon.
So what is eidos, as I'm conceiving of it, comprised of? At its simplest it would 
be those aspects of an an encountered object that we would describe to someone if we 
were aiming to convey its nature, for instance that a glass is relatively heavy, fragile, 
transparent, and frequently used to hold liquids. This has appealing links back to 
Husserl and the eidetic reduction of an item, through the stripping out of anything that 
isn't essential, to its fundamental components in order to better understand it.
Whereas “givenness” is dependant on how an object appears to us, I would like 
eidos to refer to much more than that, to refer to any aspect of a thing which gives it a 
boundary in our mind, which marks it out from its environment as being what it is124. 
This would include, but isn't limited to:
123 For more on Husserl and constitution see Zahavi, Husserl 70-75.
124 It is worth noting that the conditions under which we view an object are not a part of its eidos as this 
chapter conceives of it. Illumination, for instance, is not part of what bounds an object from the 
surrounding world in terms of our understanding of it; it's not, in the basic test, part of how we would 
ever describe the thing to others (though a particular translucency or reflective capacity may depend 
on certain environmental conditions we are still talking about an aspect of the object when we say, for 
instance, “you really have to see it in daylight in order to best understand it”). This relates to Husserl's 
notion of “optimal givenness,” “the kind of givenness that offers us the object with as much 
information and in as differentiated a manner as possible” (Gallagher and Zahavi, Phenomenological 
Mind 91. Also see Zahavi, Husserl 35). As already stated, givenness and eidos are not interchangeable, 
but givenness contributes to the eidos of an object.
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• Observations (visceral sensory experience, visual, tactile, etc.)
• Aesthetics (how it sits, intellectually, in visible, audible, olfactory, tactile, or 
gustatory relation to other things)
• Historical information (what caused it to be produced including, but not 
restricted to evolutionary processes)
• Scientific understanding (knowledge of its physical reality, chemistry, biology 
etc.)
• Classification (how we would describe it to others, how we would compare it to 
other things)
• Collective information (information regarding the item (or how it is positioned) 
culturally as passed on by other individuals)
• Action potential (what we expect to be able to achieve with, or to be denied by 
the thing)
In this way every eidetic experience is unique, as every encounter with an object will 
intend various combinations of these aspects, but a culture can instil standardised 
gestures for use, standardised ways of perceiving and responding that affect action, not 
by changing objects as they are, but as they appear to us. I've already discussed the 
changeable gestalts of technologies in the first chapter, but now it should be clear that I 
am referring to every object encountered as comprising a changeable experienced 
gestalt; the gestalt nature of technology is an effect derived from the gestalt experience 
of all things. Eidos is not, unlike knowledge or understanding, an objective claim. When 
an action is repeatably successful then we know that it must be based on accurate 
knowledge or understanding of at least some relevant aspect of the world. But eidos is 
only what we feel is understood (or known), and we can thus seem to know or 
understand things which are false or incomplete (and, as such, action is more likely to 
fail, to be impaired, or to be unrepeatable, the very opposite of demonstrable 
knowledge). Our intentional actions are always based on eidos, on an eidetic “seeming-
to-be,” rather than an essential knowledge or understanding, but it is only repeatably 
successful action which requires eidos to be accurate; luck is not a demonstration of 
knowledge. We can talk then of a “weak” or “strong” eidos: This is not an either or, but 
a continuum from a first basic encounter to a complete apprehension of what makes 
something what-it-is-to-you in that moment, functionally an apprehension of the thing 
itself, its essence. In line with Heidegger's notion of presentness-to-hand, the weakest 
eidos is to simply see an object, and maybe to contemplate it in some fashion. In many 
ways the idea of strengthening eidos is more intuitive then many of the issues that we've 
addressed in this chapter: look harder at something and you'll begin to understand it 
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better (though this intuitiveness, at least in part, must come from the terminology 
temporarily matching a way in which we commonly use it). We can grow that eidos by 
approaching the object and beginning to fill it up, to provide “fulfilment” in Husserl's 
terms, a growing understanding of the various profiles of the thing. As Zahavi describes 
fulfilment in his discussion of the Logical Investigations 
knowledge is not...static..., but a dynamical process that culminates when 
all  of  the  profiles  of  the  object  are  given  intuitively.  (It  should  be 
emphasized too that the profiles in question do not simply refer to the 
appearing  surface  of  the  object,  but  to  the  givenness  of  all  of  the 
properties of the object, be they properties that belong to the interiority of 
the  object  or properties  such as  solubility  that  only reveal  themselves 
when the object interacts with other objects) (Husserl 34-35).
As we investigate an object we build up these profiles, strengthen eidos, fulfil it, and 
move towards completion. A complete eidos would require more than the Husserlian 
profiles, however, as it also includes our understanding of its cultural situation, what 
caused it to be produced (i.e. an understanding of what evolved knowledge it has itself), 
and the potential for actions of various intimacies that it provides for us, in short its 
every relation as well as its every aspect.
In a discussion of the phenomenology of typewriters Polt uses eidos, in line with 
Husserl, to refer to what makes something what it is, its essence, something that we can 
try to get to:
Let's take a natural thing, an oak tree. The eidos of an oak is its 'oaking' - 
all the processes that it does. How those processes are done - and thus, 
what those processes really are - depends on how they are instantiated in 
its  body,  its  particular  matter,  its  wood,  bark  and  leaves.  As  for  our 
relation to the oak, we can never truly understand the eidos of an oak just 
by using abstraction and imagination to isolate some universal aspects of 
it (for instance, its genetic code); we have to keep open to seeing new 
examples  of  oaking.  And it  will  be  our  bodily habits  -  our  habits  of 
testing,  cutting,  climbing  on  the  tree  -  that  familiarize  us  with  oaks 
(“Typology...”).
Polt's example here is instructive. For him, eidos describes what the oak as thing already 
is, and to strengthen it is merely to gain a greater understanding of what makes the oak 
the oak. I use the term to describe what makes the oak the oak to us, as opposed to an 
essence created from evolved knowledge as being what makes the oak the oak; the oak's 
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“oaking” is successful action in the environment it knows. This is what makes the oak 
what it is, it doesn't require us to put it into action, and I don't believe that it's essence is 
something that we can truly approach: we will never fully understand what makes the 
oak the oak. But we can have a measure of our understanding of the oak, and of that 
making, based on the success of our interactions with it; the more successful our 
interaction with something the more accurate our understanding of the relevant aspects 
of its essence must be, and we can talk of our eidos of the oak becoming more complex 
and strengthening, not as an aspect of the oak, but as an aspect of where we meet the 
oak and divide it off from the world.
Harman states that
[t]here must be some sort of complicated way in which being announces 
itself  in appearances; otherwise, even approximate forms of knowledge 
would be utterly impossible. Just how this happens remains unclear. But 
in  negative  terms,  it  cannot  possibly  be  through  an  as-structure  that 
would adequately mirror the things themselves, or even one that would 
give us a closer and closer but merely asymptotic approach to the things. 
The gap between the two dimensions remains absolute (Tool-Being 160).
Because of the absolute distinction between the essence of the thing, and what it is that 
appears that we interact with, Harman sees no way for us to access any aspect of that 
essence in appearances (directly counter to Zahavi's reading of Husserl). I am 
suggesting that successful repeatable action can provide a hint of that essence. Although 
use exists at the level of the as-structure (we use a hammer as a hammer, not as a car or 
bathtub), ready-to-hand use, in its more common reading, is invisible; ready-to-hand use 
isn't an encounter with the hammer as anything, it's simply work (this is why I do not 
wish to let go of that term to Harman's own reading). When we can use that hammer 
again and again, reliably, predictably, successfully, we are accessing not just what the 
object is as-hammer, but also an aspect of its essence which allows the work to be done. 
We still do not encounter the whole hammer-being, by any means, there remain infinite 
aspects that are distant from us, but we get a hint of the thing itself, and that right up 
until the moment when the hammer fails us, or acts in a way that we don't expect and 
the spell of readiness-to-hand is broken: in that moment of surprise it is revealed that we 
never had access to all of the aspects of the thing relevant to the work to be done.
In this way eidos can be both complicated and/or strengthened. To complicate 
eidos is simply to expand the gestalt that makes the thing what it is to us. Scientific 
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investigation is the ultimate complexifier, moving our perception beyond the levels at 
which we ordinarily operate. But knowing that something is made of atoms, for 
instance, needn't draw us closer to the thing itself, unless it amplifies the success of the 
interactions we can accomplish with it. Every atom, after all, is also an object with a 
being which recedes from us (we will return to this point). Complexity doesn't 
automatically draw us closer to the things themselves. In fact we can get toward things 
even with relatively little complexity. How many cat owners, for instance, understand 
the biology of their particular pet? And yet their understanding of those pets seems so 
strong. This is based on the success of their interaction with them; their eidos of the cat 
is strong because what the cat is for them matches some aspects of what the cat is in 
itself, it's essence, enough to provide a successful interaction far more frequently than 
the animal biologist, a stranger to the particular cat, who encounters it with a complex 
eidos already in place. The owner understands the aspects of the cat that relate to their 
interactions well enough; that the cat can still surprise (and frequently!) shows that the 
understanding is far from complete. David Hume's skepticism of our capacity for 
inductive reasoning125 is resonant with this importance placed on surprise revealing the 
dearth of access that we have to a thing: just because something has been successful 
once, twice, or a hundred thousand times simply cannot mean that we know it will be 
true tomorrow, it merely suggests that it is probable, and maybe not even that (though 
Hume finally has faith in our instinct for what will endure; when it comes to 
successfully acting with the objects which surround us I have my doubts). As such, 
when I say that repeatable successful action implies some access to an aspect of the 
thing it really is in the weakest sense possible: that the object allows this kind of 
interaction, and this only holds up to the point that it doesn't and we're surprised.
A strong eidos, therefore, is a conception where what makes something what it is 
to us matches, at action facilitating points, aspects of the thing intended. If something 
changes too quickly, or if we never act with it on multiple occasions, we can never tell 
whether we have accessed any aspect of the thing in itself (this is what Harman argues 
from the start). But success is telling.
How do we measure the success of action? I have suggested that successful 
action is repeatable action, not a particular goal achieved with a particular tool, but any 
activity which can be achieved over and over again with few surprises. We might not 
125 See Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, “Sceptical Doubts Concerning the 
Operations of the Understanding” (18-29).
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know the chemical composition of graphite and wood, might not know the geometrical 
angles of hexagonal cylindrical forms, might not have training in draftsmanship, i.e. our 
eidetic experience of a pencil might not be complex, but believing that every time we 
put that pencil to paper we can make marks within our skill level as artists, a reality 
which manifests itself far more often than it does not, shows that we have a good 
understanding of the essence of a pencil (an understanding of a pencil) that we can 
transfer to other instances of things we believe to operate in the same way (and most 
often do, suggesting that part of what makes the pencil what it is is an aspect of most 
pencils), and that our eidos of the pencil, if not complex, is (relatively) strong. Strength 
and complexity of eidos are both only shown by report: strength is judged on 
repeatability, complexity is simply relative to the standard reports of similar type in our 
communities of users, e.g. what might seem a complex description to the average 
Kindle reader might seem standard or simplistic to a hardware designer or software 
programmer.
This perception of eidos goes some way to explaining why the bound book form 
feels more natural or more “right”: because it acts predictably in line with the majority 
of objects in the world, always “on,” not reliant on battery life, robust, and simple 
enough for nearly all users to intuit the move toward a technological interaction with it 
at encounterable levels (i.e. page-turning; the act of reading can be another matter 
entirely). We might even define modern technologies as those which deny intuitive 
progression toward technological use to the average user, at least in terms of what 
makes it go; our eidos can appear strong, but we are often surprised by our new tools 
because we don't understand why they function. As Derrida notes
[w]ith pens and typewriters, you think you know  how it works, how it 
'responds.'  Whereas with computers,  even if  people know how to use 
them up to a point, they rarely know, intuitively and without thinking - at 
any rate, I don't know - how the internal demon of the apparatus operates. 
What rules it obeys. This secret with no mystery frequently marks our 
dependence  in  relation  to  many  instruments  of  modern  technology 
(Paper 23).
That beautiful phrase, the secret with no mystery, describes the subterranean realm of 
tool-being as well as it describes the aspects of a technology which are most often 
unavailable to us (and there is much cross-over between the two). When we consider 
physical books as being more “natural,” as we've seen it's not that they're not 
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technological, but that their encountered equipmental reality makes an intuitive sense; 
the act of reading on a digital reading device, however, is built around a set of 
unintelligible, non-technological processes which allow technologies to run on top of 
them. The average user will perceive the Kindle as a simple device, and their eidos of it 
might never need to be much more complex than that of the codex. But the Kindle has 
the greater capacity to surprise the average user: we have no default, or drive, to know 
what makes it tick.
An aside on OOO
To conclude OOO's rising to the surface in the present discussion, I'd like to go over a 
couple of implications for this work that emerge from having Harman's Tool-Being as its 
ontological underpinning.
One of the most radical of Harman's formulations is that the structure of 
encounters that he outlines doesn't just apply to human-oriented encounters. As an 
object oriented philosophy Harman extends his reading to how any two objects meet, 
whether that be the object human meeting the object codex, the object codex meeting 
the object human, or the object codex meeting the object table (with OOO revealed as 
the grounding for my thinking it is perhaps clearer why my discussion of knowledge 
began with animals and artefacts encountering their respective environments; 
ontologically I see no difference between human and animal, vegetal, or synthetic 
materiality. To understand cases we might regard as “simpler” are revealing when they 
can be shown to apply equally to the human case or vice versa). What this means, 
therefore, is that no two objects meet each other as they are, but only as they appear to 
them; objects too have only an eidetic experience of one another:
No object ever unlocks the entirety of a second object, ever translates it 
completely literally into its own native tongue...[;] any object reacts to 
some  features  of  [any  object  that  it  encounters]  rather  than  others  - 
cutting  its  rich  actuality  down  to  size,  reducing  it  to  that  relatively 
minimal scope of reality that is of significance to it...[Harman imagines a 
heavy appliance resting on a frozen lake:] if the fact that the frozen lake 
supports an object is not its tool-being, then what is?...[I]magine that the 
ice  now  cracks  or  melts,  so  that  the  appliance  smashes  through  the 
surface  and  sinks  into  the  frigid  depths  of  the  lake...[T]he  important 
factor is that the heavy object, while [experiencing] the ice as a reliable 
support, did not exhaust the reality of that ice. The appliance could have 
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been resting either on thin ice or on an eternal pillar of granite, and the 
supportive effect (prior to the disaster) would have been precisely the 
same, ignoring...the specifically  icy experiences that the appliance may 
also have undergone (Harman, Tool-Being 223).
When Harman describes the heavy appliance as having not “exhausted” the reality of 
the ice this is the same as my assertion that it is surprise that reveals the lack of depth of 
our encounter with aspects of a thing. When a predicted action is unsuccessful this is the 
same as the heavy object's experience of the ice as support not being the totality of the 
ice; exhaustion would be a complete understanding, but surprise is the revealed 
asymptote, the “aptness to fall apart”126 of any interaction. The appliance falling through 
the ice is “surprised” in as much as its prior experience hadn't exhausted the ice despite 
both objects appearing to be at rest with one another.
When built upon Harman's conception of object oriented ontology, what eidos is, 
as I've described it, can be complicated further:
the tool-being of the hammer [its inaccessible reality] and the hammer as 
hammer [how it appears to another thing] are not simply two faces of the 
same entity...They must be two separate entities. For by hypothesis, the 
hammer as hammer has been prehended, and therefore has already come 
into  relation  with  me  as  a  different  entity.  Merely  by  prehending  the 
hammer, I have created a new entity, a monstrous fusion of my own tool-
being and the hammer's (Harman, Tool-Being 262, emphasis in original).
Here we see Harman's oblique relation to the West Coast interpretation of Husserl's 
noema: when we encounter an object as an object we form something new, a blend of 
my essence and its, and this object too has both an inaccessible subterranean reality and 
an impoverished expression at the level of the as. This can lead to complex 
formulations: The codex codexes, it has an inaccessible reality as codex, but my 
prehension of the codex as codex forms a me-and-codex which me-and-codexes, exists 
as me-and-codex, and can itself be interpreted, in diminished form, as me-and-codex 
etc.
So what does an object oriented approach offer our discussion here? Primarily it 
becomes part of seeing technology not as a class of objects we encounter, but as an 
experience we have during interactions; OOO asks us to look at both sides of that 
meeting. Rather than presuming an artefact's deficiency we have to ask about our own: 
126 “ἀσύμπτωτος not falling together, < ἀ priv. + σύν together + πτωτ-ός apt to fall” (“asymptote, n.” 
Oxford English Dictionary).
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it might not understand us, but have we taken the time to try and understand it?
But an object oriented approach also forces us to abandon the idea of visceral 
insulation as an ontological reality. No doubt we are separated from slaughter in our 
contemporary experience of food and food production, and this is an important cultural 
issue which has implications for how we exist in and relate to things in the world. But 
when we say that the industrial digger keeps us from the earth, more so than the spade, 
then this is an argument which occurs wholly at the level of the as-structure. Neither the 
digger, spade, or our hands unaided get closer to the soil as it is than one another, they 
merely offer us different aspects of it: soil as scented, soil as heavy, soil as density, etc. 
Whilst we may choose to privilege certain aspects over others it isn't because they take 
us closer to the soil, but because historically those aspects have helped us to act 
successfully. A spade brings us no closer to the earth than the digger, but a digger does 
separate you a) from the aspects of the earth revealed by the combination of you and 
spade and b) from the work of the spade. In electronic reading a), the combination of 
you and equipment, is just as clearly distinct: the e-reader will reveal a different 
immanent text than the codex will, though the similarity of the script and of the 
movement of the eyes does overcome many of the gestural and eidetic differences that 
do occur, which is not to downplay them but to simply to realise them for what they are: 
a significant, but not deterministic inflection of the text encountered. Strangely, 
however, it is b) that seems to most trouble people. When it comes to e-reading, the folk 
phenomenological reports point to the fact that we may risk privileging spade-work as 
somehow more worthy than digger-work.
If we wish to better understand earth during the act of digging we should attempt 
frequent and varied interactions with it to build up a profile of successful action with 
more and more aspects, a simultaneous complexification and strengthening of eidos. We 
will still never get to the earth, but we will be closer than we were by using the spade, or 
by our hands alone which we intuitively insist must take us closer to things as they are. 
But did we ever feel closer to the earth when we simply used our hands? The spade 
reveals aspects of the earth such as its position within strata, the reality of bedrock, its 
ability to be compacted, to form pits, to be used as a building material, an insulating 
material, or, in the case of peat, as a combustible material; the digger reveals yet more 
again. The telescope and microscope, the thermometer, barometer, and seismograph, 
reading glasses, the mass spectrometer, the theodolite, and the dust that detectives use to 
reveal fingerprints all bring to attention (in eidetic terms functionally create) new 
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aspects of things, of the world around us. With any rehearsed interaction we can seem to 
get phenomenologically closer even as ontologically we're forced to keep our distance, 
but sometimes we get tied to privileging certain revealed aspects. Typically, again, this 
is for reasons of successful interaction, but when these privileges become culturally 
protected, as in the case of the privileged “hard work” of the spade, or the “natural 
reading” of the codex, they can be hard to break out of even if their protection makes 
little sense in the continuing environment.
This chapter, and more obliquely the first chapter too, argued that it is practice 
which takes us closer to things, as close as we can ever get; using something we 
experience as a technology in order to perform that getting closer might just require 
more practice because we haven't spent our lives incorporating it, and with it, as we 
have with our bodies. It is in this regard that we can see how e-reading offers no more 
insulation from words and information that the codex does, just a set of interactions that 
are under-practised and that, in some cases, we are yet to see privileged. Selective 
pressures, practice, and time, however, are all it takes to strengthen eidos further, to 
technologise, and maybe get a little closer to another bit of our world.
OOO, as an underlying concern, gets us to focus on the bodies of things; it is via 
their bodies that everything encounters and divides up the world. Harman uses the 
example of tectonic plates clearly encountering one another as rock: they do not melt 
when faced with one another, one plate does not encounter the other as a tree or as soil; 
the plate encounters another plate as plate, but it doesn't exhaust its being (222). It is 
because of its own being as what-it-is that it experiences aspects of the other as what-it-
is-to-it. In the same way we can think of how our own bodies encounter things, and they 
encounter us - our bodies are the enablers, structurers, knowers, and limiters of our 
experience of and access to the world, and this deeply affects our phenomenological 
experience. This is a fundamental aspect of the definition of boundaries which function 
through the eidetic experience of a thing. For instance, the harder it is to cleanly 
separate parts of an object with our hands, the more we typically consider them to be 
elemental to the object: a cup's handle is fundamental, a lid is not; a book's cover is, but 
a sticker is not; a seamlessly glued table seems a more whole object than one obviously 
screwed together. An object's physical boundaries for us are therefore most often 
defined in relation to our bodily experience of them. At an atomic level the cup is 
literally evaporating, exchanging electrons and energy with its surroundings, and there 
is a challenge to define its boundaries the further down we go, like tracing the exact 
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outline of a cloud. The point, however, is that we don't live there. The cup is built up of 
relations of things, but they are not its essence. The molecules of ceramic are made up 
of atoms, but they are not its essence. The atoms are made up of quarks, but they are not 
its essence. The moment anything encounters something as something, as cup, atom, or 
quark, then it interacts with it at the scale of that structure (or, in our case, we can 
attempt to bring that structure to our scale via equipment such as electron microscopy). 
A cup encounter's the table as support whilst the cup's atoms encounter the table's atoms 
in entirely different but related relations. And at no point does the cup reach the table, or 
the atoms reach the atoms, they all have an eidetic experience of what those things are 
to them, meeting only mediated aspects. We only differ in that we can meet the cup at 
our level, or use our tools to drill down and try and drag the atoms up to our level, or 
imagine ourselves down to theirs. At this point we are forced to neglect the cup as cup, 
and encounter it as a structure of atoms.
When I say that the essence of a thing is unknowable it is in part (though not 
primarily) because its existence exists across scales which don't include us. Every object 
has an essence because it holds together and has an effect at one scale, but at another 
scale it makes sense to think of the object as a structure, of the atoms in the process of 
acting out a cup, at another of quarks as acting out atoms, at another of superstrings 
acting out quarks, and who knows where on from there? “The hammer is always 
siphoned away into countless systematic unions...[T]he hammer is also made up of 
trillions of minuscule tool-beings which are by no means utterly dissolved in it..., a tool-
being is always part and whole” (Harman, Tool-Being 279). At each level a sentient 
being living at that scale could make an appeal to essence, eidos, and network, what the 
object is, what it seems to be, and the structures into which it is inserted and which 
comprise it. We judge boundaries by the cause and effect of our level, and complex 
multi-part objects, such as watches, engines, and combination locks can confound our 
sense of scale (the computer even more so because vital components function at levels 
beyond our bodily comprehension). Multi-component objects, when encountered as 
such (the gestalts we encounter predominantly hide their complexity), seem to be both 
object and network at the same time, easily pulled apart, and yet one thing. The cup is 
complex enough, the computer is absurd. The e-reader is simultaneously a simple 
screen, and a complex of parts which rely on operating with precision at sub-atomic 
levels. The codex is the same of course, but phenomenologically it seems a simple 
mass, something to which we might sometimes pay attention to the cultural structure in 
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which it sits, but hardly ever, if ever, to itself as structure. This stems from its being able 
to apparently be perceived in its entirety at our scale, our bodies seem to match it all the 
way down to its components (pages) in a way that simply isn't the case with the internal 
workings of the e-reader.
OOO underpinned eidos, then, describes our growing sense of what something 
is, but it is a progression with no end and an infinite array of false paths. In a BBC 
interview from 1962 Vladamir Nabakov spoke about apprehending objects in a way 
which might be considered a folk phenomenological account of the notion of eidos that 
I'm attempting to construct here:
Reality is a very subjective affair. I can only define it as a kind of gradual 
accumulation of information: and as specialization. If we take a lily, for 
instance,  or  any other  kind of  natural  object,  a  lily  is  more  real  to  a 
naturalist than it is to an ordinary person. But it is still more real to a 
botanist.  And yet another stage of reality is reached with that botanist 
who is a specialist in lilies. You can get nearer and nearer, so to speak, to 
reality:  but  you  never  get  near  enough  because  reality  is  an  infinite 
succession  of  steps,  levels  of  perception,  false  bottoms,  and  hence 
unquenachable,  unattainable. You can know more and more about one 
thing but you can never know everything about one thing; it's hopeless. 
So  we  live  surrounded  by  more  or  less  ghostly  objects  (qtd  in  Dee 
“Nature Writing” 27-28).
This accumulation of information, of specialising, is absolutely what I would like to see 
as the attempt to fulfil eidos, and Nabakov captures perfectly the impossibility of the 
task. We are left, always, with more or less empty ghosts, and as such everything that 
we have an understanding of, no matter how close we think that we may have gotten to 
it “as it is” or “why it is” will always have the capacity to surprise us when our actions, 
based on our understanding not of it but of an eidos we have constructed, are 
unsuccessful due to the effects of some unperceived or incomplete aspect. Gallagher 
and Zahavi describe perception as “an embodied coping with the environment” 
(Gallagher and Zahavi, Phenomenological Mind 99), and eidos, as a product of 
perception, will always be bodily contingent: we cannot ever know more than our 
bodies can provide data for. Dogs see fewer colours than we do127, bees can perceive 
ultraviolet light128, and birds may even witness quantum entanglement129; which of these 
creatures sees the world as it is? We struggle to even comprehend how these organisms 
127 See Jennifer David “Color and Acuity Differences Between Dogs and Humans.”
128 See D Peitsch “The Spectral Input Systems of Hymenopteran Insects...”
129 See Lisa Grossman “In the Blink of Bird’s Eye, a Model for Quantum Navigation.”
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encounter their environment, and objects within it, and their experience reveals the lack 
in our own. But our bodies are also, as we've seen, what makes our brittle attempts at 
understanding possible.
With these definitions of knowledge, understanding, essence, and eidos in place 
we can return to the codex and the e-reader/e-book combination, the special cases for 
our concerns with technological equipment. In the first chapter we saw another 
analogue scale of weak to strong interaction with objects: technologising. 
Technologising can now be seen as a strengthening of eidos, a drawing closer of the 
object to better reveal more aspects of it. Equipment that we use as a device is 
equipment kept at a distance with the vast majority of its aspects left not understood, 
and as such we frequently have a lack of success in our engagements with it, the 
potential for surprise is too great. Equipment that is used as a technology is slightly 
better understood, and our frequently successful interactions suggest a strength of eidos 
that comes from matching states within the thing as they are (the unsuccessful uses, the 
returns to unreadiness- or even presentness-to-hand of course, reveal the incomplete 
nature of the understanding). Technologising is the act of making things feel right, of 
adapting to them, but also of clarifying, typifying, and setting up the boundaries of an 
object and what it can accomplish in a soft-assemblage with our bodies. To point at an 
object, or a set of objects, and call them “technologies” says nothing about the object as 
it is beyond our belief in its conforming to our bodies (and, eventually, our bodies to it) 
in such a way that it has the ability to provoke a relatively standardised, predictable, and 
repeatable sensory and use experience. A strengthening of eidos achieved by 
technologising comes about by improving the frequency of successful and repeatable 
extended action. Eidetic experience is not a layer of insulation between us and the 
world, anymore than a technology is for the task to which it is set; they are both the 
enabling assemblages of world, body, and cognition that allow us to act. Technology is a 
named type of intimate eidetic experience.
When something becomes technologised it can seem that we are getting to its 
essence, to how it is in itself, its “whatness.” Therefore, when our sense of eidos is as 
strong as it is during a technological interaction (i.e. our conception of the object feels 
fixed, our intellectual apperception feels complete for all practical purposes, and our 
interactions are frequently and repeatably successful) then a fluctuation which 
challenges that eidos, which reveals a still limited understanding, hits us all the more 
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strongly. The fact remains that even in a strongly technological, i.e. deeply intimate 
interaction, whilst we may catch an object's whatness in glimpses through success, all 
that we can truly rely on remains the equipment's “thatness,” not what makes it what it 
is, but simply that it exists to us at this moment as this thing. This perhaps goes some 
way to explaining the profoundness of the response to a very familiar object 
malfunctioning. Imagine writing with a pencil which suddenly splits and pierces the 
skin of your writing hand; running in favourite shoes and suddenly feeling the tips give 
way as your toes push out of the front; the steering wheel of the car, even for a second, 
becoming unresponsive. These scenes all have an element of danger, but in those 
reflective moments following the event there is also an aspect of shock that the familiar, 
the eidetically strong, the “fully understood” suddenly became alien; whatness was 
revealed as mere thatness, and simply understanding that something exists is no future 
guarantee of how it will perform.
The codex's knowledge, the resistant reader's eidos, the troubling e-reader, and 
meeting over time
Because we live in an unstable system where environments place changing pressures on 
mutating inhabitants, because we destabilise systems, and because we (as individuals 
and accumulative environments for equipment) are unstable ourselves, new facets of 
experience will continually be thrown up. “Reading on screen doesn't feel right” a 
reluctant reader says. “That doesn't matter,” a happy screen reader replies, “you'll get 
used to it.” What does this mean, to get used to something which started off feeling 
wrong? That this is possible means that an e-reader can be technologised, and we 
addressed this idea in the first chapter. I would now like to add that that process of 
technologising, a process of repeated use, also strengthens the reader's eidos of the 
object. As more aspects appear to the reader, as eidos is deepened, then this is an 
increase in a special kind of knowledge: the reader better understands the equipment. 
Greater understanding, as with all knowledge, increases the potential for successful 
action, in this case reading will cease to “not feel right” and instead will stop feeling 
like anything at all. Readers, even bibliophiles, rarely get interrupted in the activity of 
reading by just how right it feels; interruption is the preserve of decoupling 
assemblages, of becoming unready-to-hand, of malfunctioning, of surprise.
But it is also not enough to simply say that the reader will get used to an artefact 
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as they reveal it further, because reading is a meeting of two evolved bodies, the reader 
and the equipment. Whilst the reader might increase their understanding, this means 
nothing if the equipment has no understanding of them130. Each reader is part of the 
environment in which each item of reading equipment sits, they are an aspect of the 
environment to be known, a little bit of selective pressure on the gene pool, but also on 
the individual equipment like a successful predator being a part of the environment that 
affects all stick insects, but also, in that moment, a specific individual. And, just as with 
the individual stick insect meeting the individual predator, any individual (such as an e-
reader) meeting an aspect of its environment (such as a resistant reader) can pass on the 
information it gains from that meeting to the next generation of its species. For the stick 
insects this can make the species come one step closer to looking more like sticks: the 
individual just didn't cut it and their genotype is eliminated along with their phenotypic 
expression, or they made it through this time giving them a chance to go and find a 
mate. For every successful event, that stick insect knows it lives in a world where it's 
particular bodily knowledge allows it to succeed, its continued successful action 
demonstrates this knowledge. In the same way, every time a resistant reader puts down a 
Kindle and says “no, this just isn't for me,” and never buys one, and never recommends 
one, and maybe even actively tries to discourage other potential readers from getting 
one, a similar knowledge gain occurs: that Kindle didn't exist in a world where it could 
act successfully with that reader, with that aspect of its environment (success, for the 
Kindle as artefact, being use, being put into action). This affects the whole species, even 
if in a minute way, and minute effects played out over and over again is what evolution 
rests upon. Thanks to the peculiarities of their environment, artefacts tend to experience 
a much more focussed (as goal directed) set of selective pressures on each generation. 
Artefact evolution can be swift, at least until its knowledge of the environment is such 
that most of its encounters are successful; the codex has reached a relative equilibrium, 
the artefacts of electronic reading are under pressure.
With e-readers, indeed with any artefact, there is a hugely complex interplay of 
individuals, groups-as-individuals, and environments (which include or are comprised 
130 Understanding may seem the wrong term, as the evolved knowledge of the artefact has not evolved in 
response specifically to a single reader, but to an environment of users. This need not trouble us, 
however, as knowledge and understanding are both just measures of fit to aspects of the world 
however they might come about. The stick insect has an evolved knowledge of past environments, and 
yet we say it has a knowledge of the present because aspects persist with which it has a successful 
relation. The same is true of the e-reader; any feature of it which matches us specifically (or rather its 
accessible eidos of us) is understanding. Knowledge and understanding can be, but aren't always 
evolved processes.
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of individuals). For e-readers we have (at least)131:
• The individual e-reader in its environment of readers
• The individual e-reader's encounter with an aspect of its environment: an 
individual reader
• The group-as-individual of e-readers, the species (or equivalent term), 
experiencing the combined selective pressures of its environment of readers
• The individual reader in their environment which includes e-readers
• The individual reader encountering an aspect of their environment: the 
individual e-reader
• The individual reader contemplating the group-as-individual of e-readers
• The group-as individual of humans, not just the literate and sufficiently affluent 
and inclined members of the species, experiencing the combined selective 
pressures of its environment which includes, for some members, e-readers
All of these encounters are at play in the issue of getting used to any new equipment for 
reading, or to any artefact at all. Getting used to a new piece of equipment features an 
interplay between a) our (growing/growable) understanding of individual instantiations 
of the device (which can become a technology) and its (static) understanding of us as an 
aspect of its environment132, and b) our (growing/growable) knowledge of the device as 
an aspect of our environment and its (growing) group-as-individual knowledge of us as 
environment. Put more simply: a) we can improve our understanding of an e-reader by 
using it and revealing aspects of it, and successful use demonstrates not just our 
improved understanding, but the understanding that it has of us a priori, and b) we can 
conform ourselves to a species of equipment and this affects future generations of e-
readers by altering what they need to know in order to act repeatably successfully.
When the happy screen reader tells the reluctant screen reader “you'll get used to 
it,” all they can mean is: “when my understanding of the object became strong enough, 
the aspects of it that I encountered had a good enough understanding of me that a 
131 Studies on histories of the book and of reading such as Elizabeth Eisenstein's The Printing Press as an 
Agent of Change; David Hall's Cultures of Print; Adrian Johns' The Nature of the Book. Print and 
Knowledge in the Making; D. F. McKenzie's Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts; David 
Finklestein and Alistair McCleery's The Book History Reader; and Alberto Manguel's A History of 
Reading all offer extensive discussion of the kinds of complexities listed here. Our approaches differ 
in their implications: histories of reading focus on the specificities of a particular encounter (and with 
that focus comes an increased range of complexity), whereas the short list presented here is intended 
to be derived from, and applicable to interactions with a wide variety of artefacts. That said, to my 
knowledge there are, as yet, no published accounts of how e-readers are encountered from a 
specifically book-historical perspective.
132 “Static” may be disingenuous here. Does an artefact grow its understanding of a user when that user 
modifies it, wears it smooth, fixes a flaw, or otherwise conforms the thing to themselves? It cannot be 
our concern here, dependent as we are on defining the experience of the new, but I'm certainly 
sympathetic to this position.
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reading experience could occur which I would deem successful. I feel now that my 
eidos of the object is strong, it's rare that it surprises me enough to disrupt the 
engagement.” This clearly has no bearing on whether the same will be true for the 
reluctant screen reader, it's only a statement that it is possible.
But, following on from this, the accumulated pressures of all the happy and 
reluctant readers has an effect on the next generation of e-reading equipment. The next 
generation will tend to have a better knowledge of its environment, of the majority of 
readers any of its members might encounter, but those readers, through their gain in 
understanding, and maybe their technologising practices, will be a different group than 
those that the last generation met. Over time a feedback loop of knowledge and 
understanding can emerge. The stick insects, generation by generation, look more and 
more like sticks in an environment which includes individual predators that are either a) 
increasingly sensitive to perceiving the distinction between sticks and insects (resulting 
in even more stick-like insects in the next generation) or b) have gone off looking for 
other food (in which case the stick insects thrive until some mutation throws this new 
balance off). For e-readers, therefore, such a feedback loop will either a) make each 
generation of e-readers better suited to increasing numbers of individual readers who 
are, in turn, better equipped to interact with them, or b) there will always be a 
significant amount of readers who feel that, no matter how hard they try, their 
understanding won't overcome the gap in knowledge instantiated by the devices, and 
their discontent will manifest itself in keeping e-reading as a minority pursuit, or one 
with a significant amount of detractors, whilst simultaneously throwing up all sorts of 
strange mutations in e-reading devices as they try to adapt133.
This, I would suggest, is a broad mechanism for rapid equipmental change, for 
getting used to things, for the kind of exponential growth which can lead from our 
roughly dividing carcasses with chipped stones found in the surrounding area, to 
moving through the undergrowth with the practiced swings of a machete blade which 
feels like an extension of the arm rather than a tool in use. But whereas a decent knife 
can last a (human) lifetime, the vagaries of market growth, planned obsolescence, and 
manufactured consumer demand have led to an environment for new equipment where 
replication is increasingly rapid and responsive. This can be positive in some respects, 
133 Note that when I say “try” here I'm not suggesting that e-readers realise their problems and attempt to 
improve upon them. I merely want to express that their relationship with the environment, as with the 
stick insect finding a mate, prompts the next generation into being, and when a stable survival/success 
strategy is not established there is a tendency toward diversity in the ensuing offspring as all sorts of 
traits appear survivable, there is no accurate established knowledge.
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with the right tools for important jobs, medical equipment for example, going from idea 
to indispensable technology within a couple of generations. But there is also a 
homogenising influence where mutations aren't given a chance to shine as users take no 
time to understand them, and the pressures of what we think we want march over what 
we may be better off with. Such problems are largely not under consideration here, but I 
hope that the language outlined is applicable to such concerns. I don't believe that e-
reading is an inherently bad thing, I do think that we can adjust to it, and its equipment 
to us, but I also fear landfills full of misunderstood equipment and a culture where new 
mutations are prized over what could be most successful.
Use leads to beauty
Some people don't like the feel of reading books on portable screens. This is the 
statement with which we started this chapter. I began by suggesting some of the 
neurological reasons why this might be the case: that we are embodied beings; that that 
embodiment affects cognition in sometimes profound ways, particularly when it comes 
to the use of our hands; and that we can train certain types of thinking to be linked to 
certain gestures which might supersede any innate physio- or psychological propensity 
to prefer alternative modes of interaction. This would all suggest that when the physical 
aspects of the act of reading are altered then readers with established patterns of action 
are going to frequently report a struggle to adapt to the new interaction, even if at face 
value it looks much the same; the new equipment prompts gestures and feedback that 
disrupt our well-worn patterns of coping with reading material.
In the first chapter we looked at how we are able to adapt to the equipment we 
deploy, bringing it “on board” and incorporating it into a soft assembly with ourselves. 
The increasing popularity of e-reading devices, even beyond cultural factors such as 
marketing and hype, suggests that users are beginning this act of incorporation, of 
making e-readers their own, but also that e-readers are capable of being so integrated, 
maybe for the first time. In the language of this chapter, e-readers can now be adopted 
because the equipment has enough knowledge of its environment of users that they can 
be sustained as a form. But there's also been a simultaneous unfolding expansion of 
knowledge in the readers that make up that environment, a growth in individual 
understanding of how to engage with the new equipment which, for increasing numbers, 
are presumably becoming technologies and melting away during sustained use as new 
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heuristics are developed.
I cannot pretend that this is the whole story of how we get used to new 
equipment. What makes someone pick up a new device and try to make it a part of 
themselves? What motivates them to keep trying when it seems, unrelentingly, to 
remain a device? What finally makes that device match the reader enough that it can be 
used effectively? Maybe these questions are unanswerable; if they could be predicted 
then engineers would get rich by only producing equipment which suited users exactly, 
rather than throwing up iteration after iteration to see what sticks. What I hope I can say 
is that part of the reason such questions are challenging is due to the hidden complexity 
of the interactions between individuals, groups-as-individuals, and environments of 
individuals; I hope that I have shown that when artefacts gain a knowledge of us, and 
we gain an understanding of them - fleshing out an eidos, a what-makes-them-what-
they-are-to-us, the strength of which bears a partial relation to the essence of the things 
in themselves - then we affect one another. The environment which must be known 
alters itself, the individual which must know is changed, and the adoption of equipment 
which is frequently technologised must represent, in some ways, a conforming to one 
another. The exact nature of every conformation is impossible to know, each is tied to 
the vastness of environmental influences and to the millions of individual users meeting 
millions of individual artefacts and reporting back, in various ways, to the pool which 
results in the next generation. But that such gains occur is written in the body of every 
object and in the mind of every user; in every repetition of a successful interaction there 
is the demonstration that knowledge of one kind or another has been gained.
Ellen Dissanayake, in What is Art For?, attempts an anthropological explanation 
for the emergence of physical art and its evolving and being sustained. She suggests that 
communities of early humans which made things “special” were more likely to survive, 
that making things special was an adaptation to the environment in which they lived 
(74-106). As John Carey describes her conclusions
the fact of taking pains convinced others as well as themselves that the 
activity - tool manufacture, say - was worth doing. So art’s function was 
to  render  socially-important  activities  gratifying,  physically  and 
emotionally,  and  that  is  how  it  played  a  part  in  natural  selection. 
Anthropological  evidence  bears  out  Dissanayake’s  theory…Richard  L. 
Anderson134 finds  that  Inuit135 art  is  not  usually  just  decorative…Art 
134  In Calliope’s Sisters: A Comparative Study of Philosophies of Art.
135  The contemporary Inuit society is the continuation of a nomadic tribe with roots leading back to the 
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means preparing tools for the shaman or toys for the children (34-35).
If Dissanayake is correct, and her argument is persuasive, then this making special is at 
the heart of artistic production, but also at the heart of equipment manufacture and use. 
There appear to be ready ties to Walter Benjamin's notion of aura in artworks, but there 
are also important connections with our current discussion. Something which is special 
is used and imbues the whole activity with its specialness at the same time as informing 
others that the activity is worth doing. In Dissanayake's argument this is the reason that 
equipment keeps getting made, even when the task of creation, such as making large 
numbers of arrows, or meticulously crafting knives, is onerous. We evolved to place 
value on craft and craftsmen because those groups which valued good work survived 
better; they were more successful due to their plentiful and superior tools. Art as we 
now understand it, argue Dissanayake and Carey, is the vestige of an earlier adaptation 
to make important things special.
This attribution of importance to objects certainly seems to persist; perhaps the 
near religious value placed on the codex form by some readers is part of this drive, a 
vestige of something which once kept our ancestors alive.
Whether this direct line is explanatory or not, we certainly place a lot of weight 
upon our objects and endow them with a life of their own. In the descriptions of the 
codex from its acolytes that we've seen throughout this work, that sense of specialness 
can be heard again and again. It's obvious that anyone who truly loves them knows that 
codices are much much more than words on a bundle of pages. But they're not of 
course, the bundle is exactly what they are; we just bring something else, something 
better, do our best to attach it, and, with practice, do. We still make things special. 
Physical books allow us to play with paper and bring it to life, half turning pages so that 
they pass by quicker, drumming fingers, running a nail under an important line, dog-
earing corners, doodling and note-taking, mourning and then relishing the bangs and 
bumps and creases as they accumulate. It's hard to pinpoint the psychological effects of 
these things beyond a broad notion of adding importance, but that people mourn their 
loss suggests the pleasures, and maybe the necessity of physical interactions in daily 
cognitive action. But if this is the case then the outlook for e-readers is very hopeful: 
users will always develop their own routines of handed practice.
This is part of our understanding of objects: that our bid to find something's 
Stone Age.
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boundaries, which can result in our bringing the aspects we perceive onboard as 
incorporated equipment, also gives something of ourselves back to it. Part of our eidos 
of objects worth integrating is a sense of their specialness, something that isn't a part of 
their essence. The codex is just a bundle of pages, but one which has become receptive 
to being something more.
I think that some resistant readers doubt that people will find a way to place 
importance onto their digital things in the same way that they have with print, but that's 
what technologising, something that I've tried to position as central to what it means to 
be human, is all about. Making things not just things, but equipment, and our 
equipment, is what we do. Every stickered laptop, every passed-on memory stick, every 
annotated electronic text, every emoticon-ed IM, every abbreviated SMS, every nail-
varnished mobile, every cheap home movie, every bedroom recording, every tagged 
photo, every lovingly tended Myspace, Deviant Art, and Live Journal profile is 
testament to the fact that we spend our days making things our's, as in mine, and ours', 
as in for all of us. This is what I've tried to attach to that word “technology”; these are 
gains of understanding, of moving away from just a method for getting something done 
to being a part of us. How long could it be until e-books are regularly more than words 
on a bundle of screens? How long can it be until people, once again, use these things 
until they are beautiful?
We are slowly building the history for digital reading that on a long enough 
timescale will imbue screens with the same richness as paper pages. They traverse the 
same path as the machete: we find or make the objects, or cause them to be made; we 
use them; we select what makes them work, or what does not; and they get made again; 
and we become one with them; and we make them sing.
The most persuasive argument for the superiority of the codex form, over any 
representation of digital script, typically lies in the realm of haptics and interfaces. It is 
unsurprising that the form which has evolved over hundreds of years should have 
naturally worked its way toward fitting our bodies exactly; the codex has been tailored, 
adapted by the repeated use of generations. And the haptics of the printed form do make 
sense: it fits the hand; the pages are thin for the most amount of storage in a compact 
and cheap space; it is more portable than a carving, and more adaptable than a scroll; 
less complicated than an iPad; less fragile than a Kindle. E-readers possess a different, 
and currently lesser understanding of their users than a codex does. But, as we'll discuss 
in the next chapter, codices aren't perfect. No environment for knowledge is static, 
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evolution always occurs, and when it comes to our artefacts we would do best not to 
attempt to halt, but instead to guide it. E-readers, or something like them, can lose their 
device-iveness, can become mundane before becoming essential, and this is the path 
that every artefact we value or even love has gone through.
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Chapter 3 - Thinking Through Artefacts
The most important thing to be opened during the reading of a book is a person’s mind, 
not two slabs of cardboard
- Jeff Gomez, Print is Dead 168
We construct our technologies, and our technologies construct us and our times. Our 
times make us, we make our machines, our machines make our times. We become the 
objects we look upon but they become what we make of them
- Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen 46
- Brian Dettmer, Modern Painters
My argument throughout this work has been that the complexity of our existence as 
embodied beings is often neglected by the language and models that we use to describe 
our interactions with equally embodied things in the world, and that such failures result 
in often misconceived ideas about technologies, a class of equipment best defined by 
phenomenological experience integral to our success in the world. I've used e-reading, 
and the discourse of resistance which surrounds it, as a conduit for these discussions as 
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the field has recently very publicly provoked arguments about bodily experience in 
cognitive activity, and this has supplied us with a great amount of folk 
phenomenological data on which to draw. As I have argued, e-reading brings together 
many of the most important facets of any discussion regarding embodiment and the use 
of tools.
In the first chapter I tried to show that the word “technology” necessarily fails us 
when it allows people to describe equipment as de facto “unnatural,” and to suggest that 
the new equipment for reading on screen, if it can become a technology as defined here, 
is no more unnatural than the codices which came before them. E-reading is a potent 
example of something which we can see being turned from an unfamiliar device into a 
natural(ised) artefact by some readers, whilst just as many lament from the sidelines. In 
another generation I would have talked about the mobile phone, the home computer, the 
car136, but I think that e-reading remains the best possible example today for talking 
about an encompassing definition of technology because it affects the written word, a 
technology in itself, and one which underpins almost all of our cultural existence in one 
way or another.
The second chapter used the consumer experience of e-reading not “feeling 
right,” a more specific iteration of its perceived “unnaturalness,” in order to look more 
closely at the adjustment of users to equipment, and equipment to users over time. Our 
definition of technology was fleshed out and related to the encounter of any object in 
our environment: technology is a particular structuring interaction, one which 
permanently changes, i.e. strengthens and increases the complexity of our eidos of the 
artefacts we use in order to accomplish a task. I also considered equipment as something 
which is evolved in an environment of users, something in which a history of 
adjustments from both sides can be read (and should not be forgotten). Again, e-reading 
is amongst the very best examples for discussing such issues as the generations and 
adoption rates are swift, and extensive feedback is currently being recorded by vocal 
commentators of all skill levels and in the adaptations of the equipment itself.
In this final chapter I would like to continue these lines of thought arrayed 
around a third concern from the discourse of resistance to reading on portable screens: 
that e-reading somehow makes us more “stupid” or otherwise alters or diminishes our 
136 Examples of work in this vein include Lisa Gittelman Scripts, Grooves, and Writing Machines: 
Representing Technology in the Edison Era, William Boddy New Media and Popular Imagination: 
Launching Radio, Television, and Digital Media in the United States, and Friedrich Kittler 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter.
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intelligence. I would like to suggest that this concern, as with the previous provocations 
from each chapter, can be usefully explored by relating it to the embodied experience of 
readers, and that it in turn is best considered within, and sheds light upon a wider 
argument about technology and our encountering of objects in the world more generally.
I'll begin by looking at how this claim appears in the academic and popular 
literature and then go on to outline an approach to the assertion that I think is most 
productive for thinking about the impact of electronic reading devices, indeed any 
object or artefact on cognition. I'd like to suggest that perhaps part of the discourse 
suggesting that screen-reading makes its users less intelligent stems from its 
requirement and prompting of a new set of skills and gestures for reading and 
interpretation. These new skills cluster around new equipment as a widespread and 
correlating change in the eidos of that equipment as it is technologised. I will argue, 
conditionally, that change of this sort need not represent a lack, though something must 
always be lost in the change. I will also argue that we are able to use objects in the 
world as “material metaphors,” that our equipment in use can enable us to think novel 
thoughts, and the chapter will focus on the type of thought prompted by screen reading 
juxtaposed to that of the codex. Again, I hope to show that e-reading need not be an 
impoverished cognitive task, but that it will always be, despite manufacturers' various 
efforts, a very different one to that of encountering a codex. I do not wish to be 
deterministic about equipment, to say that it alone can cause certain kinds of thinking, 
but I also believe that it is a mistake to see technologies, things brought onboard and 
into the machine of body and distributed or extended mind with which we cognise, as 
not facilitating or prompting certain ways of looking at the world. In the same way as 
the hard assembly of the body affects our cognition, so soft assemblies with our 
technologies can affect the ways in which we think, what we can think, and what we 
think about.
In the final section I will look specifically at the work of several writers who 
play with the materiality of the printed page and the creative equipment of their day in 
order to produce meaning. I will primarily focus on E.E. Cummings and the typewriter, 
Mark Z. Danielewski and the digital screen, and Jonathan Safran Foer and his 
inheritance and particular extension of the concerns Danielewski is writing with. The 
work of these writers in terms of either their skill with the material, or the uniqueness of 
their work in the times in which they are writing mark them all out as worthy of 
investigation, but each of them also engage with their respective artefacts in particularly 
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vivid fashion, arguably more so than any of their contemporaries, helping to make my 
points as clearly as possible. My own concerns will, for the most part, not be with the 
content of their work in a qualitative sense, but rather how it literally embodies their 
own changing eidos of the page, the book, and the codex, and how their popular 
experiments are a part of prompting similar change in others. The reinvigoration of the 
printed page's capacity for meaning in and by these writer's work is the polar opposite 
of the critics of screen readings' assertion that the screens themselves are somehow anti-
intellectual; these writers provide us with an account of how eidetic change can alter the 
way that readers and creators encounter typographic technologies, and I hope that a case 
study of such will bring together and demonstrate the wider arguments of the chapter at 
work.
The claim
Commenting on Brian Dettmer’s book sculptures (one of which has been reproduced 
above), Sebastian Mary raises a variation on the belief we've now seen expressed a 
number of times:
Looking at these images of the physical matter of books, remixed into 
sculptures, I’m reminded of the process that texts are increasingly going 
through  once  digitized:  amalgamated,  remixed,  reformed  into  new 
entities…Dettmer’s sculptures invite us to think about deeply-held taboos 
around  the  sanctity  of  books  as  objects;  a  conversation  that  recurs  - 
especially  in  the  context  of  e-readers…[L]ike  European  villages 
dismantling local medieval chateaux to build outhouses, are we taking 
our cultural  history so completely for granted that we’re in danger of 
forgetting  or  destroying  millennia  of  culture  in  a  thoughtless 
reappropriation of its materials for our current preoccupations?
Mary is most interested in the remix aspect during his article, but he also raises the 
important question, as Dettmer does, of whether when we play with the forms of the 
book, more specifically with the codex, whether we are learning about, adding to, or 
neglecting what has come before. The new technologies of reading need not ask 
questions of specific texts, but instead challenge the sanctity of the form itself: why 
shouldn't we try to make books better?
We've seen two answers so far: “because it's unnatural” and “because it doesn't 
feel right.” To this I'd now like to add “because it can affect the way you process 
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information, and to such a degree that it might make you stupid.” This is perhaps the 
most provocative of the claims that I've taken from the popular discourse, but in 
variations on its explicit wording it might also be the most frequently heard. The use of 
the word “stupid” here comes from a popular and much discussed article in The Atlantic 
by Nicholas Carr entitled: “Is Google Making Us Stupid?” Carr's focus in that piece is 
with the glut of competing information online, and whether our outsourcing of memory 
to search engines and internet databases is making us, as individuals, intellectually 
deficient in one way or another, be that in terms of attention span or brute IQ (the 
former levelled at prospective readers and researchers of any stripe, the latter at young 
children still learning how to read). Carr's argument isn't specifically about the portable 
e-readers that this thesis has been dealing with, but as this chapter will argue, the 
internet and its associated reading modes and expectations are indelibly linked to the 
new reading equipment.
There is a growing body of competing literature on this subject, and Anne 
Mangen's often cited article “Hypertext Fiction Reading: Haptics and Immersion” 
provides an excellent overview of academic research into the impacts on cognition of 
reading on screen. What is immediately obvious from this paper (published in 2008), 
however, is that the field is small in breadth and scope, often unquestioningly applies 
findings based on web surfing or hypertext fiction reading onto linear e-reading on 
specialised equipment, and fails its own calls for further phenomenologically or 
embodied cognition sensitive research137: “Until quite recently...issues of materiality 
have been largely neglected in reading research overall. Several studies point to the 
importance of addressing the multisensory dimension of digital reading...without really 
pursuing the issue any further” (Mangen “Hypertext fiction reading”)138. The kind of 
studies Mangen calls for are beginning to emerge, but their evidence remains patchy. 
One significant example is that of a study conducted by Muhammet Demirbilek which 
was reported in Wired: Demirbilek looked at the impact of graphic interfaces in reading, 
137 It is telling that, in a talk at the Unbound Book conference in May 2011 Mangen still cites much the 
same studies, and makes the same conflations between hypertext, web surfing, and e-reading, at least 
as far as her freely available notes indicate. No empirical study that she cites comes after 2007, that is 
after the first generation of Kindle, bar one 2011 study (Ackerman and Goldsmith “Metacognitive 
Regulation of Text Learning: On Screen Versus on Paper”) which only deals with desktop browsing.
138 Mangen cites the following studies in this regard: Back “The Reading Senses”; Bearne “Rethinking 
Literacy: Communication, Representation and Text”; Kress Literacy in the New Media Age; Mackey 
Literacies Across Media: Playing the Text; Mackey Mapping Recreational Literacies: Contemporary 
Adults at Play; Merchant “Writing the Future in the Digital Age”; Walsh “The ‘Textual Shift’: 
Examining the Reading Process With Print, Visual and Multimodal Texts”; Walsh, Asha, and 
Sprainger, “Reading Digital Texts.”
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particularly a move from reading on a PC screen to reading on an iPad. His
conclusions don’t contradict Carr’s assertions, but they suggest that the 
gap where information is lost between short-term memory and long term-
memory  is  not  due  solely  to  hyperlinking  [which  Carr  sees  as  a 
distraction, something we'll return to shortly], but also to the disorienting 
nature  of  the  interface  used.  Carr  is  correct  that  the  traditional  PC 
computing environment (such as Windows or Mac OS X), which uses an 
overlapping-windows  interface,  is  conducive  to  shallower 
learning....However  [the  studies]  Carr  [cites  in  support  of  this  view] 
focus on interfaces that will soon be out-of-date. Newer mobile devices 
such as the iPhone, iPad and Android smartphones abolish the traditional 
graphical  user  interface  we’re  accustomed  to...On  these  mobile 
technologies - especially the iPad with its bigger 9.7-inch display - all the 
emphasis is  placed on the content,  and each launched app completely 
takes over the screen. The only pointers are our fingers...Demirbilek and 
I agree that the  iPad-driven tablet revolution is poised to improve user 
orientation and learning” (Chen “Will the iPad Make You Smarter?”).
Here Chen identifies another issue: how quickly studies go out of date while the 
artefacts go through various iterations under the selective pressures of their users. Carr 
was forced to draw his assertions about reading longer texts on a screen (newspaper 
articles are his example) from data about the use of laptops and desktops, but the iPad 
doesn't have the same material issues. Demirbilek and Chen argue that in comparison to 
these earlier screen reading operations the iPad actually promotes focus (this does not 
offer us any answer to whether the iPad is an improvement or retrograde step in 
comparison to the codex of course)139.
As researchers attempt to prove, one way or the other, variations on theories 
such as Carr's one fact is clear: the workings of the brain have entered discourse on the 
subject at every level, from the academic, to journalistic, to that of the casual blog, and 
139 Tom Weber offers a similar report of increased focus for the Kindle:
[I]t felt at first like a severely crippled computer. After all, it has a display screen, a 
keyboard - even a wireless connection and a web browser of sorts. But every time I tried  
to indulge my digital-media-trained attention span, pausing in the middle of a book or 
article  to  check  baseball  scores  or  skim  a  few  blogs,  the  experience  was  too 
cumbersome to enjoy...Over a few weeks, I rediscovered my ability to simply read the 
book or article I had punched up in the first place...It’s particularly enjoyable when 
reading a newspaper or magazine - enough so that I’ve been routinely purchasing some 
of these publications when I could have grabbed my laptop and read them for free on  
the web. In effect,  I’m paying for  the lack  of  distraction (“The Real  Genius  of the 
Kindle? 'Unitasking'”).
Again this offers us little in the way of information regarding the Kindle versus print, but it does show 
one apparent improvement of the apparatus over the desktop or laptop digital reading experience.
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often frustratingly to the detriment of the rest of the body. That said, the neurological 
theories, and their widespread appeal, are well worth investigating. Most of this work 
considers the alternative reading modes prompted by internet surfing, but the issues of 
distraction, hyperlinking, and varied writing spaces are similar enough to be relevant 
and to begin our discussion. With tablet computing the lines between laptop and desktop 
browsing and e-reader type reading are increasingly blurred. The Kindle, as we'll go on 
to see, also contains more of this history of internet centred e-reading than we might 
imagine.
Maryanne Wolf, in her popular work on the neuroscience of reading, Proust and 
the Squid, offers a number of convincing arguments for why we might rightly express 
concerns with the way content is consumed online, particularly by young or otherwise 
still learning readers:
[R]eading has begun to trouble me considerably as I consider the Google 
universe of my children. Will the constructive component at the heart of 
reading begin to change and potentially atrophy as we shift to computer-
presented  text,  in  which  massive  amounts  of  information  appear 
instantaneously?  In  other  words,  when  seemingly  complete  visual 
information  is  given  almost  simultaneously,  as  it  is  in  many  digital 
presentations, is there sufficient time or sufficient motivation to process 
the  information  more  inferentially,  analytically,  and  critically?…The 
basic visual and linguistic processes might be identical, but would the 
more  time-demanding,  probative,  analytical,  and  creative  aspects  of 
comprehension  be  foreshortened?  Or  does  the  potential  added 
information  from  hyperlinked  text  contribute  to  the  development  of 
children’s  thinking?  Can  we  preserve  the  constructive  dimension  of 
reading  in  our  children  alongside  their  growing  abilities  to  perform 
multiple tasks and to integrate ever expanding amounts of information? 
(16).
This quotation holds a number of the most pressing concerns for research into the 
altering neurology of reading: the effects of the abundance and availability of 
information; the intrusion of visual culture into the typographic; the shortening of 
attention; and last (and made very much least) the possibility that the new reading 
modes might be beneficial, if only in a supportive capacity, to childhood development. 
The importance (and our simultaneous ignorance) of these issues can't be 
underestimated. But as the internet becomes increasingly important to the lives of 
millions of people the research field becomes increasingly crowded and increasingly 
muddied, particularly as conclusions are being drawn from the results of relatively few 
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studies with small sample sizes, unpredictable control groups, and, for obvious reasons, 
limited sense of any long term effects. In contrast to Wolf's work for instance, the BBC 
reported that Internet use was good for the brain, at least for older users attempting to 
stave off dementia through increased mental activity:
 
Areas activated by reading a printed book in the brain of an experienced 
web user (left) and areas activated by surfing the web stimulating more 
activity in the same brain. Lead researcher Professor Gary Small said:
…“Internet  searching  engages  complicated  brain  activity,  which  may 
help exercise and improve brain function” (“Internet use ‘good for the 
brain’”)140.
This kind of argument, however, for net browsing as comparable to Sudoku in its 
benign effects, prompted Caleb Crane to write a counter in The New Yorker that extra 
brain activity is probably an argument against digitisation: “the journalist Steven 
Johnson argued that since we value reading for ‘exercising the mind,’ we should value 
electronic media for offering a superior ‘cognitive workout.’ But, if [Maryanne] Wolf’s 
evidence is right, Johnson’s metaphor of exercise is misguided. When reading goes 
well...it feels effortless...It makes you smarter because it leaves more of your brain 
alone” (“Twilight of the Books”). Such circles of evidence are common; commentators 
are citing just a few other writers because the diversity of studies and discussion isn't 
there (which is why we must encounter Johnson and Wolf again here on their respective 
sides of the debates).
The brain is frequently invoked as supported or destroyed by the new portable 
reading equipment, but there just isn't the published work which compares reading on 
screen to reading from the page; no one has put anyone in an fMRI or any other type of 
machine with a printed copy of A Tale of Two Cities and a digital edition to see what's 
different, no one has yet compared like for like. Maybe there's nothing to be seen about 
140 For more on this effect see Gary Small et al “Your Brain on Google...”
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the effects of e-reading in these patterns of oxygenated blood flow. But still we have a 
great many commentators seeking to reduce the argument to the pernicious impacts of 
“the screen,” rather than any cultural or content issue, doing damage to our intelligence. 
Mark Bauerlein's The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young 
Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future (or, Don't Trust Anyone Under 30) perhaps best 
typifies this reductionist approach: midway into his argument he argues that “[t]he 
screen...promotes multitasking and discourages single-tasking, hampering the deliberate 
focus on a single text, a discrete problem” (94). The screen, in and of itself, often 
becomes the enemy in Bauerlein's hands141. The titles, let alone the content of popular 
works on the fate of thought for a generation of digital readers and internet users, 
though not as blunt as that of Bauerlein (or Carr's first provocation), are still telling: 
popular books on the impact of digital content and equipment on the brain, cognition, 
and society include Maggie Jackson Distracted: The Erosion of Attention and the 
Coming Dark Age; Gary Small iBrain: Surviving the Technological Alteration of the 
Modern Mind; Andrew Keen The Cult of the Amateur; Susan Jacoby The Age of 
American Unreason; Lee Siegel Against the Machine; Jaron Lanier You Are Not A 
Gadget; Maggie Jackson Distracted; Hal Abelson et al Blown to Bits; and Nicholas Carr 
The Shallows. For all of the very real and relevant concerns expressed by work of this 
kind, when the worst criticisms of the internet and e-reading get frothed into broad 
generalisations of what the new equipment is doing to its users I can't help but think that 
the more puritanical commentators are increasingly envisioning people in the vein of 
William Gibson's “slitscan” viewers, that our screens produce a creature
best  visualized  as  a  vicious,  lazy,  profoundly  ignorant,  perpetually 
hungry organism craving the warm god-flesh of the anointed. Personally, 
I like to imagine something the size of a baby hippo, the color of a week-
old boiled potato that lives by itself, in the dark, in a doublewide on the 
outskirts of Topeka. It’s covered with eyes and it sweats constantly. The 
sweat runs into those eyes and makes them sting. It has no mouth…no 
genitals, and can only express its mute extremes of murderous rage and 
infantile desire by changing the channels on a universal remote. Or by 
voting in presidential elections (Idoru 28-29).
Such vitriol (and the Gibson quotation is a just barely hyperbolic framing of some 
141 I don't wish to dwell on Bauerlein's book, it can only be held up as a straw man, but for whatever 
reasons (perhaps simply the provocative title) his study is popular in these discussions and some of the 
language sufficiently similar to that of the popular debate as to be usefully indicative of a more 
general attitude.
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commentators' pronouncements) foments with little nuanced consideration of the 
materiality or particularity of the condemned screens. In this chapter I'd like to turn the 
tables somewhat: I will continue to bracket out content for the most part (many of the 
critics described above don't actually do this, instead confusing the medium and the 
media where it suits their argument, but it remains an idea so widespread as to be worth 
taking seriously, if only to see where it might go) and instead focus on what effects 
might really inhere in the apparatus themselves; what does “the screen” actually 
promote? In the last chapter we considered the phenomenological experience of using 
the equipment, and I would like to expand on that here by focussing on critical theory 
and the capacity for physical objects to function metaphorically.
The ideas of this chapter are extrapolated from James Gibson's notion of 
“affordances.” Gibson saw affordances as the what something in an environment 
“offers” an organism “what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill...It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the environment” (127). If a surface is horizontal, 
flat, extended in comparison to the size of the organism, and rigid enough to support its 
weight “then the surface affords support...Note that the four properties listed - 
horizontal, flat, extended, rigid - would not be physical properties of a surface...As an 
affordance of support for a species of animal...they have to be measured relative to the 
animal” (127). Note that an affordance isn't the same as an eidetic aspect, but rather a 
property of the thing: “[t]he observer may or may not perceive or attend to the 
affordance, according to his needs, but the affordance, being invariant, is always there to 
be perceived. An affordance is not bestowed upon an object by a need of an observer 
and his act of perceiving it. The object offers what it does because it is what it is” (139).
Donald Norman, in his guide for designers, uses Gibson's notion in order to 
consider the properties of materials and artefacts
primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing 
could possibly be used...Glass is for seeing through, and for breaking. 
Wood is  normally used for solidity,  opacity,  support,  or  carving.  Flat, 
porous, smooth surfaces are for writing on...When affordances are taken 
advantage of,  the user  knows what  to  do just  by looking:  no picture, 
label, or instruction is required (9).
Paper, in the terms Norman offers here, affords inscription and reading; there is a 
cultural component to both, of course, but there is also a material reality partially 
revealed by the culture. As Joanna Drucker puts it,
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[t]he force of stone, of ink, of papyrus, and of print all function within the 
signifying activity - not only because of their encoding within a cultural 
system of values whereby a stone inscription is accorded a higher stature 
than a typewritten memo, but because these values themselves come into 
being on account of the physical, material properties of these different 
media.  Durability,  scale,  reflectiveness,  richness,  and  density  of 
saturation and color, tactile and visual pleasure - all of these factor in - 
not  as  transcendent  and  historically  independent  universals,  but  as 
aspects whose historical and cultural specificity cannot be divorced from 
their  substantial  properties.  No  amount  of  ideological  or  cultural 
valuation  can  transform  the  propensity  of  papyrus  to  deteriorate  into 
gold's capacity to endure (The Visible Word 45-46).
Affordances, then, are part of the underlying reality of objects which we attempt to 
access during our more or less successful eidetic experience. Culture can program our 
reception of materials and artefacts, complicating and/or extending eidos, and we often 
act on cultural impulses until we learn for ourselves the true, or (to maintain an OOO-
like scepticism) the seemingly true affordances of a particular instance.
Throughout the various debates of e-reading (including internet browsing) 
versus the codex there is an underlying thread which is pertinent to this discussion: that 
the apparatus used to access material can seemingly be as detrimental in itself as any 
new type or frequency of content it presents. This is what I would like to concentrate 
upon: although the types of media available on any equipment must also be considered, 
it is the gestures afforded by the things themselves, effects often neglected in the current 
literature, that this chapter will interrogate. I would like to say, along with the 
commentators seen above, that reading from a screen has an effect upon the user, one 
born of a combination of affordances and cultural reception. As Hayles argues, it does 
seem intuitively “reasonable to assume that citizens in technologically developed 
societies, and young people in particular, are literally being reengineered through their 
interactions with computational devices” (Electronic 47). But the important questions 
are “how?” and “to what extent?” The latter may have to, for the moment, be taken on a 
case-by-case basis, and is presumably heavily dependant on the exposure and the 
predilections of the individual; it is still too early to plot broader trends. The “how,” 
however, is something I feel that we might be able to address, again because we can 
refer to an earlier history of technologies more generally, and equipment for reading in 
particular.
What I would like to avoid, however, is the pure technological determinism that 
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some of the above reports appeal to. As Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx describe it, the 
worst instances of technological determinism suggest that “a complex event is made to 
seem the inescapable yet strikingly plausible result of a technological innovation” (xi). 
Carr offers an example of how such determinism makes its way into the popular 
discourse:
When printed books first became popular, thanks to Gutenberg's press, 
you saw this great expansion of eloquence and experimentation...[a]ll of 
which came out of the fact that here was a technology that encouraged 
people  to read deeply,  with great  concentration and focus.  And as we 
move to the new technology of the screen...it has a very different effect, 
an  almost  opposite  effect,  and  you  will  see  a  retreat  from  the 
sophistication and eloquence that characterized the printed page (“How 
E-books Will Change Reading and Writing”).
It is, of course, ludicrous to think that it was solely the affordances (if focus and depth 
can be described as such) of Gutenberg's printed works, rather than an increasingly 
democratic access to knowledge and a raft of other cultural factors which gave rise to 
any increase in eloquence and experimentation. In a similar light I certainly don't want 
to suggest that readers will be irreversibly altered simply by the equipment that they 
choose to deploy, or to reduce the complexity of cultural trends to the results of that 
form of reading. What I do want to suggest, however, is that reading on screen will have 
an effect on how readers think, particularly if they make their new screens into 
technologies. As with any other tool which is brought “on board” during the process of 
technologising, a new machine for thinking is made which comprises of (at least) user 
and equipment, and as we have seen these sorts of soft assemblages can enable activities 
that would appear unfathomable to the hard assembled bodies of the individual. But 
they also have the capacity to more subtly alter the activities we undertake and how we 
might conceive of them; affordances, as this chapter conceives of them, are shapers and 
guiders, not determiners of thought.
Derrida, for instance, during a discussion of his own play with the writing space, 
argues that the more extensive presence of the computer, and absence of paper, both in 
the world and in his hands, would have altered the work that he produced: “I think that 
the typographical experiments…, particularly the ones in Glas, wouldn’t have been 
interesting to me any more; on a computer, and without those constraints of paper - its 
hardness, its limits, its resistance - I wouldn’t have desired them” (Paper 47). There is 
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something in the paper itself, Derrida is saying, that prompted in him, that afforded 
certain kinds of thought, and therefore certain kinds of work. There is also, absolutely, a 
wave of cultural assumptions which surround paper, particularly the paper in printed 
books, which speak to and to some degree create “its hardness, its limits, its resistance,” 
but to a greater or lesser extent those cultural biases must be able to cohere relative to 
the objects that they cluster around, as exemplified in the quotation from Drucker 
above.
Consider the alphabet. The alphabet is, primarily, equipment for preserving 
meaning, a technology for a great many people. If technologies were inert in the effects 
of their affordances then the alphabet would have no effect on thought in and of itself. 
The capacities that it endows (writing, storage, etc.) might feed into a culture in a way 
which enables change, but the individual's use of the thing itself should not have a result 
of its own. But this doesn't seem to be the case; Marshall McLuhan argued that the 
alphabet led to a certain kind of thinking:
The alphabet is a construct of fragmented bits and parts which have no 
semantic meaning in themselves, and which must be strung together in a 
line, bead-like, and in a prescribed order. Its use fostered and encouraged 
the  habit  of  perceiving all  environments in  visual  and spatial  terms - 
particularly in terms of a space and of a time that are uniform c, o, n, t, i,  
n, u, o, u, s, and c-o-n-n-e-c-t-e-d. The line, the continuum - this sentence 
is  a  prime  example  -  became  the  organizing  principle  of 
life…‘Rationality’ and  logic  come  to  depend  on  the  presentation  of 
connected sequential facts or concepts (Massage 44-45).
This belief in the equation of rational thought with linearity, something we'll return to 
again in the context of the codex, has its roots at the very inception of the modern 
alphabet in ancient Greece and its effects on the early Greek literates. The first 
“complete” alphabet came from Greece, a system which included vowels for the first 
time, as opposed to the contextual cues of the earlier vowel-less Semitic scripts where a 
thorough knowledge of how a passage would sound spoken aloud was required for 
comprehension142. This completion of abstracting the spoken word into written 
characters severed the alphabet from any relation in material experience, particularly in 
comparison to the world imitative qualities of earlier (or contiguous in the case of the 
Chinese calligraphic script) pictographic writing. Walter Ong suggests that
142 See John Man's Alpha Beta and Henri-Jean Martin The History and Power of Writing (27-42) for an 
overview of the history and impact of the development of alphabetic writing.
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it  does  appear  that  the  Greeks  did  something of  major  psychological 
importance when they developed the first alphabet complete with vowels. 
[Eric] Havelock[, in Origins of Western Literacy (1976),]…believes that 
this crucial, more nearly total transformation of the word from sound to 
sight gave ancient Greek culture its intellectual ascendancy over other 
ancient cultures (90).
Such ascendancy derived from “the philosophical thinking Plato fought for [which] 
depended entirely on writing…[F]ormal logic is the invention of Greek culture after it 
had interiorized the technology of alphabetic writing, and so made a permanent part of 
its noetic resources the kind of thinking that alphabetic writing made possible” (Ong 24 
& 52). As suggested in the first chapter, Ong identifies the alphabet as an internalised 
technology with a morphic effect on the cognition of its users. It is precisely the “kind 
of thinking” that the alphabet can engender that John Gray attacks at length in his anti-
techno-utopian Straw Dogs:
The  development  of  writing  has  enabled  [people]  to  construct 
philosophies in which they no longer belong in the natural world…The 
pictographs  of  Sumer  were  metaphors  of  sensuous  realities.  With  the 
evolution  of  phonetic  writing  those  links  were  severed...It  is  scarcely 
possible to imagine a philosophy such as Platonism emerging in an oral 
culture.  It  is  equally  difficult  to  imagine  it  in  Sumeria.  How could  a 
world  of  bodiless  Forms  be  represented  in  pictograms?  How  could 
abstract  entities  be  represented  as  the  ultimate  realities  in  a  mode  of 
writing that still recalled the realm of the senses?...[T]hroughout its long 
history,  Chinese  thought  has...understood  that  even  the  most  abstract 
terms are only labels...As a result, Chinese thinkers have rarely mistaken 
ideas for facts...Plato’s legacy to European thought was a trio of capital 
letters - the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. Wars have been fought and 
tyrannies  established,  cultures  have  been  ravaged  and  peoples 
exterminated in the service of these abstractions. Europe owes much of 
its murderous history to errors of thinking engendered by the alphabet 
(56-58).
There should be a familiarity to Gray's words here: equipment, the alphabet, places a 
barrier between its users and the world. Of course, to Ong and Havelock, that mediating 
barrier is exactly what caused Greek thought to be so powerful: separation from the 
world was what was required to think abstractly. But to Gray, as for the resisters of 
technology that we encountered in the first chapter, that separation from the world 
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seems to simply produce too many mistakes of thinking143. To some degree, by re-
appropriating Plato's bodiless eidos to an approximation of an object incommensurate 
with its richness I have sympathised with Gray's position. What is most important in this 
quotation, however, is that the alphabet has both enabled and shaped a certain kind of 
thinking. This is not to say that it was the sole arbiter of Greek thought, and of the 
Western philosophy which followed it, merely that it played a more or less decisive 
factor in it; as it separated its thinkers from the world its existence as something 
manifested in that world continued to affect the thought of any thinker who incorporated 
it into their cognitive strategies. In short, I don't think that it is deterministic to say that 
the things we encounter most intimately, be they alphabets, hammers, or codices, have 
an affect on our cognition, and that this is exactly the domain of technological use. As 
Gillespie puts it, somewhat darkly:
Caught  in  the  blood-in-the-ears  rush  of  hype,  smitten  by  novelty,  we 
regularly overlook the most glaring of continuities. The immateriality of 
digital tools has often been pointed to as proof that they do not work like 
more earthly artifacts; our fantasies of frictionless digital transaction and 
intuitive interfaces preach the same mistaken faith - that our tools are 
silent  partners,  helping us  in  our goals with no agendas of their  own 
(108).
But when it comes to the things with which we think, the equipment in as much as we 
use them, we are agnostic to materiality. As we will see we make the same mistakes, 
place the same faiths, and are rewarded with similar ends whether the tools we deploy 
are digital, mechanical, or ephemeral, i.e. purely thoughtful or abstract. When we talk 
about e-readers, even “just” the medium, then we must consider its unique physicality, 
the gestures it provokes, and the metaphors we use alongside their forms. I don't intend 
to make definitive, predictive, or qualitative judgements about the kind of changes that 
our e-reading equipment may facilitate in its users, but I do want to look at the 
mechanisms by which they may effect/affect that change, and what those changes might 
be, the “agendas of their own.” I will focus on two distinct but related areas: metaphor 
inherent in equipment and the gestures these metaphors provoke in their users, and the 
changes in eidos and the gestalt of equipment that typically comes in response to such 
metaphorical use.
143 An argument against this notion, based on practice, was put forward in the first chapter and, to some 
degree, extended in the second.
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The importance of being metaphorical
The essence of metaphor is simple: “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing 
in terms of another” (Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors 5). The enabling potential of 
metaphor, however, is immense. Metaphor is central to how we think, it “pervades our 
normal conceptual system. Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are 
either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, 
etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in 
clearer terms (spatial orientations, objects, etc.)” (115). Lakoff and Johnson see 
metaphor as a fundamentally embodied experience, one which invokes the fleshly 
experience of day-to-day life in order to understand the abstractions our minds seek out.
As beings which evolved a staggering plasticity as a survival strategy to handle 
the pressures of a rapidly changing world144 we have learned to turn to metaphor to 
overcome our limitations which stem from a lack of specificity. Humans were never the 
strongest or the fastest, but we became the smartest, where “smartness” isn't a measure 
of fact retention or IQ, but of the swiftness of our cognitive adaptation to novel 
situations followed by a continued refinement of successful techniques. The 
technologising of equipment, therefore, is simply one example of our adaptive 
smartness (another example would be our working tactically in groups to catch faster or 
stronger prey where speed of adaptability is paramount, as is the refinement of 
technique over time145). But our adaptability means that we are never experts in all 
areas, specialising only as the environment requires, and only developing those skills 
which are repeatably useful. Our bodies, not (on evolutionary timescales) our cultures or 
their conceptions, are the relative constants which broadly endure over time, so it is 
unsurprising that we have evolved to conceive of the world as it relates to bodily 
experience, not the vogueish abstractions of our era. “We may like to think that we can 
think of anything and in any way we choose. And perhaps we can, but doing so takes a 
great deal of hard work. For most people logic and mathematics are not 'easy’. 
Unconstrained, general, context-independent and domain-unspecific thought does not 
144 Change produced by the migrations, ice ages, climate changes, variations in flora and fauna, and later 
the effects of new technologies, farming, hunting, and living practices etc. which describe our early 
history (and, picking up pace once again, continue to do so).
145 We could, therefore, extend the argument and suggest that hunting practice is another instance of 
technologisable (if immaterial) equipment. I have focussed on the physical here, but, as discussed in 
the first chapter in the section on “atypical technologies,” I believe the mechanisms still hold, in which 
case “technologisable equipment” might essentially describe our entire practice, or systems of 
practice, of being in the world.
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come naturally” (Plotkin 198). Unconstrained thought, ideas without contexts, ideas 
which we cannot categorise are all troubling to us. Eidos, as described in the last 
chapter, is all about constraining things, putting boundaries around them, and for this 
reason the word's link to Aristotle's “species” is again appealing: establishing eidos 
divides up and catgorises the world relative to our form.
This may be why we're so dependant on metaphor, both in our abstract thought, 
as Lakoff and Johnson argue, and in our attitudes to any unfamiliar thing: to provide 
practical constraints and to deploy domains of intelligence that we have evolved 
through repeated use, either culturally or genetically, to enable us to adapt swiftly and to 
interact with aspects of the world successfully. Metaphors may be lies of a kind which 
weaken eidos, a way of talking about something which seems to get further from its 
essence, but they can also enable forms of essential understanding by enabling 
successful action. We may not access what the metaphor attempts to describe, but we do 
access something else about the thing beyond it, provided for by its fiction as we 
attempt to interact.
The objects that we deploy, however, can also be used as metaphors themselves, 
can be used to think through ideas in another domain, and this is where I'd like to begin.
Objects-to-think-with
In Life on the Screen Sherry Turkle deploys the term “objects-to-think-with” to discuss 
the prompting of novel thought via equipment use, and, as with the definition of 
technologically deployed equipment that has been set up here, for Turkle these objects 
can be both tangible or intangible. Her initial example is a facet of Freudian 
psychoanalysis: Freud's theory of the unconscious became immensely popular within 
his own lifetime, making its way into every level of discourse of the era, and his ideas 
regarding the interpretation of dreams proved particularly compelling. His work 
developed a memetic strength, a set of broad ideas embraced by the society which 
resulted in many more people engaging with the theories in their conversations and 
personal reflections than actually having read Freud's original work. Turkle argues that 
the power of Freudian ideas in the popular consciousness stemmed not from their 
necessary scientific validity, but becauase they offered “almost-tangible ideas such as 
dreams and slips of the tongue. People were able to play with such Freudian 'objects.' 
They became used to looking for them and manipulating them, both seriously and not so 
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seriously. And as they did so, the idea that slips and dreams betray an unconscious 
started to feel natural” (Life on the Screen 48). Turkle's language here is telling: objects-
to-think-with require “play” and “manipulation.” When something can be turned about 
in the hands it can start “to feel natural,” and this establishes a link with canonical ideas 
of readiness-to-hand, where we get to the truth of things by engaging with, not just 
reflecting upon them. The enabling processes, therefore, of objects-to-think-with, 
whether tangible or not, stem from our growing understanding of them through repeated 
use as with any other practiced ability. Technologically deployed equipment is therefore 
a prime candidate to become such an object, but whereas Freud's broader ideas clearly 
had something to say, what does a thing, in an of itself, communicate?
We return here to Gillespie's “agendas” for objects and to Gibson's affordances. 
Tools have no agency in themselves to guide or prompt our thoughts, but when they are 
brought on board in repeated use they can and do shape the kinds of thoughts that we 
manifest, both during that use, and afterwards upon reflection. One example of such 
change, Turkle suggests, comes from “[t]he technologies of our everyday lives 
chang[ing] the way we see the world...When we look at sunflowers or water lilies, we 
see them through the eyes and the art of van Gogh or Monet. When we marry, the 
ceremony and the ensuing celebration produce photographs and videotapes that displace 
the event and become our memories of it146” (47). In the same way that our continued 
exposure to the capture of light, from painting to video, structures our day-to-day 
experience of light in the world, so exposure to Freudian objects-to-think-with 
structured the perception of the unconscious in the audience of the day.
Another example of an object-to-think-with can be found in the article from Carr 
which prompted the claim of this chapter:
Sometime in 1882, Friedrich Nietzsche bought a typewriter - a Malling-
Hansen Writing Ball, to be precise. His vision was failing, and keeping 
his eyes focused on a  page  had become exhausting and painful…The 
typewriter rescued him, at least for a time. Once he had mastered touch-
typing, he was able to write with his eyes closed, using only the tips of 
his fingers…Words could once again flow from his mind to the page…
But the machine had a subtler effect on his work. One of Nietzsche’s 
friends,  a  composer,  noticed a  change in  the style  of his  writing.  His 
already terse prose had become even tighter, more telegraphic. ‘Perhaps 
you will through this instrument even take to a new idiom,’ the friend 
wrote  in  a  letter…‘You  are  right,’  Nietzsche  replied,  ‘our  writing 
146 Turkle is alluding here to an ideas explored by Susan Sontag in On Photography.
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equipment takes part in the forming of our thoughts.’ Under the sway of 
the  machine,  writes  the  German  media  scholar  Friedrich  A.  Kittler, 
Nietzsche’s prose ‘changed from arguments to aphorisms, from thoughts 
to  puns,  from  rhetoric  to  telegram  style’147 (“Is  Google  Making  Us 
Stupid?”).
Carr's principle assertion is that the tools we use can affect us in subtle ways, his own 
concern being with how the internet is changing his own memory and concentration for 
the worse. Nietzsche, it would seem, also found in the assemblage of his body with the 
typewriter a new way of thinking, a new machine for thinking with. The typewriter, of 
course, made no attempts to structure the philosopher's thoughts, but nonetheless it 
appears to have materially affected his output; somehow the tool afforded a different 
mode of doing philosophy.
We might think of such instances, at least preliminarily, as “direct” objects-to-
think-with, where play with the equipment structures the kinds of thoughts that the user 
will go on to deploy in the same or similar domains, e.g. light capture structuring light 
observation in (photography and film), or ideas about the unconscious structuring 
thoughts about the unconscious, typewriters affecting writing output etc. But there are 
also “indirect” objects which structure thoughts in seemingly remote domains, acting 
more obviously metaphorically, and they offer us even clearer demonstrations of how 
objects themselves might inspire certain kinds of thinking. The new reading on screen 
demonstrably fits into both categories.
Because, as this chapter will argue, discussions of computing and the internet are 
necessarily impossible to separate from any discussion of digital reading, whatever form 
it might take, I'd like to use the internet as my first example of an indirect object-to-
think-with. This will also provide a grounding in web-based thinking which we can 
apply more specifically to the Kindle and the iPad in the later sections of this chapter.
Thinking online
In her discussions of objects-to-think-with Turkle notes that “[p]eople use contact with 
objects and ideas to keep in touch with their times. They use objects to work through 
powerful cultural images, to help arrange these images into new and clearer patterns” 
(Reading on Screen 47). Here Turkle points towards the potential for objects-to-think-
147 Carr is citing Friedrich Kittler Gramaphone, Film, Typewriter.
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with being used metaphorically: actions with objects in one realm can help to frame our 
thoughts regarding another pursuit, and this can aid us in those areas which are most 
new and therefore least intuitive. Janet Murray makes a similar point about the nature of 
our new digital tools when she states that “[w]e cannot rewind our collective cognitive 
effort, since the digital medium is as much a pattern of thinking and perceiving as it is a 
pattern of making things. We are drawn to this medium because we need it to 
understand the world and our place in it” (“Inventing the Medium” 11).
Robert Sapolsky discusses how Wikipedia can function as just such a 
metaphorical object-to-think-with:
in  just  a  few  years,  a  self-correcting,  bottom-up  system  of  quality, 
fundamentally  independent  of  authorities-from-on-high,  is  breathing 
down  the  neck  of  the  Mother  of  all  sources  of  knowledge  [The 
Encyclopedia  Britannica]...It  strikes  me  that  there  may  be  a  very 
interesting consequence of this. When you have generations growing up 
with bottom-up emergence as routine...people are likely to realize that 
life,  too,  can have emerged, in all  of its  adaptive complexity,  without 
some omnipotent being with a game plan (“Weirdness of the Crowd”).
Sapolsky's suspicion is that the very presence of commonly used digital tools 
which function and emerge in certain ways will trigger productive, or at least 
challenging thoughts in  its  users.  In  this  light  I'd  like  to  consider  our  broad 
internet activities as objects-to-think-with and to rekindle an argument from the 
early theorisations of increasingly ubiquitous digital equipment which suggested 
that our new household electronic devices/technologies enacted the promises of 
poststructural and postmodern philosophy.
Digital  theorists of the early nineties148,  many working in areas which 
would later come under the umbrella of the Digital Humanities, often referred to 
Vannevar  Bush's  work  on  the  Memex149,  and  to  the  limits  and  potential 
expansion via  cybernetic  equipment  of  the  mind.  In describing  the  Memex's 
augmentation of memory and recall Bush was at pains to emphasise its inbuilt 
relationship with a system which was already present:
The human mind operates by association. With one term in its grasp, it 
snaps  instantly  to  the  next  that  is  suggested  by  the  association  of 
148 See for instance work from Bolter and Landow.
149 Bush envisioned his unbuilt Memex as a method for navigating an ever growing file bank of 
microfilm that could be internally linked and explored freely.
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thoughts, in accordance with some intricate web of trails carried by the 
cells of the brain. It has other characteristics of course; trails that are not 
frequently followed  are  prone  to  fade,  items  are  not  fully  permanent, 
memory is transitory. Yet the speed of action, the intricacy of trails, the 
detail of mental pictures, is awe-inspiring beyond all else in nature (“As 
We May Think” 44).
In this quotation, and others like it drawn from similar work by early digital pioneers150, 
it was frequently argued that one could see how digitisation might manifest the 
asymmetrical linkages that had been in our cultural products all along, connections 
which were in turn relevant both to how the mind works and to the arguments for 
intricate but non-hierarchical relationships that were posited as tenets of the linguistic 
turn, a postmodern outlook, or many of the philosophies, methodologies, or broad ideas 
that they inspired. Bolter, for instance, suggested at the beginning of the 90s, in Writing 
Space, that
[a]s long as the printed book remains the primary medium of literature, 
traditional views of the author as authority and of literature as monument 
will  remain  convincing  for  most  readers.  The  electronic  medium, 
however,  threatens  to  bring  down  the  whole  edifice  at  once.  It 
complicates  our  understanding  of  literature  as  either  mimesis  or 
expression, it denies the fixity of the text, and it questions the authority of 
the author (153).
Bush's fading, intricate web of trails inheres in this idea, as do the extensive associations 
between each node in the database, truisms for both brain and Memex in his eyes. As 
the powers of the digital equipment grew, their relation with the brain's workings and 
their apparent emulation of theorisations of textual production and consumption 
increased apace. These kinds of ideas can still be found, a decade after Bolter's 
pronouncements, in influential works for the Digital Humanities such as Everett and 
Caldwell's New Media (2003):
When  we  understand  computerized  linking  as  a  system  of  ‘nested 
narratives -  a narrative within a narrative’151,  following the rhizoplane 
150 Theodor H. Nelson is often cited, particularly his Xandu project, similar to the Memex, outlined in “A 
File Structure for the Complex, the Changing, and the Indeterminate” and Computer/Lib. For work on 
earlier cybernetic theorists such as Grey Walter, and R.D. Laing, who explored the potential for 
empowering connection between man and machine see Andrew Pickering's The Cybernetic Brain and 
Katherine Hayles' How We Became Posthuman.
151 Alluding to Barthes' S/Z.
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structure152,  it  becomes  analogous  to  Freudian  free  association,  which 
Lyotard interprets as ‘a way of linking one sentence with another without 
regard for the logical, ethical, or aesthetic value of the link’153” (6).
Over time such notions became part of the assumed theoretical landscape, implicit, for 
instance, in Hubert Dreyfus' On the Internet: “With a hyperlinked database, the user is 
encouraged to traverse a vast network of information, all of which is equally accessible 
and none of which is privileged” (10)154. Nancy Patterson spoke more explicitly about 
hypertext's connection to such theories: “Hypertext makes us conscious of the blurring 
of the reader/author role. Book technology seems to fix our notion of authorship, while 
hypertext challenges us to rethink that role and the role of the reader” (“Hypertext and 
the Changing Roles of Readers” 76). George Landow, in Hypertext (and its modified 
reissues as Hypertext 2.0 and 3.0), is perhaps the theorist to most explicitly link 
poststructuralism with the field and equipment of computer science:
Like  Barthes,  Foucault,  and  Mikhail  Bakhtin,  Jacques  Derrida 
continually uses the terms  link (liason),  web (toile),  network (réseau), 
and  interwoven  (s'y  tissent),  which cry out  for  hypertextuality;  but  in 
contrast to Barthes who emphasizes the readerly text and its nonlinearity, 
Derrida emphasizes textual openness, intertextuality, and the irrelevance 
of distinctions between inside and outside a particular text (Hypertext 8).
And yet more baldly, Landow sees hypertext as “an almost embarrassingly literal 
embodiment” of such theory (Hypertext 34)155. As time went on the extremity of the 
assertions tended to be moderated down, but, as Marie-Laure Ryan states, “it is easy to 
see how the feature of interactivity conferred upon the text by electronic technology 
came to be regarded as the fulfilment of the postmodern conception of meaning. 
Interactivity transposes the ideal of an endlessly self-renewable text from the level of 
the signified to the level of the signifier” (5).
Katherine Hayles' work is perhaps the clearest beginning of the end for this 
standardised appeal to a marriage between CompSci and post-60s continental 
152 An allusion to Deleuze and Guattari's Thousand Plateaus.
153 Lyotard, “Can Thought...” 30-31.
154 For a snapshot of the mid-nineties critical theoretical responses to hypertext and electronic reading 
environments which laid the groundwork for Dreyfus' pronouncement see the Landow edited 
collection Hyper / Text / Theory.
155 In Hypertext 3.0, published in 2006 14 years after the original, Landow sticks with his position of the 
link between late 20th century theory and hypermedia. As we are about to see, this approach has come 
under some attack, but Landow maintains that the theorists' “approach to textuality remains helpful in 
understanding our experiences of hypermedia. And vice versa” (Hypertext 3.0 xiv).
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philosophy:
In the heady days when deconstruction was seen as a bold strike against 
foundational  premises,  hypertext  was  positioned  as  the  commonsense 
implementation of the inherent instabilities in signification exposed by 
deconstructive  analysis…In conflating hypertext  with the  difficult  and 
productive  aporias  of  deconstructive  analysis,  these  theorists  [Hayles 
invokes Landow and Bolter] failed to do justice either to the nuanced 
operations of works performed in electronic media or to the complexities 
of deconstructive philosophy (Electronic 32).
It is no coincidence that since Hayles' seismic, and rightly incredibly well received work 
in the field, such notions have been articulated less and less156. But I think that it's a 
mistake to ignore the idea entirely, to say that what Bolter and Landow made explicit, 
and numerous subsequent critics invoked, if more tentatively, is simply, and only, over-
keen and mistaken. Hayles is right, of course, that hypertextual electronic environments 
cannot possibly capture the subtleties of the theories that they appear to perform, but 
Turkle's discussion of objects-to-think-with gives us a way to explore this idea and 
avoid simply disregarding it as spent, unsubtle, or misleading. When Turkle discusses 
the widespread interest in, and use of Freudian ideas of the unconscious, the concepts 
that were adopted were Freud's own in only the broadest of brushstrokes: that there 
existed a motivating force beyond our conscious will; that dreams could mean (clearly 
not a new idea, but newly revalidated by Freud's psychology); that people could be read 
for their subconscious, suppressed, or otherwise hidden motivations in simple tics and 
quirks (parapraxis); etc. Such notions, of course, failed to do justice to either the nuance 
of Freud's ideas or to the complexity of the unconscious mind, but nonetheless their 
deployment in the new objects-to-think-with, constructions that amateur users largely 
built amongst themselves, were undoubtedly both real and useful, introducing a 
complex idea into the popular mindset and keeping it there playfully. We shouldn't 
underestimate the effects of keeping unsubtle versions of more complex activities in 
people's minds; how many psychologists trained, for instance, because they'd heard of 
an unconscious that, if it hadn't become so accessibly debated, would never have caught 
their interest?
The same might be said, to some degree, of the enaction of complex 
156 Kirschenbaum, for instance, inherits this scepticism: “There are a number of important respects on 
which the theoretical debate has advanced considerably since the first half of the 1990s. The appeal to 
high poststructuralism forming the backdrop of many of the early accounts has been abandoned, or at 
least its influence diluted” (43).
190
philosophical ideas prompted by digital texts. The idea is dissimilar to the Freudian 
example as it doesn't appeal to a single body of work, but the theme of approximations 
of potentially intimidating or unintuitive concepts becoming accessible to a broader 
audience is certainly at play. Turkle, therefore, does not necessarily overstate the case 
when she says that
[digital]  technology  is  bringing  a  set  of  ideas  associated  with 
postmodernism -…ideas about the instability of meanings and the lack of 
universal  and  knowable  truths  -  into  everyday  life…[T]hrough 
experiences with computers, people come to a certain understanding of 
postmodernism and to recognize  its  ability  to  usefully  capture  certain 
aspects  of  their  own  experience,  both  online  and  off…Computers 
embody postmodern theory and bring it down to earth (Life on the Screen  
18).
The key phrase is “set of ideas associated with postmodernism.” When we say that the 
internet, databases and hypertextual structures enact deconstructive principles we’re 
talking primarily about a relatively few broad notions such as intertextuality; the reader 
as producer; the impossibility of univocal meaning; the abolishment of hierarchy in 
favour of networks etc. etc. Note that such items appear frequently in deconstructive, 
poststructural, and postmodern discourse, but they are not exclusive to them. In the 
same way that an introductory course on these subjects might identify such tropes in 
order to teach the thinking157, using them as a way-in, so might we also think of these 
ways-in as inherent within the equipment being deployed by an ever greater number of 
people, enabling an easier understanding of the thinking via metaphor. Consider 
Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the rhizome that must lie behind and emerge from 
every arborescent structure:
Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike trees 
or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its 
traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature…The rhizome 
operates  by  variation,  expansion,  conquest,  capture,  offshoots…the 
rhizome  is  an  acentred,  nonheirarchical,  nonsignifying  system”  (A 
Thousand Plateaus 23).
This idea of the rhizomatic force lurking within the seemingly orderly arborescent 
structures of our lives must necessarily be far easier to teach, or even naively encounter 
157 See for instance Peter Barry's Beginning Theory 72-73, where Barry lays out a list of what 
structuralists and poststructuralists “seek” incuding: “Paradoxes...Conflicts...Absences...Aporia.”
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in the age of a decentralised web of data that a billion people or more can access, 
explore, and contribute to, where hierarchical content industries are being broken down 
by rogue individuals propagating their idiosyncratic visions throughout a network which 
attempts to build new structures only to come to expect them to be torn asunder158. 
Similarly, when Ryan wishes to inform her reader of a complex post-linguistic turn 
assertion she finds a ready metaphor in the workings and gesture-prompting of 
hypertextual documents:
The literary text, like language itself, is a self-enclosed, self-regulating 
system in which meaning is determined by a strategic configuration of 
elements…Meaning is not a preformed representation encoded in words 
and in need of decipherment but something that emerges out of the text in 
unpredictable  patterns  as  the  reader  follows  trails  of  associative 
connotations or attends to the resonance of words and images with the 
private contents of memory. This operation is like following links on the  
internet:  surfing  the  surface,  remaining  in  perpetual  motion  (193) 
(emphasis mine).
There's greater complexity on both sides of this equation (metaphor is never a one-to-
one match) and yet objects-to-think-with are, for the vast majority of cases, and 
particularly for a lay audience, enough. Objects-to-think-with may not provide nuance, 
but they are triggers, supports, provocations. Far from making us “stupid,” therefore, the 
equipment of the internet and its apparatus may actually facilitate novel thought; it 
might not reveal the full extent of the work of Barthes or Derrida, but the continuing 
relevance and potential for empowerment (or disempowerment) of some of their ideas 
are manifest in the machinery. That the content currently available might not be up to an 
equal task is almost a separate problem. This is not to say that the content is entirely 
divisible from the equipment, certainly the internet also prompts, facilitates, and 
supports particular forms of content, but the content that we currently see, and the 
content that so many decry, is not all that it is capable of. To argue against the internet, 
or “the screen” as being inherently degrading to intelligence is to mistake the apparatus 
for determining rather than conditioning the output; a similar argument might rail 
158 Guattari, in The Three Ecologies, refers to the potential he saw in the newly minted internet for 
communication between otherwise disparate groups, offering the capacity to quickly organise, act, and 
dissipate again: “One symptom of this state of affairs is the proliferation of spontaneous and 
coordinated groups (organs of 'co-ordination') wherever there are great social movements. It is notable 
that they often use tele-messaging to enable the expression of 'grass-root' sentiments. (The Minitel 
'site' 3615 + Alter is a good example of this). [TRANS: Minitel is a computerized information system 
available via the telephone system in France. It has been available for many years and predates the 
popular use of the Internet.]” (99).
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against the codex for producing a stream of cheap thrillers.
I'd like to turn to the kind of thinking that may actually inhere within the codex 
as a form, looking at its most enabling, and most restrictive traits. When combined with 
our consideration of hypertextual structures as objects-to-think-with we should then 
have a base from which we might better explore the kind of thinking which may be 
provoked by the new digital equipment for reading.
Codex thinking
I need to say again that we must be careful when dealing with the suggestion that certain 
kinds of thinking may inhere in using particular equipment such as a codex. The codex 
doesn't determine any kind of thinking in its users, but it can be seen as provoking 
certain kinds of thought from within the cultural context in which it operates, or, more 
often, to restrict certain kinds of thinking. Lakoff and Johnson give us a way of thinking 
about these structuring capacities of equipment in their discussion of metaphor.
One of their most provocative explorations describes how we give “faces” to 
things based on the ways in which we interact with them: the “front” of a television is 
the side we want to view, the “front” of a car faces the direction we tend to want it to go. 
This seems a fairly logical way of bounding and orienting the world, of producing an 
enabling eidos for otherwise faceless things: making the bodies of objects akin to our 
own bodies which tend to act in the direction our eyes face. But we also ascribe faces or 
fronts to objects with which we don't have a particular plane of interaction: if we place a 
ball between ourselves and a rock or a tree we tend to think of the ball as being “in 
front” of the rock or tree. “In other languages (e.g. Hausa), speakers project fronts onto 
such objects in the opposite direction, facing away from the speaker” (Philosophy in the 
Flesh 34), but in English speaking cultures the whole world looks toward us. This 
convention, in Hausa or English, is always an embodied phenomena: “The concepts 
front and back are body-based...If all beings on this planet were uniform stationary 
spheres...perceiving equally in all directions, they would have no concept of front or 
back...Our bodies define a set of fundamental spatial orientations that we use not only in 
orienting ourselves, but in perceiving the relationship of one object to another” (34). 
Such metaphors, we might assume, emerge in relation or in analogous fashion to our 
bodies' shaping of our perception that we encountered in the last chapter.
I would like to suggest that in the same way that our bodies condition the ways 
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in which we think about the world, by exporting conventions of our own form out onto 
other objects with which we interact or locate ourselves in reference to, in some smaller 
fashion so do the objects we encounter project elements of their form back into our way 
of thinking. Forms affect thought to some degree, and for those objects brought onboard 
in soft assemblages the potential for their embodiment to affect our thinking is 
increased159.
To describe the act of form affecting thought I'd like to appropriate a word that 
can be found in Hayles' work: “material metaphor.” For Hayles it is “a term that 
foregrounds the traffic between words and physical artifacts” (Writing Machines 22), an 
interrogation of the connection between script content and the medium. But I want to 
use the term more broadly to describe an object's shaping of our thought via its form, 
where its body acts metaphorically, causing us to think of one thing in terms of another - 
in this way we can position a material metaphor as an “indirect” object-to-think-with, 
allowing us to preserve Turkle's term solely for direct effects. The applicability of 
“material metaphor” for this purpose can be seen in the following quotation where 
Hayles discusses the metaphorical impact of the codex; what's striking is not its 
particularity to that object, but that the term describes the structuring of the interaction:
We  are  not  generally  accustomed  to  think  of  a  book  as  a  material 
metaphor,  but  in  fact  it  is  an  artifact  whose  physical  properties  and 
historical usages structure our interactions with it in ways obvious and 
subtle. In addition to defining the page as a unit of reading, and binding 
pages  sequentially  to  indicate  an  order  of  reading,  are  less  obvious 
conventions  such  the  (sic)  opacity  of  paper,  a  physical  property  that 
defines the pages as having two sides whose relationship is linear and 
sequential rather than interpenetrating and simultaneous. To change the 
physical  form  of  the  artifact  is  not  merely  to  change  the  act  of 
reading...but profoundly to transform the metaphoric network structuring 
the relation of word to world (Writing Machines 22-23).
The form of the codex structures the reception of at least the content within it, but, I 
would further argue, also of the kind of thinking that follows on after use. We've already 
seen how the alphabet affected the thinking of its early adopters, not just in the 
reception of the texts, but in their wider philosophising, might the same be true of the 
codex? What kind of thinking might be built into its body?
159 In the last chapter we also saw how form affected thought, but the focus was on our form, our bodies; 
here I want to concentrate on the form of artefacts, more explicitly considering their bodies as 
enactive. That both of these formal concerns shape cognition and occur in tandem only emphasises 
their effects.
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Walter Ong describes the predominant and radically freeing effect of the 
adoption of writing160:
Since  in  a  primary  oral  culture  conceptualized  knowledge  that  is  not 
repeated aloud soon vanishes, oral societies must invest great energy in 
saying over and over again what has been learned arduously over the 
ages. This need establishes a highly traditionalist or conservative set of 
mind  that  with  good  reason  inhibits  intellectual  experimentation. 
Knowledge is hard to come by and precious (Orality 41).
Societies which have both adopted and incorporated writing hugely expand their 
capacity for novel thinking, not only through its elimination of repetition for the sake of 
memory, but also repetition between people working on a problem. Writing, particularly 
that which is presented in a form which is easily copied, preserved, stored, and/or 
distributed begins to transcend space and time; by keeping track of what problems have 
been identified and which have been solved, which still persist, redundancy in research 
can be dramatically reduced. In this way the uses of the codex and codex-like forms 
have been radically democratising with implications for religion161, expression, and the 
transmission and availability of ideas162.
But the history of the use of the codex doesn't uniformly match up with the 
message of its form; particularly in the age of the internet and its swiftly produced, 
amateur, and often fleeting texts, it becomes clear that the codex doesn't inherently 
afford caprice or rapid response, instead promoting the positives and negatives of the 
glacial flow of received wisdom. The forces of history, culture, and society interacting 
with the equipment have undoubtedly shaped each user's phenomenological experience 
160 For more on the power of the adoption of writing see Henri-Jean Martin The History and Power of 
Writing and David R. Olson et al. Literacy Language and Learning.
161 Christians were the foremost early users of the codex, adopting it in order to disseminate and work 
with their Bible:
[B]y the first century, Christians were tying loose-leaf sheets of papyrus or parchment 
together in tablets that opened down the middle. These codices were compact enough to 
be carried around in a satchel and produced at prayer meetings. The codex had two 
other advantages over the roll: with writing on both sides of the surface, it was more  
capacious; and whereas rolls had to be read sequentially, codices enabled readers to turn 
to individual pages at separate points in the book. Outside Christian contexts, the codex 
was nothing more than a handy notepad, chiefly reserved for administrative note-taking 
(McNeely 45-46).
 Also see Colin Roberts and T.C. Skeat The Birth of the Codex in this regard.
162 The most influential book regarding the history and effects of printing is surely Elizabeth L. 
Eisenstein's two volume The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. Also of note are Lucien Febvre 
and Henri-Jean Martin's The Coming of the Book and John Man's The Gutenberg Revolution.
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of the form, but they are, contrarily, not the enduring aspects of its brute embodiment. 
The defining positive features of the codex are not its provision of freedoms, but its 
order, its stability, and its sense of authority, products of its boundedness. Birkerts 
invokes its biblical origins when describing those features indelibly connected to the 
experience of the object itself in a quotation we saw in the first chapter: “What [codex] 
reading does, ultimately, is keep alive the dangerous and exhilarating idea that a life is 
not a sequence of lived moments, but a destiny. That God or no God, life has a unitary 
pattern inscribed within it” (Gutenberg (1996) 85). The belief displayed here is in “[t]he 
stable hierarchies of the printed page” (3), where the linear order marks a steady 
teleological progression towards the enlightenment of the conclusion; the form wins out 
over the history of its deployment in the repeated phenomenological experience; a 
history of new freedoms and the democratisation of information is supplanted by the 
particular forces of preservation and continuity that are tied to the form of the pages 
themselves. Italo Calvino might as well have been describing Birkerts' fear of the 
screen's usurping this fought for order when he wrote
you are gripped by the fear of having…passed over to ‘the other side’ and 
of having lost that privileged relationship with books which is peculiar to 
the reader: the ability to consider what is written as something finished 
and definitive, to which there is nothing to be added, from which there is 
nothing to be removed (If On a Winter's Night 112).
And Calvino, in his playful and experimental fiction, leads us to postmodernism. Jean-
François Lyotard's frequently cited definition of postmodernism - an “incredulity toward 
metanarratives...[,] undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress 
in turn presupposes it” (Postmodernism xxiv) - is opposed by the “destiny” Birkerts sees 
enacted in the pages of the codex; to return to our earlier discussion of the hypertext 
database, the new digital technology might well represent an incredulity to the 
metanarrative of the codex163.
We have already considered in the first chapter how a printed codex is no more 
163 Again, there is a risk here in saying what the codex is or isn't. The forms that a “book” has taken over 
the centuries is hugely varied, as evidenced by the scores of artists books which challenge the notion 
of what should be catalogued under an ISBN code (see, for instance, Johanna Drucker's The Century 
of Artist's Books). But again my concern is with popular resistance, with the codex as a well defined 
trope in common consensus. The implications of the phenomenological experience of this normative 
artefact are, I believe, as I have described, even though we might catalogue the hundred thousand 
things which buck the trend. This is a necessary evil of attempting to describe broad notions of 
interaction, but the ideas, as I intend them, should be easily applicable to any number of special cases 
with little modification.
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or less “natural” than the digital texts which have followed them, but we can now come 
full circle and consider whether that enduring illusion of naturalness in the printed book 
matches up with psychological reality. As I'll go on to demonstrate, Hayles, whilst 
railing against the lack of subtlety in the reading of digital forms as enactments of a 
certain kind of philosophy, also tacitly argues for the naturalness of linear order, natural 
in its matching of form to the processes of human thought. And here is a way in which 
we might consider whether the new equipment, in and of themselves, might make us 
somehow mentally deficient: if there is a match between the metaphor afforded in the 
form and the workings of the human mind then it seems likely for there to be the 
capacity for ease of use, and for reinforcing benefits where the formal qualities of the 
medium support the way in which the brain already wants to work, rather than fighting 
against it. If the physicality of the codex provokes a type of thinking to which we are 
not particularly suited, however, then the case for the detractors strengthens.
Linear access is natural?
Bauerlein, attempting to explain his problems with the increase in time spent online, 
states that
the  cultivation  of  nonlinear,  nonhierarchical,  nonsequential  thought 
patterns  through  Web  reading  now  transpires  on  top  of  a  thin  and 
cracking  foundation  of  print  reading.  For  the  linear,  hierarchical, 
sequential thinking solicited by books has a shaky hold on the youthful 
mind, and as teens and young adults read linear texts in a linear fashion 
less and less, the less they engage in sustained linear thinking (141).
The argument, Bauerlein assumes, is so clear as to not need stating explicitly: Linear 
reading is so beneficial in and of itself that any move away from it will be detrimental to 
the equally beneficial activity of linear thinking. In “As We May Think,” however, 
“Bush [had] argued that...the [hypertextual, non-linear] Memex was superior because it 
worked the way the mind works, through association. Kaye [Hayles' fictionalisation of 
her younger self] was not sure the claim was correct. Certainly she sometimes caught 
herself thinking through association, but logical ordering and linear sequencing were 
also important” (Writing Machines 75). Hayles' language here is as revealing as 
Bauerlein's: associative thinking is something to be “caught” doing, even if it is 
important, whereas logical ordering and linear sequencing one can be more open about. 
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The term “logical” is weighted, perhaps synonymous for “sensible”; associative 
thinking is implicitly illogical (this stance is familiar, if modulated down several 
notches, from Bauerlein's position and from the reports outlined at the opening of this 
chapter).
The question these quotations provoke is important: if the codex's linearity 
seems to match the best of the ways in which people can cognise then it may be 
important to preserve, but if there is an equal or even stronger alternative mode then the 
preservation of a form which promotes linearity becomes less crucial. I'd like to 
consider evidence of an acknowledgement of such a mode in the principle discourses 
that I have drawn in throughout: neuropsychology, philosophy, and naïve report, 
including a move toward incorporating literary voices.
From neuropsychology, Merlin Donald argues, as Hayles (despite her weighted 
language) probably intended, for a balance where the linear plays an important role. But 
the underlying or even typical mental processing Donald identifies is parallel, with 
associations being made between “frames within frames”:
Early hominids must…have evolved a capacity to…parallel process and 
thus  compartmentalize  their  conscious  mental  activities,  so  that  they 
could  run several  trains  of  activity  concurrently,  while  reviewing and 
comparing  experiences.  This  would  have  been  necessary  even  for 
relatively  simple achievements,  such as  group coordination,  organized 
big-game hunting, and long migrations…The existence of this adaptation 
is confirmed in the nature of modern human consciousness. Although our 
experience is subjectively unified, our awareness stream is rarely one-
dimensional  in  a  structural  sense…Running  frames  within  frames 
concurrently is routine for our species. Moreover, it is a flexible process. 
Our  conscious  activities  seem  to  be  stacked,  or  arranged  in  cascade, 
whereby  our  working memory  system can be  subdivided into several 
simultaneously  active  zones,  or  narrowed  to  one,  as  the  situation 
demands (So Rare 258).
Now, whilst such parallel processing need not be impeded by codex reading (it can 
easily be imagined how readers could think in simultaneous domains prompted by the 
content of the script, the form, the surroundings, personal history etc.) its materiality 
certainly doesn't actively promote such cognitive work. The multiple reading panes of 
internet browser tabs, however, enact or perform sympathetically with such a way of 
thinking, and if a balance is to be struck between multiple parallel frames and 
reductions down to a single stream for focus, then perhaps equipment which is able to 
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accommodate and promote both modes should not be the one to be denigrated a priori 
as making us “stupid.”
For a perspective on this subject from philosophy, though one, admittedly, 
fascinated by neuroscience, let's return to Deleuze and Guattari:
Thought  is  not  aborescent,  and  the  brain  is  not  a  rooted  or  ramified 
matter. What are wrongly called 'dendrites' do not assure the connection 
of neurons in a continuous fabric. The discontinuity between cells, the 
role  of  the  axons,  the  functioning  of  the  synapses,  the  existence  of 
synaptic  microfissures,  the  leap  each  message  makes  across  these 
fissures,  make  the  brain  a  multiplicity  immersed  in  its  plane  of 
consistency or neuroglia, a whole uncertain, probabilistic system...Many 
people have a tree growing in their heads but the brain itself is much 
more grass than tree (A Thousand Plateaus 17).
Deleuze and Guattari see in the structure of the brain itself a non-linear and uncertain 
system at odds with the “arborealised” thoughts that can emerge from it. For them the 
privileging of linear and hierarchical thinking is the “unnatural” mode, the disorder or 
pathology of late capitalist society; it is the tree which should be hidden, or escaped, not 
the grass which lies at our heart. Once again the radical philosophy, the philosophy 
which, in its opposition to a hegemonic order, is potentially the hardest and most novel 
to comprehend, finds its broad themes best expressed in the new digital technologies164. 
For Deleuze and Guattari one should be “caught” thinking arboreally.
There are also abundant folk psychological and phenomenological reports on the 
competing non-linear thought to be found in literature. It is in this context that we can 
understand the words from the container which holds B.S. Johnson's The Unfortunates, 
an unbound “book in a box” to be read in any order: “The book form fails to capture the 
‘truth to life.’” The materiality of the codex matches neither the simultaneous stories of 
the world, or the minds that try to comprehend them with any consistency, and literature 
contains myriad of these small rebellions against the inheritance of linear order.
We can also see these concerns expressed by certain experimental poets 
attempting to apprehend this aspect of cognition, and it should perhaps come as little 
surprise, poetry being a likely site of struggle with the problems of words and worlds. 
Jorie Graham, for instance, in the second “Prayer” of her collection Never deploys a 
specific device, the use of rounded and squared parentheses, to layer meaning against 
164 Deleuze and Guattari do not neglect the codex and they see within every “fixed” text various 
“striations” and “lines of flight,” but it is always a rebelling against, a corruption, or an escape from 
the affordances of the form. 
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the linear drive of the line:
There's a tendency in Never's layered voices to use the rounded parentheses for 
corrections in the poetic voice, and the squared brackets for asides in a cadence that 
seems to exist outside of the dominant style of the collection; this seems a particularly 
print-able device where the distinction between the two punctuation marks is clear. We 
can see, in an earlier poem from the same work, how Graham builds up a discussion 
with herself in squared brackets midway through a line, detailing how the writing of the 
poem triggered memories which first interrupt, then aid her composition:
There are, of course, many writers who have lamented the inability of words to capture 
the complexity of the world and of thought, but Graham, here, does not seem unhappy 
with words per se, only with the impossibility of the ever driving onward line to do 
justice to her thoughts, the shape of them in and of themselves. In this second quotation 
the mess of images that seem to contribute to showing her a word that she can use, the 
progression toward the word “smoke,” is inadequately captured, still seemingly let 
down by linearity, the fact that there can't be layers at once; the variety of a moment of 
cognising in time can only be expressed, equated, with forward motion. Parentheses 
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I love the idea of consequence.
Is that itself consequence--(the idea)?
I have known you to be cheap
(as in not willing to pay out the extra
 length of
blessing, weather, ignorance--all other
[you name them] forms of exodus) (14)
skeletal diminuendos of glancings as they
ascend the manifest up towards its upper reaches--soil,
timothy, stone, manyness of stone, non-mortared
  build-up of it--
mistings of just-above-stone where the
two of them meet, manifest, un-manifest [and how they
   could not
know who was looking at them][and that I was from
another country][down to the very movement of my lips]
[show me a word I can use][and how all that you say
is taken from you, they take it, just like
that it becomes smoke] smoke rising here as mist off the heavy
   topmost stones (“Philosopher's Stone” 7).
become Graham's material metaphor. A punctuation tool that has long been used to 
signal the problem, in speech and writing, of capturing messy thoughts, of tangents and 
associations and novel promptings, is put to work metaphorically for the what the line 
instills in its users: “this isn't how we think, don't forget that, but also don't get over it by 
pretending that we don't think at all.” Graham doesn't want her lines clean because 
thinking is messy. In a discussion of Graham's poetry, Helen Vendler argues that “[t]he 
appetitiveness of the mind, and the infinity of the world's stimuli, generate the excess of 
Graham's long horizontal lines, which generate, in their turn, her long vertical 
sentences. Any given poetic idea begins to produce, in Graham, a version of an aesthetic 
Big Bang with its vertiginous perceptual expansion and its receding conceptual 
distances” (54). It is in this expansion of perception that Vendler sees Graham's interest 
in the mess, the layers, her chance to “feel her way into the heterogeneity, simultaneity, 
chromatic change, spontaneity and self-correction present in all acts of extended 
noticing” (54). The associations given off by considering are natural for Graham and, 
regardless of the historical strictures of the line, they deserve, they need to be presented.
In relation to this we can return to Ong who considers associative thinking in 
terms of “redundancy”: in one sense needless additional information (i.e. repetition or 
off topic associations are redundant), but in information theoretical terms redundancy 
actually protects messages from corruption, distortion, or misconception165. By 
providing additional contextual information and repetition it becomes less important for 
any one particle of information to be interpreted correctly:
Since  redundancy  characterizes  oral  thought  and  speech,  it  is  in  a 
profound  sense  more  natural  to  thought  and  speech  than  is  sparse 
linearity. Sparsely linear or analytic thought and speech is an artificial 
creation, structured by the technology of writing. Eliminating redundancy 
on  a  significant  scale  demands  a  time-obviating  technology,  writing, 
which  imposes  some  kind  of  strain  on  the  psyche  in  preventing 
expression  from  falling  into  its  more  natural  patterns  (Orality  and 
Literacy 40).
Ong sees in our originary speech patterns a more natural expression, of necessity, in 
relation to the patterns of our thinking: redundant, associative, (implicitly) richer in its 
165 See, for instance, James Gleick's The Information (21-34) for a discussion of the redundancy built into 
both English and African talking drum languages. Because every word in the drum language is so 
similar to every other word their meanings become hugely context dependent, so much so that the 
average drum language sentence is eight times longer than its English equivalent (which, as Gleick 
demonstrates, also has a built in level of redundancy based around contextual clues).
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grasping of a thing, particularly for the unaware, the unfamiliar. The artifice of the 
technology of writing “strains” the psyche and its “natural” processes, and though Ong 
possibly overstates a problem here (as we have seen, linearity isn't entirely unnatural 
just rarer than we might assume, and certainly not our sole means of thinking well) such 
strain can also be seen underlying Graham's parentheses.
Similarly Francis Ponge, attempting to describe the pine woods as he feels them, 
“the search for everything that can be said about pine woods and only of them” (109) 
(akin to a Husserlian eidetic reduction), also offers us layers, variations, associations:
In various of Ponge's poems from Mute Objects of Expression the meaning of the 
contents indicated by the braces alters, sometimes offering straight variations, 
alternative lines, or the effect that we see here, similar to the example of Graham above, 
Ponge's own creative thought process, with the initial idea in parentheses followed by a 
more polished line elaborating upon it below. Ponge attempts to preserve some of the 
redundancy and mise en abyme framing of thought and speech that Donald identifies, 
and this feels entirely apt for this section of the collection where Ponge is attempting to 
put into the artifice of linear text the rich, simultaneous cognitive experience of 
encountering the woods.
We could also turn to E.E Cummings and a poem from 1X1:
Again, linearity doesn't do justice to the way that Cummings thinks, or to the repetitious 
tumble of the conversation he implicates us in as we sneak a peek over the wall at his 
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it's over a(see just
over this) wall
the apples are (yes
they're gravensteins)all
as red as to lose
and as round as to find (Complete Poems 543).
Like masts from base to midway up
All crinkled, lichen-cloaked like an elderly Creole,
With no constraint of lianas or cords between them.
{(with no smooth flooring on the ground)With no scrubbed floorboards on the ground but deep carpets,
{And bearing to the skies (hairdos)green, conical hats (79)
behest. The parenthesis “(yes they're gravensteins)” takes us back in time and changes 
the subject of the line, describing the apples that, as readers, we've already passed over 
as if in response to our unreported interjection “do you know what variety they are?” or 
“are they gravensteins?” Such ideas don't mark an attack on linearity, or on the page, but 
they do highlight it's unnaturalness, offering a riposte to those who would position 
screens instead as the unnatural antithesis of the codex, the new practices prompted by 
which must be de facto inferior or detrimental. These instances highlight the contortions 
that thought must go through in order to be represented in a medium which affords 
motion forward as meaning at once time passed and the filling in of detail within a 
moment.
Where Ong rightly saw writing's capacity to set people free from the 
conservative repetition of established truths, when it comes to the message written into 
the body of print, of any unchangeable linear writing, Hans Magnus Enzensberger sees 
an equally novel capacity for suppressing a kind of freedom in thinking:
The  formalization  of  written  language  permits  and  encourages  the 
repression  of  opposition.  In  speech,  unresolved  contradictions  betray 
themselves  by  pauses,  hesitations,  slips  of  the  tongue  [parapraxis], 
repetitions, anacoluthons [changes of syntax], quite apart from phrasing, 
mimicry,  gesticulations,  pace  and  volume.  The  aesthetic  of  written 
language  scorns  such  involuntary  factors  as  ‘mistakes.’ It  demands, 
explicitly  or  implicitly,  the  smoothing  out  of  contradictions, 
rationalization, regularization of the spoken form irrespective of content 
(273).
Enzensberger draws us back, here, to the assertion with which I began the chapter: 
regardless or in spite of the content it presents or fosters, the formal qualities of a 
medium can shape thought. This assertion is shared, of course, by commentators who 
say that the screen is making us more stupid, but I have tried to show that if our most 
beneficial thought process is the process most related to our nature (as these 
commentators often seem to believe), then ironically the codex might well be the more 
unnatural shaper of cognition, preserving only the linear mode. As we have seen, 
however, there is a competing litany of voices implicitly and explicitly railing against 
the tyranny of a form which has somehow become a priori natural through a mistaken 
belief in its aping of how we think. This is not to say that the cheerleaders for the codex 
don't truly believe that the form is most appropriate. In much the same way as we might 
look at a typical countryside image and think that it is pleasingly “natural,” forgetting 
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the centuries of human landscaping that have gone into its construction, so have many 
readers consumed printed books and reported that they appear to model their thoughts 
accurately. My contention is that perhaps they should have asked if their cognition has 
in fact been modelled to fit the printed page. As Sergio Cicconi puts it:
Chirographic  writing,  and,  later,  typographic  writing,  have  strongly 
modelled the organization of our thoughts, so much that now we tend to 
think of the linear and propositional structures of printed books as the 
most  faithful  representations of  the  way we organize thinking.  But  in 
spite of the paradigmatization of the ‘printed-thought’, a printed text is a 
very vague (and artificial) approximation of the flow of our thoughts.
We think in a “print” way, not because that’s our “natural” way to think, but because our 
society has developed a heuristic of codex reading standardising the gestures of 
interaction and establishing reinforcing structures of use such as the privileging of 
“clean” linear thought over complexity or the realities of association, to select for its 
strengths in a very specific way. This has modelled our minds, and also our culture, so 
that organised linear thought has long been prided as intellectually superior, as a sign of 
the brain working at its peak; print reading, in the language of the last chapter, has been 
made special as the artefacts evolved. There is no doubt that organising one’s thoughts 
into a cohesive narrative is often useful or even essential to action, but to suggest that 
it’s our default, or even most productive state is a folly sustained by the equating of 
mental efficacy with the inflexible drive forward of the printed word. In the same way 
that the reduction of semantic understanding induced by holding a text in the hands 
seems to have been overcome by practiced use, so messy thought has been rehearsed 
into outward obsolescence. It may be the case that computer based reading which 
combines the hypertextual with the linear is the form most suited to our nature, or 
perhaps yet more applicable is some as yet unknown form, but as long as the codex is 
bound up in a doctrinal naturalness to which all else is inferior we are far less likely to 
be allowed to discover it.
Associating beyond the codex
If codex embodiment enacts an arborealised, linear, hierarchical, fixed, and unified 
approach to written thought then we need look at what metaphorical use might inhere in 
the new digital equipment for reading, where the hypertextual, computational database 
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network sits sometimes uncomfortably alongside the codex tradition. Let's begin with 
the general aspects of the materiality or apparent immateriality of digital books and the 
e-readers which hold them. This task is crucial, as Littau states, for drawing on a notion 
McGann put forward in The Textual Condition: “prior to the activities of particular 
readers, and prior to the production of particular readings, the very possibility of reading 
is conditioned by the physical form that the book-as-artefact takes. The kind of form 
will therefore determine the kind of reading, and the range of readings possible for or 
available to readers” (Littau 29). I'm arguing, however, that it is not just kinds of 
reading that are affected by form, but instead that reading influences kinds of thinking 
that are in turn affected, sometimes to a significant extent by the equipment that we 
deploy.
As I've already argued, both phenomenologically and intuitively eidetically, 
digital texts don't appear to be there, they seem as insubstantial ghosts on the screen that 
disappear when they're to be replaced by other content. As Anne Mangen describes 
them,
[u]nlike print texts, digital texts are ontologically intangible and detached 
from the physical and mechanical dimension of their material support, 
namely, the computer or e-book...When reading digital texts, our haptic 
interaction  with  the  text  is  experienced  as  taking  place  at  an 
indeterminate distance from the actual text, whereas when reading print 
text we are physically and phenomenologically (and literally) in touch 
with the material substrate of the text itself (“Hypertext...” 405).
This perceived silencing of the hands' unique chatter with the brain, preceded by the 
text's chatter with the hands, may be part of what motivates resistance to e-reading built 
around feel and the apparent promotion of intellectual impediment. As we appear to 
take our hands out of reading, when we remove our tactile observation, it seems to 
induce a very human kind of blindness. Representations and fears of blindness166, for all 
their ability to shock us with our own fragility, hold none of the horror of a true loss of 
touch, not just a numbness of the hands, but a removal of the skin from our sensation. 
To touch is never in our control - we touch against our will - always maintaining a point 
in pressure with something, hence the fascination with acrobatics, zero-gravity, or the 
weightlessness of floating in a heavily-salted sea (though none of these represent a true 
loss of touch or else they would become grotesque); never in our control, but for the 
166 See, for instance,  Derrida's study on representations of blindness in visual art, Memoirs of the Blind.
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most part controlled (pain can be excessive touching, or the echo of a misplaced touch). 
No wonder that so many avid readers, so many holders of printed books, feel that they 
must speak out: in the seeming intangibility of the text might they subconsciously fear 
that the new technology will make us, if not paralysed, then haptically blind?
Such ideas are apparent in a blog post on “The Personality of Books and the 
Problem With My Kindle”:
I love my Kindle, but there’s one thing that’s…icky, about it. One thing 
that confirms all the background fear and dread I had about transitioning 
from  actual  paper  to  ebooks...The  Kindle  strips  out  all  the  tangible 
character of a book...When you remember a book you read, you’re of 
course remembering the content of the book. But there are also physical 
markers about the book you remember:
• The typeface, including the size
• The color and tactile feel of the pages...
• [T]he way it fades and ages, the beating it took...
• The weight of the book, it’s dimensions, and how it fits in your hand
These tactile reminders help the book to occupy a place in your head. 
They help give the book a personality...With a Kindle, you get none of 
this (Barker).
Barker's concerns here are legitimate, if not insurmountable; as the Kindle design 
improves an increased range of fonts and layout options are likely to emerge, offering 
the important differentiation (on the more flexible iPad they're often already there). But 
what this report highlights is the importance of physicality and the perception, in line 
with Mangen's worries, that tangibility has been negated.
In terms of the specificity of the script instantiation's substrate, of course, this is 
largely correct, but the physicality of the form does remain, although it is hidden to all 
but the minority of users involved with the guts of the machine, with access to the 
reality of the forensic realm which Matthew Kirschenbaum describes in Mechanisms167. 
As Kirschenbaum notes “[e]lectronic textuality is...locatable, even though we are not 
accustomed to thinking of it in physical terms. Bits can be measured in microns when 
recorded on a magnetic hard disk. They can be visualised with technologies such as 
167 Kirschenbaum identifies two kinds of materiality: “forensic” - “no two things in the physical world 
are ever exactly alike” (10) - and “formal” - the arbitrary material particularity, independent of 
forensic differentiation, of a particular interpretation of a data set, e.g. one set of image data producing 
a .jpeg, .tiff, .gif, metadata, histograms, watermarks etc. depending on what program interprets that 
set.
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magnetic force microscopy (MFM)” (3). As well as discussing a typically invisible 
forensic materiality Kirschenbaum also asserts that software has extended material 
elements which should not be forgotten as evidence of its place in the world:
Software  is  the  product  of  whitepapers,  engineering  specs,  marketing 
reports,  conversations  and  collaborations,  intuitive  insights, 
professionalised  expertise,  venture  capital...late  nights  (...labour), 
caffeine, and other artificial stimulants. These are material circumstances 
that  leave  material  (read:  forensic)  traces  -  in  corporate  archives,  on 
whiteboards and legal pads, in countless iterations of alpha versions and 
beta  versions  and  patches  and  upgrades,  in  focus  groups  and  user 
communities,  in  expense  accounts,  in  licensing  agreements,  in  stock 
options and IPOs, in carpal tunnel braces, in the Bay Area and New Delhi 
real-estate  markets,  in  PowerPoint  vaporware  and  proofs  of  concept 
binaries locked in time-stamped limbo on a  server  where all  the user 
accounts but one have been disabled and the domain name is eighteen 
months expired (14-15).
Most significant for us here is that to suppose intangibility at any level of the digital text 
is simply a misreading: the software has a physical forensic materiality at the level of 
the hard disk image and in the materiality that it entails from production to distribution 
to use, and it is instantiated on a device which is equally physical and entailed168. That 
the phenomenological experience is of a discomforting immateriality is born of a weak 
eidos rather than a valid ontological claim. Practice and education, as ever, will surely 
demonstrate that though the hands' chatter has changed, the chatter still occurs. What 
can seem alienating at first, however, is that it is not only use that has changed, but what 
and how that use can mean.
Talking about electronic writing on a PC screen, Hayles' detailing of this 
seemingly spectral materiality is equally applicable to the e-reader:
In the computer, the signifier exists not as a durably inscribed flat mark 
but as a screenic image produced by layers of code precisely correlated 
through correspondence rules, from the electronic polarities that correlate 
with the bit stream to the bits that correlate with binary numbers, to the 
numbers that correlate with higher-level statements, such as commands, 
and so on. Even when electronic hypertexts simulate the appearance of 
durably  inscribed  marks,  they  are  transitory  images  that  need  to  be 
constantly  refreshed...to  give  the  illusion  of  stable  endurance  through 
time (“Print is Flat” 74).
168 For more on Kirschenbaum's discussion of the alleged ephemerality and infinite malleability of digital 
text see Mechanisms 50-58.
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Elsewhere this leads Hayles to argue that “electronic text is a process rather than an 
artefact one can hold in one's hand” (Hayles “Deeper”). When a book becomes a 
process, rather than something to be held, this must have implications for how we 
conceive of it. When we are first faced with an electronic text our eidos of the object, 
beyond the visceral experience of its sheer existence, consists of at least a new gestalt 
for us to work with, and a new context for us to situate it in, i.e. we must make it 
conform to being some sort of device if we are to use it. In the production of such an 
immediate eidos we must draw on prior contexts and prior gestalts for what we believe 
are similar artefacts; when we sit with a text, on a page or a screen, we establish a 
network which is complex enough that we must rely on prior conditioning in order to 
guide us through the basics of the engagement. If we encounter an object which needs to 
be hit, and we have a heavy object to hand, we don't particularly need to draw on a rich 
history of hammering (though we clearly do access our past experience in this activity), 
but text is different. The process of drawing meaning out of the complexity of a page, 
however it is instantiated, requires a fairly stable set of restrictions on the kinds of 
actions we can attempt, and the aspects we attempt to attribute meaning to. With poetry, 
for instance, we learn over repeated engagements that a line break can mean, but we 
ensure that this is not a part of our gestalt for a novel to be read, instead the line breaks 
are necessarily ignored. The rules for reading, of what should and shouldn't mean (and 
what ends up meaning anyway, due to the ways in which it might structure our 
experience), are complex and must be flexible enough to respond to variations in 
content (e.g. in a novel where line and page breaks are put to the task of meaning). Part 
of the struggle with the digitised work then, stems from our grasping to establish such 
gestalts for apparently incorporeal reading spaces that present text as a process.
The digital document, instantiated as a block of script, drives us to our history of 
print, and to writing more generally. But its appearance on an electronic device also 
sends us to our experience of various screens:
Readers  come  to  digital  work  with  expectations  formed  by  print, 
including  extensive  and  deep  tacit  knowledge  of  letter  forms,  print 
conventions,  and  print  literary  modes...At  the  same  time,  because 
electronic literature is normally created and performed within a context 
of  networked  and  programmable  media,  it  is  also  informed  by  the 
powerhouses  of  contemporary  culture,  particularly  computer  games, 
films,  animations,  digital  arts,  graphic  design,  and  electronic  visual 
culture.  In  this  sense  electronic  literature  is  a  ‘hopeful  monster’ (as 
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geneticists call adaptive mutations) (Hayles, Electronic 4).
The gestalt of the new kind of text, as our eidos of it forms, is at first massively 
expanded to include this sort of diversity of prior contexts which we might draw upon in 
order to attempt action and understanding; all of these things are suddenly part of both 
what “book” and “digital/electronic text” can mean. Hayles identifies the struggle in 
producing a new eidos, a shape that doesn't settle easily and that can only come through 
interaction: those first uses, if they are to have any chance of success, must heavily rely 
on our prior experience.
Lakoff and Johnson provide a simple example which might help elucidate this 
further, a description of how a change in conversation can be understood by deploying a 
gestalt from another realm:
[B]eing in a conversation is a structured experience. As we experience a 
conversation,  we  are  automatically  and  unconsciously  classifying  our 
experience in terms of the natural dimensions of the CONVERSATION 
gestalt: Who’s participating? Whose turn is it?...What stage are we at? 
And so on. It is in terms of imposing the CONVERSATION gestalt on 
what is happening that we experience the talking and listening that we 
engage  in  as  a  particular  kind  of  experience,  namely,  a  conversation. 
When we perceive dimensions of  our experience [of  an exchange]  as 
fitting  the  WAR  gestalt  in  addition,  we  become  aware  that  we  are 
participating in another kind of experience, namely, an argument. It is by 
this  means  that  we  classify  particular  experiences,  and  we  need  to 
classify our experiences in order to comprehend, so that we will know 
what to do (Metaphors 82-83, capitals in original).
The conversation gestalt is born of experience with conversing, and we are able to form 
an eidos of what a conversation is to us, of its distinguishing parameters, so that when 
we are in an experience which seems to fit those particulars we can act with a 
predetermined heuristic or set of gestures which enable us to successfully negotiate that 
particular instance169. The gestalt of war, or, perhaps better, conflict, can be brought to 
the simple conversation gestalt so that we can, if necessary, become combative, give up 
or lose ground, attack weaknesses, and shoot down suggestions etc. (4). The gestalt we 
have for conversation alone is not enough to get us through the particulars of the new 
instance.
169 The term eidos, as it's described here, can also be used in conceiving our representation of our 
activities, of what they are to us. It too is a term agnostic to materiality where its broad mechanisms 
hold in a variety of instances.
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Electronic reading (as with any novel engagement with new equipment) operates 
similarly. We have a default gestalt for bound-book reading that has emerged out of our 
ontogenetic experience. We are initially forced to apply that paradigm to electronic 
reading, but electronic reading is capable of and promotes interactions such as clicking, 
scrolling, swift changes and communication between content etc. which don’t fit in with 
our printed book experience, and we must suddenly flail to find a suitable model from 
elsewhere to get us through the experience, one which can either be grafted onto the 
gestalt we first applied, or which might eventually supplant it entirely. Sometimes the 
search is brief, and we settle on and begin to redefine a prior relation almost 
immediately; sometimes we must swiftly cycle through options as the new engagement 
is so unfamiliar to our roster of previous experiences; and sometimes an interaction is 
even more subtle, fooling us into thinking that one or two of our past gestalts are more 
than enough to conquer the new instance and then surprising us, maybe weeks later, 
with their unsatisfactory ability to aid comprehension of the required aspects of the 
thing. This period of uncertain and unrelenting device-ive use as a new functional 
gestalt is forming is clearly not conducive to mental efficacy, and we might suspect that 
anyone for whom this time was excessive, too often witnessed in others, or never 
conquered in themseleves might not be disposed to championing the new equipment.
Lakoff and Johnson's discussion of structured gestalts being altered by 
metaphors drawn from other realms of experience also offers us both warning and 
explanation as to why it is not enough just to rely on a combination of the codex and 
computing gestalts and hope for the best:
Having a basis for expectation and action is important for survival. But it 
is  one  thing  to  impose  a  single  objectivist  model  in  some  restricted 
situations and to function in terms of that model - perhaps successfully; it 
is another to conclude that the model is an accurate reflection of reality…
To operate only in terms of a consistent set of metaphors is to hide many  
aspects  of  reality.  Successful  functioning  in  our  daily  lives  seems  to 
require  a  constant  shifting  of  metaphors  (Metaphors 221)  (emphasis 
mine).
Lakoff and Johnson deal with metaphors in the language we use that are shaped by our 
bodies, but their work can clearly be extended to our discussion by taking the term 
“material metaphor” seriously. If we keep on using a particular set of metaphors, i.e. 
gestalts drawn from other areas of experience, in order to understand a new interaction 
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then we will unavoidably hide many aspects of it; this is a lesson we learnt during our 
discussions of object oriented ontology in the last chapter which suggested that the way 
to best reveal a thing might be to consider it in myriad ways, though it will still always 
retreat in its totality. If we want to understand an e-reading device then we cannot stay 
thinking of it as a kind of codex crossed with a computer. This will prevent it from ever 
becoming a technology, we will not understand it, our eidos of it will complicate 
without strengthening. Instead we cycle through the metaphorical deployment of 
different paradigms until successful action is achieved, and then we work (or should 
work) on repeating that action, and this involves building a new eidos, a complex of a 
new gestalt in a new context, that we will later be able to metaphorically export to 
instigate new arenas if required.
Sometimes equipment comes to our attention which provokes such a new area of 
systematic use to acclimatise to, a new object to shape and be shaped by. During the 
strengthening of our eidos of this thing it might closely overlap with activities 
associated with our eidos of another type of object (indeed a type, such as the codex 
relation to the e-reader, which may have been part of provoking the new item into 
existence in the first place, a mutation of sorts which gets away and proliferates), 
causing a cognitive dissonance amongst the new users as similar activities, though 
impossible to be identical, can be attempted with both. If we get stranded wondering 
why an e-reader isn't behaving like a codex then we might certainly feel that the new 
medium is deficient, that it may be detrimental to our thinking because we can't use it as 
we want to. This is a problem, in the language of the last chapter, of understanding on 
both sides, a failure of metaphor, and one which can evolve to be built into the fabric of 
the thing.
Skeuomorphs and new kinds of reading
“Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus 
be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in 
turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense 
metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies” (Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors 156). The 
codex, as a potent object-to-think-with within our culture acts as a vital structuring 
material metaphor for the emergent eidetic experiences of the e-reader and the digital 
text. But an over reliance on this metaphor cannot help but lead to our treating the new 
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form as if it should act in terms of the old. This is problematic for several reasons, the 
most significant of which are that it impedes the new form evolving into all that it might 
be, maximising its understanding of its user (or its knowledge of its users) and it 
impedes our understanding of the thing, and therefore in some small ways our 
knowledge of the environment in which we live.
We can already see this failure in the reports that have been discussed here: 
much of the resistance to the new equipment can be attributed to a misunderstanding of 
what they are in comparison to the body of an idealised codex. Ben Vershbow and Dan 
Visel, writing at the Future of the Book blog well before the release of the Kindle, 
articulate this problem in relation to reading online and their exchange is worth 
spending some time with, beginning with Vershbow's initial post:
A plant in a container grows differently than a plant in open soil. The 
roots  conform to  the  shape  of  the  pot.  Similarly,  our  very notions of 
reading, of books, of knowledge classification are defined by the pot in 
which they grew. The texture of paper, the topography of the library, the 
entire  university  system  -  these  were  defined  by  restraints.  Physical, 
economic,  etc.  And  to  a  significant  extent  they  are  artifacts  of  their 
times...The  computer,  too,  in  its  current  stage  of  development,  is  an 
artifact  of  the  paper  book,  the  typewriter,  and  the  supercomputer 
terminal. These define the 'pot' in which the computer has grown. And so 
far, the questions about online 'reading' are defined by this cramped root 
structure.  Even though the pot  has  shattered,  we continue  to  grow as 
though  the  walls  were  there  (“The  Cramped  Root:  Worshipping  the 
Artifact”).
Later, Dan Visel responded to this post, invoking an established metaphor which 
Vershbow also went on to mention, that of the “horseless carriage,” as a way of 
understanding the newly invented automobile in relation to reading articles on 
Wikipedia:
When we read Wikipedia we tend to apply to it the standards of judgment 
that we would apply to a book or magazine, and it often fails by these 
standards, as might be expected. When we're judging Wikipedia this way, 
we presuppose that we know what it is formally: that it's the same sort of 
thing as the texts we know. This seems arrogant: why should we assume 
that  we  already  know  how  to  read  something  that  clearly  behaves 
differently from the text we're used to? We shouldn't, though we do: it's a 
human  response to  compare  something  new to  something we already 
know,  but  often  when  we  do  this,  we  miss  major  formal 
differences...Figuratively, what's happened with the Wikipedia is that a 
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new species of text has arisen and we're still wondering why it won't eat 
the apples we're proffering it. We judge it by what we're used to, and 
everyone  loses.  Were  you to  judge  a  car  by  a  horse's  attributes,  you 
wouldn't expect to have an oil crisis in a century (“Learning to Read”).
These commentators deploy familiar metaphors from other domains of experience in 
order to understand the new metaphors that are being put to work in comprehending 
digital reading: metaphors used metaphorically to reveal the misperceptions engendered 
by an over-reliance on metaphor. It's worth noting this kind of flailing for understanding 
lest we forget the sometimes hidden challenge of the new forms. Vershbow's point about 
the constricting pot, however, regardless of the image invoked, is vital: the codex 
evolved under constraints and provocations from its environment resulting in its 
materiality. If we treat the new forms as simply electronic codices then we inherit not 
only the useful structuring metaphors, but also a set of limitations in deployment and 
practice which need not restrict us. And when people experiment with new forms of 
production or consumption, and Wikipedia is a great example of both, particularly in 
comparison to the imposing physicality of off-screen encyclopedias, they can often 
seem bereft in their growing pains rather than a productive move toward eschewing 
unnecessary constraints (in the case of Wikipedia constraints such as storage, linking, 
portability, authorial bias, and decisions regarding suitability of materials can and have 
been ameliorated to a greater or lesser degree by the new formal practicalities). As 
Bolter puts it, the “shift from print to the computer does not mean the end of literacy. 
What will be lost is not literacy itself, but the literacy of print, for the electronic 
technology offers us a new kind of book and new ways to read and write” (Writing 2).
The “new book” that Bolter saw coming is more likely to become established, if 
it hasn't already, in the form of a text maintained on a handheld device rather than in any 
desktop- or laptop-requiring iteration as the connotations of “book,” as we have seen, 
are tied to a lengthly text, one that is contained in a portable form. Though we can 
stretch such terms, though they might, even when stripped down this far, be immensely 
plastic, if they are pushed too far too hard then they will no longer seem to fit even the 
idiosyncratic gestalts we label “book.” But at the same time, if we are too limited by our 
prior gestalts, if we don't push at them at all, then whilst we might not end up with the 
metaphorical equivalent of an unforeseen oil crisis, we can still end up with a car that 
doesn't like apples. In fact they're already here and may well be the real impediment to 
our intellect fostered by the new equipment.
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We can read in the iterations of things in action the knowledge gains that 
culminated in their creation. The stick insect was the guiding example in the last 
chapter: its body can be read to know something of the worlds that preceded it. But 
there's also a form of negative reading that might be performed which focuses not on 
which aspects make something successful, but instead on those aspects which endure 
despite their not facilitating action, or even actively impeding it. In evolutionary terms 
these forms are called “vestiges,” residual elements of evolved adaptations which were 
a part of the species' past when they fitted to the environment; “[t]he history of the 
species lives on in the modern species, and one of the most important pieces of evidence 
for this lies in vestiges of previous adaptations that may prove redundant, or useless, or 
even maladaptive, today” (Donald, Origins 121). The coccyx in humans, for instance, 
the extended “tail bone,” is a vestige of the true tail that was a part of our distant simian 
ancestors' knowledge of their environment. Our artefacts might also be thought of as 
containing vestiges, and just as with their biological counterparts they persist because 
the environment doesn't enforce pressure enough to select them out. If the coccyx was a 
danger which often prevented humans from surviving long enough to mate then it 
would soon disappear entirely, but there seems little selective pressure on reducing the 
formation further, and so it stays. Vestiges are, in themselves, another kind of 
knowledge claim: a knowledge that the environments which preceded their 
manifestation were environments which largely tolerated the continued presence of their 
particular forms.
With our artefacts, of course, we create the selective pressures, and we aren't 
always neutral in the pressures that we develop. This also means that our cultural quirks, 
such as an over-reliance on prior gestalts deployed metaphorically but treated as reality 
(i.e. understanding in one realm is presumed to be wholly transferrable to ascertaining 
essence in another), can create pressures which promote vestiges in a way that is rarely 
found in the natural world. The term for these vestiges within artefacts, a term drawn 
from archaeology, is “skeuomorph”:
Simply put they are carryovers from an older technology or way of doing 
things that had value, and are retained as a semblance, and expectation. 
Characteristic of changes in technology, they confer a kind of luster. The 
technological  reason  for  the  feature  has  gone,  but  you  expect  it  -  it 
completes the object. Open a wine bottle and pour out the wine. Notice 
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that  the bottom is dented-in, in a shape known in France as  le voleur 
(“the thief”), because without it there would be more wine. When wine 
bottles were blown, there was no alternative: the molten glass bubbled 
out like a long balloon with a rounded end; this base was then flipped 
inside  out  as  the  bottle  was  set  down  to  cool,  producing  the  level 
circumferential  basal  ring  that  would  allow  the  bottle  to  stand 
upright...the  dent  in  the  base  has  become  a  skeuomorph.  Le  voleur 
remains because we expect it to be there (Taylor, Artificial 152-153).
Skeuomorphs are readable evolutionary vestiges, hangovers from the deployment of 
prior gestalts in new eidos formation written into the things themselves. They can often 
be useful, acting as readily apparent material metaphors and enabling the adoption of 
new equipment more smoothly, as with any other metaphorical usage, by suggesting 
modes of engagement associated with the gestures and milieu of more familiar tools. 
This task is vital as there are approximately “30,000 readily discriminable objects” in 
the day-to-day life of a Western adult (Biederman 127-128). For this reason, as Hayles 
notes, they “are not unusual. On the contrary, they are so deeply characteristic of the 
evolution of concepts and artifacts that it takes a great deal of conscious effort to avoid 
them…[S]keuomorphs [can act] as threshold devices, smoothing the transition between 
one conceptual constellation and another” (How We Became Posthuman 17). But 
skeuomorphs, as with an over reliance on metaphors of any kind, can also preserve 
unneeded restriction. Le voleur is one example: why not have more wine(!), or use less 
glass? But there are more relevant examples. Take, for instance, the software that Apple 
launched with the iPad and iPhone170. Adam Greenfield, a former user-interface designer 
for the mobile telephone company Nokia, blogged about the cognitive dissonance he 
felt in using the software on his new iPhone 4:
The iPhone and iPad...are history’s first full-fledged everyware devices - 
post-PC  interface  devices  of  enormous  power  and  grace  -  and  here 
somebody in Apple’s UX shop has saddled them with the most awful and 
mawkish and flat-out  tacky  visual  cues...Dig...the  page-curl  animation 
(beautifully rendered, but stick-in-the-craw wrong) in iBooks. Feast your 
eyes  on  the  leatherette  Executive  Desk  Blotter  nonsense  going  on in 
Notes. Open up Calendar, with its twee spiral-bound conceit, and gaze 
into the face of Fear. What are these but misguided coddles, patronizing 
crutches,  interactively  horseless  carriages?...[A] networked,  digital, 
170 I don't want to focus on particular software beyond this example, preferring to explore the relative 
fixity of the physical devices themselves (though in the case of the single-use e-readers such as the 
Kindle the more fixed software can feel like a part of the thing itself). E-reading applications of 
greater or lesser complexity are abundant, with more emerging almost daily; any pretence at being up-
to-date would come across as just that.
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interactive copy of, say, the Tao Te Ching is simultaneously more and less 
than  the  one  I  keep  on  my  shelf.  You  give  up  the  tangible, 
phenomenological isness of the book, and in return you’re afforded an 
extraordinary new range of capabilities. Shouldn’t the interface, y’know, 
reflect this? (“What Apple Needs to Do Now”).
As a designer himself, Greenfield sees these user interface designs primarily as tacky 
conceits, but more importantly he also feels that by giving up on the specific materiality 
of the equipment that the new software hopes to emulate, its “isness,” we shouldn't also 
forget the new range of capabilities it allows; the differences, the gains and losses, need 
to be revealed, not occluded in a desperate bid to diffuse them. Erwin Blom states the 
matter baldly: “In an environment with new possibilities, I do not want to be confronted 
with old limitations.” If Greenfield and Blom thought that we could look past these 
skeuomorphs, these panderings to what consumers allegedly need to be present in order 
to “complete” a digital calender or notepad, then presumably they would be less 
inclined to portray them as problematic. But these concerns for the interface's reflection 
of the new practices available stems, in part, from a fear that some users, maybe a 
majority, will not move on, will only hope to use a new thing in an old way, and a way 
that is not only short-sighted, but that the equipment might also not be able to live up to 
as it's not what it has evolved as a definition of knowledgeable success.
Another relevant demonstration can be found in the qwerty keyboard that's built 
into the base of the current Kindle and replicated in digital form on the iPad. The qwerty 
keyboard was designed by Charles Latham Sholes in the 1870s in response to the 
failures of previous designs, predominantly variations on
a  rectangular  arrangement  of  keys...in  alphabetical  order.  The  levers 
manipulated by the keys were large and ungainly, and the size, spacing, 
and  arrangement  of  the  keys  were  dictated  by  these  mechanical 
considerations, not by the characteristics of the human hand...When the 
typist  went  too  quickly  the  typebars  would  collide,  jamming  the 
mechanism. The solution was to change the locations of the keys: letters 
such  as  i  and  e  that  were  often  typed  in  succession  were  placed  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  machine  so  that  their  bars  would  not  collide171 
(Norman, Design 146).
171 In an endnote, Norman wonders if this explanation may be somewhat apocryphal, after all “the 
arrangement of the keys doesn't completely fit the story...what about other frequent pairs such as e and 
r...? And it seems suspicious that the letters of the word typewriter all appear on the top row; some 
other constraints seem to have been operating.” He also notes that there is very little difference 
between the keyboards of different countries where different letter pairings are more frequent (146). 
Even so, the mechanical concerns did need to be addressed, and the qwerty keyboard does a (perhaps 
surprisingly) adept job.
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These mechanical requirements no longer exist on a modern computer keyboard, so the 
qwerty keyboard exists as an evolved vestige, though one at least partially sensitive to 
the language that it has to deal with. It would, of course, be an exaptation172 if it 
happened to be the most efficient layout for typing, but it's not:
There is a better way - the Dvorak keyboard - painstakingly developed by 
(and named after)  one of  the  founders  of  industrial  engineering.  It  is 
easier to learn and allows for about 10 percent faster typing, but that is 
simply  not  enough  of  an  improvement  to  merit  a  revolution  in  the 
keyboard. Millions of people would have to learn a new style of typing. 
Millions  of  [keyboards]  would  have  to  be  changed.  The  severe 
constraints of existing practice prevent change, even where the change 
would be an improvement (Norman, Design 148).
The qwerty keyboard, then, is good enough, but not perfect. Its continued existence in 
the face of the Dvorak layout is an example of a relative of skeuomorphs, “path 
dependence,” where past decisions produce conditions which impact upon and limit 
new options for the development of equipment. Skeuomorphs partially prepare us for 
interaction, but by definition are redundant or inefficient (if this wan't the case then they 
would simply be material metaphors). Path dependence can result in skeuomorphs, and 
the qwerty keyboard's simultaneously unnecessary and yet unavoidable harking back to 
its mechanical predecessors is skeuomorphic, at least in part.
When something is adopted because it works vastly more efficiently or 
effectively than its predecessors, then it can begin to exhibit path dependent effects, 
rarely getting altered, fending off challenges to its form when the cost of reconfiguring 
its milieu is greater than the immediate benefits it can offer. We might say that such 
triumphs as that of qwerty over Dvorak are evidence that the equipment emanating path 
dependent practices doesn't have as significant a knowledge of its human users as the 
competing apparatus, and yet still manages, against evolutionary principles, to 
propagate. But it's more true to say that their knowledge is quite accurate, even if their 
understanding of any one user isn't as accurate as it could be. Knowledge of the user 
environment includes the variety of peculiar dynamics that calls them into being, and 
our manifest economics, the costs of time, training, and materials are all elements of 
172 An exaptation is a beneficial adaptation which is being put to use in a way unlike its initial adapted 
purpose. Our ability to read is in this way arguably an exaptation, or draws on exaptations, deploying 
neural pathways which evolved for wholly different purposes.
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what is to be known; qwerty is akin to the coccyx that never quite disappears.
E-reader design is fighting against the path dependence established by centuries 
of use of the codex, against choices long made, and in this competition they are 
manifesting material metaphors and skeuomorphic tics as their iterations build their 
knowledge of the user base and shape that base with offerings of familiarity. The 
alternative, one that Greenfield seems to prefer, is in the revelation of difference and the 
persuasion of the significance of the new form over the various costs of adopting it 
fully.
So which elements of the new equipment might be considered as skeuomorphic?
• Pagination - The Kindle and the majority of the reading apps on the Kindle still 
rely on pages of information which must be “turned” in order to progress (rather 
than scrolling for instance). The page, as a unit, has become divisive173, but 
regardless of preference the reasons for its particular base-line dimensions 
currently has more to do with the economic environment of its printed cousins 
than being the optimised ratio for the equipment174. The iPad experience of 
pagination is more explictly skeuomorphic, at least in the official iBooks app, 
due to the user interface:
Notice how lovingly the designers have made it look like you are in the 
middle  of  reading  a  physical  book  by  drawing  a  little  pseudo-3D 
evocation, down each vertical side, of the pages you have read and the 
pages you have still to read. What do you think this looks like when you 
are on page 2 of a book, or 2 pages from the end? I'll tell you what it 
looks like: exactly the same. It still looks like you are right in the middle. 
That's correct: because of the sentimental and unnecessary chrome, the 
app ends up lying to you about where you are in the text you're reading” 
(Poole “Against Chrome: A Manifesto”).
• Immovable black and white text on white (or grey) page with infrequent use of 
images (much less video or sound) - the iPad in particular can provide 
multimedia presentations in a traditionally typographic environment. “Enhanced 
e-books” certainly exist175, but their arrival is still trumpeted as something 
173 Bob Stein, for instance, became compelled to write “A Defence of Pagination” at the Future of the 
Book blog.
174 See Honor Wilson-Fletcher “Why Size Matters” for a discussion of different paperback sizes and their 
perception in book stores and publishing. One of the reasons for the increasing standardisation of 
paperback sizes, at least for books attempting to be best-sellers, are chain stores' displays of “3for2” 
offers at the front of the store, huge piles of tessellating literature: “Most novels, for example, have 
300-350 B-format (ie standard paperback) pages. Deviate from this format drastically and your novel 
won't make it to the front tables of the bookshop. This means relatively few publishers do; and, in 
turn, the literary culture is shaped by that...So, even if they now seem natural, the lengths and formats 
of books are but cultural accidents” (Leith “Is this the end for books?”). For the origin of paperback 
sizing as it relates to the animal skins which held early written works see Carl Pyrdum “Why Are 
Books So Big?”
175 Enhanced Editions, for instance, are a company specialising in e-books designed for iPad and iPhone. 
For a discussion of why enhanced e-books might not have reached a mainstream audience yet see 
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audacious. It's hardly beyond the equipment or programmer's skill, it would be 
hugely beneficial for things like text books, children's stories, and experimental 
fiction, and yet the standards of the print environment persist.
• Neglecting links - Endnotes can be frustrating to get to in a codex, and more so 
in an e-book (where they could also always be offered as a “layer” to be turned 
on or off), but hyperlinks are still rarely deployed to get to them. An author may 
not want their reader heading out of their work and online, but not linking within 
their own text remains an adherence to prior limitations.
• Page-turning effects and dog-earing - the iPad, as argued by Greenfield above, is 
guilty of the former, the Kindle of the latter (clicking “bookmark this page” in 
the menu discretely “folds” the corner of the “page” down).
• Page numbers - Amazon worked hard to get “true” page numbers for official 
Kindle editions of books176, but why? The percentage gauge and slowly filling 
black bar at the base of the screen are elegant enough solutions to text which can 
morph at the touch of a button to nearly 10 times its original size and back again 
as the reader's eyes require. There's still oddly no concerted move toward a new 
standard for citing pagination or location in fluid digital texts.
Minke Kampman expresses hope for an end to just these kind of skeuomorphs: 
we’re about to leave the stage of sentiment we are in now. A stage in 
which most of the commercial software and hardware still try to replicate 
the ‘real’ reading experience by imitating a book and having us turn the 
page, make bookmarks, and read chronologically . No wonder that we 
are still comparing the two (“Apples and Cabbages”).
The implication here is clear: we are burdened by these things. They might not sound 
like big issues, but, to go back to Greenfield and Blom's fears, when combined they add 
up to a masking of the possibilities, many of them as yet unseen, that the new 
equipment and texts might hold. If authors, publishers, developers, or manufacturers 
were to singly or combined say “here's a new standard for page numbering,” or “we 
won't do page turn effects or dog-ears anymore,” or “we're abandoning the page as a 
unit” and cited their reasoning along the lines of “because digital is different and we 
want to see what it can do,” then the landscape could rapidly change. Yes, new adopters 
would flail a little longer to find their way with the new equipment (the principle 
reason, of course, that nothing like this has yet been seen), but when they had adjusted 
they'd be fully engaged with a new interaction. If there is anything cognitively 
beneficial to be gained from using the new devices on their own terms, rather than the 
terms of the old order, then the combination of these skeuomorphic practices represents 
Christopher Mims “Are 'enhanced' e-books the future of books, or mere footnotes?”
176 See Charlie Sorrell's discussion “Amazon Adds Real Page Numbers to Kindle.”
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an inhibiting of thought.
One of the principle ways in which the new e-readers alter the way in which we 
read, however, something no skeuomorphic adherence can hide, is in their relation to 
the hyperlinked structure of the internet. For all of the Kindle's appeal to being a single-
use device, a tool developed solely for linear reading, it has wireless connectivity built 
into its every iteration, and free cellular network “anywhere” internet on the more 
expensive models (currently the only equipment which offers a full service of such, and 
maybe the only e-reader, thanks to Amazon's international reach, that will be able to do 
so, at least for multiple countries, for the foreseeable future). Ostensibly this access 
exists in order to buy books swiftly from Amazon's online Kindle store without having 
to go to a computer, but a functional web browser, though somewhat hidden within a 
menu labelled “experimental,” is available via a few button presses. Presumably this 
experiment will conclude in future iterations with the browser's more open deployment. 
The same browser means that clickable hyperlinks can appear within documents. 
Amazon's advertising also touts that you can go from thinking of a book to reading it in 
under a minute177, an activity indivisibly associated with a cultural expectation of 
connectivity, an expectation in stark contrast to the old order of libraries and bookshops. 
On the other hand, the iPad, as with any tablet, is an unashamed internet portal; any 
reading experience upon it will have to fit in alongside a default of web-based activity 
(Steve Jobs' keynote at the launch of the iPad began by describing the joy of “holding 
the internet right there in your hands” (“[SUBTITLES!] Apple Special Event January 
2010” 1:28).
This deep and inescapable association with internet connectivity, in both types of 
equipment, is important to understand because it inflects any linear reading that occurs 
on their screens. This can be seen by folk phenomenological reports which express a 
desire not to be distracted during reading and of the joy of books staying “just books,” 
for example:
Books encourage and enable long-form thinking. Ebooks, because they 
are  (ex  hypothesis)  on  the  Net,  are  distracting.  They  string  together 
associated chunks and tempt us with links beyond themselves. It is easy 
to  imagine  ebooks  providing  the  singleminded  pbook  [print/physical 
book] experience: “Press here to remove all links.” But, of course, you 
could always unpress the button. Besides, since your ebook is on the Net 
177 From the Kindle product page: “Books in 60 seconds - Download books anytime, anywhere” (“Kindle 
3G Wireless Reading Device...”)
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(ex hypothesis), all that’s stopping you from jumping out of the book and 
into your email or Facebook [or to anywhere] is self-discipline. So, while 
ebooks can provide the single minded experience of pbooks, some of us 
may prefer the paper version to keep the distraction of the Net at bay 
(Weinberger “Will Books...”).
Weinberger fears he might not be able not to take links, even if a simple option to 
remove them was available to him. One might wonder why people are reading things so 
dull as to drive them to Facebook in preference if the internet is simply made more 
easily available. This doesn't seem an argument against the form, after all if you're 
reading one book another text, computer, phone, or whatever else is often within reach; 
distractions always surround us. Regardless, this is a commonly voiced concern, and the 
“single use” marketing of the Kindle, for all of its inaccuracy, seems an attempt to 
placate such apprehension. Despite Amazon's efforts to hide the Kindle's functionality 
from their more cautious adopters, by allying themselves to any degree with the 
capacities of contemporary digitisation they cannot keep the internet out.
If it's always going to be a part of e-reading from the start let's return to 
hyperlinking, and to what it might mean. A hyperlink, most typically represented as an 
underlined blue word, when clicked takes the reader from the page that they are on to 
somewhere else, known or unknown. The author of the document sets the hyperlink 
marker, which word or image is clickable, and they set the destination; the reader 
chooses whether or not they are going to click the link. This doesn't mean, however, that 
an unclicked link has no meaning. Steven Johnson describes hyperlinks as an entirely 
new linguistic element, “the first significant form of punctuation to emerge in centuries” 
(Everything Bad 111), and this is an apt description; hyperlinked words do not change 
the words themselves, at the level of letters, but instead augment and alter their meaning 
and capacity to mean. In early writing systems pictographic script represented spoken 
words; the spoken “bird,” in the simplest pictogram, would have a representational or 
symbolic parallel with the image of a bird. A text was accurate if the interpretations of 
each image matched some value of what the author intended. A chirographic or 
typographic written word is different: it is more precise, and part of its ability to better 
capture specific meaning comes from its representing, or coming to represent a spoken 
word inscribed many times with its own history and context. For instance,
[l]inguists classify English as a morphophonemic writing system because 
it represents both morphemes (units of meaning) and phonemes (units of 
221
sound)  in  its  spelling...[T]he  linguists  Noam  Chomsky  and  Carol 
Chomsky use words like ‘muscle’ to teach the way our words carry an 
entire history within them178…For example, the silent ‘c’ in ‘muscle’ may 
seem unnecessary, but in fact it visibly connects the word to its origin, 
the  Latin root  musculus,  from which  we have  such kindred words as 
‘muscular’ and ‘musculature.’ In the latter words the ‘c’ is pronounced 
and represents  the  phonemic aspect  of  our  alphabet.  The  silent  ‘c’ of 
‘muscle,’ therefore, visually conveys the morpheme aspect of English. In 
essence, English represents a 'trade-off' between depicting the individual 
sounds of the oral language and showing the roots of its words (Wolf, 
Proust and the Squid 42-43).
To look at a pictogram of a muscle, it would always mean the concept of “muscle”; 
whatever the culture dictated that concept to be, the image would always suggest to the 
reader their current interpretation of that conventional concept. But if we look at the 
word “muscle”, with its silent “c,” then we get the full morphophoneticism of English 
coming to the fore: the Latin root, with its pronounced “c,” hides within, a conceptual 
trace, a history more or less known, and more or less affective to the reader. But now 
paint that word blue and underline it, put it on a screen and it becomes imbued with 
possibility. This contraption now means the interpreted cultural concept of the spoken or 
inscribed “muscle,” like the pictogram; it contains “musculus” and a history of use, like 
the inscribed word; but it also reminds us, without our even clicking it, in fact without, 
now, it even being a hyperlink of everywhere it might take us: anatomical diagrams, 
bodybuilding, bodyguards, seafood even, or somewhere we have yet to learn.
Consider for example this section from George Church's essay “Ctrl+Click to 
Follow Link”:
(143).
178 Wolf cites N. Chomsky and Halle The Sound Pattern of English and C. Chomsky “Stages in Language 
Development and Reading Exposure” in this regard.
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The urge to click is unbearable, and yet this is a paperbound essay. The links clearly 
have an effect here, are a part of the meaning of the writing; even if they cannot be 
followed they still have implications for interpretation. Hyperlinks, and their apparent 
manifestations, represent a personal aspect to every underlined word, of choices made to 
access, or not, a unique link or combination. They are hypermorphophonemic, 
conceptual, historical, possible.
But if every e-reading space is tied to hyperlink-inflected reading, either 
explicitly with an ever-present browser, or metaphorically through early-adopters 
deploying their computing gestalts to get a handle on the new screen, then suddenly any 
particular word need not even be a visible link, instead every word carries this new 
weight. Hyperlinks exist to remind us that we can head out into other texts, out into the 
world, that where we are is not the final say, and that the boundary lines we have 
revered in print are blurred at best, and potentially inconsequential. In the webs of text 
online, hyperlinks chart an authored path, whilst simultaneously reminding us that with 
Google only ever a few clicks away we can always break out from the document we’re 
reading to wash ourselves in information whose connections are of a much more 
arbitrary and idiosyncratic variety. That promise of hyperlinks now exists in all digital 
texts, whether they appear online or not, and this weaves a gentle magic, existing as a 
fundamental, conscious or unconscious breakdown of the privileging of the boundaries 
set by the author or typesetter, and the immutability of bound paper text; for 
experienced readers of digital texts the hyperlink device can become an incorporated 
technology.
We can see this written in the expectations built into the equipment. The Kindle 
3, for instance, allows you to search for any word within a document, and this parallels 
and extends one of the first hyperlinking systems created: the printed index. But any 
word, or word string, can also be searched for in your entire Kindle corpus, binding all 
of your texts together, drawing links and associations, or it can be searched for in the 
Kindle store, linking together the nearly 1 million available documents there (950,000 
as of June 2011). The dictionary search function, highlighting any word on the page 
you're reading and looking up a definition in the built-in database, similarly parallels a 
pre-existing link making mechanism. But that same highlight and search function, with 
one more button push, can search for the term in Wikipedia, probably the second most 
popular example of the power of hyperlinked information, or on Google (the first). 
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Every word in a Kindle text is always already a hyperlink to somewhere beyond the text 
you're working with. This is the type of newness Adam Greenfield suggests should be 
made apparent by the interface, and yet on the Kindle it is subtle, untrumpeted, hidden 
an extra submenu away from a familiar index-type search almost out of embarrassment 
for its un-codex-like power, and yet it remains unavoidably a part of the new reading 
environment. As Nancy Kaplan asserts,
[t]urning a book’s pages…adds nothing to signification: the end of a page 
is  an  arbitrary  boundary  imposed  by  an  intransigent  material  world. 
Taking a link from here to somewhere is not the same thing at all, for in 
the aggregate the set of chosen links and each link’s place in the set play 
off against all the sets passed over. That doubleness - the links taken and 
those passed by - brings a particular reading into being (227).
A particular, and particularly new reading, hiding behind the skeuomorphic capital that 
the equipment still manifests in its software or hardware.
Hyperlinks are impossible to escape. On the one hand their potentially 
distracting presence may be seen as part of the detrimental effects of the new hardware, 
but on the other this very factor is a large part of the e-reader and e-book's new powers 
as objects-to-think-with, what might, if we can get past the codex as a default, be an 
enabler of new and productive thought rather than its impediment. How this new 
reading could unfold is, of course, unpredictable, but the remainder of this chapter will 
attempt to show some ways in which it is starting to manifest.
The weight of a body in theory
In 1991 Bolter argued that “[t]he intertextual relationship occurs everywhere in 
print….yet the electronic space permits us to visualize intertextuality as no previous 
medium has done” (Writing Space 164). Writing Space came out in the same year as the 
public launch of the World Wide Web179, and the rise of ubiquitous internet access in the 
subsequent years would lay claim over the local hyperlinked documents Bolter was 
describing. Now, with the rise of a new generation of portable e-reading equipment 
since 2006, there's a medium which may supplant the internet enabled desktop computer 
or laptop in its status as an object-to-think with for intertextual, non-hierarchical, 
reader>author textual production and reception. Critics of the new technologies might 
179 See John Naughton A Brief History of the Future: Origins of the Internet.
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call them out as diminishing our intellectual ability, and in the short term they're likely 
right as we attempt to adjust; there may yet even prove to be something about these 
sleek screens' seemingly intangible documents that is problematic for certain kinds of 
apprehension, particularly in very young children learning to read for the first time. And 
related to the hardware, but not inherent within it, is the problem of “information 
overload” that commentators such as Carr refer to, not knowing when to stop clicking, 
when to disconnect and concentrate, when to read linearly rather than bouncing around 
the database, something that wouldn't occur with more traditional reading material180. 
This, however, is not a problem of “the screen” that Bauerlein and others fear, but rather 
a problem that needs to be addressed in education and cultural perception; no one is, or 
at least no one should be arguing that children shouldn't be taught how to read 
appropriately in the new environment, that they shouldn't be equipped with skills 
commensurate to the task of balancing diverse ways of interacting with media. But 
adults who didn't grow up with that education (and, unless we start teaching children 
appropriately, soon there may be too many of those) need to work hard too, to decide 
what they want from their sources of written information and entertainment and to try to 
produce a culture which values sustainable, responsible, enlightening engagement. As 
Google's Larry Sanger bluntly puts it,
[d]iscussions such as Carr's assume that intellectual control has already 
been ceded - but that strikes me as being a cause, not a symptom, of the 
problem Carr bemoans. After all, the exercise of freedom requires focus 
and attention, and the ur-event of the will is precisely focus itself. Carr 
unwittingly confessed what is for too many of us a moral failing, a vice; 
the  old  name  for  it  is  intemperance  (in  the  older,  broader  sense, 
contrasted with sophrosyne, moderation or self-control). And, as with so 
much of vice, we want to blame it on anything but ourselves (“Bleat for 
Yourself” 405).
Regardless, that these concerns exist is enough to render them important; they 
180 That said, Vaughn Bell offers an interesting historical counterpoint:
A respected Swiss scientist, Conrad Gessner, might have been the first to raise the alarm 
about the effects of information overload. In a landmark book, he described how the 
modern world overwhelmed people with data and that  this overabundance was both 
'confusing and harmful' to the mind. The media now echo his concerns with reports on 
the unprecedented risks of living in an 'always on' digital environment. It's worth noting 
that Gessner, for his part, never once used e-mail and was completely ignorant about 
computers. That's not because he was a technophobe but because he died in 1565. His  
warnings referred to the seemingly unmanageable flood of information unleashed by the 
printing press (“Don't Touch...”).
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shouldn't be ignored, but equally they shouldn't be taken as the dominant or most 
accurate voices. It remains the case that supporting empirical evidence just isn't present. 
Detailed studies with large sample sizes need to be undertaken, and opinions modified 
in their wake, but neither advocates nor detractors should assume that their position is 
currently clear. I have suggested, however, that we can start to go some way to forming 
opinions on whether screens themselves somehow have the capacity for making us 
more stupid: maybe, if we insist on retaining skeuomorphic design features that invoke 
older forms not as enabling material metaphors, but as path dependent restrictions on 
new possibilities for metaphorical use. But there is also much possibility for using the 
new equipment to think through complex ideas.
I've already spoken of hyperlinks, and the effects that they can have on the 
reception of a word; this effect is amplified by making every word a potential link in the 
Kindle and any future e-reader which attempts to ape its functionality, and the always-
on anywhere internet of the iPad (and the tablets that hope to compete with it) continue 
the work begun by the desktop and laptop computer, also acting as a constant reminder 
that one can always be somewhere else, that all information can be connected. These 
kinds of interactive associative reading that are allowed, implied, or provoked by the 
equipment demonstrate the non-linear human aspect that can be found in hyperlink-
enabled forms of reading. In Narrative as Virtual Reality, Marie-Laure Ryan uses a 
child’s bedtime story as an example of a rarely passive audience: “Why’s the princess 
called that?” “No, stupid, she doesn’t go that way!” “But how many beans did Jack get 
for the cow?” During codex reading we all constantly ask these same (or similar…) 
questions of our literary texts, although the authors we have to endure as adults seem 
unwilling to accommodate our enquiries. As such we must constantly forge our own 
links with other texts and with our experiences in an attempt to fit each new document 
into our understanding. Internet enabled reading equipment allows us to return, 
somewhat, to asking the questions of our childhood (a time of near constant learning 
and reevaluating), seeking answers that we often had to wait too long to find for 
ourselves when our authors became silent Others. This finding of answers is, of course, 
a crucial facet of education, and not something to back away from; the only difference is 
that electronic hypertexts enable us to find answers to the more esoteric questions, to 
find the stranger links in our own fashion, and to find them now. The impact of this 
state of affairs, of no text being considered in isolation, of having the covers ripped off 
of our books and exposing them to their surrounds, is reflected in the Inuit word for 
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“internet”: “When the time came...to find an Inuktitut181 term...Nunavut’s182 former 
Official Languages Commissioner, Eva Aariak, chose ‘ikiaqqivik’, or ‘travelling 
through layers.' The word comes from the concept describing what a shaman does…
travel[ling] across time and space to find answers” (Soukup). Like the shaman of Far 
Northern Canada we move without moving in an uncertain journey to find what we 
need amongst our networked texts. Arthur C. Clarke's appeal to sufficiently advanced 
technology's being indistinguishable from magic seems resonant.
The new screens persist in their imperfect relations to linguistic turn 
philosophies and critical theories. Nancy Patterson saw in the ever changing face of the 
computer a material metaphor for Barthes' birth of the reader: “The fact that electronic 
text is no longer caught between the covers of a book, that it only becomes present 
when a reader calls it up on screen, invites the reader to come closer to the text, to write 
the text anew each time he or she engages with it” (74). But if the internet enabled PC 
matched the turn toward the word and to networked relations in twentieth century 
thought, contemporary philosophy may find a more suitably allied object-to-think-with 
in the e-reader or the tablet. Phenomenology's concern with embodiment, perhaps most 
vividly expressed in the work of Merleau-Ponty, became neglected in the wake of his 
student, Derrida, and Deconstruction. With the new century, however, and the continued 
work in fields such as Gender Studies, Queer Theory, the Extended Mind, and 
Embodied Cognition there has been a sustained return to the concerns of the body, 
incorporating the lessons of the abstract linguistic movements, negotiating Cartesian 
dualism, and looking at what it means to have, or to be, or to act with, or act within, or 
act upon a body. And yet here comes a technology which, at least in the texts that it 
projects, seems to have none. In the work of Digital Humanities researchers such as 
Hayles and Kirschenbaum who attempt to reveal and read the electronic text's 
continuing materiality we can see a parallel struggle to bringing the body to light in 
philosophy, psychology, sociology, and critical theory.
“Electronic text is the first text in which the elements of meaning, of structure, 
and of visual display are fundamentally unstable…[R]estlessness is inherent in a 
technology that records information by collecting for fractions of a second evanescent 
electrons at tiny junctions of silicon and metal” (Bolter, Writing Space 31). Mark 
Hansen also notes this restlessness and associates it with the screen's always containing 
181  The Inuit language and dialect variants in Canada.
182  The newest Canadian territory.
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a Library of Babel-esque infinity of images based on alterations of the current image: 
any screen of information is “a merely contingent configuration of numerical values that 
can be subjected to 'molecular' modification, that lacks any motivated relation to any 
image-to-follow, and indeed that always already contains all potential-images-to-follow 
as permutations of the set of its 'elementary' numerical points” (New Philosophy 8). This 
aspect of the electronic text cannot help but be felt in its comparison to the codex 
reading from which it follows: that we can call up such a variety of materials without 
seeming to have the object in our hands change in any substantial fashion is a new 
experience, the phenomenological impact of which should not be ignored. Discussing 
this novelty, another influential early researcher of digital texts, Espen Aarseth, finds 
himself wondering “[w]hat is the difference, in terms of script, between Don Quixote on 
paper and Don Quixote on a screen? I believe they are the same, although I ‘know’ that 
the ink-cellulose relationship promotes and impedes different rituals of use than does 
the electron-phosphor relationship” (Hyper/Text/Theory 766). The “electron-phosphor 
relationship” has become the electron-liquid crystal relationship, or the electron-eink 
dot relationship, but the point still stands: Don Quixote remains scripturally the same, 
but the text, the complex relationship of script, medium, and reader, alters. Aarseth 
knows that they are the same words, but he also recognises that his interaction must be 
reconfigured by the change in medium, which prompts a change in himself in terms of 
the “different rituals of use,” i.e. the formal change alters the reception of its content to 
such a degree that the mode of interaction, the gestures must alter too. Birkerts explains 
his own response to this change - a change which can feel highly problematic to anyone 
used to a sense of stability when it comes to printed text - as a difference in “weight,” a 
belief that to move a text to the screen is to devalue it: “The word cut into stone carries 
the implicit weight of the carver’s intention; it is decoded into sense under the aspect of 
its imperishability. It has weight, grandeur - it vies with time. The same word, when it 
appears on the screen, must be received with a sense of weightlessness - the 
weightlessness of its presentation. The same sign, but not the same” (Gutenberg (1996) 
155). There are two important aspects to Birkerts' report here. The first is that even a 
single word can be somehow felt differently against the backdrop of its medium, that 
the way our bodies materially encounter the artefact can shape our reception of what it 
holds. The second is that this functions by comparison: the word on stone vies with 
time, but that same word is surely weightless on the screen only by comparison with 
more tangible artefacts. If we're used to reading on stone (or similarly enduring media, 
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bound paper codices for instance) then the sheer transience of the screen is shocking. 
But the transience of orality doesn't and didn't shock pre-literate peoples with no 
comparison. This leads us to wonder whether Birkerts' assertion will itself endure for 
some future generation which might grow up only knowing access to media presented 
on a screen. I'm not, particularly in light of what has been discussed in this chapter, 
solely appealing to such relativism. Something about stone as a material really does 
seem to suggest, to afford, if not grandeur then longevity, as the earlier quotation from 
Drucker would suggest. I merely wish to say that the cultural baggage might be played 
down over time, even if the suggestions of the material itself remain. In Birkerts' eyes, 
in a text's lacking permanence it begins to lack authority, something bound to the 
physicality of the codex that we often never appreciated was there.
Following MSA
This lack of appreciation is fast disappearing, however, prompted by the debates which 
are opened or reinvigorated by the new equipment. That they need to be begun, rather 
than continued, is the reason that Hayles, in her landmark work Writing Machines, 
called for literary scholars of all stripes, but particularly those involved with what would 
become more formally termed “electronic literature,” to adopt a more Media-Specific 
Analysis (MSA). The Kindle, and portable e-reading in general should be of particular 
interest to proponents of MSA because it reopens, reinvigorates, or, for most non-
academic readers, simply begins the debate surrounding embodiment and materiality in 
textual comprehension. When Jerome McGann wrote on the subject of the embodied 
text in The Textual Condition it wasn't surrounded by a thousand newspaper articles (let 
alone blogs and comments) speaking rapturously about the scent of books, old or new, 
and the joy of being able to read them in the bath. I don't mean this to be a flippant 
observation, but rather an acknowledgement that we are surrounded by extensive folk 
phenomenological reports of the change in reading experience prompted by e-readers; 
the mere existence of the new equipment alters our engagement with the old, 
emphasising once ignored aspects. Perhaps this is something akin to CDs replacing 
vinyl: again, it wasn't until the presence of the new medium that the particularities of 
something that already existed began to be, not appreciated (presumably they were 
already appreciated, even if not identified as themselves), but vocalised, rhapsodised. 
That so many voices in non-academic media and casual discussions are now speaking to 
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such specific aspects of the codex as paper weight, typography, contrast, pagination, the 
heft of the object, in short that they are discussing the intimacies of an artefact's 
embodiment and its impact on the reading experience is a minor miracle, and one which 
should get any researcher of writing technologies excited, particularly those who have 
bought into some flavour of MSA.
“Understanding literature as the interplay between form and medium, MSA 
insists that 'texts' must always be embodied to exist in the world. The materiality of 
those embodiments interacts dynamically with linguistic, rhetorical, and literary 
practices to create the effects we call literature” (Hayles, “Print is Flat, Code is Deep” 
70); “Media-Specific Analysis, [is] a mode of critical interrogation alert to the ways in 
which the medium constructs the work and the work constructs the medium” (Hayles, 
Writing Machines 6). Hayles saw the need for MSA arising from a neglect, in various 
forms of literary study, of materiality's capacity to mean:
Whereas art history has long been attentive to the material production of 
the art object, literary studies has generally been content to treat fictional 
and  narrative  worlds  as  if  they  were  entirely  products  of  the 
imagination...By  and  large  literary  critics  have  been  content  to  see 
literature as immaterial verbal constructions, relegating to the specialized 
fields  of  bibliography,  manuscript  culture,  and  book  production  the 
rigorous study of the materiality of literary artefacts (Writing Machines 
19).
But “[l]iterature was never only words, never merely immaterial verbal constructions. 
Literary texts, like us, have bodies, an actuality necessitating that their materialities and 
meaning are deeply interwoven into each other” (Writing Machines 107). The codex 
always had a body, of course, but it was neglected through long use, through over 
familiarity, and most often by the very people who should have been paying it the most 
attention. Bibliography, Book History and Textual Studies are all, clearly, built around 
media-specific practices, and Hayles appreciatively notes their contributions; her 
concern is with literary scholars, researchers used to close reading who in their neglect 
of the material supporting the script haven't, historically, looked closely enough. 
Suddenly, however, at the birth of an increasingly normalised digital reading the body of 
the codex and the body of the reader, in their complex of gestures and affects, are 
beginning to be considered anew alongside the discussion of where a text occurs, and 
this in a variety of levels of discourse. Ironically, in part this stems from how such texts 
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can seem to be intangible themselves. Inherent within the new forms may lie the 
provocation to consider bodies of all kinds; the missing weight that Birkerts sensed is 
something which is being played with, not something that is being ignored.
Following Hayles' call for a more media aware criticism, I would like to take this 
final section as an opportunity to look at three writers who responded to the equipment 
of their times in order to produce meaning: E.E. Cummings, Mark Danielewski, and 
Jonathan Safran Foer. I hope to show that each of them were inspired by certain objects-
to-think-with and used them both to alter their own eidos of what print could be and 
achieve, and to contribute toward provoking alterations in our own perceptual gestalts. 
In this pedagogical role they each provide us with something important: disruption, a 
revealing of the constituent parts of a thing so that they can never be put back together 
in the same way again. Their work exists as proof that technology didn't stupefy them, 
but instead enabled them to do things that were truly smart, and the products that they 
came up with become new objects-to-think-with and material metaphors for our own 
elucidation. In the case of Danielewski and Foer it was even the new digital media that 
made them think, despite any intellectual impediments it may also have offered.
The first lines of one of E.E. Cummings most famous poems reads:
Robert Wegner, drawing on these words, suggests that within Cummings' poetry can be 
found a warning: “The danger of unquestioning obedience to the syntax of things is 
sterility” (142). Not that Cummings wholly ignored the syntax of things; rather he paid 
meticulous attention to how others' adherence to the rules of language could enable their 
subversion, as an act, to mean. Those who obey unquestioningly the “rules” of things 
will never be wholly able to engage with the world; far better to test, to provoke and be 
provoked.
Cummings' most famous literary trope is his play with capital letters, notoriously 
extending out to the inscription of his name at times. But rather than a simple affectation 
Lloyd Frankenberg suggests that the device was enabling, allowing “his capitals the 
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since feeling is first
who pays any attention
to the syntax of things
will never wholly kiss you (Is 5 93).
ability to say more than their obvious remark, 'I am starting a line.' They...were restored 
to the ear (‘mOOn Over tOwns mOOn’183)” (x). Cummings' outlandish use of line 
breaks and punctuation can often, if not always, also be traced back to such impulses. 
Barry Marks, for instance, explores Cummings' use of the lines “so/!f!/t”184:
By  isolating  the  ‘so’  of  ‘soft,’  [Cummings]  added  a  ‘logical’ 
intensification  by suggesting  the  idea  ‘so  soft.’ More  importantly,  the 
exclamation points surrounding the ‘f’ make the sound of the letter  a 
metaphor for his precise meaning. Cummings says to us, ‘If you really 
want to know what I mean by ‘soft,’ then listen intently, even feel the 
letter ‘f.’ Say it to yourself and observe the way you blow air over your 
lips. That’s my meaning!’ (101).
Frankenberg sums up the impulse nicely: “He goes behind the rules to the reasons; puts 
commas, semicolons, colons, question-marks and periods where they can be heard; 
leaves them out where they can’t” (x). Marks would later articulate the power of 
Cummings' manipulations, saying that they “enable the reader to hear trains 'chewing.' 
They fracture the reader’s expectations about the meaning of words and their 
relationship to one another” (101).
An often overlooked aspect of Cummings' work, however, lies in his use of the 
typewriter. Similar to the function of his other literary devices, Cummings causes the 
writing equipment to go against the grain of its position: rather than being meekly 
invisible, allowing the words to speak for themselves uninterrupted, Cummings instead 
uses the typewriter in such a way as to extend his and its capacity to mean. I say 
overlooked not because no critic has ever spoken of it (far from it as we shall see), but 
because in the reproductions of his work in collections and online, in critical editions 
and quotations in scholarly journals the particular patterns and messages of the 
typewriter, so richly developed in the poetry, are occluded, not merely removed but 
erased and made impossible to think of.
In an article that would be redrawn in his later biography, Richard Kennedy 
recounts Cummings’ first experience of Ezra Pound’s “The Return” which he 
discovered in 1916, immediately prior to the summer where he would begin the 
meticulous research which would lead to his purposefully machined poetry. Kennedy 
states that
183 A quotation from a poem of the same name collected in No Thanks (3).
184 In the poem “(fea” (Complete Poems 653).
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[h]e was moved by the linguistic expressiveness of the piece, which used 
modern diction and oblique treatment for a classical subject, the decline 
in the power of the gods. But the arrangement on the page, he said, ‘the 
inaudible poem - the visual poem, the poem for not ears but eye - moved 
me more’…For Cummings, Pound’s poetic example provided a release 
from formal  bonds,  and as  he  sat  at  the  family  typewriter  trying  out 
visual  arrangements,  he saw that there  were immense possibilities for 
expressiveness in the combinations and the separations of the words on 
the page (176-178).
I'd like to pause here, with Cummings about to discover the possibilities of the 
typewriter, to suggest a critical idea with which to frame the discussion of a poem which 
is clearly a product of these experiments.
In the first chapter we looked at how the body can bring tools “on board” to such 
a degree that, during successful use, the brain makes no distinction between the tool and 
the limb holding it, at least not at the simple boundary line of the skin. If the body 
schema can be expanded to include tools, how else might minds mesh with objects in 
the world? Andy Clark and David Chalmers' work on “The Extended Mind” began with 
a related question and answer: “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world 
begin?…Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside 
the body is outside the mind…We advocate [instead]…an active externalism, based on 
the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.” When we count on 
our fingers, or use a pencil and paper to write down a shopping list, or increase our 
reliance on our mobile phones and internet document storage instead of keeping items 
in long-term memory (or learning them in the first place), then we actively recruit items 
in the world to further our cognition (and note that each of these aren't mere memory 
aids, they also affect what and how we think). Biological boundaries must be 
questioned, Clark and Chalmers say, as a common sense mapping of the boundaries of 
mental work; such work also goes on in the world. For instance, what if that work, save 
for such boundaries, would be considered a fully cognitive process? They invoke a 
“parity principle” to begin such a thought experiment:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which,  were  it  done  in  the  head,  we  would  have  no  hesitation  in 
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is 
(so we claim) part of the cognitive process…In these cases, the human 
organism  is  linked  with  an  external  entity  in  a  two-way  interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its 
own  right...If  we  remove  the  external  component  the  system's 
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behavioural competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of 
its brain (“Extended...,” emphasis in original).
We saw in the first chapter Maravita and Iriki's discussion of how tools can be brought 
“on board” into the kinaesthetic representations of our bodies in action; here Clark and 
Chalmers state that our cognition can pass the other way and be spread onto objects in 
our environment in such a way that the system of brain, body, and object can be thought 
of as cognising (rather than simply a post-dualist construct of body-affected mind). If 
we then take this parity principle and apply it back onto incorporated/ready-to-hand 
tools then we can come to the following formulation: If there exists in the world a tool 
even temporarily incorporated into a user's body schema where if the work performed 
with it was achieved by the user's bodily assemblage alone we would consider it the 
work of the body, then it is best considered as a part of that working assemblage, not a 
mere addition to the thing which works. For example, if driving a nail could be achieved 
by the brain's stimulating the shoulder working with the bicep, working with the tricep, 
working with the elbow, working with the forearm, working with the wrist, working 
with the hand, working with the fingers, then we would say that the nail could be driven 
by the body, or by the arm or hand if we ignore the entailed apparatus. In the same way, 
when the hammer comes on board with the arm, it extends our concept of the arm’s 
abilities, and the new assemblage is able to drive the nail - the hammer cannot drive the 
nail, the arm cannot drive the nail, only the assemblage has that ability. However, 
though the hammer is as invisible as any other biological element within the 
assemblage, we still choose to mark a distinction at the boundary of skin and object, 
seeing user and thing rather than a gestalt machine comprised of parts, a separation 
which the unconscious action of our brains, for that time of work, does not. Clark and 
Chalmer’s parity principle asks “why?” In our conscious lives the distinction makes 
eidetic if not ontological sense, but we largely addressed this issue in the last chapter. 
Here, instead, we'll now see how this question might be usefully put to work in 
considering the boundaries of written texts.
Kinaesthetic extensions
I would like to re-appropriate the term “kinaesthetic” as a critical theoretical term, one 
bound to Textual Studies and MSA. I would like to use the term to suggest that as we 
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might naturally be kinaesthetes of our own bodies, appreciating consciously or 
unconsciously our gestures and their changing shapes in concert with our tools, so we 
can also become increasingly kinaesthetically aware of textual bodies, that the extent of 
their forms might be brought to consciousness and, crucially, made malleable in much 
the same way as our own in-built kinaesthetic experience. A “textual kinaesthetics” 
would be the attempt to expand or alter a reader's notion of what could or should be 
included in the meaningful assemblage of a text in action.
In this way, McGann's project in The Textual Condition could be considered 
under the umbrella of textual kinaesthetics as he passionately describes the text as “a 
laced network of linguistic and bibliographical codes…[S]uch matters as ink, typeface, 
paper, and various other phenomena…are crucial to the understanding of textuality…
[A]ll texts, like all other things human, are embodied phenomena, and the body of the 
text is not exclusively linguistic” (13). In this call for a more nuanced notion of what 
should be included in the assemblage of the text, McGann extends our conception of 
“text,” “codex,” and “page,” changes their meaning, changes what we might include 
under their name, and in so doing alters the way in which we apprehend their bodies. 
McGann’s work has been vital in displacing the automatic privileging of script-content 
as the ultimate meaner, allowing for an image of the text, a body image, which is 
materially aware.
In the same way that cognitive science is revealing how we are able to spread 
our cognitive load onto our bodies (in gesture for instance) and out into objects in our 
environment, I would like to argue that critics, theorists, authors, poets, and playwrights 
can perform a function analogous to the psychologists: revealing how texts can spread 
the load of meaning further than the previous sanctity of their own minds (their 
content), onto their bodies (as Textual Studies and Book History have long argued), and 
out into objects in their environment in the vein of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind.
Barthes and McGann both speak of such objects when they rightly bring the 
reader into the meaning making of text. They, and the critics they've influenced have 
contributed to a sense of text that can describe operations of meaning which exist 
beyond the material body and script-brain. As Aarseth describes them, “[t]exts are cross 
products between a set of matrices - linguistic (the script), technological (the 
mechanical conditions), and historical (the socio-political context)” (“Nonlinearity and 
Literary Theory 766). Such work seems to suggest that we should think of text not as a 
thing, even in a particular instance, but instead as an interaction, an assemblage 
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triggered by a script presenting object (e.g. a codex) meeting an equally embodied 
reader-subject; the reader brings their baggage, mental and physical, and the codex 
brings its own along too, both lexical and material185. Barthes’ essay “From Work to 
Text” is clearly relevant in this regard: he argues that a text is immune to single 
interpretations, and concerned with a web of interactions surrounding artefact and 
reader, a polyphony of interpretation, origination, and intertextuality, aspects which are 
necessarily untheorisable and unquantifiable in the particulars of their effects. The text’s 
meaning is produced anew in each play of these meetings, but in some cases only to the 
extent that the reader is made aware of them. The material existence of the page can 
mean in all sorts of ways that are unconsciously recognised and incorporated into the 
text, but some meaning is made only when it is brought to our attention, dragged in out 
of the cold so that we can recognise its role.
I would like to explore these identifiable “calling-outs” from works to events 
outside of their immediate material existence, particularly those outside of the reader’s 
own typical interpretative strategies. When we have become complacent with what a 
written text can be, a kinaesthetic extension is an instance in any work, literary or 
theoretical (or both), which teaches us to expand our comfortable image of how far a 
text reaches, and provides a new extensive way of making meaning for future readers 
and creators. The specific study of such would be Textual Kinaesthetics, itself an 
attempt to persuade its readers of an expanded definition of “text” revealed by an 
artwork or critic. The following examples are some preliminary kinaesthetic readings, 
but they will culminate with examples from two writers, Danielewski and Foer, who 
straddle all of our discussions here: lovers of codices in the face of the digital, but 
supporters of the power of the new forms; fascinated by materiality; and revelling in the 
meeting of bodies and traditions as sites for mass, democratic, novel thought and spaces 
which aid rather than impede, provoke rather than diffuse the wrestle with difficult 
theoretical, philosophical, and cultural ideas.
Extension in practice
In the summer of 1916, Cummings followed his encounter with Pound by sitting down 
at his typewriter and producing line after line of formal experiments, learning what the 
185 In this regard also see Michel de Certeau (167-169).
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machine could and couldn't do to words and letters186. In the first poem of his collection 
95 Poems we can see how this play came to fruition in a kinaesthetic extension:
This poem is a great example of one of Cummings’ almost haiku like forms. At first it 
looks like a mess of letters, but then we come to see the words, just four of them - in the 
parenthesis: “a leaf falls,” and surrounding that: “loneliness.” It’s arrangement enacts 
the falling of the leaf described, the alternating “af” and “fa” in the 4th and 5th lines 
suggesting its twisting descent on its way to the longest line, “iness,” that forms the 
ground; in this respect it is almost a concrete poem. Marks, during an extensive 
discussion of these few words, states that “Cummings’ poem does not make an assertion 
about loneliness. Such an assertion would not have been very interesting...Instead, the 
poem combines the abstract idea and the concrete image in such a way as to show us 
something…it asks us to look at the printed page” (23). What, then, is particularly 
important about the materiality of this poem? Marks begins by asking us to look at the 
word outside of the parenthesis:
“Thanks to the modern typewriter,” he says, “whose letter 'el' (l) doubles as the figure 
'one' (1), Cummings shows us that a very commonplace word is really a quite singular 
word. It states its meaning five times. It says 'loneliness,' but it also says, 'one-one-one-
186 See Richard Kennedy's biography of Cummings' Dreams in the Mirror: A Biography of E.E. 
Cummings.
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fa
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one
l
iness
l
one
l
iness
iness' (that is, the quality or condition of being 'I')” (23).
The significance of the typography is only available to us if we understand that 
the text extends beyond the material artefact of the poem from which it originates. It’s 
not enough simply to see that there are what appear to be numeral ones on the page, 
because then we would misread the poem, we couldn’t read the word “loneliness.” 
Typically readers gloss over such peculiarities of typewritten typography so that they 
might get to the “text itself,” appealing, as we have discussed, to a pre-established 
gestalt of what should be read. But this poem punishes such adherence to the syntax of 
things by withholding meaning, becoming boring. It's not just the final means of 
production that are written into the poem, not just the printing press and the paper, but 
also the equipment of writing, of thinking, that Cummings deployed. Forever enshrined 
in the poem is its inception, and for anyone who works it out for themselves, or 
becomes aware of Marks' own kinaesthetic study, his bringing to light of this peculiarity 
of the text, they cannot help but consider it and to go looking for it, or something 
similar, in Cummings' other poetry. And this is important because the text, when it now 
makes it into various reproductions, often isn't presented in even some simulacra of 
typewritten script, therefore erasing, in the absence of Marks' critique, the poem's full 
capacity to mean. With Marks' critique, however, every edition can become richer; even 
in the absence of the reproduction of a particular machined typography an extra layer of 
meaning exists as it is recalled.
With this idea in place we can read the poem more fully, seeing its mess of 
singulars and articles. To start with, it’s the first poem in the collection, labelled simply 
“I,” or one, and now the first line potentially reads “one” then “a,” the indefinite article. 
Or, as Iain Landles argues, it might read “la,” the French feminine singular, followed, in 
the second line, by “le,” the masculine (38). With both Marks and Landles' readings in 
mind we might ask whether the representation of the sexes there refers to the two els, 
now ones, of the fifth line which sit paired whilst the wholly separate other ones mope 
at opposite ends of the clipped lines 1-8. What can make us feel worse when we are 
lonely, after all, than seeing a happy pairing? But, to the contrary, there might now be a 
tension in the letters after “leaf,” from the second half of line four, which now reads 
“all’s one, one-iness,” or “all's oneliness,” a statement either that everyone and 
everything is always alone, or, in another twist, that instead we continually live “at one” 
with the world, an assertion which subverts, trivialises, or perhaps provides a Whitman-
esque solution to any temporary feelings of loneliness that we might have.
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None of this could present itself were it not for the typewriter being dragged out 
of obscurity and into the text. Marks concludes that “Cummings' treatment of 
‘loneliness’ adds to the word not a semantic quality but what critics of the visual arts 
call a 'plastic quality.' He does not deepen or extend its meaning in any way; it has 
suddenly become vital to the touch, as it were, and has become an object of delight” 
(24). Something different is going on here than a text merely referring with its content. 
When the poem talks about an apocryphal single leaf falling it doesn’t bring the 
materiality of leaves into the text’s meaning, only meaningfulness, as a single leaf 
falling relates metaphorically to loneliness. When the poem calls-out to the typewriter, 
however, it brings the materiality of that object into meaning, and not meaningfulness; 
the typewriter’s operation has very little to do with loneliness, and yet it holds much of 
the burden, in the poem’s extended text, of producing meaning. As Adam Kirsch notes, 
“Cummings was not the first poet to use a typewriter, but…he was the first to take 
advantage of its power to control the exact spacing and shape of every line, and thus to 
make a poem’s visual appearance as important as its musical rhythms. What looks like a 
thin trickle of letters becomes, to a reader who has learned Cummings’s tricks, a picture 
in print.” More than a picture, it becomes an extensive object, one not limited by the 
boundaries of its scriptural brain, or paper and ink body, but a text, something always 
and unrepeatably unique in its every expression, a malleable and fluid, yet always 
boundaried thing.
Danielewski on film and online
Mark Z. Danielewski spent much of the nineties writing his debut novel House of 
Leaves against the backdrop of the growing internet. For all its relations to the new 
digital era, House of Leaves was written in a time largely before Google changed search 
(1998), before the iPod changed the music industry (2001), and well before YouTube 
changed the distribution of moving images (2005). But the internet, ubiquitous home 
computing, and the beginnings of the “threat” to the codex that digitisation is meant to 
pose are written deeply into the pages of Danielewski's book.
It would be both impossible and irrelevant to accurately detail the complexities 
of House of Leaves' plot, our focus must remain on how Danielewski kinaesthetically 
extends its ability to mean, but it can loosely be thought of as a haunted house novel 
about a house bigger on the inside than the outside; a reworking of the minotaur in the 
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labyrinth myth; a critical theory-heavy film studies monograph; a meditation on the 
power of the codex; and at least two family dramas all combined into a truly inspiring 
piece of fiction. The principle narrators are a blind man named Zampano, a Borgesian 
figure whose critical discussion of the film documenting the exploration of the house of 
the title drives the plot, and Johnny Truant, a young tattooist who inherits Zampano's 
draft and notes and attempts to make a book out of them, a book which has apparently 
been published as House of Leaves. As Hayles describes the structure of the work
Zampano’s account contains allusions, citations and analyses of hundreds 
of interpretations of  The Navidson Record [the film under discussion], 
along  with  hundreds  more  ancillary  texts.  Johnny  Truant’s  footnotes, 
parasitically  attaching  themselves  to  Zampano’s  host  narrative,  are 
parasited in turn by footnotes written by the anonymous ‘Editors,’ upon 
which  are  hyper-parasitically  fastened  the  materials  in  the  Exhibits, 
Appendix, and finally the Index (which like the index of Pale Fire turns 
out to be an encrypted pseudo-narrative of its own) (Writing Machines 
111).
Beyond the labyrinth of footnotes, index, and appendices, House of Leaves' layout and 
typography is often visually striking. Most famously, in the colour edition every 
instance of the word “house” is coloured blue, and offset slightly; in the black and white 
edition (for the UK market) the offset seems more distinct and the word appears in grey. 
Other quirks include short sentences, single words, or even parts of words spread across 
pages in some sections, and script that is presented upside down, diagonally, or that 
requires a mirror in order to read it. Sometimes footnotes take up more space than the 
ostensibly principle text, going on for pages; sometimes the symbols indicating 
footnotes and addenda put chapters into loops, where the reader has to elect not to 
follow the path of the normally elucidating signs if they wish to progress any further. 
Sometimes, as in Chapter IX, House of Leaves looks like this:
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(132-133).
The left hand blue box shown here is intended as the obverse of the right hand box on 
the previous page; the right hand blue box will be repeated in reverse, mimicking its 
“back” on the next page. In this way a footnote passes as a core though this chapter - an 
attempt to list everything that isn't in the house: for instance there are no lights in the 
house “whether electrical discharge, incandescent, or combustion, no flame arc or gas-
filled, tipless, inside frosted, decorative, general service, 10,000 watt aviation picture 
studio, projection, signal, Christmas tree, arc projector, photoflood, mercury, sodium, 
glow, sun, flash, black light, water cooled...” (123-125) etc.
From the early experiments of Tristram Shandy, through Apollinaire's 
Calligrames, to Cummings and other Modernist and Surrealist explorers, the layout of 
script on the page and the subversion of our expectations of what “should” be there, has 
a long history. Aarseth goes as far as to say that we have come to privilege a whole and 
“faultless” incorporeal text already over whatever might appear in a printed work:
[T]he stability of paper-based documents is as much a product of our 
metaphysical belief in a transcendental text as an inherent quality of the 
physical object…Imagine a book in which some of the pages appear to 
be missing,  or the print  is unreadable every 16 pages, or some of the 
pages are repeated while an equal number omitted. Even if this copy is 
the only one we ever see, we automatically assume that it is not supposed 
to be this way and that a more correct version exists. It may never have 
been  printed;  but  to  us  who  can imagine  it  perfectly  (except  for  the 
missing  words,  of  course),  it  is  still  more  real  than  the  one  we  are 
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holding…we do this out of lack of respect  for the copy; it  appears to 
misrepresent the ‘real’ text…In short, we prefer the imagined integrity of 
a  metaphysical  object  to  the  stable  version  that  we  observe 
(“Nonlinearity” 764).
Clearly such deeply embedded expectations, once again the syntax of things, are ripe for 
meaningful play and House of Leaves engages with just these kind of concerns. But if 
I'm to argue that Danielewski's book is kinaesthetically extending then I'm going to have 
to demonstrate that his motivations for making his pages look as they do comes from 
somewhere new, brings something unfamiliar into the text to the aid of meaning 
making, something that isn't there in the earlier experiments described above, or in other 
late 20th century, but pre-internet works such as Milorad Pavić's Dictionary of the 
Khazars, Mark Saporta's Composition No.1, or Nabokov's Pale Fire187. As with 
Cummings and his typewriter its the equipment of his day to which Danielewski turns - 
to digital film, and to the computer.
Danielewski's father, Tad Danielewski, was a television director and avant-garde 
filmmaker who steeped his children in a culture of cinema:
My sister and I didn’t know it then, but what a magnificent and strange 
education. Every week Kubrick, Reed, Chaplin, Fellini, Bergman, Ford, 
Welles, Lean came into our living room. All their light, all their wonder, 
their genius and misconceptions, flung up on the wall like some magical 
hallway stretching into far away places…[D]uring th[e] first break [Tad 
had a projector and screen and charged Mark with changing the reels], 
my father  would start  asking the  first  questions:  ‘What  are  we really 
watching children?’ ‘Why that color?’ ‘Why that name?’ ‘What about the 
sound? The music? The performance?’ ‘Is this truly just about cowboys?’ 
None of which compared to what followed the film - long discussions, 
hours long, sometimes inspiring, sometimes raw with the words of battle; 
and  yes,  of  course  fear.  We  covered  everything.  Structure,  political 
content, aesthetic (or not) achievement…The film was just the starting 
point...it was the talk that mattered most (“A Conversation...”).
We have the first clue to the importance of film in the novel in this quotation; the 
“magical hallway stretching into far away places,” the impossible depth which the 
young Danielewski marvelled at, is projected into the mysterious hallway which 
187 Pavić's novel is set out as a dictionary with entries which refer to one another, bouncing the reader 
around the text and leaving them unsure as to exactly how much they've read; Mark Saporta's 
Composition No. 1 is a collection of loose leaves in a box to be shuffled before reading; Nabakov's 
Pale Fire sends the reader shuttling back and forth between an epic poem and its possibly insane 
curator's annotations.
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appears, one day, in the house of the novel, a haunting of space into which the 
characters pass and begin to unravel. This fantastic and fearful emergence of depth 
might also refer to Auguste and Louis Lumière’s seminal film screenings in late 19th 
century Paris. In what is most likely at least a partially apocryphal tale188, on December 
28th 1985 the Lumière brothers hung a plain white sheet against a café wall, called for 
attention, turned off the lights, and projected one of the first moving pictures, L'Arrivée 
d'un Train Ã la Ciotat, a static camera shot of a train pulling toward the camera and into 
Ciotat station. Legend has it that in this charged environment several panicked 
witnesses fled from the oncoming engine. Whatever grain of truth lies at the heart of 
this tale, the early novelty of both photography and film led to a belief that they were 
able to apprehend reality without mediation (to such a degree that photographs were 
initially refused the protection of copyright as the image had been created by the 
reflection and capture of light, a scientific tool for apprehending the world rather than a 
creative process). The apprehension of reality is a dominating theme of House of 
Leaves, and the illusion and promise of film to get at the world like no other medium is 
an appropriately constant tension (the book is the critical viewpoint of a blind man 
critiquing a film he can't have seen, mediated through a tattoo artist who's begun to 
hallucinate, and it regards the home recordings of a photojournalist).
Danielewski would turn his father's education in film toward postgraduate study, 
and later worked on the 2002 documentary Derrida, a film which comprised footage of 
and interviews with the philosopher for which Danielewski acted as assistant editor and 
sound technician. With a clear interest in the man and his work, it's unsurprising, 
therefore, that Derrida's influence can be felt throughout House of Leaves, in direct and 
imagined quotations, in its physical resemblance to pages from Derrida's Glas, and the 
importance of Deconstructive criticism to its statements about textuality, spectres, 
echoes, and recursion. But it's not in Deconstruction that Danielewski situates the truly 
extensive meaning making, principally it's in the magic hallway of film:
That had been the design from the very beginning: to use the image of 
text itself in a way that had been studied very carefully for a hundred 
years by exquisite film-makers and to increase the reader's experience as 
they progress through the book…A very simple example is in an action 
movie.  Before  an  action  sequence,  a  director  tends  to  present  the 
audience with long shots and static views so the eye is fixed on a certain 
focal point on the screen and doesn't move. When the action sequence 
188 See Martin Loiperdinger “Lumiere's Arrival of the Train: Cinema's Founding Myth.”
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actually  comes  in,  a  lot  of  short  cuts  are  used  and  it  intensifies  the 
viewers' experience by shifting the focal point all over the screen. The 
eye is moving all around and there's an actual visceral response to that…
So I began to theorise how one could adopt the same techniques textually 
(Danielewski, “Five minutes with Mark Z Danielewski”).
Mark Hansen notes a clear emulation of the projected upon screen in House of Leaves' 
visual design during in Zampano's description of a videocamera running out of film 
during a rescue scene: “Spread out over the space of five pages (307-11, with slashes 
indicating page breaks) and located at various heights on the page, the following words 
are inscribed: ‘The film runs out here, / leaving nothing else behind but an 
unremarkable / white // screen.’ Here the blank page functions as a material analog of 
the blank screen” (“Digital Topography” 616). But in line with Danielewski's statement 
above, we might also consider a more oblique reference, a moment late in the novel 
when the house is being investigated. After a small group of explorers have passed 
through a newly appeared door in the owners' bedroom the house reveals its true scale 
and the nature of its topography, offering up a long corridor terminating in a set of steps 
that takes the group minutes to descend, but hours to re-climb. At the bottom of these 
steps, in pitch darkness, exists an enormous labyrinth, a shifting structure that gives the 
impression of an infinite entropic blankness. One of the group is injured in the darkness, 
and he must be hoisted up the shaft of the main stairwell. All is well, and he's 
progressing to the top until, suddenly, the dimensions of that space fantastically expand, 
the house warps, stretching the rope and leaving him dangling, almost there, suspended 
over the mouth of an ever-growing black abyss. That rope, despite, as we’ve been told, 
being able to withstand several thousand pounds of tension, is drawn tight, tighter, and 
then…
In a more traditionally typeset novel the detail of these events would be the end 
of a tense paragraph. But in House of Leaves this description, still only a few words, is 
spread out over 12 pages. We riffle through them, hungry to work out what is about to 
occur, and then we realise, now, slowly turning the last three pages with a sense of 
hideous finality as the rope
sn-//
-a-//
-ps (294-296).
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It’s a masterful piece of control over the reader, dictating our hands’ actions in the world 
as well as the movement of our eyes, and the frenzy of our minds; it accelerates the 
action of turning the pages at the same time as making our heart beat faster. And that 
final three page “snaps” is a visual in line with Cummings’ falling leaf, less subtle 
perhaps, but of the same school. Where Cummings’ leaf slows us down and spins us 
about with eddies of orthographic topology, Danielewski’s near empty pages make us 
breathlessly rush, our hands unable to keep up with our eyes in clearing the pages. 
There’s something oddly invigorating in the making of the usual crawl of turning leaves 
into a tumble, where broken sentences, broken words need to be held in working 
memory for reconfiguration as soon as the hands and eyes can provide just enough 
content for comprehension.
In order to best make sense of this effect we must consider how Danielewski, 
like Cummings, has his work call-out to a site of meaning beyond its material body. 
Danielewski says that:
My view of placing text on the page - aside from being influenced by the 
likes of E. E. Cummings or maybe some John Cage - was...cinematic. 
The point wasn’t just to get really obtuse in the placement of the words. I 
was very interested in how the reader moves through a book. I’ve never 
talked to anyone who didn’t feel a sense of elation when they’d read, say, 
80  pages  in  an  hour,  because  something  was  moving  quickly  -  or 
expressed some sort of frustration because it took them an hour to read 
ten pages...I began to realize that cinema has an enormous foundation of 
theories on how to control the viewer’s perception (“Building A House of 
Leaves”).
In hyperkinetic film editing, which became increasingly mainstream throughout late 
eighties and nineties action cinema, Danielewski saw a new space for generating 
meaning, a riff on old styles, but something genuinely novel. It's important to note that 
there is no particular referred to film which is meaningful with regards to House of 
Leaves, instead the text makes the grammar of film in general an available site in 
tandem with the work of the material book. Hansen identifies the swift procession of the 
sparsely populated pages with “cinematic effects of temporal acceleration” (“The 
Digital Topography...” 617), and it is an awareness of the equation of medial speed with 
temporal speed and tension that makes this effect work. After all if we don’t associate a 
swift turning of the pages with tension then we would be missing something of the 
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extensive text that Danielewski is trying to offer us. We can easily imagine a link 
between flipping pages and boredom or skim reading were it not for our training in 
Hollywood and beyond that motion in media is equated with excitement. Film grammar 
is instead made to be a properly kinaesthetic part of the text.
Following George Lucas and Steven Spielberg’s dominance of summer cinema 
releases throughout the late seventies and eighties, and the rise of home VHS, the 
American film industry, looking for ever greater spectacle, turned to the promise of new 
digital technology to draw people out to the big screen. As the industry increasingly 
found fans of its means of production, as evidenced by “making of” documentaries 
accompanying home video and later DVD releases of blockbuster films, the term “blue 
screen” became a part of pop-culture. With this in mind we can see another filmic link 
in the text, and a more digital one: the instances of the word “house” appearing in blue 
ink. “[W]hile Danielewski would not reveal his motives for using blue or ‘house,’ he 
was kind enough to offer that it has something to do with how blue is used in film. 
Knowing this, it’s not much of a stretch to say that Navidson’s house acts as a 
psychological ‘blue screen’” (Wittmershaus). Not only the word “house,” but the box 
surrounding the footnote which passes through chapter nine also appears in blue. Hayles 
sees significance in the infinity such a device invokes, a surface “onto which anything 
can be projected...[T]he text is attempting to project into this space the linguistic 
signifiers for everything in the world, as if attempting to make up through verbal 
proliferation the absolute emptiness of the House as a physical space” (Writing 
Machines 123).
There is, however, another explanation for the motif, also associated with an 
infinite blue: the hyperlink. Throughout, House of Leaves draws on the digitisation of 
the written word as it was already established at the end of the nineties during the 
book’s gestation. From the sizeable index's functioning as a search engine (long a skill 
of the codex, but given greater weight in the novel with its more trivial entries 
(including “all,” “and,” “back,” “can,” “for,” “here,” “in,” “into,” “just,” “more,” “my,” 
“not,” “nothing,” “only,” “out,” “so,” “something,” and the single use of the word 
“Yggdrasil”) giving the impression that every word is searchable189), to the myriad 
189 The index of House of Leaves allows
readers to trace the different contexts in which the words appear and even the frequency 
of that appearance. So if you come across the listing for “for,” you don’t have to look up 
all the passages where “for” appears to be able to say, Wow, there's a prevalence of this  
word and here is a certain stylistic habit statistically represented with page numbers. 
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footnotes acting as hyperlinks that actually form entire parallel narratives, House of 
Leaves interrogates the digital challenge to the printed book. This challenge is 
something that Danielewski himself seems to have taken very seriously; commenting in 
interview on the complex layers of the work he suggests that
[r]eally the only thing challenging about my book is the idea of a book 
itself.  Older  generations...will  find  House  of  Leaves difficult  because 
they’re prejudiced. They’ve been taught what a book should look like 
and how it should be read. Ruler-wielding didacts have instilled in them 
the notion that a book must start here, move along like this, and finish 
over there…But books don’t have to be so limited. They can intensify 
informational  content  and experience.  Multiple  stories  can lie  side by 
side  on  the  page...Passages  may  be  found,  studied,  revisited,  or  even 
skimmed. And that’s just the beginning. Words can also be colored and 
those colors can have meaning...Hell pages can be tilted, turned upside 
down, even read backwards…But here’s the joke. Books have had this 
capability all along. Read Chomsky, Derrida, Pinker, Cummings. Look at 
early 16th century manuscripts. Hell, go open up the Talmud. Books are 
remarkable  constructions  with  enormous  possibilities...[S]omehow  the 
analogue  powers  of  these  wonderful  bundles  of  paper  have  been 
forgotten. Somewhere along the way, all its possibilities were denied…I'd 
like to see that perception change…I'd like to see the book reintroduced 
for all it really is (“A Conversation With Mark Danielewski”).
House of Leaves never allows us to forget this agenda, not only because of the 
experiments' stark contrast to the majority of contemporary literature, but also in the 
bringing in of the threat to nearly every page: every instance of “house” in blue should 
also make us think of online links, blue words that can whisk us away to just about 
anywhere. Hansen, justifiably more focussed on the filmic aspects of the text, is 
somewhat dismissive of the colouration: “Making pseudoserious reference to the blue 
highlighting of hyperlinks on Web pages, the blue ink of the word “house” in the work’s 
title transforms this keyword into something like a portal to information located 
elsewhere, both within and beyond the novel’s frame” (“Digital Topography” 598). But 
I think that, though he's playful with it, Danielewski is deadly serious about the 
The index allows you to suddenly start  asking questions about  books you normally 
wouldn’t think about in these terms. Wouldn’t it be nice to have an easy way to find out  
how many and’s (sic) appear in a Faulkner book or the King James? Or how many for’s 
(sic)  appear  in  a  Virginia  Woolf  novel?  Do  they  vary?  What  do  these  signs  of 
reoccurrence reveal? Maybe nothing at all, but it brings that question to mind. And to 
me any feature  of  a  book that  invites  readers  to  ask different  sorts  of  questions  is  
valuable (Danielewski, “Haunted House” 118-119).
 Danielewski's interest in his work being in some way pedagogical, or otherwise elucidating to the 
reader, is clear here.
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importance of this interpretation, particularly in light of, as Sonya Hagler notes, 
“[p]urple, the color of visited links, mak[ing an] appearance, in chapter twenty-one: 'I’m 
sorry, I have nothing left. Except this story, what I’m remembering now, too long from 
the surface of any dawn190'…Fittingly, this purple text deals with memory” (Hagler). 
Blue effects screens, and blue links on computer screens, are brought together in 
the frequent instances of “house” and the footnote core sample, further examples of 
external forces being called upon to mean, in conjunction with one another as well as 
with the material book itself, altering our perception of where the locus of meaning is 
properly found within the text, and thereby readying us for any future works which 
might deploy the same or similar codes. Ink is rejuvenated in the text as meaningful, 
acting as a material metaphor for the equipmental structures surrounding the novel. 
“Why do we deprive ourselves?” Danielewski seems to ask, “of any opportunity to 
layer meaning?” Every instance of “house” in blue is a sore thumb, sticking out to 
remind us that a book is more than evanescent content: these are words in thick, black 
ichor, hammered in place by a metal reflection or dragged into shape with lasers. But 
simultaneously that materiality points to the potentiality of phenomenologically 
intangible links and their implications for print; Danielewski drags the materials and 
means of production into the extended and extensive text. Again, it isn't simply a case of 
bringing the means of production into the text, though, as Hayles notes, “[l]iterature in 
the twenty-first century is computational…almost all print books are digital files before 
they become books...They should, then, properly be considered as electronic texts for 
which print is the output form” (Electronic Literature 43). Instead, knowing well the 
traces that would intentionally or unavoidable permeate his work, Danielewski brings 
the internet and the threat of digitisation into meaning, as indispensable to the text, and 
simultaneously mounts a defence of the codex as a form. I think that this defence is an 
act of pedagogy on Danielewski's part, an attempt to strengthen and broaden our eidos 
of what a codex is, not simply as a response to a perceived threat, but also as a response 
to the provocation and excitements of the new electronic forms. Digital is not bad in 
Danielewski's eyes, he's far from being one of Steven Jones' Neo-Luddites, but what is 
wrong is underestimating or restricting the codex. That this occurs is thrown into stark 
relief by the adoration of digitisation: “so what if there are hyperlinks? Books could 
already do this!”; “so what if texts call out to one another? That was already 
happening!” For Danielewski the codex already acted as a material metaphor for aspects 
190 (Danielewski, House 518).
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of linguistic turn philosophy, and through his work's relation to the new forms he hopes 
to keep it as such until it is truly, rather than fraudulently, exhausted. In this way it also 
reveals how the new equipment caused him, and his readers, to think through certain 
ideas; rather than sequestering thought, House of Leaves is an example of another way 
in which digitisation can enervate it.
Foer's ruptured pages
I'd like to conclude with a brief consideration of Jonathan Safran Foer's late 2010 novel 
Tree of Codes in relation to the theoretical concerns outlined above, and to situate it as 
continuing on from Danielewski's faith in the codex in the face of the rise of e-reading 
and the reinvigorated interest in materiality.
Tree of Codes started life as Bruno Schultz's The Street of Crocodiles. Foer 
printed off Schultz's novel (his favourite) and set about erasing letters and words and 
sentences to produce a new work, the sTREEt OF CrOcoDilES. The book we get to 
hold, however, is not simply the words Foer has hewn from the original; instead every 
copy is individually die-cut, the physical holes in the pages mirroring the now missing 
script from Schulz's novel. What we encounter is a straightforward paperback cover 
surrounding a collection of leaves that are more absence than presence, where we can 
see through to words 10 or 20 pages on from the space that we're “meant” to be reading. 
In this way, Foer deals with simultaneous thinking in his pages: Where Ponge and 
Graham's brackets vie for representations of simultaneity, Tree of Codes enacts it. A 
palimpsest forms, but not between Foer and Schulz; it becomes an oscillating, iterating 
palimpsest of itself. From the first page you can see elements of the text to come 
between the bars/barricades/supports of the cut-out page that you're currently on, and 
every page-turn will change that view. Words that you catch a glimpse of inflect, and are 
inflected by their surroundings over and over until suddenly you're upon text you've 
been reading in various ways for ten minutes, revealed now in its “true” context. 
Whether this saturates or empties them of meaning in the context of the story itself 
comes partly down to luck and the willingness of the reader, but the sheer 
performativity of the text, the making of a material metaphor for the way that words are 
just letters (which are just proxies for fragments of sounds), which depend and alter and 
turn on context, is an incredibly effective device, allowing the reader, any reader, to 
produce more meanings than they might expect from such a strange engagement. 
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Needless to say it's both beautiful and infuriating to interact with, impractical certainly, 
but I haven't seen anyone flick through it who hasn't experienced some frisson of 
excitement or wonder.
(“Tree of Codes, by Jonathan Safran Foer”).
Bloggers, before the book had even been released, were remarking on the form's 
relationship with the cut-ups of William Burroughs, the self-imposed constraints of the 
Oulipo group, and, most often, with Tom Phillips' A Humument191. Phillips' project is 
perhaps the most obvious comparison as he too started with another author's work and 
produced an artefact recognisable as a novel at the end of his process, painting and 
drawing over the lines of W.H. Mallock's A Human Document. But there's an important 
difference between Phillips' and Foer's creations. A Humument is an artist's book, a 
codex produced in a meticulous small run (in this case a single volume, though Phillips 
frequently creates replacement pages as updates). Though you can walk into most any 
large bookstore and buy a copy, or at least order it online, what you're getting is a 
facsimile in the same way that a postcard of the Mona Lisa is a facsimile; the postcard 
and the shop bought paperback are undoubtedly objects for consideration, but the aura192 
changes between the thing in the Louvre and the thing tacked to the wall of the study, 
191 See, for example, Owen Troy “Typografriday: Tree of Codes Part 1.”
192 “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time 
and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be…One might subsume the 
eliminated element[, that which disappears in the process of reproduction,] in the term ‘aura’ and go 
on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art” 
(Benjamin 1168-1169).
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between the copy Phillips can display and the homogenous reproductions found on sale. 
The same is not the case with Tree of Codes: every copy is the primary artwork, its 
meaning is richest in its incarnation as a mass(ish)-market paperback, not as the 
collection of Foer's scrawled-on printed sheets. The aura in this case is in the 
mechanical reproduction, not despite it. To return again to Genette, the transcendent text 
is located much more closely to the immanent reproductions than is the case with 
Phillips' project.
The kinaesthetic extension I want to focus on in the book comes in part from the 
increasing discussion of so-called “redacted” documents in our times. Boris Kachka, 
interviewing Foer for New York magazine, describes reading Tree of Codes as “a little 
like going through an FBI document full of blacked-out passages, except that the 
excised portions are now holes through which you get glimpses of subsequent text,” and 
this does seem important. A Humument never felt like a redaction, just a creative use, an 
ever adding, not removing of value. Maybe it's the way that Phillips' paint and ink, and 
the paper and the glue of his collages sometimes only partially obscures the text that's 
no longer supposed to be there, allowing the palimpsest to emerge, for the two to 
mingle, at least to some degree. In Foer's work, of course, this can never happen: 
Schulz's text is obliterated, and that pang of regret (that I have no doubt will be 
experienced as an eerie “is this...ok?” by some readers) that a book (the pristine copy of 
Aarseth's thought experiment) has been somehow destroyed to make this one becomes 
significant in a way it might not have in a time less sensitive to leaked dossiers, 
expenses scandals, or whistle-blowing sites' attempts at selective and protective 
censorship. Plain white pages with sections missing, things lost through effort, black ink 
replaced with space, oddly with depth, undoubtedly feels politically resonant today. The 
sanctity of intact books is surely tied to a belief in their wholeness as a form of truth; 
that pang of regret at a desecration becomes tied, in Tree of Codes' form, to our belief 
that redacted documents aren't an “interpretation” or a “version,” they're a species of lie.
The kinaesthetic extension comes from this appeal to wholeness: Foer's text calls 
out to the discussions of the fate of the book that we've seen throughout this work in 
order to produce a meaning which extends beyond the brutal and beautiful materiality of 
its production. It's a novel extension of textuality if only because of detailed die-cut's 
newness to mass-market presentation, but it's also no coincidence that this book appears 
at this time. The excitement of one blogger shows the effect that this form can have in 
this moment:
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[I]n an increasingly digitalized age where the printed word is said to be 
going the way of the Do-do (sic), Foer’s most recent innovation in the 
way  we  read  and  write  literature  is  a  veritable  wrench  in  the  mind-
numbing  machine  of  blind  progress  that  continues  to  degenerate  our 
society’s level of intelligence. Amen (“Tree of Codes by Jonathan Safran 
Foer.”).
E-reading isn't the particular subject of the work, but in its impetus in heightening the 
debate of digitisation's effects on the power and reception of the printed word it cannot 
help but be drawn into meaning. In interview Foer has been explicit on this front:
I started thinking about what books look like, what they will look like, 
how the form of the book is changing very quickly. If we don’t give it a 
lot  of thought,  it  won’t be for the better. There is an alternative to e-
books. And I just love the physicality of books. I love breaking the spine, 
smelling the pages, taking it into the bath...I thought: What if you pushed 
it to the extreme, and created something not old-fashioned or nostalgic 
but just  beautiful? It  helps you remember that life can surprise you...I 
love the notion that “this is a book that remembers it has a body.” When a 
book remembers, we remember. It reminds you that you have a body. So 
many of the things we may think of as burdensome are actually the things 
that make us more human (“Jonathan Safran Foer Talks...”).
In the light of our discussion, Foer's words are doubly meaningful: Tree of Codes (in 
fact any codex) remembers, remembers you have a body, knows, understands. Foer all 
but states the conclusions of the second chapter in this quotation: codices have 
something to teach e-readers as they know us better. This is why they continue to be 
deployed as skeuomorphic material metaphors. What Foer and Danielewski, what 
Hayles, Barthes, McGann, and Kirschenbaum entreat us to do, however, is to genuinely 
listen to both sides, to understand as best we can, to not rely on slavish metaphors and 
neutered applications, but to really consider what each form might best afford.
What Tree of Codes comes to mean, in the time in which it lives, depends on a 
conversation which surrounds it, and to a reader in 50 years who doesn't realise the 
weight Foer intended for its body to refer to, and who has seen all the various iterations 
of books that will come to pass, Tree of Codes will mean less and less until some critic 
points out what was occurring at this moment where some authors were forced to 
become interested in remaking print as sacred, as it seemed to them to always have 
been. For Foer, this sacredness is written into a burdensome body, not a memento mori, 
but a book which cannot be skim read because Foer's done the skimming, cannot be 
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digitised because what would be the point, and cannot be ignored because, well, look at 
it.
A Humument was released in a critically acclaimed iPad edition at the end of last 
year, on the 15th of November, the same day that Tree of Codes was published.
Before moving to my conclusions I would like to complete my statement on 
kinaesthetic extensions.
There must always be a first kinaesthetic extension for any reader. McGann has 
to tell you how the paper means; Barthes has to show you that the reader makes 
meaning; Kirschenbaum must offer pictures of suddenly tangible digital information; or 
you can work a new facet out for yourself, but no aspect comes to us theorised, 
preformed, and complete, any more than we start learning to read already knowing how 
letters make words. Cummings' play with the typewriter was novelly extending in a way 
that his expressive play with capitals and punctuation was not: a great many artists and 
readers knew that letters and interruptions could be made to mean, but no one had 
played with the typewriter quite as Cummings did. And if we were to find some writer 
that had then it would not change the point, they would just be the originators of the 
extension - this is the critic's argument, not the theorist's. Any device or practice, 
however, is extensive for someone who encounters it for the first time. If someone 
repeats a project then it might be extensive to any unfamiliar reader, but to the reader 
who knows the first experiments it becomes something else, maybe just another 
experiment, maybe something derivative. If we want to argue that a text is definitively 
extensive then we must prove that it is the first to call a new way of meaning into being, 
or the first in a long time, or the first in a culture, or the first in a particular form, 
essentially something unexpected, surprising. But none of this precludes a shamelessly 
derivative work from acting as a kinaesthetic extension to the naïve reader.
I would like to repeat myself a final time for the sake of clarity. Two things are 
extended by a textual kinaesthetic extension: i) the particular text's capacity to mean, 
and ii) the previously naïve reader's/s' understanding of what might constitute the active 
range of a form. My hope is that the term works as a provocation to thinking about what 
we intuitively attend to when we read a text, and how this gestalt of elements can be 
manipulated and expanded by writers and critics, that indeed it must be the case because 
of the nuanced conception of text that we've already inherited.
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Conclusion
As we work toward critical practices and theories appropriate for electronic literature, 
we may come to renewed appreciation for the specificity of print. In the tangled web of 
medial ecology, change anywhere in the system stimulates change everywhere in the 
system. Books are not going the way of the dinosaur but the way of the human, 
changing as we change, mutating and evolving
- Katherine Hayles, Writing Machines 33
Throughout this work I've tried, in essence, to argue one thing: that the discourses 
surrounding technology, and e-reading as a specific example, are at once revealing of 
the complexity of the terms and yet remain incommensurate to the task of expressing 
them. Understanding technology, much less e-reading, requires a blend of cognitive 
tools that are not in general use, and I've tried to show that in order to begin to 
understand the issues involved we need an interdisciplinary approach which draws from 
disciplines sensitive to embodiment, cognition, and, in the special case of e-reading, 
textuality. As such I've brought together work from Philosophy and Cognitive and 
Neuropsychology as well as from my native English Studies, and explored fields which 
traditionally sit across broad disciplinary boundaries such as Cognitive and 
Neuroscience, Embodied Cognition, and the Digital Humanities. But alongside these 
academic disciplines I've also tried to emphasise the importance of folk 
phenomenological reports, the living and growing database of people using the objects 
under discussion who are expressing themselves with increasing voracity, erudition, and 
awareness of the issues at stake.
The first chapter considered the idea that technology could be somehow 
“unnatural,” coming between us and the world, and what this might mean for the 
resistance to technology as a class of object, and to e-reading more specifically. I argued 
that even if we take “technology” to simply be the equipment that we use to extend our 
abilities then, no matter how complex the interaction, this is neither a modern activity 
nor an “unnatural” one, indeed extensive artefacts are at the heart of what it means to be 
human. But there is use to this word, and to the resistance directed at certain objects and 
practices, so it should be reclaimed and put to work with increased precision to account 
for the diversity of ways in which we interact with things. I offered a definition of 
technology that is sensitive to embodiment, to the intimacy of interactions with objects 
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that humans can achieve, and to the capacity for equipment to alter the way we act in 
the world. By making technology a class of interaction with equipment that is agnostic 
to materiality I hope that the definition can account for the most dynamic of the fusings 
with ways of thinking and ways of acting that we are capable of. To describe the things 
we use, but which don't possess these capacities, or that we otherwise use poorly or 
inexpertly, I suggested the term “device,” and this term may well be of use for those 
who hope to resist something, those who would say “this new thing can never be more 
than a device, but we have a technology right here.” In this chapter, however, e-reading 
equipment was shown to be no more or less natural than the codices which proceeded it, 
but it was accepted that many users may not, as yet, experience a technological 
interaction when using them to read.
The second chapter looked at the claim that “e-reading doesn't feel right.” The 
chapter approached this notion first by considering the “feel” of e-reading, providing 
and considering reports of the phenomenological experience of the equipment in use. It 
then went on to look at the role of the body in thought, particularly the hands, and how 
this might be disrupted by the new artefacts as opposed to the established practices of 
the codex. The second approach to the idea of e-readers not feeling right was to consider 
how we encounter objects in the world and get used to them; the process of 
“technologising” identified in the first chapter is a special case of getting used to an 
object, of coming to act with it successfully. This idea was further subdivided into two 
sections: firstly I argued that artefacts emerge out of an evolutionary process and as 
such can be considered, under the rubric of Plotkin's conception of a branch of 
evolutionary epistemology, to possess knowledge of their environment, their users. 
Secondly I considered the phenomenological experience of “getting used” to something, 
of revealing aspects of an object and engaging with it increasingly successfully. In this 
way we meet our artefacts in the middle, trying to understand them as they get to know 
us, and this promotes and accelerates the activity of “getting used” and repeatable 
successful interaction. This answered a hangover from the first chapter: many people do 
not experience e-readers as technologies, but the second chapter argued that they can 
and outlined the mechanism by which this, if it happens, will occur.
The third chapter considered the commonly heard notion that our new digital 
reading equipment impedes intelligence (in some poorly defined way). Again, it was 
emphasised that folk phenomenological reports shouldn't be ignored, but at the same 
point their motivations can be culturally prejudiced and swayed by vocal commentators 
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who don't always have adequate supporting evidence for their claims beyond their own 
suspicions. To take the claim seriously, that somehow the equipment itself, rather than 
any content displayed might perniciously affect thought, the third chapter looked first at 
how objects might affect cognition more generally by promoting certain ways of 
thinking, particularly via metaphor. We returned to the language of the first chapter to 
see whether the internet, hyperlinks, codices, or e-readers, functioning as objects-to-
think-with or material metaphors, acted “naturally,” i.e. were suited to our nature, as the 
folk reports seemed to suggest that an artefact's functioning closer to our natural mode 
of cognising was less likely to impede intelligence. In light of this I suggested that it 
may well be the digital equipment which are most closely allied to our natures and also 
promote novel and challenging ways of looking at our culture and cultural production. 
The chapter finished with a reading of several texts which used the artefacts of their day 
to create new works which produced their meaning whilst spread out onto those 
apparatuses.
For Danielewski and Foer the new digital equipment, in its perceived threat and 
in its enabling potential, is not only a site for meaning, but also a demonstration that 
these authors haven't been shut down by their engagement with the digital, but instead 
have been invigorated by it, as their readers will be and have been in turn; they keep the 
codex special. In Paper Machine, Derrida considered “the book to come”:
In this discussion we will surely have to come back to…religiosity, to 
this quasi sacrality, more precisely to this quasi resacralization that, with 
all  the  political  issues  it  involves,  has  marked  the  entire  history  of 
technologies of inscription and archiving, the entire history of supports 
and printing methods - as if each stage, in a technological transformation, 
seemed  the  one  to  desacralize,  democratize,  secularize,  defetishize, 
throughout an interminable history of Enlightenment or Reason…but as 
though each stage, all the same, was also inescapably accompanied by a 
sacred or religious reinvestment. For it is obvious, for instance, that if our 
generation is suffering from seeing the book yield ground in the face of 
other supports, other modes of reading and writing, this is partly because, 
inevitably,  it  has  resacralized  everything connected  with the  book (its 
time, its space, its rhythm, starting from the ways it is handled, the ways 
it is legitimated, even the body, the eyes, and the hands bent around it…) 
(12).
This “resacralisation” is part of the projects, and a site of meaning for both House of 
Leaves and Tree of Codes: Danielewski and Foer's books emphasise these resacralised 
attributes in the wake of the reimagining of the book, they focus on time and space 
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(seen in Danielewski's requirement of our jumping around, through footnotes and 
appendices, a space which mimics in some way the house it describes, and Foer's 
disruption of the orderly codex implication of the onward drive of time, giving us a 
sense of a sometimes thwarted simultaneity), and the body, the eyes and the hands that 
hold the work. But neither Danielewski nor Foer are neo-Luddites (Danielewski in 
particular deploys both Twitter and internet forums, the latter becoming an integral part 
of his writing after House of Leaves as his next novel, Only Revolutions, revolved 
around his fans' most memorable historical events of the last 150 years, reports he 
solicited online), and neither book, not House of Leaves nor Tree of Codes, could have 
been produced without computers and computer run printing and cutting machines. 
They might both have at their heart a fear of the codex being neglected in the face of the 
digital, but neither advocate a discarding of electronics, a breaking of the binary frames. 
There is space, they seem to say. By highlighting the power of codices they serve to 
highlight the specificity of these objects' position in a vibrant and competitive medial 
ecology; the space they occupy leaves much room for digital objects to sit alongside 
them as they mark what each can do best.
Bolter saw “electronic technology” as able to recreate the book in two ways, first 
by giving us new kinds of books which would also alter “the rhythms with which we 
read,” but secondly by adding “to our historical understanding of the book by providing 
us with a new form that we can compare to printed books, manuscripts, and earlier 
forms of writing…The coming of the new electronic book helps us to understand the 
choices, the specializations, that the printed book entails” (Wrtiting Space 3-4). This, 
again, is at work in Danielewski and Foer's resacralisations: computers gave them new 
kinds of books, books which couldn't be made without them, books made in response to 
them, and which certainly alter the rhythms with which we tend to read, but they also 
force readers to deal with the specificity of print presented in two wedged piles, one 
giving to the other as the whole assemblage tries to mean in tandem with a reader and a 
world. I wonder if those who see threats in “the screen” and its new reading practices 
also see the same threats in such work which plays with the traditional form, short a 
history as it is, of the mass printed book? As Nancy Kaplan puts it, “ongoing debates 
about reading practices help reveal the epistemologies, ideologies, and power relations 
driving the conservative (and sometimes openly hostile) response of the academy to 
challenges mounted by alternative reading modalities” (“Literacy Beyond Books” 21). 
Certainly questions of whether reading on screen is an impediment to learning should be 
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asked, but however it is framed this question emerges from the belief that our prior 
reading habits might have been optimal, whereas more likely they have always been 
personal and tuned to the times. Reading used to be undertaken aloud and standing up, 
giving the act the weight it appeared to deserve. Books used to be read deeply, often, 
and thoroughly; now the best researchers, even textual scholars, must read a variety of 
materials, sacrificing the depth of the older modes lest they be left behind by current 
(and prior) debate. The landscape has grown and altered, books of all kinds have a new 
position in their environment, and reading practices have changed to meet them, always 
remaining suitable as the readers who deploy them aim for success. This is not to 
suggest that we shouldn’t question a loss of depth in reading, but we should do so by 
addressing the times, not, or not solely the ever-tuning practices. Pedagogy should 
emphasise the importance and uniqueness of sustained arguments, of spending time 
with a single author and resisting the predominance of multiple surfaces. But we should 
also appreciate the newly tuned reading practices that digitisation allows for and may 
make manifest; scanning and diverse reading is a part of this, following trails of links, 
getting lost, layering thoughts on thoughts mimicked by windows in windows and tabs 
on tabs. We should learn how to teach it, not, or not only, to resist it.
[Y]oung brains painlessly absorb the world their parents created, and that 
world takes on a glow of timelessness and eternity, even if it was created 
only the day before you were born...[M]y grandchildren will not have the 
fragmented, distracted, alienated digital experience that I do. To them, the  
Internet  will  feel  as  fundamental,  as  rooted,  as  timeless  as  a  battered 
Penguin  paperback,  that  apex  of  the  literate  civilization  of  the  last 
century, feels to me (Gopnik 272 & 274).
Gopnik reminds us of something here: that the codex of the popular imagination is our 
myth, not that of the readers entering, or about to enter the world. Our ability to adjust 
to things as a species, as active interactors with objects, promises, I have suggested, that 
not only will the next generation get used to digital equipment, they will also make 
them technologies, they will adapt them, and adapt to them. In the absence of evidence, 
and there is an absence, of the effects of reading on screen on the developing mind we 
must turn to what we have: the past, the reports, and our instincts. The past, I have 
argued, implies adaptation: we adjust, our variety of tools can be brought on board and 
used into invisibility, this is at the heart of our nature and our interaction with things in 
the world. The reports, however, are also conclusive: despite some very strong cases for 
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democracy, accessibility of information, theoretical thinking through, and better 
matching of thought patterns, the overwhelming voice heard in popular discourse, and 
through much of the academy, is a tacit or vocal resistance; these things don't feel right, 
they're not natural, they'll make us all stupid. These reports are the collection of other 
people's instincts and as such they shouldn't be neglected. But neither should our own 
feelings, though they may not be heard as loudly. This work has been my attempt at an 
informed report, and with e-readers, with any useful equipment, my instinct has become 
that if trusted and given time new users can make things technological and beautiful, 
make them feel right, feel special, a part of their nature, and an aid to their thought.
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